

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
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**MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF ĀRYADEVA,
DHARMAPĀLA AND CANDRAKĪRTI**

THE CATUḤŚATAKA OF ĀRYADEVA, CHAPTERS XII AND XIII, WITH THE
COMMENTARIES OF DHARMAPĀLA AND CANDRAKĪRTI: INTRODUCTION,
TRANSLATION, SANSKRIT, TIBETAN AND CHINESE TEXTS, NOTES

BY

TOM J. F. TILLEMANS

VOLUME I



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN
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ERNST STEINKELLNER

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For Shelley, Leah and Sylviane

PREFACE

The following work takes as its nucleus a series of seminars given by Prof. J. May during which, over a number of summer semesters, we read the Sanskrit texts of Āryadeva's *Catuhṣataka* (CS) and Candrakīrti's *Catuhṣatakavṛtti* (CSV). Subsequently, in Japan, while working mainly on Dharmakīrti with Prof. S. Katsura, I began to read the Chinese commentary of Dharmapāla, and was impressed with the importance and philosophical interest of the latter text, not only for understanding Āryadeva in a different manner, but also for its connections with the Epistemological school founded by Dignāga.

Below the reader will find translations of two chapters from Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and Dharmapāla, chapters which are diverse in style and content, CS XII and its commentaries being largely rhetorical — a polemic against the infidels — while the subsequent chapter on perception and its commentaries are full of dense philosophical argumentation. My approach has been, in effect, to show a representative sample of Candrakīrti and Dharmapāla's interpretations of Āryadeva. Nonetheless, two chapters are hardly exhaustive: we should mention that the eighth chapter of Dharmapāla's commentary, which is of considerable philosophical and historical interest, remains to be translated.

The translations are preceded by a three chapter introduction. The first seeks to present the usual introductory matters, such as material on previous research, lives, dates and works of the authors, as well as a few methodological points. The subsequent two chapters are loosely based on topics in the commentaries to CS XII and XIII respectively, but instead of summarizing the details of Āryadeva and his commentators' numerous arguments, I have preferred to treat of the dominant themes in CS XII and XIII by placing them in a larger context of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka philosophies. Nonetheless, the structure of the arguments themselves should be comprehensible from the subheadings which I have added to the translations and from the presentation of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen's topical outlines (*sa bcad*) which I have appended to the introduction (i.e. Appendices III and IV).

A few brief words are in order on the transcriptions of Tibetan and Chinese words and on some other conventions which I have adopted. Tibetan transcription is in the system recommended by the American Library Association and the "Verein Deutscher Bibliothekare", that is, with the *n* + superdot (ñ), *n* + tilde (ñ), *z* + *accent aigu* (ž) and *s* + *accent aigu* (š) instead of the *ng*, *ny*, *zh*, *sh* which one would use in the system of T. Wylie. (See e.g. Steinkellner and Tauscher 1983 p. ix or Mimaki 1976 p. 185 for the details.) Chinese is transcribed in *Pinyin*, with the first tone (flat) being indicated by macrons (i.e. ā, ē, ī, etc.), second tone (rising) by an *accent aigu* (i.e. á, é, í, etc.), the third tone (falling-rising) by a superscribed "ˇ" (i.e. ǎ, ě, ǐ, ǒ, ǔ) and fourth tone (falling) by means of an *accent grave* (i.e. à, è, ì, etc.). I have repunctuated the *Taishō*'s Chinese text by placing a small circle (i.e. °) *beside* the character which I take as ending the Chinese sentence. The *Taishō*'s own rather misleading punctuation,

consisting in points *after* the characters, can safely be ignored. Footnotes are used in the introductory chapters, while endnotes figure in the translations. The former are indicated simply by superscribed numbers, whereas the latter are indicated in the text by numbers in parentheses, the actual endnotes themselves being found in the section "Notes to the Translations". In cross-references and in the indexes "footnote" is abbreviated by "fn." and "endnote" by "en." Finally, it may be remarked that many Sanskrit words, such as "dharma", "karma" and "nirvāṇa", have been left unitalicized: this is because they are now bona fide English words. Nonetheless, in many cases, such as "skandha", "śraddhā", "dharmakāya", etc., where the reader might very well have difficulties, I have still followed a more conservative approach, i.e. putting the term in italics and providing a translation. For a partial list of these surprising new English words included in *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* see Jackson (1982).

Numerous are those who have in one way or another assisted me in accomplishing this work: amongst them let me single out a few names for special mention. First and foremost is Jacques May, who was the director of my thesis and who has shown me great personal kindness and careful guidance over the years that I have been in Switzerland. My gratitude also goes to the other members of the jury, i.e. J.F. Billeter, J. Bronkhorst and D.S. Ruegg, as well as to Shōryū Katsura, and (last but not least) to Ernst Steinkellner, for his encouragement and willingness to publish this work. Karen Lang, who has made and is making important contributions on the *Catuhśataka*, has kindly provided Prof. May and me with copies of her publications. Her work has been of constant use to me, and has been consulted at every stage in working on the CS and CSV. As in the case of Richard Hayes' recent book on Dignāga, which is also a valuable contribution, my occasional disagreements should not at all be misinterpreted: they are, hopefully, constructive disagreements and are intended as such.

Tony Duff, of *Help! Computer Consulting* in Boulder, Colorado, has the incalculable merit of satisfactorily solving the problem of printing Sanskrit, Tibetan and Pinyin diacritical marks. Georges Dreyfus, with whom I've had a running dialogue on common philosophical concerns for approximately ten years, has had an important influence on the development of my ideas: no doubt many of our discussions have in one way or another found their course into the positions which I've adopted in this book. Finally, my sincere thanks to my parents, and especially to my wife, Shelley, whose support, comments and patience were indispensable to my being able to accomplish this work.

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Tom J.F. Tillemans
March, 1990.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AK	Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu.
AKBh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu.
B	V. Bhattacharya.
BHSD	The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary of F. Edgerton.
chapt	chapter
CS	Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva.
CSV	Catuḥśatakavṛtti (or ṭīkā) of Candrakīrti.
D	sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
ed	edited; editor.
en	endnote. See "Notes to the Translations".
EA	Etudes Asiatiques.
fn	footnote.
H	Part Two (Chinese-Sanskrit) of A. Hirakawa's Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.
HPS	Haraprasād Shāstrī.
IBK	Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).
JBORS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.
JIABS	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy.
k	kārikā(s).
Kaḥ thog	The dBu ma bzi brgya pa'i rnam par bśad pa rgya mtsho'i zeg ma of Kaḥ thog mkhan po Nag dbaṅ dpal bzaṅ.
KSP	Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa of Vasubandhu. See Lamotte (1936).
Kyik	Kokuyaku Issaikyō, Chūgan-bu 3. See N. Endō (1932).
LVP	Louis de la Vallée Poussin.
M. av.	Madhyamakāvatāra of Candrakīrti.
MAV	Madhyāntavibhāga of Maitreya.
MCB	Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques.
MMK	Mūlamadhyamakakārikās of Nāgārjuna.
MMV	Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti of Buddhapālita.
Mvyut	Mahāvvyutpatti.
n	note.
Nak	H. Nakamura's Bukkyō-go dai jiten.
NB	Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti.
NM	Nyāyamukha of Dignāga.
NP	Nyāyapraveśa of Śaṅkarasvāmin.
NS	Nyāyasūtras of Gautama.
P	Peking Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
PES	Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, Sarnath U.P.
PP	Prajñāpradīpa of Bhāvaviveka.

Pr	Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti.
PS	Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga.
PSP	Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa of Candrakīrti, ed. Lindtner.
PST	Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā of Jinendrabuddhi.
PSV	Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga. PSVa = transl. by Vasudhararakṣita and Señ rgyal; PSVb = transl. by Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab.
PV	Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti.
PVBh	Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta.
PVin	Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti.
PVSV	Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti of Dharmakīrti.
PVSV-ṭīkā	Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā of Kaṇakagomin.
PVV	Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Manorathanandin.
Red mda' ba	The dBu ma bži brgya pa'i 'grel pa of Red mda' ba gZon nu blo gros.
rGyal	The bZi brgya pa'i nram bsad of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen.
Siddhi	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Transl. Louis de la Vallée Poussin.
SK	Sāṃkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.
Skt	Sanskrit.
SV	Ślokaavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, The Tripiṭaka in Chinese.
Taishō	= T.
Thesis	The Ph.D thesis of K. Lang, i.e. Lang (1983).
Tib	Tibetan.
Traité	La Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse. Transl. E. Lamotte.
transl.	translated; translation.
TS	Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita.
TSP	Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla.
VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda.
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens.
WZKSO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.
Zidian	Xin biān zàng wén zì diǎn = Dag yig gсар bsgrigs of Blo mthun bsam gtan et al.

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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

A. Past research on the *Catuḥśataka* and its commentaries; the scope of our project.

The *Catuḥśataka* (CS), the major work in sixteen chapters of the Madhyamaka author, Āryadeva, has remained less accessible and less well understood by contemporary scholars than the major work of the founder of the Madhyamaka school, Nāgārjuna. The situation is partly explained by the fact that, apart from a few fragments in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, the CS is only conserved in Sanskrit in the incomplete eleventh century manuscript discovered by Haraprasād Shāstrī (HPS)¹, but another no doubt non-negligible factor is the difficult argumentation to be found in Āryadeva, argumentation which is frequently directed against fairly obscure non-Buddhist opponents and which demands recourse to commentarial exegeses if we are to have any hope to follow its sinuous development. There is thus an obvious necessity to translate and edit the commentaries to CS.

Recent work on the *Catuḥśataka*, such as that of K. Lang and J. May, has almost exclusively interpreted the CS in the light of Candrakīrti's commentary, the *Catuḥśatakavṛtti* (CSV), alternatively known as the *Catuḥśatakaṭīkā*, the only exception being Giuseppe Tucci's (1925) Italian translation of the Chinese version of CS in which he incorporated a few excerpts from Dharmapāla's commentary. Now, contemporary Western and Japanese scholars are not alone in viewing CS via Candrakīrti, i.e. from the perspective of the so-called Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika school. Traditional Tibetan scholars, apart from their few isolated references to Dharmapāla's general position which they might have, in part, gleaned from accounts of the famous Dharmapāla-Bhāvaviveka debate², generally take Candrakīrti's perspective too. A cautionary result

¹ Haraprasād Shāstrī (1914) p. 449: "The following fragments of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśatikā* [sic] with their commentary by Candra Kīrti are published from 23 old palm leaves written on in Newari character[s] of the 11th century." About one third of CS and the commentary by Candrakīrti is conserved in Sanskrit. Haraprasād Shāstrī (1911) is a preliminary study of the manuscript which he discovered.

² Some remarks on the Tibetan perception of Dharmapāla. rGyal tshab rje (chapter I, p. 4), after paraphrasing a few lines of Candrakīrti, makes the following accurate comment which is not found in Candrakīrti: *sñiñ po'i don yañ kun brtags ran gi mshan ñid kyis grub pa 'gog pa mam par rig pa tsam gyi* tshul du 'grel par*

which emerges from our integral translation of both Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti's commentaries to the twelfth and thirteenth chapters of CS is that, paradoxically, Āryadeva's thought is even less well understood than we, or the Tibetans, might feel it is. Dharmapāla's commentary, which approaches the text from the standpoint of the Idealist school, or Vijñānavāda, and which very often explains Āryadeva's verses as directed against very specific non-Buddhist schools, provides an interpretation of the CS which is coherent and thorough, but one which nonetheless radically differs from that of Candrakīrti, who was frequently more inclined to take Āryadeva as simply giving more general Madhyamaka-style arguments directed against no school in particular.

Now, the first major task which lies before us in researching the thought of Āryadeva and his commentators is the problem of a readable text. As the Sanskrit of CS and CSV is incomplete, we need to have recourse to the Tibetan and Chinese: fortunately, the CS was translated in its entirety into Tibetan by Sūkṣmajana and Pa tshab Ņi ma grags and into Chinese — the second half only — by Xuán zàng 玄奘. In the case of Dharmapāla's commentary, i.e. the so-called "Commentary on the Extensive Hundred Treatise" (*guāng bǎi lùn shì lùn* 廣百論釋論), which is in fact on the last eight chapters of CS, we have only the Chinese of Xuán zàng: nothing remains in Sanskrit and the work was never translated into Tibetan.

mdzad do /. "He [i.e. Dharmapāla] explained the essential point from the point of view of Vijñaptimātra, refuting that thoroughly imagined phenomena (*kun brtags* = *parikalpita*) were established by their own natures."

* rGyal reads *gyis*. On the Bhāvaviveka-Dharmapāla debate see Chapter III, section B. Note that other Tibetans, such as gSer mdog pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507) and 'Jam mgon koñ sprul Blo gros mtha' yas (1813-1899), were also, at least to some degree, familiar with Dharmapāla's thought. They included him in the "other-voidness" (*gzan ston*) lineage with Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and characterized him as explaining Madhyamaka from the Vijñaptimātra point of view. Curiously enough, following this depiction, Dharmapāla ends up in the same camp as Tāranātha and the Jo nañ pas. See van der Kuip (1983), p. 42 and n. 146 for references. As van der Kuip n. 146 points out, Dharmapāla was sometimes represented as having written a commentary on Nāgārjuna's MMK. See Ruegg (1973) pp. 2-4, n. 2-3 on pp. 3-4 for the Jo nañ pa doctrine and p. 7, n. 1 for the question of its (obscure) Indian antecedents. One oddity in placing Dharmapāla (and many other Vijñānavādins) in the camp of the *g'zan ston* pas is that he seems to assign real and ultimate existence to *paratantrasvabhāva* ("dependent natures") (see fn. 116, 119, 126), whereas *g'zan ston* pas usually take *paratantra* and *parikalpitasvabhāva* ("thoroughly imagined natures") as being only conventionally existent. See below pp. 45-50 for the three natures (*trisvabhāva*). See 'Jam mgon koñ sprul's *Śes bya kun khyab* Vol. 3 p. 38: *kun brtags gzan dbaṅ kun rdzob don dam ni / yonīs grub rañ rig ye śes gzan ston lugs* /. "The Other-voidness tradition is that thoroughly imagined phenomena (*kun brtags* = *parikalpita*), dependent phenomena (*gzan dbaṅ* = *paratantra*) are conventional; the ultimate is what is thoroughly established (*yonīs grub* = *pariṇiṣpanna*), viz. the wisdom consisting in self-awareness (*rañ rig* = *svaṃvedana*)." See also *ibid.* p. 39 for the interpretation of the Jo nañ pa, Dol po pa Śes rab rgyal mtshan (1292-1361), on the question of the three natures — *paratantra* is just conventional. See Ruegg (1977) n. 126 on an Indian Vijñānavādin source — i.e. the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* — which held that *paratantra* was not ultimately real.

Finally, note that Candrakīrti in CSV I, P. 34a7 refers to the commentary on the *Catuhśataka* by the "contemporary poet, Bhadanta Dharmapāla" (*da lia'i sñan dñags mkhan bstun pa chos skyori*); Tāranātha's *rGya gar chos 'byuri*, probably following Candrakīrti's lead, praises Dharmapāla's poetic skills at greater length; see ed. Schiefner (1868) pp. 123-124, transl. Schiefner (1869) p. 160.

In 1923 Vaidya presented the available Sanskrit of the *kārikās* and attempted the dubious project of "reconstructing" the Sanskrit of the others from the Tibetan; on this basis he attempted a French translation. Bhattacharya (1931) presented the available Sanskrit of the *kārikās* to the last eight chapters of CS along with that of CSV to these chapters and sought to reconstruct the missing Sanskrit in CS and CSV from the Tibetan version. (The latter work was not translated into Chinese.)

While Bhattacharya's work no doubt represented a significant advance, it was marred by two principal flaws: (a) his reconstructions, like virtually all reconstructions into Sanskrit of long passages from Tibetan, are untrustworthy. (b) Bhattacharya's Tibetan text was based only on the edition of sNar than, which indeed he frequently misread.

In short, the enterprise of reconstructing CS and CSV's Sanskrit from the Tibetan is probably only of value when it is a question of a few words here and there which are missing in Shāstrī's manuscript; to understand the large passages which are missing in Sanskrit, it is certainly of use to find equivalences and to imagine possible structures in Sanskrit, but basically we must read the text as a Tibetan text. Another factor which serves to complicate the picture is that Haraprasād Shāstrī's manuscript of CS and especially of CSV, even disregarding the extensive lacunae, is not the same text as what we find in Tibetan. Not only does the Tibetan text contain numerous sūtra quotations left out in HPS's manuscript, but, what is more, in the parts where it does seem to correspond approximately to HPS, it often has words or phrases which do not figure in the latter text at all: there seems little doubt that the Sanskrit original which Pa tshab Ņi ma grags (1055/1054 -?)³ used was significantly different from the version we have in HPS. Bhattacharya, when faced with this problem, took what seems to me the least satisfactory solution: he systematically amended HPS's text, adding words here and there and unnecessarily changing the Sanskrit so that (with the exception of missing sūtra quotations) it would correspond to the Tibetan. My proposal will be to translate on the basis of HPS's text without trying to blur its difference from the text which Pa tshab Ņi ma grags must have used. As a guiding rule I have adopted a "maxim of minimum change", only modifying HPS's text when it seemed clearly erroneous, corrupt, badly edited or badly punctuated: if HPS is comprehensible as it stands, I have not attempted to change it simply in order to make it conform to the Tibetan.

Lang (Thesis) and (1986), besides presenting HPS's Sanskrit of the *kārikās* and a readable translation, also edited the Tibetan of CS, comparing the Peking, sDe dge, Co ne and sNar than editions of the *kārikās*, thus yielding a satisfactory Tibetan text of CS. In her doctoral thesis, she summarized Candrakīrti's commentary, but did not edit it nor translate it; her 1986 translation and edition is only of the *kārikās* in CS.⁴ It is worthwhile remarking that in fact there are two Tibetan versions of the *kārikās* of

³ The date is that of Vostrikov (1970) p. 149 and Tucci (1980) p. 99. For some arguments against this date, see van der Kuip (1985) p. 4, who situates him somewhat later.

⁴ In addition she has prepared a summary of CS and CSV which will appear in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. on Mahāyāna Buddhism, ed. K. Potter, Motilal Banarsidass.

CS, one being only the *kārikās* and the other incorporating the *kārikās* into CSV: the two often differ significantly in their readings. Lang (1986), dealing only with CS, compared the editions of the former text; I give priority, whenever reasonably possible, to the latter, as the present study is concerned primarily with CS as seen via its commentaries. The variants from the simple *kārikā*-texts in the four editions of the canon are given in the notes.

As for work on the CSV, J. May in a series of articles, viz. (1980), (1981a), (1981b), (1982) and (1984), translated the ninth chapter of CSV into French, also editing the Tibetan whenever the Sanskrit was unavailable. Japanese translations of CSV IX and XI were respectively published by S. Yamaguchi 山口 益 (1964) and by I. Ogawa 小川 一乗 (1977). K. Lang, in her unpublished (1976) M.A. thesis, edited and translated the fourteenth chapter. We should also mention an edition of the fifth chapter by E. Sasaki 佐々木 恵精 (1978).

The Chinese version of CS and the commentary of Dharmapāla occupy two entries in the Taishō, viz. T. 1570 and 1571 respectively, but the text in T. 1570 simply consists of the *kārikās* extracted from Dharmapāla's commentary and exhibits no differences from the *kārikās* in the latter. Dharmapāla's commentary has as yet received little attention, much less than it merits. N. Endō 遠藤 二平 (1932) published a literal Japanese translation in the *Kokuyaku Issaikyō*, a translation which I have systematically consulted, but which in its literalness is of limited utility in shedding light on the meaning of the Chinese terms. (The Japanese translator's understanding of the syntax is also in many cases misleading.⁵) The Japanese translator does, however, provide a number of corrections or choices of variants for the Taishō text which I have taken into account and which are often helpful.⁶ Apart from some excerpts in Tucci (1925) and Louis de la Vallée Poussin's (1932) translation of CS k. 220-221 along with Dharmapāla's commentary, nothing has been translated into European languages.

One final point needs to be mentioned in this connection. Just as the Sanskrit original which Pa tshab Ņi ma grags had in front of him probably differed significantly from the Sanskrit in HPS, so it seems that the Sanskrit text on which Xuán zàng based his Chinese translation may very well have been quite different too. At any rate, be it due to differences in the Sanskrit original or due to Xuán zàng's way of translation, the result is that the Chinese of CS does exhibit important divergences and has to be treated separately from the Sanskrit and Tibetan. To avoid confusion between different texts and different commentarial perspectives, I have, therefore, given priority to Dharmapāla's interpretation in translating the Chinese of CS and have generally

⁵ I generally do not indicate my numerous divergences from the Japanese translator's interpretations.

⁶ In his foreword (Kyik. p. 145) the Japanese translator mentions six commentaries on CS listed in catalogues; unfortunately only one *juàn* of one of the commentaries seems to be extant. Amongst the names of the commentators we find the Korean, Yuán cè 圓測 (Wǒn ch'uk), of the Xī míng 四明 temple in Chang An who belonged (temporarily) to Xuán zàng's school and wrote an important commentary on the *Samādhinirmocanāsūtra* which is conserved in the *Zokuzōkyō* Vol. 34 and was translated into Tibetan. See Hirabayashi and Iida (1977), and their n. 22 for references to S. Inaba's restitution of some missing parts of the commentary plus references to G. Nagao's review of Inaba.

adopted Candrakīrti's perspective in translating the Tibetan and HPS' Sanskrit of Āryadeva's text.

B. Lives and Works of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti

According to the commentator Candrakīrti's account⁷, Āryadeva seems to have been born on the island of *Siṃhala* as a prince and to have subsequently become a monk in South India under the great Madhyamaka master, Nāgārjuna. Other perhaps less credible biographies maintain that he was a South Indian Brahmin who studied with Nāgārjuna, particularly skilled in defeating non-Buddhist opponents, indeed so much so that he finished his life murdered by a vengeful student of one of these teachers.⁸

The question as to whether *Siṃhaladvīpa* is to be identified with Ceylon is subject to some controversy⁹; if, however, we accept this identification, as seems reasonable, then it may very well be that Āryadeva is the Deva referred to in Sinhalese chronicles.¹⁰ From this some scholars, such as Lamotte, have concluded that Āryadeva was associated with the Ceylonese kings Vohārikatissa and Saṃghatissa and lived in the second half of the third century during the time of the Mahāyāna heresy, or Vetullavāda, in Śrī Lāṅka.¹¹ K. Lang, however, takes somewhat different dates for Vohārikatissa's reign from those of Lamotte and stresses that Nāgārjuna, and possibly Āryadeva, were associated with one of the Śātavāhana kings, a dynasty which ended in the middle of the third century; hence she places Āryadeva's literary activity between 225 and 250 A.D.¹² At any rate, while his being a student of Nāgārjuna and co-founder of the Madhyamaka is beyond doubt and his preoccupation with refuting non-Buddhist

⁷ CSV, Peking p. 34b. On the life and works of Āryadeva, see the Introduction to Lang (1986), (Thesis) chapter II; Ruegg (1981) p. 50 et seq.; Robinson (1967) pp. 27-28; Lamotte, *Traité* III, pp. 1371-1374, n. 2; V. Bhattacharya (1931) Preface and Introduction; May *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. *Chūgan* p. 479.

⁸ Based on the *Dī pō pū sà zhuan* 提婆菩薩傳 (T. 2048); see Robinson (1967) pp. 27-28; Lang (1986) p. 7.

⁹ Dutt (1934) p. 660 took Siṃhapura as being in North India; P.S. Shāstrī (1955) maintained that Āryadeva's birthplace was in Andhra, from where he subsequently went to Ceylon. See Ruegg (1981), p. 50, n. 136.

¹⁰ Namely *Mahāvamsa* (xxvi, 29) and *Dīpavamsa* (xxii, 41, 50). See *Traité* III, p. 1373.

¹¹ On the Vetullavādins, or Vetullaka, see Bureau (1955) Chapter XXXIV; see also Lokesh Chandra (1984) pp. 105-113 on Vetullavāda in Śrī Lāṅka.

¹² See Lang (1986) p. 8; Lamotte, *Traité* III p. 1373. Lamotte also relies on Xuán zàng's *Xī yóu jì* for references to Xuán zàng's detection of traces of Āryadeva's journeys in North India. Cf. Ruegg (1982) pp. 506-507 on Nāgārjuna's possible affiliation with different Śātavāhana monarchs. Ruegg opts for c. 150-200 as dates for Nāgārjuna. On the Śātavāhana kings see *L'Inde Classique* § 449.

doctrines is amply attested to by all sources and certainly by his own major work, the *Catuḥśataka*, the problem of his dates is probably no more or less clear than that of his teacher, Nāgārjuna, with many contemporary scholars following Kumārajīva's chronology and situating Nāgārjuna in the latter half of the third century A.D., others placing him in the first or second centuries.

Generally nowadays one differentiates between two Āryadevas, viz. the Mādhyamika disciple of Nāgārjuna (Āryadeva I) and a Tantric author also known as Āryadeva (Āryadeva II). One also differentiates the Mādhyamika Nāgārjuna from a Tantrika of the same namesake, viz. Nāgārjunapāda, and indeed the names and careers of the key figures in the Tantric lineages mirror those of their Mādhyamika counterparts: Āryadeva II seems to have been a disciple of the Tantric master, Nāgārjunapāda, who founded the important commentarial lineage of the *Guhyasamājatantra*, the so-called Ārya tradition. Major Tantric works attributable to this Āryadeva include the *Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa* on Nāgārjunapāda's *Pañcakrama* on *Guhyasamāja*. There is, however, little doubt that these Tantric writers lived much later than their Mādhyamika counterparts. Indeed, if we hypothesize that Āryadeva II was also the author of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*, attributed to "Āryadeva" in the Tibetan canon (see below), then he must have lived well after the sixth century, for he cites the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and *Tarkajvāla* of Bhāvaviveka (500-570) in his *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*.¹³

Besides the *Catuḥśataka* — the only work of Āryadeva I which remains partially conserved in Sanskrit —, numerous other philosophical works are attributed to "Āryadeva" in the Tibetan and Chinese canon. Let us begin with the works according to the Chinese canon. Here we can presume authorship by Āryadeva I as the Chinese canon, unlike the Tibetan, does not confuse Āryadeva I with the Tantrika of the same name:

1. *Guāng bǎi lùn* 廣百論 (i.e. the last half of the *Catuḥśataka*) T. 1570 and 1571. T. 1570 is only the *kārikās*, whereas T. 1571 is with Dharmapāla's commentary.
2. *Bǎi lùn* 百論 (**Śata(ka)śāstra*), T. 1569. Only the first half is conserved and is integrated with the commentary by Vasu.¹⁴

¹³ See Mimaki (1987), "Āryadeva", pp. 431a-432a and Ruegg (1981) pp. 105-106.

¹⁴ Transl. Tucci (1929). As for the question as to which half of the *Bǎi lùn* was in fact translated, the Preface to the *Bǎi lùn* by Sēng zhào 僧肇 T. 1569 makes it clear that Kumārajīva did not think the last ten chapters were worth translating for his countrymen. See Robinson (1967) p. 211. On Vasu and the *Bǎi lùn*, see e.g. Peri (1911) pp. 361-368; the attribution of this work to Deva = Āryadeva has been questioned by De Jong (1971).

3. *Bǎi zì lùn* 百字論 (**Akṣaraśataka*) T. 1572 with a commentary which may be by Āryadeva himself.¹⁵

4. *Dī pó pú sà shì léng jiā jīng zhōng wài dào xiǎo chéng sì zōng lùn*
提婆菩薩釋楞伽經中外道小乘四宗論 T.1639.¹⁶

5. *Dī pó pú sà shì léng jiā jīng zhōng wài dào xiǎo chéng niè pán lùn*
提婆菩薩釋楞伽經中外道小乘涅槃論 T. 1640.¹⁷

In the Tibetan canon we find the following works, of which only the first and second are attributable to Āryadeva I:

a. *Catuḥśataka*. P. 5246 (*kārikās* only) and P. 5266 (*kārikās* with Candrakīrti's commentary).

b. *Akṣaraśataka* P. 5234. In fact, the Tibetan canon attributes this work and its commentary to Nāgārjuna. However, not just the Chinese but also the Tibetan Dunhuang translation of this text attribute it to Āryadeva.

c. *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* P. 5244 and 5248 (*kārikās* only), P. 5245 and P. 5249 with the commentary, the *Hastavālaprakaraṇavṛtti* or *Hastavālavṛtti* respectively. The work is also in the Chinese canon, but is attributed there to Dignāga.¹⁸

d. *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetuisiddhi* P. 5247 (Āryadeva II?)¹⁹

e. *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* P. 5250 (Āryadeva II?).

f. *Jñānasārasamuccaya* P. 5251 (Āryadeva II?). The text gives a fourfold presentation of Buddhist doctrine typical of doxographical (*siddhānta*) texts, a genre which considerably post-dates Āryadeva I.²⁰

¹⁵ See May *Chūgan* p. 479; Lang (Thesis) pp. 82-85. Transl. Gokhale (1930). The Tibetan canon attributes this text and its commentary to Nāgārjuna, but as Lang p. 82 and Gokhale p. 2 point out, the Tibetan Dunhuang translation made by Chos 'grub on the basis of the Chinese refers to Āryadeva and suggests that someone else (unnamed) wrote the commentary.

¹⁶ A work on a version of the *catuskaṭi* dealing with identity and difference.

¹⁷ Transl. Tucci (1926). It should be mentioned that there are some scholars who are inclined to identify Āryadeva with Qīng mù 青目 (= *Piṅgala) as the author of commentaries (T.1564 and 1568) on the *Zhōng lùn* 中論 (i.e. MMK) and the *Shí èr mén lùn* 十二門論. See e.g. Lamotte *Traité* III p. 1373; cf. Robinson (1967) p. 29; Peri (1911) pp. 365 n. 4 and May *Hōbōgirin* s.v. *Chūgan* p. 481 for further references.

¹⁸ T. 1620, 1621. Cf. Hattori (1968a), p. 7 n. 41, who also attributes this text to Dignāga. Transl. F.W. Thomas and H. Ui (1918); Tibetan text in Frauwallner (1959).

¹⁹ Transl. R. Clark and L. Jampal (1979). The attribution of this text and the **Madhyamakabhramaghāta* to Āryadeva I is questioned. See Lang (Thesis) p. 85. See also Lang (1986) p. 15 who mentions that the former work is cited in the *Ratnapradīpa*; Lindtner (1982a) p. 173, n. 21 points out that the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* is identical with a part of the *Tarkajvāla* of Bhāvaviveka.

²⁰ Edited and transl. along with the commentary by Bodhibhadra in Mimaki (1976).

Turning now to Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, the information gleaned from Xuán zàng's *Xī yóu jì* 西域記 leads most scholars to fix Dharmapāla's dates at 530-561 A.D.²¹ We find other information to the effect that he was born in Kāñcī in South India as the eldest son of a high official; subsequently, fearing that he was to be forced to marry a daughter of the king, he fled to a monastery and later became a famous Vijñānavādin teacher in the monastic university of Nālandā in the North. In 559 A.D. at the age of twenty-nine he retired from Nālandā to meditate in Bodh Gaya, where he remained until his death in 561 A.D.

In spite of his short life, he had a considerable influence on the development of Indian and Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhist thought, in part due to his celebrated debate with the Mādhyamika, Bhāvaviveka, but also because of his influence on Xuán zàng, who wrote his famous *Chéng wéi shí lùn* (**Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*) as a compilation of various Indian Vijñānavāda masters' thought. The latter relied especially heavily on Dharmapāla's commentary to the *Trīṃśikā* of Vasubandhu,²² very possibly because Dharmapāla was himself the teacher of Xuán zàng's guru, Śīlabhadra.

Crucial to understanding Dharmapāla's thought is his connection with the Epistemological school. Indeed he may have been a grand-pupil of Dignāga²³, or at least he had very close ties with this branch of Vijñānavāda, as is evidenced by his commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and by the fact that he wrote a (now lost) commentary on the *Nyāyamukha*. Moreover, his philosophical standpoint in his commentary on the *Catuhśataka*, and especially his discussions there on particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and the philosophy of language, bear witness to a marked affinity with the Epistemologists. In the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* we also see that, like Dignāga's branch of the Vijñānavāda, he accepted and placed great importance on the existence of a "self-awareness" (*svasaṃvitti*; *svasaṃvedana*) not distinct from the mind which divides itself into objective and subjective parts (*fēn* 分 = *bhāga*). These

²¹ See Frauwallner (1961) pp. 132-134, who summarizes the reasoning of H. Ui. See also Kajiyama (1968), Peri (1911) pp. 383-384 and N. Aiyaswami Shāstrī (1942) p. xx et seq. on the life and dates of Dharmapāla. In fact, at the risk of making a heretical statement, I doubt that these dates are quite as sure as they are often made out to be. The whole argument rests on calculations from the fact that Xuán zàng met Dharmapāla's pupil Śīlabhadra who was supposedly 106 years old at the time, a "ripe old age" which inevitably suggests exaggeration. Note that Śīlabhadra, at age 106, then supposedly taught Vijñānavāda to Xuán zàng for a few years. On Śīlabhadra's life see Mimaki (1987), "Śīlabhadra", pp. 320b-321b.

²² Contrary to what is often thought, the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* (**Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*) is not an Indian text. In the Chinese canon we find the work attributed to "the bodhisattva Dharmapāla and others", but in fact the work must be regarded as essentially an indigenous Chinese work, a kind of digest of Indian Vijñānavāda based on paraphrases and résumés of the works of writers such as Dharmapāla, Nanda, etc., but compiled and written by Xuán zàng himself. Cf. D. Shimaji in S. Lévi (1932) p. 16: "Les commentaires décisifs [de la *Trīṃśikā*] furent ceux de 'dix grands maîtres en śāstra', comprenant chacun dix chapitres, soit en tout cent chapitres. Hiuan-tsang [= Xuán zàng] les rapporta de l'Inde et en fit une traduction éclectique en dix chapitres, prenant pour base l'interprétation de Dharmapāla et y combinant celles des neuf autres maîtres: c'est le *Tch'eng wei che louen*."

²³ See Hattori (1968a) p. 2.

latter two "parts" consist respectively in the "image" or "aspect" of the object" (*viṣayākāra*; *arthākāra*) and the "aspect of [the awareness] itself" (*svākāra*), or in other equivalent terms the objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*) and the subjective aspect (*grāhakākāra*)²⁴. As is well known, postulating a *svasaṃvitti* "part" of the mind is a key element in the Epistemologists' proof of idealism in that it eliminates the need for external objects to explain cognition: mind simply knows its own objective and subjective aspects, i.e. mind just knows itself. We will return to the question of *ākāra* in more detail in Chapter III, but for our purposes now in showing Dharmapāla's affiliation with the Epistemologists, it should be stressed that he also seems to have embraced Dignāga's account of *pramāṇaphala* ("the result of the means of valid cognition"), which Dignāga had taken as *svasaṃvitti*.²⁵

²⁴ See e.g. the explanations in Hattori (1988) p. 51 et seq. and May (1971) p. 306. See fn. 131 for Dharmakīrti's and Dignāga's Idealism. See also Kuī jī's characterization of Dharmapāla's position, fn. 127.

²⁵ See *Chéng wéi shí lùn* T. 1585 ii 10b et seq.; *Siddhi* pp. 132-135. In Dignāga's Idealist system there are in fact three divisions or "parts" to consciousness: the apprehended object (*grāhya*), the apprehending perception (*grāhaka*) and the self-awareness (*svasaṃvitti*; *saṃvitti*) of the perception. The first is the *prameya* ("what is validly cognized"), the second the *pramāṇa* ("the means of valid cognition") and the third is the *pramāṇaphala* ("the result of the means of valid cognition"). See PS I k. 10: *yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ / grāhakākārasaṃvittī trayam nātaḥ prīhakṛtaṃ ||*. Transl. Hattori (1968a) p. 29: "Whatever the form in which it [viz. a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (*prameya*). The means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and [the cognition which is] its result (*phala*) are respectively the form of the subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another." See also Hattori's note 67 and PV III k. 354. As Hattori pointed out, PS I k. 10 is quoted in *Chéng wéi shí lùn* ii 10b 13-16; *Siddhi* p. 131.

Now it might perhaps be objected that Dharmapāla's position — if we are to believe Xuáng zàng and Kuī jī — is *not* in fact completely the same as that of Dignāga. The *Chéng wéi shí lùn* passage referred to above describes a position where a fourth "part" (*fēn* 分 = *bhāga*) is postulated for consciousness: besides *svasaṃvittibhāga* ("self-awareness"), there is also, according to this view, *svasaṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga*, the "self-awareness of self-awareness", i.e. an additional part. Moreover, LVP (*Siddhi* p. 133) cites Kuī jī's commentary on the *Vimśatikā*, viz. the *Wéi shí èr shí lùn shù jì* 唯識二十論述記 T. 1834, specifying that *Dharmapāla* not only accepted *svasaṃvitti* (= *zì zhèng* 自證) but also *svasaṃvittisvasaṃvitti* (*zhèng zì zhèng* 證自證). (LVP was no doubt thinking of T. 1834 xià 999a24-28.) This, however, is probably of less importance than it may at first sight seem, for the fourth part is in fact included in the third, both being classified as *pramāṇaphala*. (See *Siddhi* p. 134 and Kuī jī T. 1834 xià 998c 27 - 999a 4). Indeed, evidence that this "divergence" from Dignāga was not of great consequence comes from Kuī jī's own repeated statements in the *Wéi shí èr shí lùn shù jì* that Dharmapāla held *three* parts of consciousness, i.e. the perception (*jiàn* 見), the characters (*xiāng* 相) of the object and the self-awareness (*zì zhèng* 自證). See e.g. T. 1834 shàng 982c 12-16 and xià 1007b 18-19. See fn. 127 for text and translation. In short Dharmapāla does not seem to be significantly different from Dignāga in his interpretation of *svasaṃvitti*, nor in the doctrine of *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramāṇaphala*.

Note also that Kuī jī (op cit.) stresses the important point that Dharmapāla accepted that all three parts were "dependent phenomena" (*paratantra*), a position which Kuī jī contrasts with that of Sthiramati who held that the first two were "thoroughly imagined" (*parikalpita*). Here then is another similarity with Dignāga that is worth noting: both were *sākāravādins*. Cf. Kajiyama (1965) pp. 423-421 who gives a brief account of Dharmapāla's *sākāravāda* (i.e. the position usually ascribed to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti that consciousness

Finally, if we are to follow Tāranātha, he was in fact a guru of Dharmakīrti, a claim which, from a doctrinal point of view, is not at all implausible, but which is, alas, chronologically problematic.²⁶

has real aspects) and the differences between Dharmapāla and Stīramati's positions, the latter being a *nirākāravādin*. (See our Chapter III, A for the general issues at stake.) He quotes, with some apparent skepticism, Frauwallner's opinion (in *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*) that Dharmapāla's theory is based on Aśaṅga. As Kajiyama (p. 421) points out, this latter view would contradict usual characterizations (e.g. in Bodhibhadra) of Aśaṅga as being a *nirākāravādin*.

Indigenous Tibetan writers too provide arguments for affiliating Dharmapāla with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the question of acceptance of *svasamvitti*. Vasubandhu and Aśaṅga are generally classified by Tibetan doxographical literature as *luṅ gi rjes su 'braṇ pa'i sems tsam pa*, "Vijñānavādins who follow scripture", while Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are *rigs pa'i rjes su 'braṇ pa'i sems tsam pa*, "Vijñānavādins who follow reasoning". See e.g. *Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba* p. 91 ed. Mimaki (1977) or *ICaṇ skya grub mtha'* p. 158: *sa sde sogs kyi rjes 'braṇs luṅ gso bor smra ba luṅ gi rjes 'braṇs daṅ / iśhad ma'i bstan bcas sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa nas bśad pa ltar gi rigs pa'i rjes 'braṇs gñis su yod pa ni grags che la /*. As *ICaṇ skya grub mtha'* p. 193 points out, *svasamvitti* occupied a major place in the position of the Vijñānavādins who follow reasoning, but it is not clear to what degree the other branch of Vijñānavāda accepted it at all: *...rigs pa'i rjes 'braṇ gi sems tsam pas mñion sum la dbañ yid rañ rig māl 'byor mñion sum bži 'dod do / luṅ gi rjes 'braṇ gi sems tsam pas gzan gsum 'dod kyañ rañ rig 'dod mi 'dod ni gsal bar ma bśad la rje btson dam pa 'jam dbyaṇs bśad pa'i rdo rjes sa sde'i rjes 'braṇ gi sems tsam pas rañ rig mi 'dod de / sa sde lña nas ma bśad pa'i phyr zes gsuñs so*. "...The Vijñānavādins who follow reasoning accept that perception has four [sorts], i.e. physical sense [perception], mental [perception], self-awareness and yogic perception. The Vijñānavādins who follow scripture accept the other three, but do not clearly explain whether or not they accept self-awareness. So 'Jam dbyaṇs bśad pa'i rdo rje [Nāg dbañ btson 'grus (1648-1722)] said that the Vijñānavādins who follow the "Collections of the *bhūmis*" [i.e. the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*, etc. of Aśaṅga,] do not accept self-awareness, because it is not asserted in the five 'Collections of the *bhūmis*.'" Given the clear importance that Dharmapāla placed on *svasamvitti* it seems more reasonable to place him in the camp of Dignāga on this point, rather than in Aśaṅga's.

²⁶ If we take Dharmakīrti as having lived in the seventh century — Frauwallner (1961) pp. 136-139 opts for c. 600-660 A.D. — he would not have met Dharmapāla. In brief the usual argument is as follows: if we accepted the hypothesis of a meeting between the two, we would have to situate Dharmakīrti in the sixth century, with a few years of his old age perhaps occurring in the seventh century. In that case, Xuán zàng's silence on Dharmakīrti becomes difficult to explain, as the Chinese pilgrim, who was an aficionado of epistemology and Vijñānavāda and left India in 644 A.D., would certainly have mentioned Dharmakīrti if he had known of him. Yī jīng, who left India around 685 A.D., does mention Dharmakīrti, a fact which leads Frauwallner to conclude that the beginning of Dharmakīrti's fame must be between these dates. The problem remains open. Cf. the arguments of Lindtner (1980) to place Dharmakīrti c. 530-600, and the discussion in Ruegg (1982)'s postscript. On Dharmakīrti's life according to Tāranātha's *rGya gar chos 'byuñ*, See ed. Schiefner (1868) pp. 134-142; transl. Lama Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya (1970) pp. 228-240; Schiefner (1869), pp. 175-185. See Tosaki (1979) pp. 3-24 on Dharmakīrti's life; *ibid* p. 4 for a résumé of Tāranātha's account; *ibid* pp. 20-21 for an evaluation of the hypothesis that Dharmapāla was the teacher of Dharmakīrti.

As Ruegg (1981) n. 148 points out, Tāranātha also relates that Dharmadāsa, who was supposedly a direct pupil of Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu and a teacher of Ārya Vimuktisena, was also a teacher of Dharmapāla. See *rGya gar chos 'byuñ*, transl. Schiefner (1869) p. 124; Lama Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya (1970) pp. 188-189 as well as pp. 212-214 for Tāranātha's account of Dharmapāla's life. That this Dharmadāsa (Chos

None of Dharmapāla's works survives in Sanskrit, nor were they translated into Tibetan.²⁷ In the biography of Xuán zàng by Huì lì 慧立 we find mention of four works:

- a) *Shēng míng zá lùn* 聲明雜論 in twenty-five thousand *śloka*s;
- b) a commentary on the *Guāng bǎi lùn* (= *Catuhśataka*);
- c) a commentary on *Vijñaptimātrātā*, i.e. *Wéi shí lùn* 唯識論 ;
- d) a commentary on logic, i.e. *Yīn míng* 因明 . (*Yīn míng lùn* = *Nyāyamukha*)

The titles of a), c) and d) were given rather improbable Sanskrit reconstructions by Beal and later N. Aiyaswami Shāstrī²⁸, viz. **Śabdavidyāsaṃyuktaśāstra*,

kyi 'bañs) was a teacher of Dharmapāla is also mentioned in Sum pa mkhan po Ye šes dpal 'byor's *dPag bsam ljon bzai*, (ed. Das) pp. 99 and 102. This Vijñānavādin teacher is mentioned in CSV P. 35a4-5 as giving examples for the first eight chapters of CS: 'dir rab tu byed pa brgyad kyi tshig le'ur byas pa dag re re la **slob dpon chos kyi 'bañs** kyis sbyar ba'i dpe mams 'don pa de dag dan than cig mam par bsad par bya'o / . It is tempting to speculate that some of the aspects of Dharmapāla's philosophical stances which seem to resemble Asaṅga's might have been communicated to him by this Dharmadāsa. Cf. e.g. Dharmapāla's and Asaṅga's views that it is only *manas* and *manovijñāna* (and not sense consciousnesses) which are responsible for *parikalpita*, or "thoroughly imagined natures". See *Siddhi* p. 518 et seq. which quotes Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* in this context; cf. Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XIII k. 322.

A confusion to be avoided is that between the Dharmapāla who was the teacher of Śīlabhadra, died in Bodh Gaya, etc. etc. and a Vijñānavādin Dharmapāla of Suvarṇadvīpa, who was a guru of Atīśa Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna c. 1000. (Tāranātha p. 214 transl. Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya has this confusion.) N. Aiyaswami Shāstrī (1942) p. xix also warns against confusion with the Dharmapāla of the Theravāda school, who was, according to the *Viśuddhimaggāṭikā* colophon, a native of Badarītthā, not far from Ceylon. According to Shāstrī, this is "near Negapatam, a small seaport town in South India." Hence, Shāstrī reasons that our Dharmapāla, who fled Kāñci to go North and who had no connection with Badarītthā, is clearly different from the Theravādin.

²⁷ The Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur* does, however, mention two works by a "Dharmapāla":

1) *Theg pa chen po'i chos brgya gsal ba'i sgo bstan bcos* P. 5564. This work, which was translated from the Chinese, *Dà chéng bǎi fǎ míng mén lùn* 大乘百法明門論 T. 1614, is according to the Tibetans by Dharmapāla, but is by Vasubandhu according to the Chinese. The work gives a list of various Abhidharmic entities, e.g. the consciousnesses, *citta-caittas*, etc. In fact the colophon in Tibetan says merely that the work is "generally thought by Tibetans to be by Dharmapāla". *rgya'i dpe las slob dpon dbyig gñen gyis mdzad par snañ / den sañ bo'z mams dpal ldan chos skyon'gis mdzad ces grags so /*. "In the Chinese text it appears that it was composed by Vasubandhu, but nowadays Tibetans generally think that it was composed by the exalted Dharmapāla."

2) *Yi ge'i mdo'i 'grel pa*, i.e. *Varṇasūtravṛtti* P. 5770. A short commentary in eight folios on Candragomin's *Varṇasūtra*; if we situate Candragomin as fl. 650, this makes it impossible that our Dharmapāla is the author.

²⁸ See fn. 30 and transl. Beal p. 139; cf. also N. Aiyaswami Shāstrī (1942) p. xx. The restitutions are those of Aiyaswami Shāstrī; clearly *Vijñaptimātrātsiddhi* is preferable instead of his *Vidyāmātrasiddhi*. Kui ji's phonetic commentary on the Sanskrit term in his *Chéng wéi shí lùn zhǎng zhōng shū yào* 成唯識論

**Vidyāmātrasiddhi* and the **Nyāyadvāratarkaśāstra* (= the *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga) respectively.

The first work was also spoken about by Kuī jī 窺基 as being a profound work on grammar in 25,000 *ślokas*, especially prized in the "Western regions"; he gave the title as *Zá bǎo shēng míng lùn* 雜寶聲明論.²⁹ Now, Yī jīng had spoken of a work by Dharmapāla in 14,000 *ślokas* on "Bì ná", which was in turn in 3,000 *ślokas*.³⁰ Takakusu had transcribed the characters 畢拏 as "Pei na" and speculated that the text might be a work on the *Vedas*³¹, but this is unlikely and it is probably in fact a *Vyākaraṇa* treatise — Brough (1973) argues that, in spite of the phonetic dissimilarity, "bì ná" is "*Prakīṇaka*", i.e. a section of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. If that is so, then the grammatico-philosophical work of Dharmapāla mentioned in Yī jīng is a commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, and the question naturally arises as to whether it is identical with a) above. What seems possible is that Kuī jī (whose account is similar to that of Huì lì) was talking about the same commentary as Yī jīng but exaggerated its length.³²

At any rate, neither a) nor d) are extant, and in fact it is probably wise to keep a dose of skepticism about *Vyākaraṇa* works attributed to Dharmapāla. There is, to our knowledge, no trace of such works. Nor is there, for that matter, any trace of Dharmapāla's supposed "poetry", although both Candrakīrti and especially Tāranātha (see fn. 2) insisted on his being a notable poet (*sñan dhāgs mkhan*) — it is, again, not clear how we should take these affirmations. What does remain in the *Taishō* are the following works:

掌中樞要 T. 1831 *shàng běn* 608c23-27, makes it clear that this is what it must be.

²⁹ *Chéng wéi shí lùn zhǎng zhōng shū yào*, T. 1831 *shàng běn* 623a29-b2: 然護法 菩薩造 二万五十頌名雜寶聲明論西方矣以爲聲明究竟之極論. See Peri (1911) p. 377 n. 4. Note that Kuī jī, Yī jīng and Huì lì speak of "the bodhisattva Dharmapāla", thus suggesting that it is not a different Dharmapāla who produced the work on *Vyākaraṇa*. Finally, it is worthwhile to remark that "*śloka*" in this context does not necessarily mean that the work is in verse, but can refer to groups of thirty-two syllables. See Brough (1973) p. 259, n. 40.

³⁰ T. 2125 iv 229b5-6: 次有畢拏頌有三千釋有十四千頌乃伐菴可利所造釋則護法論師所製。Cf. *Life of Xuān zàng* T. 2053 iv 241c22-24: 造聲明雜論二万五千頌 又釋廣百論唯識論及因明數十部並盛宣行。

³¹ Takakusu (1898) p. 180 and endnote.

³² Brough (1973) p. 260: "... 'Pei-na' is the *Prakīṇaka*. Rangaswamy Iyengar and Subramania Iyer have already made this proposal, and the latter suggested that the Chinese name might represent a Prakrit *paiṇṇa*. Unfortunately (unless Takakusu had a different reading before him), the modern transcription should not be *pei-na*, but *pi-na* 畢拏 [= *bì ná* in *pinyin*], Mid. ch. *pī-ṇa*. It is hard to reconcile this with *paiṇṇa*. At the same time, it is equally hard to reject the identification. One can only suggest that I-ching misheard the Prakrit name, and that his transcription reflects a distortion, **piṇṇa*. ... This is not a very satisfying solution; but no better alternative has yet suggested itself." As Brough shows, Yī jīng's account of grammatical works contains some inaccuracies but is far from being a work of pure inventive fiction.

1. *Guǎng bǎi lùn shì lùn* 廣百論釋論 T. 1571.
2. *Chéng wéi shí lùn* 成唯識論 T. 1585.³³
3. *Chéng wéi shí bǎo shēng lùn* 成唯識寶生論 T. 1591. A commentary on Vasubandhu's *Vīmśatikā* translated by Yī jīng. The commentary on the *Trīmśikā* on which Xuán zàng relied is not extant.
4. *Guān suǒ yuán lùn shì* 觀所緣論釋 T. 1625. A commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā* translated by Yī jīng.³⁴ The text comments on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* only up to the seventh verse and then abruptly stops.

As for Candrakīrti, we have almost no reliable information concerning his life, the only material being the largely fabulous biographies of Candrakīrti by the Tibetan historians, Bu ston Rin chen grub, Tāranātha and Sum pa mkhan po Ye śes dpal 'byor. In addition to recording legend, these writers tend to confuse the philosopher Candrakīrti with another Tantric Candrakīrti who wrote the *Guhyasamājatantra* commentary known as the *Pradīpoddyotana* (P. 2650). Indeed it may even be that there was a third writer of this name who wrote the **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra* (P. 5264) and collaborated with 'Gos khug pa lhas btsas to translate it into Tibetan, thus enabling us to date this "Candrakīrti" in the eleventh century — it is, however, unclear whether the Candrakīrti of the *Pradīpoddyotana* is to be identified with this author or with the philosophical writer who commented on Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva. At any rate, these confusions between two or possibly three figures led Tibetans to claim a lifespan of three to four hundred years for "Candrakīrti".³⁵

Taking a more sober perspective, the dates for the Madhyamaka philosopher and commentator, Candrakīrti, are generally held to be from approximately 600 A.D. to 650, although some would wish to place him in the sixth century. (Lindtner [1979] p. 91 opts for 530-600.) As is well known by now, he and Buddhapālita were responsible for a method of Madhyamaka philosophy based on the use of *reductio ad absurdum*, or "consequences" (*prasaṅga*), and hence he is considered as one of the principal figures in the Prāsaṅgika school of Madhyamaka thought.³⁶ Contrary to Mādhyamikas such as Bhāvaviveka or Śāntarakṣita, who borrowed heavily from the Epistemologists, Candrakīrti's standpoint is often quite opposed to Buddhist

³³ See fn. 22 for the question as to who wrote this work. Transl. Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1928-1929), i.e. *Siddhi*.

³⁴ Translated into Sanskrit and English by N. Aiyaswami Shāstrī (1942).

³⁵ See Mimaki (1987) "Candrakīrti" pp. 58b-59a, Ruegg (1981) pp. 71, 81 and 105, Lindtner (1979) pp. 87-91.

³⁶ On Candrakīrti's approach, see Ruegg (1981) pp. 76-80; May (1959) pp. 15-16; Tillemans (1982) pp. 105-112 for Tsoñ kha pa's view on Prāsaṅgikas. Note that the term itself is convenient Sanskritizing of a Tibetan term, *thal 'gyur pa*. It may very well be Pa tshab Ņi ma grags who first came up with the distinction into *thal 'gyur pa* and *rañ rgyud pa* (*svāntarika*). See Mimaki (1983) pp. 163-164.

epistemology, and in fact shows a marked preference for certain aspects of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic and analyses of conventional truth.³⁷

His main works (viz. 1-5 below), with the exception of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, consist in commentaries on works of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva:

1. *Prasannapadā Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*.³⁸
2. *Yuktiṣaṅgikāvṛtti* P. 5265. Conserved only in Tibetan.³⁹
3. *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* P. 5268. Conserved in Tibetan.⁴⁰
4. *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Bhāṣya*. Conserved in Tibetan.⁴¹
5. *Catuḥśatakavṛtti* or *Ṭikā*.
6. *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa* P. 5267. Conserved in Tibetan.⁴²
7. *Triśaraṇasaptati* P. 5366 / 5478. Conserved in Tibetan.⁴³

In terms of relative chronology little can be said except that it was probably in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* that Candrakīrti initially formulated his thought on Madhyamaka — we see that this work is cited in *Prasannapadā* and in the *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*.

C. Some methodological remarks

1. The question of an Indo-Tibetan approach

First of all, the rather thorny question might arise as to the use and value of indigenous Tibetan materials in interpreting the *Catuḥśataka* and *Catuḥśatakavṛtti*.⁴⁴

³⁷ See fn. 89. In logic, for example, he deliberately uses the Nyāya five-membered reasoning instead of the two-membered (or sometimes three-membered) Buddhist *parārthānumāna*. He also accepts the four Nyāya *pramāṇas*, viz. perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and testimony (*śabda*).

³⁸ Sanskrit in: Pr. edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Transl. by several scholars; see May (1959) p. 10 for the details.

³⁹ An edition and French translation is in preparation by C. Scherrer-Schaub.

⁴⁰ Translation in preparation by F. Erb.

⁴¹ Text ed. by LVP (1907-12). Transl. of chapters I-V and VI k. 1-165 in LVP (1907), (1910), (1911). Transl. of VI k. 166-226 in Tauscher (1981).

⁴² Tibetan edited in Lindtner (1979).

⁴³ Edited and translated by P. Sorensen (1986). The authorship here is questionable. It may be the work of the Tantric author of the same name. See Ruegg (1981) p. 105 n. 334.

⁴⁴ Cf. the following sampling of opinions pro and contra: Hattori (1968a) p. 15: "There is a commentary on PS(V) by the great Tibetan scholar Darma Rinchen. However, I have not utilized it since I thought that the examination of it might serve to clarify only the Tibetan interpretation of Dignāga's thought." (My

There are Tibetan commentaries on CS and CSV⁴⁵; what is more, there is a wealth of Tibetan literature on the philosophies of Candrakīrti, Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna, not to mention the corpus of writings on epistemological problems, the doxographical literature, much of which, depending upon one's methodology, could be potentially relevant. Without any pretensions of exhausting the issue, I would make the following observations on the suitability of an Indo-Tibetan approach.

1) I take it as obviously true that Tibetan commentaries or Tibetan oral traditions cannot *replace* a thorough study of the Indian texts in the context of the Indian, rather than Tibetan, philosophical discussions and that this study must rely primarily upon the Sanskrit originals of the texts when the Sanskrit is available.⁴⁶

2) Tibetan word-commentaries (*tshig 'grel*) on Indian texts are useful in understanding as to what would be the most natural way for an educated Tibetan to read the Tibetan translation. Some drawbacks of relying on such commentaries: a) The Tibetan translation which the indigenous Tibetan commentators rely upon often differs substantially from the Sanskrit. The reasons for these divergences are complex and have to be evaluated case by case, but it has to be granted that not too infrequently the

comment: It is not clear whether Hattori is thinking of just the situation with regard to PS or whether he would generalize. It is true that the indigenous literature on PS is very meager and of a much lower quality than that on PV. No doubt the difficulty of PS and the abysmally bad Tibetan translations played a role.)

Ruegg (1981) p. viii: "In Tibet for example there has existed for over a millennium a tradition of study of a very considerable portion of Indian literature, including even works that are not specifically Buddhist; and with a view to both translation and exegesis Tibetan scholars developed remarkable philological and interpretative methods that could well justify us in regarding them as Indologists *avant la lettre*."

R. Hayes (1988) p. 8: "But while it may be a mistake when discussing Buddhist philosophy to rely too heavily on Brahmanical works to the exclusion of Buddhist works, it is no less a mistake to rely too heavily upon Buddhist works, and especially on works of the later Tibetan tradition, as guides to understanding Indian Buddhist thought."

K. Mimaki (1982) p. 3: "On entend souvent la critique suivante à propos de l'étude des *grub mtha'* [i.e. Tibetan doxographical literature]: dans l'étude des *grub mtha'*, s'agit-il du bouddhisme indien ou du bouddhisme tibétain? Cette question revient à dire que ce n'est ni le bouddhisme indien, parce que ce sont des tibétains qui écrivent les *grub mtha'*, ni le bouddhisme tibétain parce que ce sont des écoles indiennes qui y sont décrites. Il est facile de répondre à cette critique, en disant, comme pour sortir d'un dilemme, que les *grub mtha'* constituent justement le bouddhisme tibétain, parce que ce sont des tibétains qui les écrivent: c'est aussi le bouddhisme indien, parce que c'est la philosophie bouddhique indienne qui y est exposée."

⁴⁵ There are four Tibetan commentaries available on CS and CSV, generally of uneven quality. The longest is that of the Sa skya pa, Red mda' ba gZon nu blo gros (1392-1481), i.e. *dBu ma bži brgya pa'i 'grel pa*; also of interest is the *bZi brgya pa'i mam bsad legs bsad sñiñ po* of rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432). Kaḥ thog mkhan po Nāg dbaṅ dpal bzañ (1879-1941) wrote the *dBu ma bži brgya pa'i nam par bsad pa rgya msho'i zeg ma*, which is largely a remake of rGyal tshab, apart from a few additional remarks. The nineteenth century rÑiñ ma pa writer, gZan dga' gZan phan chos kyi snañ ba, wrote an interlinear commentary on the *kārikās* entitled, *bsTan bcos bži brgya pa zes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa'i mchan 'grel*. I thank J. Dantinne for kindly making a microfilm of the latter commentary available to me; thanks also to G. Dreyfus and Z. Horváth for help in obtaining Red mda' ba's commentary.

⁴⁶ Cf. the remarks of De Jong (1986), p. 128.

translators, who were of course of varying competence, did not fully understand their texts. b) What is equally problematic is that even when the Tibetan does not really differ from the Sanskrit, it often has to be read in an artificial and unnatural manner, one which eludes the word-commentaries. c) The Tibetan word-commentaries on many occasions adopt an interpretation which is not philosophically inaccurate in the light of the Sanskrit and the Indian commentaries, but which so transforms and adds to the original that the Indian author's own wording and syntax is no longer clear — there are, then, obvious perils in adopting these interpretations for translational purposes.⁴⁷ Now, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, priority should normally go to the Sanskrit originals and commentaries. If, however, the Sanskrit original is lost and there are no Indian commentaries (as is the case for much of CSV), then indigenous Tibetan word-commentaries can come to the rescue.

3) The *forte* of the indigenous Tibetan writers is their philosophical interpretations and their philological discussions of certain issues, rather than their word-by-word commentaries. In another context (viz. Tsoñ kha pa's explanations of Śāntarakṣita's argumentation in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*) I argued that the distinction between internal and external history in the history of science made by the Hungarian historian and philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos, is also relevant for our field of study. To prevent this digression from becoming unduly long, let me simply cite these remarks:

"I think it is fair to say that Tsoñ kha pa was less concerned with what Śāntarakṣita and others said, than with rationally reconstructing the logical situations they faced. We follow Imre Lakatos and make a distinction between internal and external history, the former being primarily logical deductions of what could have been said, given the key ideas of the philosopher in question, the latter being what was actually said, what actually took place. In this light, there is no doubt that Tsoñ kha pa, the great debater, was a specialist at internal history; as such his stretching of terminology, his imposition of concepts which have no obvious textual justification, should not be judged by the severe criterion of the external historian. Bearing this distinction in mind, we deprive neither Tsoñ kha pa, nor for that matter, ourselves, of the possibility of using fertile but foreign concepts."⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Take the case of a very useful Tibetan word-commentary on PV: dGe 'dun grub pa's *Tshad ma mam 'grel legs par bśad pa*. Often the typical dGe lugs pa method of paraphrasing into "sequence and reason" (or *thal phyir* to use Stcherbatsky's phrase) makes so many changes in PV's word-order and so many additions that the original syntax is unfindable. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that dGe 'dun grub *does* usually manage to capture Dharmakīrti's thought quite accurately and insightfully. For a discussion of *thal phyir* logic, see Tillemans (1989a).

⁴⁸ Tillemans (1983) p. 312. See Lakatos' *History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions* pp. 102-105, 118-121 in the edition of his papers by J. Worral and G. Currie (1978). (Cf. M. Broido [1988] n. 12 who suggests that my approach works somewhat better for writers like Tsoñ kha pa than for others like Pad ma dkar po, in that Tsoñ kha pa "perhaps had a more highly developed sense of the way the systems he interpreted might be expected to evolve.")

Obviously, the dominant current in our field is towards external history, and this is probably as it should be. However, I would also make a plea for sufficient flexibility to account for what I am terming "internal history." What is to be avoided is a certain type of stultifying narrowness in the name of "history" or "philology". To take an example: we typically find investigations as to whether or not a certain term occurs in a particular philosopher's writing; if it does not, but occurs later in a commentary, the natural tendency is to say that it reveals the commentator's thought, an "historical development", rather than that of the philosopher in question. This reasoning is not at all probative. But more significantly, the question is what we mean when we speak of a certain philosopher's "thought", viz. his subjective states (henceforth "thought₁"), or his philosophy taken as a set of propositions forming a system (henceforth "thought₂") — in the latter sense it is highly possible to attribute to him things which he never wrote, nor perhaps even thought₁ of. Indeed, there may be an enormous discrepancy between, for example, the tortuous and roundabout psychological processes which constitute the thought₁ of a logician such as Kurt Gödel or Bertrand Russell and, on the other hand, their thought₂, viz. Gödel's Proof, Gödel's work on the foundations of mathematics, or Russellian logic. We will probably study Gödel's proof in a form in which he never conceived of it (e.g. that of Barkley Rosser or perhaps in a *Scientific American* type of presentation such as that of E. Nagel), but that in no way prevents us from attributing this form of the proof to Gödel in that it represents a *rational reconstruction* (to use Lakatos' term). To take another example: the creative, philosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein in Saul Kripke's 1981 work on Wittgenstein's argumentation on rules and the private language. It is probably of secondary importance to Kripke's arguments about "Wittgenstein" whether or not the actual man subjectively had in mind the very same connections between rules and private language that Kripke finds in reading the *Philosophical Investigations*. In short, to resume this approach to history and hermeneutics, internal history is a study of the history of thought₂, thought taken in its impersonal, non-psychologistic sense, much like Frege's *Gedanke* and Popper's "third world".

For the Tibetan hermeneuticians' own interpretations of "thought / intention" (*dgoñs pa* = *abhiprāya*) and "intentional foundation" (*dgoñs gzi*), see Broido (1984) and Ruegg (1985), (1988); see also Thurman (1984), Lipman (1980) on aspects of Tibetan hermeneutics. Buddhist hermeneuticians themselves, however, seem to be generally speculating on the thoughts₁ of authors, or perhaps it might be more accurate to say that the distinction which we are making is unknown to them, and as such the Buddhists' own hermeneutics is probably significantly different from what we are advocating here.

A few examples of some important Tibetan developments which we maintain arguably represent Indian philosophers' thought₂:

a) the notion of a *tshad ma'i skyes bu* ("person of authority"). See Steinkellner (1983), van der Kuip (1985b), (1987), M. Inami and T. Tillemans (1986) pp. 127-128.

b) In Madhyamaka: Tsoñ kha pa's important elaboration and development of the term *kun rdzob tsam* in M. av. VI: 28; see Williams (1979). The identification of the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*) in Madhyamaka argumentation; see Tillemans (1982).

c) the interpretation of PS III's definition of the thesis as making a difference between real and nominal subjects (*rañ rten chos can* vs. *chos can 'ba' zig pa*); the use of this and the *don spyi* ("object-universal") in Tibetan analyses of *āśrayāsiddha*. Tillemans (1984c), see n. 42; Kobayashi (1987); see also Kobayashi (1986) on Kamalaśīla's analysis which was an important source for Tsoñ kha pa.

d) Tibetan doxographers' classifications of Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras. See Mimaki (1982), (1983).

e) Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, in his *rNam 'grel spyi don* ff. 56a-58b, gives a good example of the internal historian's approach to the problem of *niścita-grahaṇa* and the fact that *niścaya* / *niścita* are missing in PS's version of the *trairūpya*.

2. Can we legitimately speak of Dignāga, Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti as belonging to one unified school?

A second methodological point. Is it meaningful to speak of an Epistemological school to which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmapāla belonged? Can we reasonably use Dharmakīrti's thought to interpret Dignāga or Dharmapāla, as I obviously do? There is a current tendency to make a radical distinction between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, a position strongly argued for by Richard Hayes (1988) and Radhika Herzberger (1986). Here is Hayes' position:

"Both Frauwallner and R. Herzberger have helped to advance our understanding of the Buddhist epistemologists to the point where we can no longer speak of them as being anything like a uniform school of thought with a single agenda."⁴⁹

As I am primarily concerned here with the problem of scriptural authority in the Epistemological School and in Āryadeva and his commentators, I will concentrate my attention on Hayes' views on this matter; an extensive treatment of Herzberger's views, which concern Dignāga's logic, would take us too far afield.

Hayes, in his admirable work on Dignāga's philosophy of language, argues that Dignāga's position represented a type of skepticism which was completely distorted by Dharmakīrti and later commentators. On this he becomes quite polemical:

⁴⁹ Hayes (1988) p. 310. For an earlier article on the problem of doctrinalism and the authority of scripture in the Buddhist epistemologists, see Hayes (1984). One observation that must be made: Hayes in (1984) seeks to make a difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti which turns on Dignāga's definition of the thesis in PS III k. 2, and hence, on the refutation of theses by scripture. Unfortunately this definition is misrepresented, with the result that Hayes' discussion on pp. 656-657 is marred. The Sanskrit of the PS III passage in question is found in PVBh 545,7 and 549,6 and reads: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣo 'nirā-kṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmaṇi*. The definition, inter alia, includes four ways in which a sound thesis is not refuted: 1) by objects of *pratyakṣa* (perception); 2) by *anumāna*; 3) by authorities (*āpta*); 4) by commonly acknowledged (*prasiddha*) linguistic conventions. See PV IV k. 109-130 on refutation by *prasiddha*. In Hayes' translation (p. 656) there are only three ways: "the person advancing the argument himself believes it and it is not overthrown by anything that is known through sensation, inference or the testimony of a competent witness." The result is that he leaves out *prasiddha* and then he takes the example of the moon being called *śaśin* ("that which has a rabbit") as a proposition whose truth should be established by "competent witnesses". Thus *acandraḥ śaśi* is claimed to be an example of a proposition refuted by *āptavacana*. (See p. his 657 and n. 12.) This is wrong. The latter proposition is an example of a thesis refuted by *prasiddha*, as we see by the discussion in PV, and also in Dignāga's PSV ad PS III and NM. We therefore must reject Hayes' conclusion (p. 657): "And so it turns out that these 'competent witnesses' to whom Dignāga refers are simply the linguistic community at large from whom we learn the proper usage of words, phrases and constructions."

"It could be said, taking R. Herzberger's observations a step further, that Dharmakīrti not only washed away Dignāga's philosophical accomplishments but also washed away much of the accomplishment of the Buddha as well. It is ironic that in his very attempt to secure the truth of the traditional teachings of Buddhism, to establish the authority of the Buddha himself as a teacher, and to defend established Buddhist doctrine as much as possible from the sharp-minded critical attacks of some non-Buddhist thinkers, Dharmakīrti managed to violate the essentially open-minded and critical spirit of many of his predecessors, putting in its place a dogmatic edifice that eventually very nearly imprisoned a number of the later Indian and Tibetan Buddhist traditions."⁵⁰

Strong stuff, but is it really plausible? I think the evidence for a charge like this would have to be much stronger than what Hayes is giving. Below we will take up the question of Āryadeva and the Epistemologists' views on scriptural authority, but for the moment suffice it to say that Hayes' main point is that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti differed on their views of the use of scripture or verbal testimony. The basic difference which emerges from Hayes is that Dharmakīrti maintained that with regard to imperceptible, supra-sensible states of affairs one can formulate valid inferences based on scripture and testimony, providing these scriptures meet certain criteria for trustworthiness. Dignāga, however, according to Hayes' comment on PS II, k. 5, maintained that

"a passage of scripture can be regarded as authoritative only insofar as what it says is true. So, rather than saying that something is true on the authority of scripture, we can only say that something in scripture has authority only if it is already known to be true."⁵¹

This would indeed be different from Dharmakīrti, and for that matter from Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and Dharmapāla, (whose views I maintain are similar to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti). It seems to me, however, that the Sanskrit passage of Dignāga on which Hayes may very well have based his remarks does not support this interpretation. The Sanskrit of PS II, k. 5ab reads:

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 310.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 239. Compare also Hayes' (p. 253) explanation of why Dignāga did not accept verbal testimony (*śābda*) as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) for supra-sensible matters:

"First, some things mentioned in scripture, such as heaven and primordial matter (*prakṛti*), are utterly unknowable; belief in them is not knowledge at all, but only unjustified belief. Of these things it is inappropriate to speak of a means of acquiring knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Second, some things mentioned in scripture are knowable, but our knowledge of them turns out to be justifiable by ordinary sense experience or inferences that rest in the final analysis on sense experiences."

*āptavākyaṁvisamvādasāmānyād anumānatā*⁵²

Hayes translates (the italics are my doing):

"The statements of credible persons are inference *insofar* as they have the common character of not being false."⁵³

My translation:

Because authoritative words are similar in not belying, they are [classified as] inference.⁵⁴

The problem is that one cannot translate the ablative *°sāmānyād* as "insofar". It is giving a reason for authoritative speech being classified as inference; it is not saying that such speech is inference *provided, or to the degree that*, it is not *visamvāda* ("false"; "belying"), a sense which would have been better expressed by a *yāvat ... tāvat* construction. Note also that PS and PSV, in Tibetan translation, are unambiguous about taking the ablative (*...mtshuñs pa'i phyir*) as "because" or "therefore" (as Hayes

⁵² Skt. in Randle (1926) p. 17; PVS ed. Gnoli p. 108,1.

⁵³ Hayes (1988) p. 238.

⁵⁴ Cf. Tillemans (1986a), p. 32. Note that in the discussion which follows I understand *āptavacana* / *yid ches pa'i tshig* as the words of an authoritative person, although for brevity I speak of "authoritative words". The interpretation fits the Sanskrit *āpta* (cf. M. Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* p. 136: "a fit person; a credible or authoritative person") better than the Tibetan *yid ches pa*, which clearly puts the accent on trustworthiness. Cf. Monier-Williams *ibid.* s.v. *āptavacana*. The translation of *visamvādin* / *visamvāda* by "belie" is that of Eli Franco. For *avisamvādin*, I occasionally use a neologism, "non-belying", instead of the longer "... does not belie". Cf. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* s.v. *believe*: "Give false notion of; fail to fulfil (promise etc.); fail to justify (hope etc.); fail to corroborate." Note that this translation, which has the distinct advantage of capturing the etymological sense, could be understood as also expressing the positive quality of *reliability*. Dharmottara's gloss on *avisamvādata* in his *Pramāṇaviniśayaṭīkā* brings out the sense of "not failing to fulfil a promise" or "reliability": *ji liar 'jig ren na khas blañs pa'i don dan phrad par byed pa mi slu ba yin pa de bzin du ses pa yañ bstan pa'i don dan phrad par byed pas mi slu bar blta bar bya'o || de'i don ni 'di yin te / dños po 'dzin par byed pas ni yañ dag pa'i ses pa ñid ma yin gyi 'on kyañ dños po thob par byed pa ñid yin no ||*. Text and translation in Steinkellner and Krasser (1989) p. 26 and 75: "Ebenso, wie in Alltag einer, der eine (von ihm) versprochene Sache erreichen lässt, ein Verlässlicher (*saṁvādata*) ist, ist auch eine Erkenntnis, sofern sie die (von ihr) gezeigte Sache erreichen lässt, als verlässlich (*saṁvādata*) anzusehen. Der Sinn dieser (Formulierung im PVin) ist folgender: Nicht dadurch, dass das Ding erfasst wird, hat [eine Erkenntnis] den Charakter einer richtigen Erkenntnis, sondern das zum Erreichen des Dinges Führen [ist dieser Charakter einer richtigen Erkenntnis]." This dimension of "reliability" or even "infallibility" in *avisamvādata* would be insisted upon by certain Tibetan philosophers, who would argue that it is possible to have a simply correct cognition which is nonetheless not *avisamvādin*: this is the case of *yid dpyod* ("true presumption"), which is not *avisamvādin*; it just happens to be correct, but cannot elicit sufficient certainty to dispel erroneous opinions. See fn. 86.

himself implicitly recognized in translating the PSV passage by "because..."). PSV(a) 29b7:

yid ches pa'i tshig gzuñ nas kyañ mi slu bar mtshuñs pa'i phyir de yañ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do /. My translation: "When one apprehends authoritative words, they are similar in not belying, and therefore, they too are said to be inference."

If we translate PS without surreptitiously changing the ablative into a *yāvat* ... *tāvat* construction, much of the textual basis for Hayes' commentary on k. 5 may go by the board and with it Dignāga's supposed skepticism about scriptural authority. However, there is one other point on which Hayes places store: the fact that, according to PSV, some scriptures speak of "heaven" or *prakṛti* / *pradhāna* (the "Primordial Nature" in Sāṃkhya philosophy) and other such imperceptible and unknowable things.⁵⁵

"...[S]tatements the truth of which cannot be ascertained through sensation or reasoning are statements the truth of which cannot be ascertained at all. In *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 2:5ab and his own commentary on it, for example, Diñnāga cites the Sāṃkhya doctrine that all mental and physical phenomena are transformations of a primordial substance (*pradhāna*) as a doctrine the truth of which is unknowable. Presumably his reason for declaring primordial substance unknowable is that such a substance is in principle impossible to experience in its primordial form, but one can never in Diñnāga's view infer the general form of anything if one has not previously experienced a particular instance of it. Thus in general Diñnāga's view of those religious, moral and metaphysical doctrines that can neither be established nor repudiated by direct experience or reasoning would most likely be that it is a mistake to say that *knowledge* of them can be acquired only through scriptures."⁵⁶

It should be fairly obvious that this view would lead to skepticism about scriptural authority, but once again, I would understand Dignāga somewhat differently.

First of all, Hayes lumps Dignāga's talk about "heaven" and *prakṛti* together as giving examples of unknowable entities on which Dignāga remains agnostic. I doubt that they do belong together: Dignāga accepted the heavens as things which were unknowable by sense perception or ordinary inference but which could be known by scripture; *prakṛti*, on the other hand, is an example of something which does not exist, and where the scriptures describing it are bogus.

Let me try to give an alternative explanation of PSV ad k. 5ab. (Texts and translations of the key passages of PSV and PST are to be found in Appendix I.)

⁵⁵ See Appendix I pp. 71, 72, 73 for the "heavens".

⁵⁶ Hayes (1988) p. 180. Cf. Kitagawa (1973) p. 93 who takes k. 5 as showing Dignāga's "pragmatism" (*jitsuyō shugi*).

1) The general underlying principle in Dignāga is that the object of inferences is not a real particular, or *svalakṣaṇa*, but that, nonetheless, via these mentally created objects we do gain knowledge about *svalakṣaṇa*.

2) In the immediately preceding passage to k. 5, Dignāga had made a distinction between two types of inference, depending upon whether the object is empirical or non-empirical, arguing that in the former case we can apply names to what is empirical, but in the latter case we only have a concept (*mam par rtog pa = vikalpa*) and do not cognize the *svalakṣaṇa* object.⁵⁷

3) An opponent then tries to find an absurdity, saying that in that case authoritative statements about imperceptible objects would just express the conceptually invented object and not the real particular at all: hence there would be no difference between authoritative and unauthoritative statements.

4) Dignāga then replies that authoritative statements about heaven and the like do not express *just* the conceptually invented object: they are similar to normal inference because they too are non-belying with regard to the real particular. For, although the heavens and so forth are beyond our sense range, authoritative people have directly seen them and hence were able to apply the words "heaven", etc. Dignāga then says, "This position refutes inferences with regard to natures such as *pradhāna* and so forth." In other words, the word "*pradhāna*" has never been applied by an authoritative person to a real particular.

5) His conclusion from all this is to restate his general view, now safe from attack: "therefore, the object of inference is not a *svalakṣaṇa*."

It should be clear that this interpretation of Dignāga differs from that of Hayes and does not support the view that Dignāga was essentially agnostic on scripturally-known matters. At least on the question of scriptural authority I see no reason to make a split between Dignāga, on the one hand, and Dharmakīrti, the perverter of Dignāga's thought, on the other, but then, in general, I confess that I am very reluctant to accept R. Herzberger's account of the supposed "differences" in their philosophy of language and *apoha* too. But *that* is something which (apart from a few remarks in Appendix I) will basically have to be put on hold for the present. At any rate, there seems to me little reason to question *across the board* the whole legitimacy of speaking of the Buddhist Epistemologists as being a unified school thought; and if that is so, then circumspectly using Dharmakīrti's, Dignāga's and Dharmapāla's works to explain each others' thought must be unobjectionable.

⁵⁷ PSV(a) P 29b5-6: *sgra yañ yul thun moñ ma yin pa dañ 'brel pa'i yod pa ma yin pas mnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag par brtag par bya ste / mthoñ ba'i don ma mthoñ ba'i don no // de la mthoñ ba'i don la miñ bstan pa'o** / *ma mthoñ ba'i don la ni mam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' 'zig ste / don gyi bye brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no* /* I follow PSV(b) and PST here. PSV(a) reads: *de la mthoñ ba'i don mi gsal bar byed pa'o*.

II. THE PROBLEM OF SCRIPTURAL AUTHORITY

Having thus attempted to define a stance on these methodological preliminaries, let me now turn to what I maintain became the predominant Buddhist interpretation in the problem of appeals to authority, namely, an approach which we find in Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* XII and its commentators and which, according to some insightful remarks of Tsoṅ kha pa, is precisely the same thought developed in the Epistemological school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The approach is of some philosophical interest in that it seeks to resolve the inevitable tension between scripture⁵⁸ and reason in a way which permits certain "propositions of faith", but nonetheless retains a rationalistic orientation and extreme parsimony with regard to acceptable means of knowledge. At the end of this chapter we shall attempt a brief analysis as to how far it succeeds, but first the details.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ In what follows the difference between *āgama* ("scriptures") and *śāstra* ("treatises") is of no consequence. Also, as Dharmakīrti argues in PV IV k. 93-107 (Sāṅkṛtyāyana's heading: *āgamasvavacanayos tulyabalatā*), there is no essential difference in the force or trustworthiness of one's own words and those of scripture. The same evaluative procedures apply to both.

⁵⁹ The general problem of the soteriology of the Epistemological school is treated in numerous publications, notably Steinkellner (1982), and Vetter (1964), (1984). Particularly important is the opening verse of PS and PV II's comment on this verse. See Nagatomi (1959), Hattori (1968a) p. 23 et seq. and 74 et seq., Inami and Tillemans (1986), Franco (1989) pp. 82-84. Worthwhile pursuing in this connection is Franco's suggestion (p. 84 and n. 8) that the key term in this verse, viz. *pramāṇabhūta*, finds parallels in the *Mahābhāṣya*, where Pāṇini is so called. On Dharmakīrti's and the early Naiyāyika's view of scriptural authority, cf. the recently published book of V.A. van Bijlert (1989), pp. 16-19, 30-34, 80-82 and 122-125.

An earlier version of this chapter appeared in an article in *Tetsugaku*, the *Journal of Hiroshima University's Philosophical Society*. See Tillemans (1986a): "Dharmakīrti, Āryadeva and Dharmapāla on Scriptural Authority". In that article as well as in the present chapter, I, like most writers on these subjects, deliberately treat the problem of authority from a theoretical and philosophical point of view. I am, however, aware that the problem is not *just* theoretical, but has important sociological and political dimensions as well. Indeed, as may even be implicit in both Candrakīrti's commentary on CS XII, k. 294 (see §64) and Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XII, k. 280, one of the motivations for trying to prove that a teacher was trustworthy on matters beyond the range of the senses was to defuse opponents' criticisms about the impropriety of his behaviour or the questionable behaviour of certain monks. The dark side of it all is that the Buddhist's theoretical argumentation about *āyanta-parokṣa* was probably fairly frequently misused to rationalize power-politics and

A. The Epistemological school's position

As discussed in the previous chapter, the key elements in the Epistemologists' position are to be found in *kārikā* 5 of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. They were subsequently given a sophisticated development by Dharmakīrti in the *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* chapters of *Pramāṇavārttika* (i.e. PV I and PV IV respectively).

Pramāṇasamuccaya II (*Svārthānumāna*) k. 5a:

"Because authoritative words (*āptavāda*) are similar in not belying, they are [classified as] inference."⁶⁰

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛttikā to PS II k. 5a:

"Authoritative words which concern completely imperceptible things (*śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i yul can* = *atyantaparokṣaviśayin*) are similar in being non-belying to the other authoritative words which concern states of affairs seen by direct perception and inference. Therefore, they are [classified as] inferences. Such is the meaning of [Dignāga's] statement."⁶¹

Pramāṇavārttika I (*Svārthānumāna*) k. 215, 216, 217:

"A [treatise's]⁶² being non-belying [means that] there is no invalidation of its two [kinds of] propositions concerning empirical and unempirical things by direct perception or by the two sorts of inference [viz. inference which functions by the force of reality (*vastubalapravṛtta*) and inference which is based on scripture (*āgamāśrita*)⁶³]." (k.215)⁶⁴

corruption by saying that such-and-such things are too subtle for us to understand or criticize. Certainly amongst Tibetans the Tantric precept that the one should transform all "apparent" faults of the master into virtues because his purposes are too subtle for us to perceive was and still is being widely abused.

⁶⁰ See the previous chapter p. 22 for Sanskrit text and Appendix I, §a and §b for PSV.

⁶¹ PST P. 104a5-6: *yid ches pa'i tshig śin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i yul can ni cig śos mñon sum dan rjes su dpag pas mthoñ ba'i don gyi yul can gyi yid ches pa'i tshig dan mi bslu bar mshuñs pa ñid kyi phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid do źes pa ñag gi don no l*.

⁶² Cf. PVSV-ṭīkā: 392,15: *asya śāstrasyāviśaṃvādaḥ*.

⁶³ PVSV-ṭīkā: 392,14-15: *...anumānena ca dvividhena vastubalapravṛttenāgamāśritena ca ...* Cf. also PVV ad k. 215.

⁶⁴ *pratyakṣenānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭā dṛṣṭārthayor asyāviśaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ ||*. Van Bijlert (1989) p. 123 seems to have gotten this wrong, which adversely affects the clarity of his exposé. He translates: "The trustworthiness of this [useful sentence] about visible and invisible things which are [i.e. can

"As authoritative words are similar in not belying, the understanding of their imperceptible (*parokṣa*) object is also termed an inference, for [otherwise] there would be no way [to know such objects⁶⁵]." (k.216)⁶⁶

"Or, they do not belie with regard to the principal point [viz. the four noble truths⁶⁷], for the nature of what is to be rejected and what is to be realized as well as the method is acknowledged. Therefore [the understanding arising from the Buddha's words can properly] be an inference in the case of the other things [too, i.e. completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*) objects⁶⁸]." (k.217)⁶⁹

Now, first of all, the usual types of inferences which we associate with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, such as those of sound's impermanence and the like, are said to be *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* in that they derive their truth from the fact that the reason, being a product (*ḥtakatva*), is in reality, or objectively, related with the property, impermanence, and qualifies the subject sound. However, an important point which needs to be clear is that in spite of the numerous passages in which these authors talk about one state of affairs proving another, or, in the case of Dharmakīrti, about essential connections (*svabhāvavapratibandha*) between the terms in an inference, it is not so that every inference functions by the force of reality (*vastubalapravṛtta*).⁷⁰ *Vastubalapravṛtta* is certainly an unbending requirement for the normal or "straightforward" type

be] objects of the [two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference], consists in the fact that [the information contained in such a sentence] is neither contradicted by perception nor by twofold inference." In fact, *tadarthayoh* and *drṣṭāḍṣārthayor* are not to be connected with *avisamvāda*, but rather with *abādhanam*, as we see in PVV and very clearly in PV Tib: *mthoñ dan ma mthoñ dños po yi // don de dag la mñon sum dan // rjes su dpag mam gñis kyis kyar // gnod med 'di yi mi slu ba'o //*. See n. 75 for dGe 'dun grub pa's *Tshad ma mam 'grel legs par bsad pa*, which shows the Tibetan's understanding of the syntax of k. 215.

⁶⁵ Vibhūticandra comments on PVV's (p. 365) phrase *agatyānumānatokā: ato 'nyathā parokṣe pravṛtīyasambhavāt*.

⁶⁶ *āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyād anumānatā / buddher agatyābhihiitā parokṣe 'py* asya gocare //*. *PVV reads *nisiddhapy*. But cf. Tib. *lkog gyur na'arī = parokṣe 'py*.

⁶⁷ Cf. PVSV 109,15-16: *heyopādeyatadupāyānām tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisamvādaḥ / yathā caturthām āryasatyānām vakṣyamāṇanītyā* /...* * PVSV-ṭikā reads *vakṣyamāṇayā nītyā*.

⁶⁸ Cf. PVV ad k. 217: *paratrātyantaparokṣe 'py arthe bhagavadvacanād utpannam jñānam anumānam yuktaṃ ihi vā pakṣāntaram /*.

⁶⁹ *heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ / pradhānārthāvisamvādād anumānam paratra vā //*.

⁷⁰ Cf. for example PV IV k. 15: *arthād arthagateḥ*, etc. See Tillemans (1987). For Dharmakīrti's development of the notion of *svabhāvavapratibandha* ("essential connections"), see Katsura (1986a) pp. 96-107 and the English summaries in (1986a) pp. 121-122 and (1986b) pp. 13-14; classic sources on *svabhāvavapratibandha* are to be found in passages such as PVSV ad PV I, k. 14; see Steinkellner (1971), (1984) and Matsumoto (1981).

of inferences with which we are familiar, but, as we see in PV I k. 215, there are also inferences based on scripture, that is to say, a scriptural passage rather than a state of affairs is given as the reason. The question then easily arises as to (a) which sorts of scriptural passages can be used in such inferences, and (b) how the admittance of scriptural proofs can be harmonized with the general tenor of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's thought, which is, no doubt, oriented towards *vastubalapratyātūmāna*.

Let us begin with (b). The Epistemological school solves this problem by introducing three sorts of objects: perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), imperceptible (*parokṣa*) and completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*).⁷¹ The first sort consists of those things such as form (*rūpa*), vases, etc. which are accessible to direct perception, the second being things (such as impermanence, selflessness [*nairātmya*], etc.) which can be proven through the usual *vastubala* kind of inference. The third kind, however, are objects such as the different heavens (*svarga*) or the details of the operation of the law of karma, all of which are, of course, inaccessible to direct perception, but also cannot be proven by citing some or another state of affairs as a reason: in short, we might say that they are beyond the limits of *ordinary* rationality. A slight complication which should perhaps be cleared up at this point is that Dharmakīrti often uses *parokṣa*, a term which also has an extremely important place in PS II and PV III (*Pratyakṣa*), in the sense of *atyantaparokṣa*.⁷² However we see in the commentaries that what is at stake in PV I k. 216 — as well as in PS II k. 5 — is indeed *atyantaparokṣa*, and moreover, it is abundantly clear from certain passages elsewhere (in PV IV) that Dharmakīrti himself did explicitly accept this threefold division of objects.⁷³

⁷¹ In my (1986a) article I chose different translations, i.e. "evident", "obscure" and "extremely obscure", arguing on p. 44, n. 12 that literalness was impossible because "it is anomalous in English to make a difference between 'imperceptible', and 'extremely imperceptible': there are no degrees of imperceptibility. (Cf. the problem of translating the Tibetan term *curi zad lkog gyur* by 'a little bit imperceptible!') This time I choose to bite the bullet, essentially because the discussion of *pratyakṣa* in the next chapter demands that I stay literal.

⁷² E.g. PV I k. 216.

⁷³ In k. 216, its *Svaṃtū* and subsequently, Dharmakīrti does not himself use the term *atyantaparokṣa*, but his commentators Manorathanandin and Kaṇhakagomin do. (Cf. PVV and PVSU-ṭīkā ad k. 216) However, it is clear from passages such as PV IV k. 51 (*ṛṇīyasthānaśaṃkrāntau nyāyāḥ śāstraparigrahaḥ*) that Dharmakīrti does accept the threefold classification. *Ṛṇīyasthāna* refers to *atyantaparokṣa*. Cf. also k. 50 where Dharmakīrti speaks of the first two sorts of objects: *tathā viśuddhe viśayadvaye śāstraparigraham / cikīrṣoḥ sa hi kālaḥ syāt tadā śāstreṇa bādhanam* // PVV ad k. 50: *śāstropadarśite viśayadvaye pratyakṣaparokṣe rūpanairātmyādaḥ tadā pramāṇapratyāyā viśuddhe nirṇite sati paścād atyantaparokṣe svargādaḥ śāstreṇa śāstrāśrayeṇānumānaṃ cikīrṣoḥ sataḥ sa hi kālo 'bhyupagamasya' yadi śāstrabādhō na bhavet* /. "Suppose that the two [types of] objects taught in a treatise -viz. perceptible and imperceptible [objects], such as form and selflessness, etc.- are ascertained by *pramāṇas* as faultless. Then subsequently, when one wishes to make an inference concerning completely imperceptible [objects] such as heaven, etc. by means of a treatise, i.e. by recourse to a treatise, then if the treatise is not invalidated, this would indeed be the occasion to accept it."

*Sāṅkṛtyāyana: *abhyupagamyā*. Cf. PVBh 505,4: *sa hi kālaḥ syād abhyupagamasya*. Finally note that in the usual Dharmakīrtian interpretation of PS II k. 5a and PSV by Jinendrabuddhi, we find the term *śin tu lkog gyur* =

So what Dharmakīrti and Dignāga do is to limit the scope of scripturally based inferences to cases where the object is *atyantaparokṣa*, and hence beyond the range of ordinary ratiocination. By means of this strict delimitation, the theory that ordinary inference must be objectively grounded can be preserved, for this will be a requirement of logical reasoning which applies to the first two kinds of objects, viz. *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. The Epistemologist can also at the same time distance himself from the non-Buddhist schools' use of scripture: in effect the error which a Mīmāṃsaka or Sāṃkhya makes in citing scriptural passages as a means of proof (*sādhana*) is that they apply scriptural arguments to propositions, such as sound's impermanence, etc., which can and should be decided by *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, and which are not at all outside the bounds of ordinary ratiocination.⁷⁴

As for question (a), viz. the kinds of scriptural passages which can be used, Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga, if we read him via Jinendrabuddhi's commentary) introduces what Tibetan scholastics would come to call "the threefold analysis" (*dpyad pa gsum*) for testing as to whether particular scriptures (*luṅ* = *āgama*) are sound bases for inference.⁷⁵ Specifically, as PV I k. 215 makes clear, such a scripture must be unrefuted

atyantaparokṣa.

⁷⁴ Cf. e.g. PV IV k. 2 and our commentary in Tillemans (1986b).

⁷⁵ Cf. e.g. rGyal tshab rje's commentary (*rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*) to k. 215, Vol. I pp. 177-8, where the three criteria in k. 215 are presented as a formal reasoning (*sbyor ba* = *prayoga*): *śin tu lkog gyur ston pa'i bcom ldan 'das kyi gsuñ chos can / rañ gi bstan bya la mi slu ba yin te / dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i luṅ yin pa'i phyir /*. ("Take as the topic the speech of the Illustrious One which describes completely imperceptible [objects]; it does not belie with regard to the [states of affairs] described, because it is a scripture which is [judged] immaculate through the three [kinds of] analyses."). Cf. dGe 'dun grub pa, *Tshad ma mam 'grel legs par bśad pa* p. 58 on k. 215: *luṅ de bstan bya'i don la ji ltar mi slu ze na / khyad par gsum ldan gyi luṅ 'di chos can / bstan bya'i don la mi slu ba yin te / dpyad gsum gyis dag pa'i luṅ yin pa'i phyir te / mhoñ ba mñon gyur dan lkog gyur la mñon sum dan rjes dpag dan / ma mhoñ ba śin tu lkog gyur gyi dños po'i don de dag la yid ches rjes dpag gis kyañ gnod pa med pa'i luṅ yin pa'i phyir /*. These are more or less standard versions of what in *rTags rigs* literature is categorized as a "reason based on authority" (*yid ches kyi rtags*). Interestingly enough, this literature then goes on to treat such reasons along the same lines of other types of valid reasons, classifying them in terms of effect (*kārya*), essential property (*svabhāva*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhī*). Cf. Yoris 'dzin *rtags rigs*, ed. Onoda p. 46. On the Tibetan interpretations see also Ruegg (1969) p. 229 n. 2 and van der Kuijp (1979) pp. 4-5.

Note that here it is not actually the words of a suitably tested scripture which prove or refute anything but rather the fact that the words pass the three tests: the reason used is *dpyad gsum gyis dag pa'i luṅ*, and it is this reason which can be said to have the necessary connection with the property to be proved. There does, however, seem to be a position which took the *prayoga* differently, citing an actual scriptural passage as the reason. Tibetan texts speak of an Indian Buddhist debate on the question as to whether the scripture itself can refute or invalidate (*gnod byed*) opposite propositions or can only create an "impediment" (*gegs byed*) to them — the debate between *luṅ gnod byed du 'dod pa'i lugs* and *luṅ gegs byed du 'dod pa'i lugs*. The former position was apparently held by some followers of Dignāga who maintained that the scripture itself could both refute and prove. See dGe 'dun grub pa's *Tshad ma rigs pa'i rgyan*, pp. 268-269: *slob dpon phyogs glañ gis / luṅ mam dag ran lugs la brjod bya sgrub pa'i rtags yañ dag tu mi bžed kyañ / re žig gžan nior* brjod bya sgrub pa'i rtags yañ dag yin pa'i mam gžag mdzad pa la 'khrul nas / slob dpon gyi slob ma kha cig na re*

by direct perception and by *vastubalapravṛttānumāna*, and cannot come into contradiction with other propositions whose truth is scripturally inferred. Put in this way it might seem that what is being said is simply that the scripture cannot be refuted by *any pramāṇa* or that it cannot come into conflict with any of the other three kinds of objects. However, the point at stake, as we find it elaborated in PV I k. 216, the *Sva-vṛtti* and Karmakagomin's *Ṭikā*, is more subtle and is essentially an argument by analogy: the scripture's assertions concerning perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and imperceptible (*parokṣa*) objects do not belie, and so, *similarly*, its assertions about completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*) objects, if not internally inconsistent, should also be trustworthy. The same type of analogical argument is given an alternative formulation in the next *kārikā* when Dharmakīrti says that because the (Buddhist) scriptures do not belie concerning the principal points, viz. the four noble truths, they should also be authoritative on completely imperceptible matters. The four noble truths are accessible to proof by *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* — as we see in the second chapter of PV — and thus, as these propositions in the Buddhist scriptures are trustworthy, so the others should be too.

In short, scriptural argumentation — when applied to *atyantaparokṣa* objects, which is its only proper domain — is an inference: there is no need to postulate an additional *pramāṇa* such as the *śabda* ("testimony"), etc. of certain Hindu schools. It is,

*/ luñ mam dag de rañ gi brjod bya sgrub pa'i rtags yañ dag dañ log phyogs la gnod byed yin te / g'zal bya'i gnas dañ po gñis la dpyad pa dag nas / sbyin sogs dkar po'i chos ni tshes 'phos nas bde ba ster ba dañ sdug bsñal ster** ba la 'jug ldog bya dgos la / 'jug ldog byed pa de'i gzi tshad mas grub dgos siñ / luñ las gzan pa'i sgrub byed yañ dag med pa'i phyir / gal te luñ gnod byed min na gags byed du yañ mi 'gyur te / gags byas pa'i gzi tshad mas ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'jes zer ro //* *Text has *dor*. **Text: *stor*. "Although the Master, Dignāga, did not hold that immaculate scriptures, in our own tradition, are valid reasons for establishing their content, still a disciple of the Master once went astray on the position that [scriptural passages] are valid reasons for establishing their content to the opponent and argued as follows: 'An immaculate [passage of] scripture is a valid reason for establishing its content and does invalidate the opposite [of what it says]. This is so because after the analyses of the first and second sort of *prameya*, one then must affirm and negate [the respective propositions] that giving, etc. will bring happiness or will bring suffering in subsequent lives — the basis for these affirmations and negations must be established by means of a *pramāṇa*, and [yet] apart from scripture there is no other valid *sādhana*. If scripture were not something which invalidates then it would not create an impediment either, for the basis for being an impediment would not be established by a *pramāṇa*."

As dGe 'dun grub pa makes clear further on, an advocate of this position would give a quite different type of *prayoga* to prove imperceptible state of affairs. He would say (ibid. p. 271): *sbyin sogs chos can / spyad pa las bde ba 'byuñ ba ste / spyad pa las bde ba 'byuñ bar luñ las gsuris pa'i phyir /*. "Take as the subject giving, etc.; happiness arises from their practice, because it is said in scripture that happiness arises from their practice." Dharmakīrti's own position on the actual formulation of the *prayoga* is not clear. In PV IV 98-100 his main point seems to be that words themselves can at most conflict or "impede" each other when there is no *pramāṇa*. There is no doubt that he does himself say in PV IV k. 95 that Dignāga thought that a treatise can an invalidator (*bādhaka*), but this does not necessarily mean that he would be partial to the second sort of *prayoga*.

Georges Dreyfus, in a chapter of his Ph.D thesis (U. of Virginia), will give an in depth account of the *luñ gnod byed / luñ gags byed* debate in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, with explanations of the respective positions of gSer mdog pañ chen Śākya mchog ldan (i.e. *luñ gnod byed*) and mKhas grub rje (*luñ gags byed*).

however, a rather special, indirect case in that it turns on an analogy which presupposes the use and correctness of direct perception and *vastubalapraṇṭītanumāna*.

B. Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti

A remarkable point in this connection is that the Tibetan writer Tsoñ kha pa blo bzañ grags pa (1357-1419) in his *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ chen mo* and *sNags rim chen mo* noticed that Dharmakīrti's PV I k. 217cd resembles k. 280 in chapter XII of Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* (i.e. "CS").⁷⁶ Tsoñ kha pa was followed in this by rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432), who also remarked that CS k. 280 was the same reasoning as found in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (*phyogs glañ yab sras*); subsequently, the Mongolian, A lag śa Ṇag dbaṅ bstan dar (1759-1840)⁷⁷, in his *sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gnam*, elaborated on the two verses, paraphrasing them into an identical formal reasoning (*prayoga*), and citing them in his proof that the Buddha is a "person of authority" (*tshad ma'i skyes bu*).⁷⁸ This latter author obviously follows Tsoñ kha pa's thought, but — what is less obvious in Tsoñ kha pa — Ṇag dbaṅ bstan dar markedly relies on Candrakīrti's commentary to CS k. 280 where the correctness of the Buddha's teaching on voidness is said to be an example (*dr̥ṣānta*) on the basis of which we can infer correctness in otherwise rationally inaccessible imperceptible matters, an argument which we saw was also implicit in PV IV k. 216-217.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ See *Tshad ma'i brjed byañ chen mo* pp. 158-159 where Tsoñ kha pa cites these two verses together and says that they show the same way (*tshul mtshuñs pa*) to prove completely imperceptible states of affairs. For a similar discussion on these two verses, see *sNags rim chen mo*, pp. 7, line 3 - 9, line 5 (ff. 4a-5a), transl. Hopkins (1977), pp. 88-90.

⁷⁷ Dates given by the Mongolian scholar, T. Damdinsüren.

⁷⁸ For rGyal tshab, see his *bZi brgya pa'i mam bśad*, p. 5: *spyi'i mam gźag ni phyogs glañ yab sras kyis bśad pa dañ / śiñ rta chen po mams 'dra bar yod do* /. Cf. also *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. I p. 179. For *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, see Steinkellner (1983) and the references therein. Cf. also M. Inami and T. Tillemans (1986) p. 128 and n. 12 for the triple division of *tshad ma* (= *pramāṇa*) into *śes pa* ("consciousness"), *ñag* ("speech") and *skyes bu* ("person").

⁷⁹ See *Tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gnam*, pp. 43-44: *de luñ gis ci ltar sgrub ce na / sañs rgyas kyis gto bo'i don ñes legs ji ltar gsuñs pa ltar du mi bslu bar dños stobs rigs pas bsgrubs nas de mthun dper byas te phal ba'i don mñon mtho gsuñs pa la'añ mi bslu bar sgrub par byed pa yin pas / de yañ sbyin pa las loñs spyod dañ tshul khirms las bde ba 'byuñ bar gsuñs pa'i sañs rgyas kyi gsuñ chos can / rañ gi bstan bya'i don la mi bslu ste / dpyad pa gsum gyis dag pa'i luñ yin pa'i phyir / dper na sañs rgyas kyis gañ zag gi bdag 'dzin zad pa'i ñes legs ji skad gsuñs pa ltar mi bslu ba bzin źes pa'i tshul gyis sgrub par byed pa'am / yañ na brjod bya gto bo ñes legs tshad mas grub nas / de dañ rñom pa po gcig yin pa'i rñags kyis brjod bya phal ba mñon mtho ston pa la'añ mi bslu bar sgrub par byed de / gto bo'i don gsuñs pa la mi bslu ba'i tshad ma'i skyes bu phal ba'i don gsuñs pa la bslu mi rigs pa'i phyir / **rañ don le'u** las /*

blañ dañ dor bya'i de ñid ni //

While it seems impossible to definitively establish lines of transmission here, it is not at all unlikely that Dharmakīrti was aware of Āryadeva's thought, and made use of certain elements via the commentary of Dharmapāla, a hypothesis which becomes even more seductive if we accept Tāranātha's account that Dharmapāla was a guru of Dharmakīrti.⁸⁰ The details of the external history will, no doubt, elude us, but the internal historian's approach of finding a common program between the Epistemologists and the Mādhyamikas is certainly insightful. However, are we to say that the Tibetans had a "flash of genius" (to use E. Steinkellner's term) in intellectually putting together two otherwise separate traditions, as they did with their notion of *tshad ma'i skyes bu*, combining the path-theory of the *Bodhipathapradīpa* with the *pramāṇa* tradition?⁸¹ What seems more likely to me is that the members of the sixth and seventh century Epistemological and Madhyamaka schools were in fact very familiar with and referred to each other's works on these questions. Let us look at k. 280 with Dharmapāla's commentary.

After Dharmapāla has argued that the doctrines of the non-Buddhist Outsiders (*wài dào* 外道) contain various faults and untruths, the Outsider then objects:

thabs bcas rab tu rjes pa yis //
gso bo'i don la mi bslu'i phyir //
gzan la rjes su dpag pa yin // [PV I k. 217]
žes dan / bži brgya pa las kyañ /
sarīs rgyas kyis gsuīs lkog gyur la //
gañ žig the tshom skye 'gyur ba //
de yi(s) ston pa ñid bsten te //
'di ñid kho nar yid ches bya // [CS XII, k. 280]
žes gsuīs pa bžin no //

Translation:

"How is the [Buddha's account of the cause of superior rebirths] proven by means of scripture? Having first proven by reasonings [functioning] through the force of reality (*vastubala*) that the principal matter, viz. what is supremely excellent [such as liberation, and enlightenment], is non-belying as the Buddha explained it, one takes this as a homologous example (*sādharmyaadṛṣṭānta*) and proves that the explanation of the secondary meaning, i.e. superior rebirths, is also non-belying. Thus, taking as the subject [of the argument] the Buddha's statements asserting that wealth arises from giving and happiness from moral discipline, [these statements] are non-belying with regard to their expressed meaning, because they are scriptural citations which are [judged] immaculate through the three types of analysis, just as Buddha's explanation of the supreme excellence consisting in the elimination of grasping at the self is non-belying. In such a way is [the Buddha's account of superior rebirths] proven [by scripture.] Alternatively, when the principal explicandum, i.e. supreme excellence, has been proven by a *pramāṇa*, then using the reason that the author is the same, one proves that the teaching on the secondary subject, viz. superior rebirths, is also non-belying. For, it is logical that a person of authority who is non-belying in explaining the principal matters should be non-belying in explaining secondary matters. [The author then cites PV I, k. 217 and CS XII, k. 280]"

⁸⁰ See fn. 26. Other arguments in Dharmapāla seem to be taken up in Dharmakīrti too. See en. 44. Furthermore, there is no doubt as to Dharmapāla's proximity to the Epistemological school.

⁸¹ See Steinkellner (1983) p. 281.

"(216c3) [Objection:] In that case, the noble teaching in the Tripiṭaka of the Tathāgata [also] sometimes has statements which are scarcely believable, and so all the Insiders' and the Outsiders' texts would be untrustworthy; thus a gross absurdity (*tài guò shī* 太過失 = *atiprasaṅga*) would ensue. How so? [Because] in the Buddha's sūtras are mentioned various miraculous transformations (*shén biàn* 神變 = *vikurvaṇa*; *ṛddhi*) which are unimaginable. Or [these sūtras] speak about states of affairs which are extremely profound (*shèn shēn* 甚深 = *atyantaparokṣa*(?)) truths (*zhēn shí* 真實 = *tattva*); no sentient beings fathom [these things]. [...]

(216c20) [Reply:] Phenomena, if they merely existed, could indeed give rise to [such types of] doubts. But phenomena are also void. Hence [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

When someone entertains doubt concerning the profound (shēn 深 = parokṣa; Tib. lkog gyur) things taught by the Buddha, then he can rely on the voidness which is free of all [defining] characters, and [can thus] gain sure faith. (k.280)⁸²

The point is that the correctness of the Buddha's teaching on voidness, which is accessible to ordinary inferential understanding, should lead one to believe that his teachings on matters inaccessible to such inferences are also correct. It is interesting to note that the Sanskrit of Āryadeva's verse employs the term *parokṣa*, which is translated into Chinese as *shēn* 深 "profound". In Dharmapāla's commentary we see him using the term *shèn shēn* 甚深 in this context, which might thus seem to be the equivalent here of *atyantaparokṣa*, although such an equivalent is not to my knowledge attested elsewhere and usually *shèn shēn* (and *shēn* 深 alone) translate *gambhīra*. At any rate, whether the equivalence is *gambhīra* or *atyantaparokṣa* is not of very great importance: it is clear that the use of *parokṣa* / *shēn* at stake in Āryadeva and Dharmapāla, just as in Dharmakīrti's k. 216 and Jinendrabuddhi's comment on PS II k. 5, does refer to propositions inaccessible to direct perception and ordinary inference.

The similarities between Dharmakīrti and Dharmapāla's approaches become even more striking when we look at the argumentation in the subsequent *kārikā* in the *Catuhśataka* and Dharmapāla's commentary. Āryadeva gives a kind of contraposed version of the reasoning in CS k. 280, arguing that because the Outsiders are mistaken on objects which are accessible to inference, then they must also be mistaken on those which are not. Dharmapāla, at this point, launches into a long refutation of the Vaiśe-

⁸² Transl. according to the Chinese. Cf. the Skt. *buddhokteṣu parokṣeṣu jāyate yasya saṃśayaḥ / ihaiva pratyayas tena kartavyaḥ śūnyatām prati*.

"When someone entertains doubt concerning the imperceptible [things] (*parokṣa*) taught by the Buddha, he should develop conviction in these very things on account of voidness (*śūnyatā*)".

Note that the Tibetan interprets *śūnyatām prati* as "on the basis of voidness" or "relying on voidness": *de yis ston pa ñid bten te // 'di ñid kho nar yid ches bya //*.

śika's metaphysical categories (*padārtha*) and the Sāṃkhya's theory of the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*) and the three qualities (*guṇa*) to show that the Outsiders are indeed hopelessly mistaken in their accounts of rationally analyzable objects, and hence cannot be trusted in their accounts of what is unanalyzable and is essentially more difficult to comprehend. Not only is this completely consonant with Dharmakīrti's approach in PV I k. 215-16, but conspicuously, Dharmakīrti in the *Svavṛtti* to k. 215 explicitly mentions the three qualities and the Vaiśeṣika categories of substance, motion, universals, etc. as being prime examples of refutable objects.

C. Some final remarks on appeals to authority

It may be thought that in fact this Buddhist position, which is common to both the Madhyamaka and Epistemological schools, is not novel at all, but is already found in earlier Nyāya thought. It is true that elements of this approach to scriptural authority are no doubt also present in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, notably, the fact that a scripture's trustworthiness depends upon evaluative tests rather than on the eternalness of the words (as Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas maintain)⁸³, and that accuracy in one area leads one to infer accuracy in others. Gautama and Vātsyāyana, for example, appeal to the observed trustworthiness of the Vedas on medicine (*āyurveda*) and spells (*mantra*): the authors of these texts are trustworthy in empirical matters in that we see that they have altruistic motivation and describe phenomena accurately; hence their words are trustworthy in all other matters too, empirical or not.⁸⁴

Dharmakīrti, in PV IV's commentary on Dignāga's definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*), however, adds many more details to the Nyāya position from what we find in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*'s explanation of NS 2.1.69, with the result that the contrast between the Buddhist's orientation and the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is better brought out. The essential difference is that the Buddhist restricts scripture to only *atyantaparokṣa* phenomena, with the result that for all other types of phenomena he remains critical and does not accept any appeals to authority whatsoever; if we believe Dharmakīrti's characterization of the Naiyāyika, the latter fails to make this delimitation, thus mixing the domains of reason and dogma. And indeed this is not an unfair

⁸³ For Dharmapāla's criticisms of the Mīmāṃsakas see his commentary to CS XII, k. 294 and en. 124; for further criticisms of the Mīmāṃsakas and Grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*), see his commentary to CS XIII, k. 306cd. For Dharmakīrti, see PV I k. 213ff. See NS-bhāṣya to NS 2.1.69 for Vātsyāyana's arguments against the thesis that words are permanent and therefore trustworthy.

⁸⁴ Cf. NS 2.1.69: *mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyavac ca tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt* / NS-bhāṣya (p. 224): ... *evam āptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam / evam āptiḥ pramāṇam / dṛṣṭārthenāptopadeśenāyurvedenāḍṛṣṭārtho vedabhāgo 'numātavyaḥ pramāṇam* iii / *āptaprāmāṇyasya hetoḥ samānatvād* iii /. See the discussion in van Bijlert (1989) pp. 30-34 on Vātsyāyana (= Pakṣilasvāmin); ibid pp. 16-19 on the Naiyāyika *pramāṇa*, "testimony" (*śabda*), i.e. "the teaching of an authority" (*āptopadeśa*).

characterization: it is so that *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 defines the *pramāṇa*, testimony (*śabda*) as the "teaching of an authority" (*āptopadeśa*) and then proceeds to say in 1.1.8 that it is of two sorts according to whether the object is empirical or not (*sa dvividho dṛṣṭā dṛṣṭārthatvāt*) — scriptural statements are to be seen as specific cases of *śabda*.

Some representative elements of the discussion in PV IV where we see clearly that the general direction of Dharmakīrti's position (contrary to that of the Naiyāyika) is to eliminate the role of scripture in anything but *atyantaparakṣa* matters:

a) A treatise might ascribe various qualities to an entity, but it is only that quality intended by the proponent himself which is the proposition under discussion when he presents a reasoning. PV IV k. 42-47. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, maintains that any and all properties put forth in his treatise are also under discussion; thus, when one argues about the thesis of sound's impermanence, one also must be arguing about sound's being a quality of space (*ākāśaguṇa*) because that is the way sound is characterized in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises. Dharmakīrti rejects this completely: what one's own school's scriptures hold is simply irrelevant to the discussion.

b) PV IV 48-59. Dharmakīrti maintains that inferences which function due to the force of reality (*vastubalapravṛtta*) do not depend in any way on treatises. Naiyāyika: But if the proponent does not accept scriptural propositions, there would be no debate. Dharmakīrti: No, inferences are not engaged in because one accepts treatises; rather, they are themselves the *method* for deciding whether a treatise is valid or not. In short, Dharmakīrti wishes to avoid the circularity of relying on a treatise to examine whether that treatise should be accepted or not, and this he does by banishing all references to treatises from ordinary inference about rational matters.

c) PV IV k. 98-99. Scripture is no more authoritative in itself than one's own words. Unsubstantiated propositions, be they scriptural or otherwise, can only clash, but one does not refute the other. Thus, in the absence of a deciding *pramāṇa*, even if what one says is in contradiction with one's own scripture, this does not constitute a refutation. It is only when one proposition has a *pramāṇa* supporting it that it can refute the other.

Of course, Naiyāyika and Buddhist alike do accept some link between trustworthiness in one area and trustworthiness in another, but that is a relatively superficial and imprecise similarity. The Naiyāyika is allowing trustworthy scriptures to play a role in ordinary inferences about sound's impermanence, *ākāśaguṇatva*, etc., and in so doing he easily falls into circularity when he tests the scripture's truth, and risks refutation whenever the scripture conflicts with his own inferences. The Buddhist's approach, as we find it CS, PSV and PV, would avoid that circularity as well as the risk of refutation due to simple contradiction with dogma, in that it maintains the complete independence of *vastubala*-type inferences from scripture and relegates the use of scripture to a domain of objects where there can be no conflict with such inferences.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ It seems to me that the Buddhist approach also differs significantly from that of Bhartṛhari in that the former maintains the adequacy and primacy of logical analysis independent of scripture, whereas Bhartṛhari seems to have little confidence in the adequacy of such inferences. Cf. *Vākyapadīya* I, k. 34:

A closing remark of a critical nature. Once one understands the Buddhist position as found in CS and the Epistemologists, it is difficult to resist the impression that the Buddhist, especially as explained by Dharmakīrti, sets his standards almost impossibly high. It should be apparent that no one, Buddhist or non-Buddhist, can in practice inferentially or empirically test for himself all rationally analysable propositions on which he must make a decision. The result to which a Buddhist philosopher is led, therefore, is that his stringent standards force him into a type of skepticism about much of what we would wish to term "justified true belief" or "knowledge", for inevitably the majority of our knowledge about matters which are not at all *atyantaparakṣa* (such as e.g. geography, history, etc.) is not due to our own personal observations or inferences. (We do not, for example, observe or infer the rationally analysable truth that Columbus sailed with three ships to America: we read about it. Nonetheless, is it not reasonable to claim that we know this fact?)

Interestingly enough, some later Buddhist philosophers seem to accept this skeptical consequence, saying that in non-*atyantaparakṣa* matters, reliance on testimony, books or any other type of information apart from one's own direct perception and *vas-tubalapravṛttānumāna*, does *not* yield real knowledge, but rather, "true presumption" (*yid dpyod*), to use the epistemic category elaborated upon in the Tibetan scholastic. The eighteenth century writer A kya yōñs 'dzin clearly expresses this skepticism:

"Understanding (*go ba*) which just comes from hearing is mostly true presumption and thus one says that its continuum is not solid (*brtan po min*)."⁸⁶

yatnenānumito 'py arthaḥ kuśalair anumāṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate //

Transl. Biardeau: "Même si une chose a été inférée à grand labeur par d'habiles experts en inférence, elle peut l'être d'une autre manière par d'autres encore plus habiles." Cf., however, Hayes (1988), p. 253.

⁸⁶ See A kya yōñs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros' *Blo rigs kyi sdom tshig blañ dor gsal ba'i me lon*, Collected Works, Vol. I, p. 518: *thos byuñ tsam gyi go ba ni / phal cher yid dpyod yin pas na // de rgyun brtan po min zés gsus //*. For definitions of *yid dpyod*, see *ibid.* p. 518: *de yañ rañ yul bden pa la // gsar du zen pa'i tshad min blo // yid dpyod kyi ni' mshan ñid yin //*. "Now the defining characteristic of true presumption is that it is a cognition which is not a *pramāṇa*, but which newly conceives of its true object". Yōñs 'dzin *blo rigs*, p. 53, folio 15a, line 5 et seq: *rañ yul la zen pa'i* slu ba'i zen rig don mthun*. *Read *pa'i* instead of *pas*. The Tibetan Epistemologists classify true presumptions as based on contradictory reasons, unascertained reasons, or no reason at all apart from other peoples' say-so. The point, according to textbooks such as Yōñs 'dzin *blo rigs*, etc., is that *yid dpyod* is a correct cognition in that it is in accordance with reality (*don mthun*). However, it is not real knowledge in that it is not *mi bslu ba* (= *avisamvādin*): it cannot bring forth any certainty which would conclusively eliminate error. To take my "Columbus" example, this would probably be what Yōñs 'dzin phur bu lcog would term *rgyu mshan med pa'i yid dpyod* "true presumption where there is no reason". This has to be understood as meaning that the person in question believes something true on the basis of no reasons; it does not mean that there are no reasons at all for anyone. Cf. Yōñs 'dzin *blo rigs* p. 53, f. 15b: *dañ po ni / sgra mi rtag ces pa'i ñag tsam la brten nas sgra mi rtag 'dzin pa'i blo lia bu ste / sgra mi rtag ces pa'i ñag des sgra mi rtag pa'i dam bca' brjod kyi / rgyu mshan ma brjod pa'i phyir /*. "The first [sort] is like a mind which apprehends that sound is impermanent on the basis of the mere sentence 'sound is impermanent'. For, while the sentence 'sound is impermanent' does state the thesis that sound is impermanent, it does not state the reason."

Granted there is no specific technical term corresponding to our word "justified", but it is probably fair to say that the thrust of the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist system (as we see in Dharmakīrti as well as in the above quotation from a later writer) is that a belief is only justified for a person *X* if *X* himself has a *pramāṇa* which establishes that belief. If we take *that* understanding of "justification" coupled with the Buddhist account of *pramāṇas*, then most of what we "know" from simple hearing, reading, television or computer data-bases — cognitions which the A kya yōṅs 'dzin would have to call *yid dpyod* — could not be "justified true belief" for us. Certainly we do not personally have direct perception or *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* on most such matters. If, however, we say that it is not necessary for the person *himself* to have an inferential or perceptual *pramāṇa* on some matter in order to hold a justified belief, then it becomes rather hard to avoid something like a Nyāya account which would advocate reliance on trustworthy testimony, even in empirical matters.

"Knowledge", if we want Tibetan equivalents, would be *rtogs pa*, *rtogs pa'i blo*, which, as dGe lugs pas such as lCañ skya Rol pa'i rdo rje routinely point out, is a matter of "being able to elicit certainty which eliminates errors concerning the matter at hand" (*chos de la sgro 'dogs gcod pa'i nes ses 'dren nus pa*). Cf. lCañ skya grub mtha' p. 192: *de [= blo] la dbye na rtogs pa'i blo dan ma rtogs pa'i blo gñis su yod de / blo des chos de la sgro 'dogs gcod pa'i nes ses 'dren nus pa dan mi nus pa gñis su yod pa'i phyr /* "If one divides [cognition] there are two, knowledge and non-knowledge, for there are two [sorts] according to whether the cognition can or cannot elicit certainty which eliminates errors on the matter at hand." As for *yid dpyod*, it is classified as *ma rtogs pa'i blo*, i.e. it is not knowledge. A kya yōṅs 'dzin op. cit. 517: *blo rigs bdun las mñon rjes dan // bcad ses gsum po rtogs pa'i blo // gzan bži ma rtogs blo yin la //* "Among the seven sorts of cognition, perception, inference and subsequent cognition are knowledge (*rtogs pa'i blo*). The other four [viz. true presumption, erroneous cognition (*log ses*), doubt (*the tshom*) and inattentive cognition (*snañ la ma nes pa'i blo*)] are not knowledge."

Note that *rtogs pa'i blo* and *mi slu ba'i ses pa* are coextensive (*don gcig*) and span the same set of cognitions: if we adopt this dGe lugs pa position, they both will come to mean a cognition which is able to elicit sufficient certainty to eliminate error. It should be said, however, that this account of *yid dpyod* and *avisamvāda* is the prevailing dGe lugs textbook version, but was far from unanimously accepted; for intra-Tibetan debates about the meaning of *avisamvāda*, see the article by G. Dreyfus, "Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* and its interpreters", forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna. It is difficult to find any Indian sources where *avisamvādakatva* would be clearly interpreted in terms of a cognition possessing sufficient *certainty* to eliminate error. Dharmottara's position in his *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā* and in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* on PVin I 30, 17ff. (ed. Vetter) is, rather, to explain that a cognition which has *avisamvādakatva* makes one arrive at (*prāpaka*) the object in the real world to which it applies. See Durveka Miśra's *Dharmottapradīpa* 17, 13: *avisamvādakaṃ pravṛtṭiṣayavastuprāpakaṃ samyagjñānam iti*. See also note 54 for Dharmottara's explanation of *avisamvādakatva* as "reliability". The "reliability" of a cognition, then, seems to be grounded on *prāpakatva*. Cf. Steinkellner and Krasser (1989) pp. 75-76.

Finally, the term *yid dpyod* itself is probably due to the eleventh century thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seṅ ge who came up with so-called sevenfold classification of cognition (*blo rigs bdun du dbye ba*) in Tibetan Epistemology. See van der Kuijp (1978); on the latter author's translation of *yid dpyod* as "reflection-as-an-ego-act" in his (1978) and (1983), see n. 7 of my (1984a) review-article of van der Kuijp (1983).

III. CANDRAKĪRTI AND DHARMAPĀLA ON PERCEPTION

In what follows I intend to look at some aspects of Madhyamaka thought as seen via the perspectives of our commentators, namely, the status and role of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and the given. The subject of perception, which is extensively discussed in CS XIII and in the third chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (MMK), is approached from differing standpoints by the commentators on CS. Dharmapāla here clearly concentrates his attention on refuting Vaibhāṣika and non-Buddhist philosophies of perception and on showing the general impossibility of the sense organs, their objects and the contact between them. Candrakīrti, however, besides fulfilling his commentator's duties in explaining the verses of Āryadeva, was obviously inspired by a subject on which Dharmapāla and Āryadeva said little, viz. the etymology, defining characteristics and epistemic status of direct perception, themes which recur in other writings of Candrakīrti, notably the first chapter of the *Prasannapadā*, and could be said to pervade much of his philosophy. Let us then first take up Candrakīrti's views.⁸⁷

If Candrakīrti is to press forward his basic view — as we find it presented in texts such as *Catuhśatakavṛtti* XII — that nothing whatsoever is established by its own nature (*svabhāva*), he not only has to refute naïve realist views such as those of the Vaiśeṣika, but he equally must refute different idealist positions: these idealists refute external objects, but make a separation between perception and the conceptualization about what is perceived, the latter being the source of error. As we see in CSV XIII §9, Candrakīrti has a formidable adversary here in the Epistemological school, which holds that perception is *kalpanāpoḍha*, "free from conceptualization", and that it perceives inexpressible real particulars, or *svalakṣaṇa*.⁸⁸ The Epistemologist, in effect, takes a position which is common to many theorists East and West: he says that while

⁸⁷ I am indebted to articles by P. Williams (1979) and M. Broido (1988), who approach the problems from Tsoṅ kha pa's perspective. I have also profited from the recent book of D. Lopez (1987) on the dGe lugs account of Svātantrika. I have, however, in the following section deliberately kept my references largely to Indian material. For some of the problems seen from the dGe lugs pa approach, see also Tillemans (1982).

⁸⁸ On *svalakṣaṇa* see en. 366; for *kalpanā* see en. 367. Dharmakīrti subsequently elaborates the definition as *kalpanāpoḍha* plus *abhrānta* ("not mistaken"). In PV III, k. 123 he keeps simply *kalpanāpoḍha*: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva sidhyati* /. But in NB I, 4 he adds *abhrānta* to insist upon the fact that the definition also eliminates all illusory cognitions: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam* /.

the ideas we have about our data may be false, at least the data which immediately appear as given to our perception, if taken only for what they are, must be real and unassailable. The implicit move is what R. Rorty would call the Doctrine of the Naturally Given: Knowledge is, or reduces to, cognitions of the sort of entity naturally suited to be immediately present to consciousness; the added metaphysical premise is that "the most knowable is the most real" (Rorty 1980 p. 105). The Epistemologist does indeed hold that the *svalakṣaṇa*, which is what is knowable, must be of the same nature as the mind and is real. It is a cardinal position of his Vijñānavāda, found clearly in Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, that the object of knowledge must be mental and that mind knows itself (see p. 61 and fn. 131 below). Indeed, there is a frequently used reasoning — which T. Iwata has called the "*saṃvedana* inference" — to the effect that a cognized object cannot be different from the consciousness which cognizes it, simply because it is cognized: only what is of same nature as the cognizing consciousness can be cognized (see n. 131 below).

Philosophically speaking, the prime candidate for an immediately given entity naturally suited to be present to consciousness is often thought to be some form of a sense-datum or phenomenon, and indeed B.K. Matilal in his 1986 study on Indian philosophies of perception repeatedly refers to the Buddhist positions as being various types of phenomenalism or sense-data theory. Alas, what exactly a sense-datum is turns out to be rather difficult for philosophers to specify, so much so that many contemporary writers, after comparing the contradictory accounts on such things, would say that sense-data and the like are no more than a muddle and do not exist. Such reservations aside, it is important to have a feeling for the seductiveness of postulating sense-data; the Western version of such entities comes through most clearly in the so-called "arguments from illusion". Here is how A.J. Ayer once put it:

"Let us take as an example Macbeth's visionary dagger... There is an obvious sense in which Macbeth did not see a dagger; he did not see a dagger for the sufficient reason that there was no dagger there for him to see. There is another sense, however, in which it may quite properly be said that he did see a dagger; to say that he saw a dagger is quite a natural way of describing his experience. But still not a real dagger; not a physical object; not even the look of a physical object, if looks are open to all to see. If we are to say that he saw anything, it must have been something that was accessible to him alone, something that existed only so long as this particular experience lasted; in short, a sense-datum." (Ayer 1966, p. 90.)

In fact the key move, as Ayer points out further on (p. 96), is to pass from perfectly innocuous sentences like, "It now seems to me that I see a cigarette case" to the philosopher's rendition, "I am now seeing a seeming-cigarette case". To cite him again:

"And this seeming-cigarette case, which lives only in my present experience, is an example of a sense-datum. Applying this procedure to all cases of

perception, whether veridical or delusive, one obtains the result that whenever anyone perceives, or thinks that he perceives, a physical object, he must at least be, in the appropriate sense, perceiving a seeming-object. These seeming-objects are sense-data; and the conclusion may be more simply expressed by saying that it is always sense-data that are directly perceived."

Let us then in what follows understand by the term "the given", the sense-data, i.e. the phenomena or seeming-objects, which present themselves to our perception immediately, without intermediary and without there necessarily being any real or external object which caused them or to which they correspond. These sense-data can be of various sorts. Generally, they are considered to be mental entities, but indeed, as H.H. Price once argued (1950, pp. 317-318), certain phenomenologists took them as being neither mental nor physical. For our purposes we shall put the emphasis on their being seeming-objects, stressing that they are wholly mind-dependent, but allowing the possibility (as in some Svātantrika positions) that they are not classified as *mental entities* in the way in which, for example, a feeling of pain is said to be mental. Some philosophers of a reductionist inclination, such as Bertrand Russell or R. Carnap (see p. vii in the preface to the second edition of his *Logische Aufbau*), would take them as being the sensations specific to the individual senses of vision, hearing, touch, etc. — particular patches of blue, tickings of the clock, feelings of heat, etc. — while gross objects are constructs out of these sensations. Others, as we saw above, would speak of "objects" like Macbeth's dagger as being a sense-datum: Bishop Berkeley, for example, was of this latter sort and maintained that trees and stones (*qua* impressions) were directly perceived. We shall understand the term "sense-data" or "phenomenon" as including both sorts; reductionists tend to use the term more along the first lines, but the other position where one speaks of a sense-datum of an object such as a rose is frequent too. The Epistemologists, with their notion of *svalakṣaṇa*, seem to have been reductionists and to have professed something like the first sort of sense-data.⁸⁹ Below

⁸⁹ Cf. Candrakīrti's arguments against the logicians in Pr. 58.14-59.4 and CSV XIII ad k. 301. In effect, a main theme of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamaka* is a type of anti-reductionism, in which the Epistemologists are, no doubt, his principal adversaries. Cf. Carnap (1967) p. vi on the reductionist approach: "[I]t is in principle possible to reduce all concepts to the immediately given." The Buddhist Epistemologist analyzes away common gross objects, which he considers to be unreal conceptual fictions, and reduces them to the only thing he accepts as real, the *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the particular, inexpressible, momentary entities which are what one *really* sees in direct perception — all the rest is mental fabrication coming from conceptualizing. See en. 366 on *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.

A reductionist of this sort is clearly a redoubtable adversary, for he maintains that he accounts for the worldly truths while still being more sophisticated than the world. He can himself use the arguments showing inconsistencies in the gross entities accepted by the world to justify his own program; for him such arguments do not lead to the conclusion that *everything* is void or unreal, but rather that ordinary entities, as conceived by the world, are unreal. He will propose something more basic and unassailable in their stead. (It could perhaps be argued that Dharmapāla was a type of reductionist too, and indeed he was able to assimilate all *Madhyamaka* arguments to his own program.)

I will argue that certain Mādhyamikas, in particular the Svātantrikas, accept the other type of given when they speak of conventionally existing objects, which are in fact only "seeming-objects", like illusory daggers, and are nothing *real*.⁹⁰

To the modern reader Candrakīrti's works can often seem to contain a large number of widely diffuse miscellaneous themes with no obvious interconnection or common goal. To be sure, a good portion of Candrakīrti's philosophy concerns the actual logical reasonings used to prove that things have no natures (*svabhāva*) whatsoever. But then there seem to be a number of other issues: the problems concerning *pratyakṣa*, its etymology and definition as discussed in CSV XIII; whether terms in arguments will be perceived similarly by both debaters; the rejection of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*; *svasaṃvitti*); the discussions in the *Madhyamakāvatāra* on "mere conventionality" (*saṃvṛtimātra*), on the erroneousness of ordinary beings' direct

Candrakīrti seems to have been implicitly aware of the fact that refuting a few details of his adversary's reductionist analyses was not enough; one must somehow show that the whole enterprise of providing such analyses is flawed. In the *Prasannapadā*, he shows a marked preference for the Naiyāyika's realism, which consists in uncritical description and schematization of worldly truths. See Stcherbatsky (1927) p. 140, n. 5. There his move was to characterize the Epistemologist's program as mere description of worldly truth, a description which the Epistemologist supposedly justifies on the grounds that other philosophers' descriptions, such as those of the Naiyāyikas, were bungled. In other words, the only justification for the Epistemologist's program would be if the Naiyāyika account of worldly truth was inadequate, but, argues Candrakīrti, such is not the case. Pr. 58, 14- 59,3: *atha syād eṣa eva pramāṇaprameyavyavahāro laukiko 'smābhiḥ śāstreṇānuvarṇita itī // tadanuvartanasya tarhi phalaṃ vācyam // kutārkikair sa nāśīto viparītalakṣaṇābhīdhānena tasyāsmābhiḥ samyaglakṣaṇam utkam itī cet // etad apy ayuktaṃ / yadi hi kutārkikair viparītalakṣaṇapraṇayanam kṛtaṃ lakṣyavaiparītyaṃ lokasya syāt / tadantaṃ prayatnasāphalyaṃ syāt / na caiva evam itī vyārtha evāyaṃ prayatna itī //*

In fact, this is a somewhat too facile and inaccurate characterization of what the Epistemologist is up to and blurs the fact of his reductionism: he is not trying to do a better inventory of the worlds' notions, he is explaining and criticizing them by reducing unrealities to more ontologically fundamental elements. A more profitable approach is to attack the notions of *svalakṣaṇa* and the privileged status which the Epistemologist confers on perception. In the *Prasannapadā* and *Catuhśatakaṭṭī* XIII, Candrakīrti frequently obfuscates things by providing too many arguments of uneven quality, but he is at his most persuasive when he uses the line of reasoning in Āryadeva's k. 301 and 304: if we reduce gross objects to *svalakṣaṇa* sense-data, such as form, colours, etc., the same argument which was used against the gross object will also apply to the *svalakṣaṇa*, for just as we never *see* the whole gross object, but only its parts, so we never see the whole form either. The conclusion is that the reductionist will never give us entities which are more coherent or ontologically fundamental than our ordinary unsophisticated notions.

⁹⁰ Note that some philosophers, such as the Sarvāstivādins, tried to maintain that these sense-data or collections of them *are* the external objects and are real. Thus, matter is analyzed into dharmas of color, shape, smell, tactile sensations, etc. — it is these latter data that exist really and externally. Such a position is, however, very difficult to maintain, as we see by the Buddhist counterarguments. See Kajiyama (1977), Hattori (1988) p. 34 et seq. on the Sarvāstivāda position. Cf. Matilal (1986) p. 246 on the Sarvāstivādin's "realistic phenomenalism": "The Vaibhāṣika view is that the objects of (external) perception are non-mental phenomena which are somehow 'out there', the gross sensibilia."

perceptions and on correct and false conventional truth, i.e. *tathyasamvṛti* and *mithyāsamvṛti*. Now, we can see these as a collection of miscellany — no more than *ad hoc* arguments against particular Buddhist opponents. But this is shortsighted. In fact, these issues are, broadly speaking, linked in constituting a philosophy of perception which harmonizes with and supports Candrakīrti's thoroughgoing rejection of *svabhāva*, for the opponents are introducing this given, or seeming-object, as an attempt to provide at least *something* which has *svabhāva*. I would argue, then, that a unity can be found among these themes in Candrakīrti's philosophy of perception by seeing them as supporting a common point: *there is no given at all*.

A. Candrakīrti on perception and the status of the given

While Western sense-data theorists would generally hold that the given is real, and would not quibble much about the sense of "real" involved here, Candrakīrti's adversaries' positions are more diverse on this latter point. Some would indeed hold that the given is ultimately and fully real, whereas others, of a Madhyamaka inclination, would say that the given has an unassailable conventional reality. At any rate, the opinion that the given is either ultimately real or possesses a *svabhāva* on at least a conventional level is shared by almost all of Candrakīrti's principal Buddhist adversaries. Most of the Vijñānavādins would subscribe to some form of this principle, depending upon their position on the status of the "aspects", or "images" (*ākāra*), which present themselves directly to perception. The Satyākāravādins (viz. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) who, as their name implies, maintained the reality of these images, held that the raw sense-data which present themselves to perception, such as impressions of blue, etc., are real and possess dependent natures (*paratantrasvabhāva*) in that they are inseparable from consciousness, which is itself real.⁹¹ These *ākāra* are then misinterpreted as external entities by conceptualization and thus subsequently, through the

⁹¹ For *paratantra* and *parikalpitasvabhāva*, see the following section on "Dharmapāla on perception". This is one convenient way to characterize the Satyākāravādin's position and is to be found in Bodhibhadra's *Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana*. See Mimaki (1976) pp. 202-203. In Bodhibhadra's text we see him dividing Yogācāra into *mam pa dan bcas pa* (*sākāravādin*) and *mam pa med pa* (*nirākāravādin*), the representatives of the first being Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, while the second school is that of Asaṅga. In fact, the terms *sākāra* and *nirākāra* in these Yogācāra contexts correspond to *satyākāra* (*mam bden pa*) and *alīkākāra* (*mam rdzun pa*) respectively. See Kajiyama (1978) p. 125. Cf. also *Blo gsal grub mtha'* ed. Mimaki (1982) pp. 99 and 100 which divides Yogācāra, using these latter terms, Dignāga and co. being Satyākāravādin and Asaṅga and Dharmottara representing the Alīkākāravādins. See Moriyama (1984) for Haribhadra's arguments against these latter two schools; see also Kajiyama (1965) and Mimaki (1976) pp. 71-72; also Kajiyama (1978) for an explanation of the broad lines of the debate and Śāntarakṣita's arguments. Note that amongst later Vijñānavādins, Ratnākaraśānti becomes the principal representative of Alīkākāravāda, whereas Jñānaśrīmītra is probably the principal Satyākāravādin. See Ichigō (1985) p. lxxviii for a schematic diagram of the Vijñānavāda's positions on *ākāra* and those of Śāntarakṣita.

influence of a cognition different from simple perception, they acquire false or "thoroughly imagined natures" (*parikalpitasvabhāva*).⁹²

Even amongst Candrakīrti's fellow Mādhyamikas, those of the Svātantrika school, while certainly not accepting real *ākāra*, and in fact refuting both Satyākāravāda and its opposite, Alīkākāravāda,⁹³ did hold that conventionally there must be something which appears similarly (*mtshun snan ba*) to both parties in a discussion, and without which logical discussion and communication in general would be impossible.⁹⁴ This object, if analysed, turns out to be impossible, but must at least exist as the

⁹² The opposite Vijñānavāda position is that of the Alīkākāravādins, who profess that the given data, or *ākāra*, while conventionally existent, are themselves deceptive in that they are falsely of two sorts, subjective (i.e. *grāhakākāra*) and objective (*grāhyākāra*). Only the pure non-dual consciousness is real. See Moriyama (1984) pp. 12-14. This school is, no doubt, something of an exception to the Yogācāra tendency to attribute full reality to the given, and in that respect they are closer to those Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas who recognize an object-*qua*-appearance, one which is conventionally established, but is ultimately illusory. The major difference from the Mādhyamikas, however, is that the Alīkākāravādin, being a Vijñānavādin, wishes to say that the mind is still ultimately real. In particular, to take Bodhibhadra's explanation, the Alīkākāravādin maintains that the *ākāra* themselves are not *paratantra* but *parikalpitasvabhāva*: the raw given which one sees is itself unreal; it is only the self-awareness, or *svasamvedana*, which is fully real.

⁹³ See the refutations of both using the "neither one nor many" argument (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛāloka*, transl. Moriyama (1984), and in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, transl. Ichigō (1985).

⁹⁴ The point occupies an important place in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and *ṡṡṡṡṡṡ*, Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* and Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and *ṡṡṡṡṡṡ*. First of all, note that the requirements that the reason and subject be established for both parties (*ubhayasiddha*) were laid down by Dignāga in PS III, 11: *dvayoḥ siddhena dharmena vyavahārād viparyaye / dvayor ekasya cāsiddhau dharmyasiddhau ca neṣyate*. Skt. found in PVBh 647,9; see Hattori (1958) fragment 8; Kitagawa (1973) p. 153. Indeed NM Ib 11-12 (Tucci p. 13; Katsura 1977 §2.2, p. 122) makes it clear that this applies to all three characters of the reason (*rūpa*); see Tillemans (1984b) p. 80 and n. 21. Śāntarakṣita argues (*ṡṡṡṡṡṡ*, pp. 73b6-74a3) that if there were not at least a datum of appearance which, *qua* appearance, would be understood by "scholars, women and children", then "the locus [i.e. the subject] of the reason would be unestablished (*gtan tshigs kyi gzi 'grub par mi 'gyur*). Kamalaśīla (*Pañjikā* 103b8), commenting on this problem of the locus being unestablished, argues: *chos can snan ba 'di la ran bzin yan dag par sgro btags pa dag pa sgrub byed kyi / chos can gi ran gi no bo 'gog par ni ma yin pas ...* "although one refutes projections of a real nature to such an appearing subject, one does not refute the essence of the subject." See Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅgaṡṡṡṡṡṡ* D. 5b6: *rgol ba dan phyir rgol ba'i śes pa la snan ba'i cha la ni rtsod pa su yan med do // rtsod par byed na ni mñon sum la sogs pas gnod par 'gyur ro //* "Nobody has any debate about the element which appears to the consciousnesses of the proponent and opponent. If they did debate [about that], they would be refuted by direct perception and the like." Finally, in D. 5b4 we see Jñānagarbha using the words *mtshun par sian ba* in the context of showing that conventional truth "appears similarly to the consciousness of everyone, from children on up." *'di liar byis pa yan chad kyi śes pa la mtshun par don ji sñed rgyu las snan ba de ni yan dag pa'i kun rdzob yin par rigs te /*. See Tillemans (1982) pp. 105-112 on these topics; Lopez (1987) p. 78 *et passim* on *chos can mtshun snan ba* ("commonly appearing subjects"); also Hopkins (1989) on Tibetan explanations of *chos can mtshun snan ba*; Eckel (1987) for an edition and translation of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and *ṡṡṡṡṡṡ* along with a study of Jñānagarbha's thought. See also fn. 96, 107 below.

phenomenon on the basis of which our practical ordinary activity revolves. In effect, the Svātantrikas probably did make the reification, common to those who hold a perceptual given, that "seeming to see an *X*" implies "seeing a seeming-*X*"; this reification of appearances is well brought out in the Tibetan characterization of the Svātantrikas as holding that things are illusions, but that even *qua* illusions they do have an "objective mode of being" (*don gyi sdod lugs*). Part and parcel of this idea is the Svātantriķa position that phenomena are "conventionally established by their natures" (*tha sñad du rañ bžin gyis grub pa*) or "conventionally established from their own side" (*tha sñad du rañ ños nas grub pa*). While the terms are not explicitly those of the Indian texts, but rather belong to the Tibetan doxographers, the ideas seem on the balance those of the Svātantrikas, at least from the point of view of what we are terming "internal history".⁹⁵ At any rate, the essential point for us, as we find it in the Indian Svātantriķa texts, is that what appears in non-conceptual direct perception is some type of an entity, a phenomenon about which we are undeceived so long as we do not give it anything more than conventional status: our mistake is to grasp it as having a real nature.⁹⁶

What is important in this connection is that Candrakīrti's Buddhist adversaries, Svātantriķa or not, generally seem to use the same definition of perception, that of the

⁹⁵ Cf. Tillemans (1982) n. 18 and 33 and the selection from Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *sKabs dan po'i spyi don* translated in Tillemans (1984c). Cf. the definitions of "Svātantriķa" to be found in *Grub mtha' rin chen phren ba*, ed. Mimaki (1977) p. 97: *rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa tha sñad du khas len pa'i ño bo ñid med par smra ba de / rañ rgyud pa'i mshan ñid / ... ci'i phyir dbu ma rañ rgyud pa žes bya že na / tshul gsum rañ ños nas grub pa'i riags yañ dag la bten nas bden dños 'gog par byed pas na de liar brjod pa'i phyir /*. "The defining characteristic of a Svātantriķa is that he asserts that there is no nature while accepting that conventionally [things] are established by their own characteristics (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) ... Why does one say 'Mādhyaṃika-Svātantriķa'? It is because they refute truly existent entities by means of valid reasons whose three characters are established from their own side". In *lCañ skya grub mtha'* p. 325, the author first defines what is meant by *svatantra* and then proceeds to explain "Svātantriķa": *des na phyir rgol gyi khas blarīs tsam la ma 'khris par gdams gži'i ños nas don gyi sdod lugs kyi dbañ gis rgol gyi tshad ma ma 'khrul ba la chos can mñhun snañ du grub ciñ / chos can de'i steñ du riags kyi tshul mams 'grub tshul ries par byas nas bsgrub bya riogs pa'i rjes dpag bskyed pa žig rañ rgyud kyi don yin la / de liar dgos pa 'thad par khas len pa'i dbu ma pa la dbu ma rañ rgyud pa žes zer pa yin no /*. "The subject (*dharmin*) is established as appearing similarly to the non-deceptive *pramāṇa* [i.e. direct perception] of the debaters by virtue of its objective mode of being (*don gyi sdod lugs*), a mode of being which belongs to the side of the locus in question (*gdams gži*) and is not guided by the mere belief of the opponent. On the basis of such a subject the various characters of the reason are ascertained, and there arises an inference which cognizes the proposition to be proved. This is the meaning of *svatantra*. Those Mādhyaṃikas who agree that the above mentioned requirements are necessary are called 'Mādhyaṃika-Svātantrikas'." Cf. Lopez (1987) p. 294.

⁹⁶ Cf. Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, P. 74a3: *kho bo yañ mig la sogs pa'i šes pa la snañ ba'i ñaṇ can gyi dños po ni mi sel gyi /*. "As for us, we do not deny entities in so far as they are appearances to the eye and other sense consciousnesses." *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅgavṛtti*, D. 5a3: *mam par riog pa med pa'i mñon sum gyi šes pas yoris su bcad pa'i ño bo'i dños po zgugs la sogs pa dan bde ba la sogs par rig par grub pa mams ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa kho na yin no /*. "The establishment of cognitions of entities such as form, etc. and pleasure, etc., whose essences are discriminated by direct perceptions free of conceptualization, is conventional truth alone."

Epistemologists, to wit, a consciousness which is free from conceptualization.⁹⁷ In sum, be it in the Vijñānavāda schools where the *ākāra* are ultimately real, or in the Svātantrika school where the given is at least conventionally real and non-deceptive, there is a key separation between direct perception, on the one hand, and conceptualization (the source of error), on the other; the former is non-deceptive so long as it does not go beyond its legitimate bounds and is not influenced by the latter.

Now, first of all, in CS XIII we see that Candrakīrti does not accept the Epistemologist's definition of perception as always non-conceptual. The thrust of his argumentation on etymologies of *pratyakṣa* is, in effect, to eliminate the privileged status which perception has in his adversaries' systems, for once we grant a non-conceptual *pratyakṣa* which simply sees the given stripped of concepts about it, the road to *svalakṣaṇa*, real *ākāra*, "common appearances", etc. becomes dangerously open. By shifting etymologies Candrakīrti tries to make perception banal: any consciousness, conceptual or not, caused by a perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) object will be termed *pratyakṣa*.

This, however, is a skirmish, a small part of a larger combat against taking perception as being an unmissaken access to the given. In verse 23 in the sixth chapter of the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Candrakīrti provides us with some clues about the main lines of his own position, saying that "the object of those who see correctly is called reality, and that of those who see mistakenly is called conventional truth" (*samyagdarśam yo viśayaḥ sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādarśam samvṛtisatyam uktam*),⁹⁸ a passage which shows that what ordinary beings cognize, viz. conventional truth, is always in fact fundamentally mistaken, whether the cognition in question is a direct perception or not. Of course, as we shall see in more detail below, the subsequent verses of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* do show that, within this general misapprehension of things, we can find things which are "truths" for the world, and other things, like mirages, which are not even true in that limited sense. But what emerges is that the general misapprehension about the object's voidness will always be present for a non-Ārya, who has not realized voidness: even his direct perception is mistaken about the object and perceives it as having a *svabhāva* which it does not have at all.

Candrakīrti makes a number of points which tell particularly against the Yogācāra, rather than Svātantrika, version of the given. His refutations of the Yogācāra views on the ultimate reality of dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) are fairly accessible by now; suffice it to say that the arguments in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI and

⁹⁷ Not only is this definition used amongst the Epistemologists, but also among the Svātantrikas. See e.g. TS(P)'s discussion of the definition of perception. Cf. the passage from the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* cited in fn. 96 where we see that Jñānagarbha qualifies *mñon sum (pratyakṣa)* as *mam par rtog pa med pa* ("without conceptualization").

⁹⁸ M. av. VI, 23: *samyānamṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ / samyagdarśam yo viśayaḥ sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādarśam samvṛtisatyam uktam* // Cited in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* p. 174. Transl. LVP: "Les choses portent une double nature qui est constituée par la vue exacte et par la vue erronée. Le domaine de ceux qui voient juste est appelé 'réalité', de ceux qui voient faux, 'vérité d'erreur'." For Tsoñ kha pa's discussion in *dBu ma dgonis pa rab gsal* and *rTsa se ñik chen* on this and related passages, see Broido (1988) pp. 34 et seq.; see also Williams (1979).

elsewhere⁹⁹ against *paratantra* will also refute the ultimate reality of *ākāra* in the Satyākāravādin's system. In *Madhyamakāvatāra* IV, 71cd he summarizes his main point of contention with the Yogācāra's idealism: Yogācāra holds that the subject and its states are real but that the object is unreal; this is impossible, for real subjective states must depend upon real objects. The Yogācāra philosopher, of course, seeks to avoid this dependence on objects by saying that the mind cognizes itself — hence, Candrakīrti's long arguments against such a "self-awareness" (*svasaṃvedana*).

While the arguments against the Yogācāra given are relatively clear, it is more difficult to see the difference, albeit subtle, between Candrakīrti and the Svātantrikas. The Svātantrika's given is perhaps best brought out by Jñānagarbha's famous dictum that "conventional truth is just as it appears" (*ji ltar snañ ba 'di kho na kun rdzob*). This is interpreted to show that conventional objects do not have any existence apart from the appearance to mind, typically to direct perception¹⁰⁰ — thus our depiction of the Svātantrika's conventional object as being a seeming-object, a reified appearance.

When confronted with the problem that there would be no difference, *qua* appearance, between illusions and conventional truth, Jñānagarbha agrees, but says that the difference comes out in their practical consequences, their possessing or lacking practical efficacy, i.e. *arthakriyā*.¹⁰¹ Thus, for Jñānagarbha *et al.* the seeming-object which is given is itself no different in the case of error or conventional truth: that difference is discovered *a posteriori* by *praxis*. Nor was Jñānagarbha the first or only Svātantrika to hold such a theory: Bhāvaviveka, in his *Prajñāpradīpa* and *Madhya-*

⁹⁹ See M. av. VI k. 47 et seq. Refutations of Yogācāra are also to be found in the *Sūnyatāsaptatiṣṭhi* P. 318b-320b.

¹⁰⁰ *Satyadvayavibhārīga*, k. 3. *Vṛti* D. 4a3: *ji ltar ba lañ rdzi mo la sogs pa yan chad kyi mthoñ ba de ltar kun rdzob tu bden pa mam par gnas kyi yañ dag par ni ma yin te / mthoñ ba dañ mthun par dños po'i don rñes par 'dzin pa'i phyir ro //* "Just as something is seen by [people] from cowherds and the like on up, so is it conventionally established as true, but not ultimately, for they definitely apprehend an entity in accordance with what they see." Cf. *Madhyamakāloka* P. 254a6: *de'i phyir de dag gi bsañ pa'i dbañ gis dños po brdzun pa'i rño bo thams cad ni kun rdzob tu yod pa kho na'o*. "So therefore, all entities which are deceptive [i.e. non-ultimate] natures because of [one's] thought about them, are just conventionally existent." Cf. Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's comment in *sKabs dañ po'i spyi don* f. 24b3-4: *blo la snañ ba'i dbañ gis bžag pa'i yod pa de kun rdzob tu yod pa'i don yin pa ...* "An existence established in virtue of its appearing to the mind' is the meaning of 'conventional existence'." See Tillemans (1984c) pp. 360-361. See Lopez (1987) pp. 145-149. See also fn. 137.

¹⁰¹ *Satyadvayavibhārīga* k. 12: *snañ du 'dra yañ don byed dag / nus pa'i phyir dañ mi nus phyir / yañ dag yañ dag ma yin pas / kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas /* "Although their appearance is similar, one divides conventional [truth] into correct and false because of practical efficacy or inefficacy." *Vṛti*: *śes pa gsal ba'i mam pa snañ ba can du 'dra yañ / ji ltar snañ ba bžin du don byed pa la stu ba dañ mi stu ba yin par rñes par byas nas chu la sogs pa dañ smig rgyu la sogs pa dag 'jig rten gyis yañ dag pa dañ yañ dag pa ma yin par rñogs so //* "Although the cognitions are similar in having appearances of manifest images, [still] after ascertaining whether or not [the objects] as they appear belie their practical efficacy, the world then understands that water, etc. and mirages and so forth are [respectively] correct and false." For *arthakriyā*, see Nagatomi (1967-68), Mikogami (1979); see also Katsura (1984) for *arthakriyā*'s general role in Dharmakīrti's theory of truth.

makārthasaṃgraha, had already similarly classified conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) into correct (*tathyaṣaṃvṛti*) and false (*mīthyāsaṃvṛti*).¹⁰² For the Svāntarikas, then, the given is a phenomenon, "something appearing to consciousness" (*śes pa la snañ ba'i cha*).¹⁰³ For Jñānagarbha and Bhāvaviveka, who accept conventionally existing external objects, a conventional external object "conforms to the appearance" (*śes pa la snañ ba dañ mthun par dños po gnas pa*)¹⁰⁴ if the latter passes the tests of practical efficacy, otherwise there is only *mere* appearance, like a hallucination. Śāntarakṣita, and other Svāntarika-Mādhyamikas of his idealist-inclined faction (who do not conventionally accept external objects), hold that the appearance itself, if it passes the practical tests for *tathyaṣaṃvṛti*, simply *is* the object. But the difference between the two Svāntarika tendencies is not of great importance in this context. In effect, the essential point is that one always sees a seeming-object — it may subsequently be judged to be conventionally true, but that is a only matter of assigning a certain status to one and the same phenomenon: even for a Svāntarika like Jñānagarbha the external objects are unreal and are never anything but seeming-objects.

Candrakīrti, however, does not concede even this Svāntarika version of a minimal intersubjective "given" phenomenon which appears similarly to all, is *in itself* unassailable, and is the necessary condition for communication and rationality. There are a number of elements in the dossier which show Candrakīrti's distance from the key points of the Svāntarika position.

First of all, judging from CSV XIII §16 and *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI, 25, he seems to use two criteria for truth and error, both of which differ significantly from those of Jñānagarbha *et al.*: a) something is erroneous when the way it is and the way it appears are different (*rnam pa gzan du gnas pa'i dños po la rnam pa gzan du snañ ba*);¹⁰⁵ b) something is erroneous simply when there are causes for error present, like eye diseases and so forth.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² See Lindtner (1981) pp. 200-201, n. 14.

¹⁰³ See fn. 94. At this point, though, one can imagine the objection that we have failed to make a distinction between the Svāntarika's version of appearances and his account of the objects which appear and that it is absurd to maintain that for a Svāntarika like Jñānagarbha the conventionally established *object* which appears is a given. In fact, I think that for a Svāntarika there can be very little difference between the two; it is a question of which label we confer on appearances after subjecting them to practical tests. As I shall argue below (see p. 64 *et seq.*), Mādhyamikas who accept external objects do so not because there is something external or something "behind" the seeming-object, but rather because they see no reason to revise our ordinary notions and assign a *preferred ontological status to mind*.

¹⁰⁴ *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* D. 5b5.

¹⁰⁵ See CSV XIII §16.

¹⁰⁶ See M. av. VI, 25 quoted in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* p. 171: *vinopaghātena yad indriyāṇaṃ saṅgām api grāhyam avaiti lokaḥ / satyaṃ hi tal lokata eva śeṣaṃ vikalpitaṃ lokata eva mīthyā* //. Transl. LVP: "Ce que le monde considère comme perçu par les six organes exempts de trouble, cela est vrai du point de vue du monde; le reste, du point de vue du monde, est tenu pour faux." Cf. *Blo gsal grub mtha'* p. 156: *gzan dag skyon med skyon bcas ni / byis pa'i nior yin yañ log med* //. Transl. Mimaki (1982) p. 157: "Les autres (c.-à-d.

The first criterion is used to show that any perception by an ordinary being is erroneous, because something will appear as real or as having a *svabhāva*, whereas it is in fact void. The second criterion accounts for the difference between conventional truths and falsehoods simply in terms of agreed-upon causes for error: never is there question of an appearance or seeming-object being subsequently tested for *arthakriyā* so that, as was the case for Jñānagarbha, Bhāvaviveka and the other Svātantrikas, it can be found to be correct or false. In fact, in the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti makes it clear that he does not even need an object appearing in common to both parties for logic and communication to function, and that especially in the case of arguments between Mādhyamikas and non-Mādhyamikas about voidness, such a common intersubjective appearance is, in any case, impossible.¹⁰⁷

les Prāsaṅgika) [n'établissent la distinction de vrai et faux qu']eu égard aux gens ordinaires (*byis pa, bāla*) [dont l'organe est] sans défaut ou défectueux; [ils] n'[admettent] pas [la distinction entre] les vérités conventionnelles vraie [i.e. *tathyasamvṛti*] et fausse [i.e. *mithyāsamvṛti*]."

¹⁰⁷ See Pr. 28,4 - 30,14. Let me present a large excerpt, Pr. 29,6 - 30,8: *na caitad evaṃ / yasmād yadaivoṭpādapratīṣedho 'tra sādhyadharmo 'bhipretaḥ / tadaiva dharmiṇas tadādhārasya viparyāsamātrāsādītāma-bhāvasya pratyutiḥ svayam evānenāṅgīkṛtā / bhinnau hi viparyāsāvipyāśau / tad yadā viparyāsenāsat sattvena gṛhyate taimirikeṇeva keṣādi / tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhiḥ / yadā cāvipyāśād abhūtaṃ nādhyaṛopitaṃ vitaimirikeṇeva keṣādi / tadā kuto 'sadbhūtapadārthaleśasyāpy upalabdhir yena tadānīṃ samvṛtiḥ syāt / ata evoktam ācāryapādaiḥ*

yadī kiṃ cid upalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā /

pratyakṣādibhir arthaiḥ tadbhāvaṃ me 'nupālambhaḥ //

yataḥ caivaṃ bhinnau viparyāsāvipyāśau / ato viduṣāṃ aviparītāvasthāyāṃ viparītasyāsaṃbhavāt kutaḥ samāvṛtaṃ cakṣur yasya dharmivartṇaṃ syāt / iti na vyāvartate 'siddhādhāraḥ pakṣadoṣa āśrayāsiddho vā hetuḍoṣaḥ / ity aparihāra evāyaṃ /* *LVP has '*siddhādhāre pakṣadoṣa*. De Jong (1978) p. 31 reads '*siddhādhāraḥ pakṣadoṣa*.

Translation: "[Candrakīrti:] Now this is not so [i.e. it is not so, as Bhāvaviveka had argued, that the *dharmīn* is simply the unqualified general term]. For, precisely when the negation of production is intended to be the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) here, then indeed this [philosopher, i.e. Bhāvaviveka] himself accepts the elimination of the *dharmīn* which is the locus for this [*sādhyadharmā*], viz. the self's possessions [such as the eye, etc.] which are found just because of error. Indeed, error and non-error are opposed. And so, when something inexistent is grasped as existent due to error, as in the case of the hairs and other such [illusions grasped] by those who have [the eye-disease known as] *timira*, then at this time how could there be a perception of even the slightest trace of a real entity? And when no inexistent thing is superimposed because there is no error, as in the case of the hairs and so forth when someone is free of *timira*, then how [too] could there be perception of even the slightest trace of an unreal entity, so that it would then have to be conventionally existent? It is precisely for that reason that the venerable Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] stated [in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* XXX]:

If, through perception or other [*pramāṇas*], I were to apprehend something, I would affirm or negate. But as such a thing is inexistent, I am without reproach.

Now, since error and non-error are thus opposed, then in the unerring state of the wise nothing erroneous can exist, so how would the conventional eye [i.e. the general unqualified term] be what is the *dharmīn*? Therefore, [Bhāvaviveka] does not avoid the thesis-fault of an unestablished locus nor the reason-fault of an unestablished basis. And so this was not at all a reply [to our criticisms]."

This part of *Prasannapadā* I is greatly elaborated upon in numerous Tibetan texts such as mkKhas grub rje's *sToñ thun chen mo*, sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan's *Thal bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas*, etc. etc. and

The second criterion, then, is in accordance with a general thrust of Candrakīrti's philosophy: to dispense with the Svātantrika's and Yogācāra's postulation of seeming-objects as being *sine qua non* for our judgements of truth and falsity and our logical reasonings; truth, falsity and logic can be grounded simply on the conventions and rules of ordinary life, and *require nothing further* — no common intersubjective phenomena or data on which the world's practices would be based.

But to go back to the first criterion, however, let us look a bit more closely at what Candrakīrti seems to mean by things appearing different from the way they are and what the consequences are for the given taken in the Svātantrika way. A particularly interesting passage is to be found in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* to VI, 28, where we read that things which are conventional truths (*saṃvṛti-satyā*) for ordinary beings, appear as just simply conventional (*saṃvṛtimātra*) for the Āryas, in that the latter *see* (*gzigs pa*) that conditioned things (*saṃskāra*) are false like reflections, and hence see them as artificial and not true.¹⁰⁸ What is important in this

forms the basis for the problem of "commonly appearing subjects" (*chos can mthun snai ba*). See fn. 94; for remarks on the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate, see my article "Tsoñ kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti debate" forthcoming in the proceedings of the 1989 Congress of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Narita, Japan.

Finally, we should also mention Pr. 35,9 where Candrakīrti stresses that seeking agreement from both parties on an inference is generally pointless: *svārthānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī / nobhayaprasiddhiḥ / ata eva tarkalakṣaṇābhīdhānaṃ niḥprajojanam* /. "But in the case of an inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*), it is always just one's own acknowledgment which is particularly important, not an acknowledgment by both [parties]. For this very [reason] the logical characterizations [of Dignāga and co.] are pointless." The passage is cited and discussed in *ICaṇi skya grub mtha'* pp. 407-408. For passages from Svātantrika texts which argue for commonly appearing subjects, see fn. 94; cf. also e.g. Kamalaśīla's *Sarvadharmāṇiṣvabhāvasiddhi* P. 326b7 where he admonishes against reasons being established simply because one accepts them (*dam bcas pa tsam gyis 'dod pa'i don ma grub pa*), the latter absurd position being inevitable for him if reasons are established in the absence of anything objective and common to both debaters.

¹⁰⁸ M. av. bhāṣya ad M. av. VI, 28 (LVP ed. 107,19): *de yañ ñan thos dan rari sañs rgyas dan byañ chub sems dpa' ñon moñs pa can gyi ma rig pa spañs pa / 'du byed gzugs brñan la sogs pa'i yod pa ñid dan 'dra bar gzigs pa mams la ni bcas ma'i rari bñin yin gyi / bden pa ni ma yin te / bden par mñon par rlom pa med pa'i phyir ro // byis pa mams la ni bslu bar byed pa yin la / de las gñan pa mams la ni sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rien cin 'brel par 'byuñ ba ñid kyis kaun rdzob tsam du 'gyur ro //* Transl. LVP "Cette [*saṃvṛti*] — pour les śrāvakas, les pratyekabuddhas et les bodhisattvas, qui ont abandonné 'l'ignorance souillée' et qui voient les *saṃskāras* comme ayant le même mode d'existence que les reflets, etc., — est artificielle et non pas véritable, car il n'y a pas [dans ces Āryas] 'illusion sur la vérité' (*satyābhīmāna*). Les [objets] qui trompent les sots (*bāla*) ne sont que *saṃvṛti* (*saṃvṛtimātra*) pour ceux qui ne sont point [des sots], parce que ces objets sont, tout comme une magie optique, etc., produits par l'enchaînement des causes."

Nagao (1954) p. 561 made an interesting hint at a rapprochement between the *saṃvṛtimātra* of Candrakīrti and the *paratantrasvabhāva* in Yogācāra, free of *parikalpita*. This is somewhat misleading if we think of *paratantra* as ultimately established, which is of course the way Vijñānavādins take it. Candrakīrti is clearly not advocating that. However, Mādhyamikas, such as Kamalaśīla in *Madhyamakāloka* P. 162b5-7, do also speak of a *paratantra* which is *not* ultimately established, and that might perhaps seem a better candidate for similarity with Candrakīrti's *saṃvṛtimātra*. Kamalaśīla writes: *dbu ma pa mams kyañ ño bo ñid gsum mnam par bñag pa khas mi len pa ni ma yin te / gñan du na mthoñ ba la sogs pa dan 'gal ba ji ltar spoñs par 'gyur*

passage, is not that the Āryas and non-Āryas have exactly the same sense-datum and then conceptualize differently (as the other schools would have it); nor is the point at stake that Āryas have some of sort of radically different raw given from non-Āryas, as if we saw blue patches and they saw red patches. The upshot is that the Prāsaṅgika is probably not framing the problem in the context of there being uninterpreted sense-data, *ākāra*, "common appearances", etc. which are subsequently conceptualized. The various models of perception which turn around the definition of perception as *kalpanāpoḍha*, and which presuppose that one simply sees an uninterpreted brute datum are, in effect, being put in question in favour of perception of already interpreted data.¹⁰⁹

/ de la dños po ma brtags na grags ji ltar snañ ba sgyu ma bñin du bñen nas byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni gñan gyi dbañ gi ño bo ñid yin no // de yañ kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bñin du gñan gyi rkyen gyi dbañ gis skye'i /... "Mādhyamikas too do not fail to accept the presentation of the three natures, for otherwise how could they abandon contradictions with observation and the like. Here, that which is acknowledged so long as one does not analyse the entity, is just as it appears and arises dependently like an illusion is *paratantrasvabhāva*. It is produced conventionally, like an illusion, due to other conditions, ..." However, if we look at what Kamalaśīla is saying, the similarity with *saṃvṛtimātra* becomes more remote. He is obviously taking a position similar to that of Jñānagarbha, where conventional truth is, or corresponds to, simple appearance, the given which everyone has, whether Ārya or not. For Candrakīrti, *saṃvṛtimātra* only concerns the Āryas, and is their exclusive way of seeing objects; it is not also common to ordinary beings.

¹⁰⁹ Part of the conceptual tool-kit of most contemporary analytic philosophers is the distinction formulated by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations* between simply seeing an object — like seeing the lines on a page — and seeing an object *as* being something — one sees the lines as a picture of a duck or rabbit. Taken in the light of this distinction, one could say that Candrakīrti's point is to minimize or eliminate seeing in favour of seeing-as. His Svātantrika and Yogācāra opponents, by contrast, are saying that one sees something and then conceptualizes, or thinks, that it exists in a certain way. For Candrakīrti, however, the question of truth or falsity is not a matter of a given which first just simply appears and then is conceptually interpreted. The difference in the Ārya's and non-Ārya's perception is that the former "sees conditioned things *as* having a similar [illusory] mode of existence as reflections, etc."; the latter sees things as existing in reality.

A word on some of the numerous indigenous Tibetan debates on these matters. One could reasonably argue that it makes no sense to speak of the mere appearance of an object apart from its interpretation as true or false. Curiously enough, on Tsoñ kha pa's point of view, it would be more accurate to say that it is the *ordinary person* who cannot make that difference between a mere appearance of X and the (erroneous) way in which X appears. *dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal* p. 222: *...sñon po rañ gi mshan ñid kyis grub par snañ ba na yañ / sñon po'i steñ nas rañ bñin gyis grub par snañ mi snañ gi cha gñis dbyer med par snañ la* ... "Also in the case of blue, which appears as established by its own characters, then with regard to the blue, the element (*cha*) which appears as established by its own nature and that which does not appear [in this way] appear inseparably." Elsewhere in *dGoñs pa rab gsal* (p. 175) he argues that to make that separation one must have realized voidness. In short, Tsoñ kha pa's analysis detected two things, the appearance of a vase and its appearance as having a nature, and then argued that short of Āryahood we cannot make the distinction.

No doubt he had his reasons for this approach, not the least of which is his doctrine of the "identification of the object to be refuted" (*dgag bya ños 'dzin*) and his enormous effort to be able to somehow preserve *pramāṇas*. By saying that at least the Āryas could make such a separation, he could safely say that the appearance of the vase, (but not the appearance of it being established by *svabhāva*) is conventionally

Finally, a consequence of this rejection of uninterpreted data and of the fact that non-Āryas always erroneously *see* things as being real, or possessing *svabhāva*, is that Candrakīrti (in M. av. VI, 24-25) does not accept the Svātantrika idea of *tathya-saṃvṛti*, viz. that the appearances can correspond to, or be, the conventional object.¹¹⁰ Instead, he makes a distinction between conventions of "truth" or "falsity" which presupposes that actually (in terms of the first truth-criterion which we gave above), all must be false. The only relevant element is the presence or absence of certain recognized causes for error, such as defective sense organs.

"Those who see falsely are accepted as being of two sorts, those whose sense organs are clear [i.e. undefective] and those whose sense organs are defective. The consciousness of those with defective sense organs is held to be false relative to the consciousness of [those with] sense organs which are in good condition."¹¹¹

Given that *svabhāva* / *svalakṣaṇa* is not even acceptable on a conventional level (cf. M. av VI, 36),¹¹² then the way in which we see can never correspond to anything. Thus, Candrakīrti rejects the Svātantrika's distinction between *tathya-saṃvṛti* and *mithyāsaṃvṛti*, and with that distinction also goes the Svātantrika's postulate of a minimal given which can *correspond* to the conventional object (as in the philosophy of

established by a *pramāṇa*. The debate on these subjects has a long development in Tibetan all the way up to the free-thinking twentieth-century scholar, dGe 'dun chos 'phel, who pertinently argued that because the two "elements" were, practically speaking, impossible to separate, it is best not to even attempt such a distinction, for the danger in speaking of *pramāṇas* is that one will surely reify conventional truth. See his *Klu sgrub dgoris rgyan*, f. 13a: *rje bla ma rañ gi źal nas / stoñ ñid ma rtogs bar du / yod pa tsam dañ / bden par yod pa'i khyad par nam yañ phyē mi srid ciñ / de bzin bden par med pa dañ / med pa tsam gyi khad par yañ 'byed mi nus źes gsuñs śiñ / thal rañ la chos can mthun snañ ba med pa'i rgyu mshan mthar thug kyañ de yin par gsuñs pas / lta ba ma rtogs goñ du bden grub zur du ños zin pa ga la srid / des na dgag bya ños 'dzin khul byas pa de la yid rton ga la yod /*. "The Holy Lama [Tsoñ kha pa] himself stated: 'Before realizing voidness, one can never distinguish between mere existence and true existence and similarly one cannot make a difference between true inexistence and mere inexistence.' And he said that this [fact] is the ultimate reason why subjects [of reasonings] (*dharmin*) do not appear similarly to Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. Therefore, before realizing the view, how could one separately recognize 'true establishment' (*bden grub*)? So why should we have any confidence in those [followers of Tsoñ kha pa] who pretend that they recognize the object to be refuted?" See Hopkins (1983) on the Sa skyā-dGe lugs debate on these and related topics.

¹¹⁰ See fn. 106.

¹¹¹ M. av. VI, 24: *mthoñ ba brdzun pa'añ mnam pa gñis 'dod de // dbañ po gsal dañ dbañ po skyon ldan no // skyon ldan dbañ can mams kyi źes pa ni // dbañ po legs gyur źes bltos log par 'dod //*. Cf. LVP's translation, (1910) p. 300.

¹¹² See M. av. bhāṣya to VI, 36: *de'i phyir rañ gi mshan ñid kyi skye ba ni bden pa gñis char du yañ yod pa ma yin no //*. Transl. LVP "Par conséquent, au point de vue des deux vérités, il n'y a pas naissance du caractère propre (*svalakṣaṇa*)."
J. May emends: "Par conséquent, au point de vue de l'une et l'autre vérité ..."

Jñānagarbha et al.), or which is itself the conventional object (as in Śāntarakṣita's system).

To resume Candrakīrti's view we could construct the following table showing the different positions on the given which we have examined:

Positions	Schools which accept them
1. <i>ākāra</i> are <i>paratantra</i> (ultimately real).	Satyākāravijñānavāda (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti)
2. <i>ākāra</i> are <i>parikalpita</i> but mind is real.	Alīkākaravijñānavāda (Asaṅga, Dharmottara, etc.)
3. <i>svasaṃvedana</i> is ultimately real	Satyākāravijñānavāda and most (if not all) Alīkākaravijñānavāda
4. Appearances (<i>snañ ba</i> ; <i>snañ ba'i cha</i>) can conform to, or be the conventional object and are conventionally real.	All Svātantrikas

Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas all reject 1 and 3, but (at least according to Tibetan doxographical literature) those who accept Yogācāra on the level of conventional truth can lean towards Satyākāravāda or Alīkākaravāda on this level. E.g. in the first case *ākāra* are *paratantra* and are conventionally real; whereas in the second case it is only *svasaṃvedana* which is conventionally real.¹¹³ At any rate, what is important for us is that *Candrakīrti rejects all four positions above.*

One final piece is necessary in the mosaic we have constructed. Although we see that Candrakīrti does not accept the Yogācāra's and Svātantrika's versions of the given, in the end does he, or could he, accept any kind of perceptual given at all? Paul Williams thinks he must:

¹¹³ See e.g. the Mādhyamika classifications in 'Jam dyañs bzad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo*, as well as in *lCañ skya grub mtha'* and *Grub mtha' rin chen phren ba*. See Mimaki (1982) pp. 29-31. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are Mādhyamikas who are "inclined towards Satyākāravāda" (*nam bden pa dañ mthun pa*), whereas Haribhadra, Jitāri and Kambala are Mādhyamikas "inclined towards Alīkākaravāda" (*nam rdzun pa dañ mthun pa*). At least in the case of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, I can find some evidence that this classification is sound. See fn. 108 for the *Madhyamakāloka*'s position on *paratantra*. In the case of Kambala, his Alīkākaravāda seems probable, but it is not clear why he is to be classified as a Svātantrika-Mādhyamika rather than as a Vijñānavādin. Cf. his *Ālokaṃālā*, verses 19-21, 23-27. Text and translation in Lindtner (1985).

"Even the Prāsaṅgikas could not totally deny the given, and indeed to do so would be fatal to Buddhism for this would be to deny the basis for religious activity." (Williams 1979 p. 329.)

Any answer which we can present here will admittedly be somewhat speculative, but if we mean by the words "the given" the *entity* which, as we saw earlier, Richard Rorty and other contemporary philosophers describe as "the sort of entity naturally suited to be immediately present to consciousness" (Rorty 1980, p. 104), then I think Candrakīrti does not have a given at all. Undeniably, we do sometimes find uses of the term *ākāra* in Candrakīrti's works. In CSV XIII to k. 322 (§87) we find the words *jalākārasamjñā* ("a notion which has the aspect of water") used in describing cognitions of mirages, and in *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* to VI, 37-38b he speaks of reflections being void, but that nonetheless "consciousnesses will arise in the aspect of these [reflections]" (*śes pa de yi nam par skye 'gyur*). It is, however, far from clear as to whether *ākāra* is not just being used in a fairly loose sense where it just describes what the consciousness in question is like. As such, these passages give us little indication of Candrakīrti's stance. A perhaps more problematic case is to be found in the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti*, where Candrakīrti seems to flirt very briefly with what looks like a Sautrāntika Sākāravāda, i.e. the position that consciousness has *ākāra* which accord with those of the external object, or *svalakṣaṇa*.^{113a} In fact, however, the reference to Sākāravāda here probably has little more than analogical value. Candrakīrti is seeking to answer a very specific objection, namely, how could one see anything at all when one realizes the truth of cessation? It is at this point that he says that it is like others' account of perceiving *ākāra*, but there is no evidence that he advocated generalizing a Sākāravādin account to apply to *all* perceptions. Indeed the Sākāravādin's explicit reliance on *svalakṣaṇa* here suggests that a literal acceptance of such a Sautrāntika position by Candrakīrti is impossible.

I would maintain that the simple talk about *ākāra*, even in an apparently more technical context, is not enough by itself to attribute to Candrakīrti an acceptance of a given. It is quite possible to use the terminology of *ākāra* merely to assert that consciousness has certain contents, without taking the additional step of reifying that content into something which is naturally suited to be the immediately present *entity*, like a seeming-object. That latter step, as I have tried to show, typically relies upon at least *some* acceptance of a constellation of other concepts, such as real *paratantra*, *svasaṃvedana*, common appearances, the non-deceptiveness of perception, *tathyaṣamvṛti*, etc., *all* of which Candrakīrti rejects. The same considerations apply *mutatis mutandis* to the not infrequent talk about "appearances" in Prāsaṅgika texts. Judging from the dossier which we have presented, Candrakīrti could reasonably speak of things

^{113a} p. 10a5-10a7: *gal te de'i tshes des ci mthoñ na de'i tshes ci zig de la mñon sum du 'gyur / bśad pa / ma mthoñ du zin kyañ nam par śes pas de'i nam par rig pas mñon sum du źes gdags so // gžan dag gis kyañ yul ran gi mshan ñid kyi nam pa dañ mthun pas sñon po la sogs par snañ ba'i nam par śes pa gžan yañ mñon sum du bstan to // 'di la yañ de dañ mthun pa yod pas de mñon sum źes bya ba de 'gal ba med do //*

My thanks to C. Scherrer for this reference.

"appearing in a certain manner", or even of "appearances" and *ākāra*, without reifying them: "appearance" would mean no more than the way something looks, and not a type of phenomenal pseudo-object.

In sum, I think that Candrakīrti's position would have to be something like the following: *We seem to see objects such as vases, etc., are under the impression that we see such objects and certainly speak of seeing them, but no further explanations can or need to be given.* Firstly, Candrakīrti, by his thoroughgoing negation of all *svabhāva*, including the conventionally established *svabhāva* of the Svātantrika school, does, I believe, deny that "seeming to see *X*" implies seeing some determinate and definable phenomenon, i.e. an appearance of *X*, or a seeming-*X*. Disregarding the usual hyperbole which we find in Tibetan literature on how difficult it is to understand the Prāsaṅgika position of no *svabhāva*, I think we *can* venture two alternative interpretations: *a)* Svātantrikas and others reify the way an illusion appears into a determinate phenomenon with a nature; Candrakīrti says that *all* seeming-objects are impossible, because they have no natures. Thus, he would definitively block *any* move from "seeming to see *X*" to "seeing a seeming-*X*". *b)* The Svātantrika's version of the given, i.e. *his* type of seeming-object, is impossible, but there could be some type of seeming-object which nonetheless had no nature at all. I think *a)*'s rejection of all seeming-objects is the most readily defensible, and indeed some version of this rejection has been defended by quite a number of thinkers (e.g. R. Rorty, W. Sellars). The second alternative is extremely hard to imagine: we would on the one hand admit illusory "objects" like Macbeth's dagger, but on the other hand say that they had no illusory daggerness or any other nature at all. A second consideration: Candrakīrti's anti-reductionism (see fn. 89) and his positions on the functioning of logic and communication would tend to show that such a reified appearance is, moreover, quite unnecessary: without it he could still cogently say that there is a basis for religious activity. Indeed, Candrakīrti could appeal to ordinary usage, just as he does in CSV XIII §8-17, and maintain that he accepts "seeing objects" in just the way in which all non-philosophers do — pseudo-refinements like common intersubjective appearances of *X*, or even any kind of appearance which is not just the "way *X* looks", but is reified into an object, would be superfluous intellectual distinctions made by "logicians [who] become intoxicated through imbibing the brew of dialectics (CSV XIII §17)" and who are "completely unversed in mundane things" (CSV XIII §8).

B. Dharmapāla on perception

Turning now to Dharmapāla's philosophy of perception, let us provisionally adopt the usual formula and characterize it as idealism. This much will, no doubt, seem like a truism, especially if we refer to Dharmapāla's continual insistence on the refutation of external objects in his commentary on Āryadeva and in the *Chéng wéi shí lùn*, as well as his endorsement of the ultimate reality of the dependent natures (*paratantra*) and thoroughly established natures (*pariniṣpanna*) in the eighth chapter of his commentary on the *Catuhṣataka*. In fact, as we shall see below, while it is true that Dharmapāla's philosophy was a type of idealism, it is more complicated to say exactly what sort of an idealism it was. Complicating the picture is the fact that he is commenting on and using Madhyamaka arguments. But before taking up these questions, let us briefly look at some of the typical Yogācāra (= Vijñānavāda) elements in Dharmapāla's position.

We now have quite some material on the (written) debate which took place between him and the Mādhyamika, Bhāvaviveka: Dharmapāla put forward his position in the last chapter of his commentary on Āryadeva; Bhāvaviveka's critique of Dharmapāla's Yogācāra is set forth in the first and twenty-fifth chapters of the former's *Prajñāpradīpa* and in the fifth chapter of his *Madhyamakahrdaya*; we also possess an account of the Bhāvaviveka-Dharmapāla debate by the Korean monk, Wŏnch'uk (Yuán cè 圓測) of Xī míng 四明 temple, a disciple of Xuán zàng.¹¹⁴ It is impossible for me to go into many of the details of the debate and the interpretations of the various sūtra quotations, but the essential point of the debate concerns the interpretation of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*'s pronouncements that dharmas are without natures (*niḥsvabhāva*), do not arise (*anutpāda*) or cease, have always been tranquil and by nature in nirvāṇa¹¹⁵; Dharmapāla took the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*'s statements as being of "interpretative meaning" (*neyārtha*) and opted for the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*'s

¹¹⁴ See Yamaguchi (1941) for an initial study. For research in European languages, see LVP (1933b) pp. 47-54 "Conflit Madhyamaka-Yogācāra" for an early but accurate presentation of the main issues and some quotes from Dharmapāla's commentary; see May (1979) *Hōbōgirin* s.v. *Chūgan*, pp. 484-486 for Chinese and Japanese sources on the "debate on voidness and existence" (*zhèng kōng yǒu* 證空有), as the Indian debate came to be known; Hirabayashi and Iida (1977) on Wŏnch'uk's account; Iida (1980), especially pp. 259-269 on the *śayadvaya* and *trīsvabhāva* theories plus excerpts from Tsoi kha pa's *Dran nes legs bśad sñin po*; Iida (1973); Iida and Conze (1968); Kajiyama (1968) for a general account of the circumstances of the written debate and a few examples of Dharmapāla and Bhāvaviveka's interchanges in *Guāng bǎi lùn shì lùn* VIII and *Prajñāpradīpa*; Eckel (1985) on Bhāvaviveka's critique of the Yogācāra in *Prajñāpradīpa* XXV plus a translation of the Appendix to Chapter XXV; Lindtner (1984) for an edition of the Appendix to Chapter XXV; Lindtner (1986) on Bhāvaviveka's critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* IV, plus a summary of his position in *Prajñāpradīpa*, *Madhyamakahrdaya* and the commentary, *Tarkajvāla*. To complete and balance the dossier, we need a translation of the final chapter in the *Guāng bǎi lùn shì lùn*, for as things stand the work on Bhāvaviveka is far more advanced than the work on Dharmapāla.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *Aṣasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* chap. 15, p. 148 and other citations in Lamotte (1935) p. 193, n.2.

explanation in terms of the three-nature (*trisvabhāva*) doctrine¹¹⁶, while Bhāvaviveka took the statements about "non-arisa!", etc. as definitive (*nūtārtha*). For Yogācāra, the causally dependent phenomenon, i.e. *paratantra*, does really exist and does arise: it is the *parikalpitasvabhāva*, the misconceived or thoroughly imagined natures of *paratantra*, which have never existed nor arisen and which are without nature.

There are numerous *parikalpitasvabhāva* discussed in the Yogācāra school, but principally two take on major importance. In the *Samdhinirmocansūtra* and in Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*, the main fiction which we imagine is that words apply to their referents in virtue of the referents' own natures (*svabhāva*), and not simply due to our conceptualization. For Dharmapāla, however, the principal *parikalpitasvabhāva* which he stresses is the imagined difference between the subject which apprehends (*néng yuán* 能緣 = *grāhaka*) and the object which is apprehended (*suǒ yuán* 所緣 = *grāhya*); this is an unreality because in fact both subject and object are developments (*biàn yì* 變異 = *pariṇāma*) of the same karmic tendency.¹¹⁷ At any

¹¹⁶ See Lamotte (1935) p. 193. See also *Siddhi* p. 556 note b. For the three-nature doctrine itself see *Samdhinirmocansūtra* chapt. VI §3-7 (transl. Lamotte [1935] pp. 188-189); Vasubandhu's *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, transl. LVP (1933a); Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha* chapt. II, 16ff. (transl. in Lamotte [1973] pp. 108-124); *Siddhi* p. 514 et seq.; *Triṃsikā* k. 20-25, transl. Lévi (1932) pp. 114-119. Further references and explanations in *Siddhi* p. 514 n. b.; J. May and K. Mimaki (1979), *Hōbōgin* s.v. *Chūdō* pp. 467-469. See also LVP (1933b) pp. 48-49 and the article by Liu Ming-wood (1982) on the three-nature doctrine in Indian and Chinese schools.

¹¹⁷ For Dharmapāla, see e.g. §229c11. For Asaṅga, see *Mahāyānasamgraha* chapt. II, 16 (p. 109 ed. Lamotte) which places the emphasis on language-based imputations of characteristics to objects. *Samdhinirmocansūtra* chapt. VI §10 (Lamotte [1935] p. 190): "Le caractère imaginaire repose sur les noms attachés aux notions". See also Tson kha pa's *Dran nes legs bśad sñin po* pp. 8, 30ff. *rJe btsun pa'i grub mtha'* f. 8a5-6 refers to both *parikalpita* in its presentation of the Yogācāra's notion of the subtle selflessness of dharmas (*dharmanairāmya*): *chos kyi bdag med phra mo'i mshan gzi ni / gzugs dan gzugs 'dzin pa'i tshad ma rdzas gzan gyis ston pa'i ston pa nid dan / gzugs gzugs zes pa'i sgra 'jug pa'i 'jug gzir ran gi mshan nid kyi grub pas ston pa'i ston nid la bu /*. "The illustrative examples of the subtle selflessness of dharmas are like the following: (a) the voidness [consisting in the fact] that form and the *pramāṇa* which apprehends form are void of any different substance; (b) the voidness [consisting in the fact] that form is void of any establishment by its own nature as being the referent for applying the word 'form'." Tibetans of Tson kha pa's school, in explaining Vijñānavāda, attempt a synthesis of these two sorts of *parikalpita*. See *lCañ skya grub mtha'* p. 238: *lugs 'dis ni gzugs sogs phyi rol don du ma grub pas phyi rol don snañ gi bag chags kyi dbañ gis don du snañ ba'i mam par rig pa skye zhi / de la ni thog ma med pa nas 'di sñon po'o 'di sñon po'i skye pa'o zes sogs yañ dan yañ du mñon par brjod pa'i bag chags kyi dbañ gis de lta bu'i tha sñad kyi gzir snañ ba 'byuñ rto // de lta snañ ba'i gzugs de ni nañ zes pa'i bdag nid tsam yin gyi de dan gan nas 'brel ba med pa'i phyi rol gyi don ma yin pa'i phyir dan / de nid min gi tha sñad kyi gzir snañ ba yañ nañ gi mñon par brjod pa'i bag chags kyi dbañ gis snañ ba yin pa'i phyir / snañ tshul de min brdas bzag pa la ma ltos pa'i yul ran gi gnas tshod kyi dbañ gis snañ tshul du mi rigs so //*. "According to this tradition [i.e. Vijñānavāda], form and so forth are not established as external objects, and thus, it is due to [karmic] tendencies (*bag chags* = *vāsanā*) for [things] to appear as external objects that a consciousness arises to which [form] appears. And here it is due to the tendencies [stemming] from saying again and again since beginningless [time], 'This is blue', 'This is blue's arisa!', etc. that they [i.e. form etc.] appear as being the bases for linguistic designations such as ['blue', etc.]. The form, etc. which appear like this are just of the essence of the inner consciousness, but are not external objects which

rate, whether we follow the one account of *parikalpita* or the other, both Asaṅga and Dharmapāla would also say that there does exist a fact that *paratantra* lacks these *parikalpitasvabhāva*; this fact is itself real and is "thoroughly established" (*pariṇiṣpanna*).¹¹⁸ Such was Dharmapāla's position, as can be seen from his adversary's depictions, those of Wōnch'uk and his own statements in the last chapter of his commentary on Āryadeva. There is no doubt that for him both *paratantra* and *pariṇiṣpanna* exist really and ultimately (*paramārthatas*) and have natures (*svabhāva*). The former is inexpressible, directly perceived and, like the latter, must be classified as ultimate.¹¹⁹ To take a representative quotation from the eighth chapter of Dharmapāla's commentary:

"In reference to the thoroughly imagined natures (*biàn jì suǒ zhī xìng* 遍計所執性 = *parikalpitasvabhāva*¹²⁰), he [i.e. the Buddha] said that they are void of nature, without arising or cessation and so forth. Fools, on the basis of dharmas such as form, etc., which are developments of their own minds, have completely imagined understandings and grasp [these forms] as having various real natures. The Illustrious One, in reference to those [falsely imagined natures], said that the natures of dharmas such as form and the like are all void, without arising, cessation, etc. As for the natures which arise in dependence on others [i.e. *paratantrasvabhāva*], because they lack the thoroughly imagined natures, they too are said to be void. [But] their own nature is not void, and they are not without arising, cessation and so forth. The Tathāgata in various places has explained the three natures, always saying that the thoroughly imagined natures are void, but that the dependent (*yī tā* 依他 = *paratantra*) and thoroughly established (*yuán chéng* 圓成 = *pariṇiṣpanna*) natures both

would be completely unrelated to those [appearances]. Moreover, the [form's] seeming to be the basis for the linguistic designation, viz. the name, also appears [like this] due to inner speech-tendencies. Therefore, [for these two reasons,] this way of appearing cannot be a way of appearing which is due to the object's own mode of existence, independent of establishment through names and conventions."

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga* I, 13: *dvayābhāvo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇam*. "The defining characteristic of voidness is the inexistence of duality [between subject and object][and] the existence of [that] inexistence."

¹¹⁹ T. 1571 x 247a6: 又現量證緣起色心言不能詮應非俗諦。"The dependently arising form and consciousness, which are established by direct perception, are inexpressible by words and cannot be conventional truth." Cf. fn. 2. The theme of the inexpressibility of the nature of dharmas is crucial in Yogācāra; cf. e.g. Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi* chapt. IV p. 26, line 12 (ed. Dutt), who terms their nature *nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatā*. Cf. also Lamotte (1935) p. 182 and our §217a21, §221c7, en. 138. Candrakīrti in M. av. VI,47 represents his Yogācārin opponent as follows: *saṃvidyate 'taḥ paratantrarūpaṃ prajñaptisadvastunibandanaṃ yat / bāhyaṃ vinā grāhyaṃ udeṣi sac ca sarvaprapañcāviśayasvarūpaṃ* // . Cited in the *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, f. 23. Transl. LVP: "Par conséquent existe le 'dépendant' (*paratantrarūpa*), qui est la condition de 'la chose existant en tant que désignée' (*prajñaptisadvastu*); il se produit indépendamment d'objet extérieur; il est; son être propre est inaccessible aux idées et aux paroles (*prapañca*)."

¹²⁰ For various ways of translating the Skt. terms for the three natures, see Liu (1982) pp. 195-197.

exist. Therefore one knows that the teaching of voidness has another meaning."¹²¹

In reading Dharmapāla's commentary on Āryadeva, the question naturally arises as to how it is possible that Dharmapāla could write a seemingly Madhyamaka commentary, for just as it is sure that he accepted the reality of *paratantra* and *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*, it is equally sure that his Madhyamaka opponents, like Bhāvaviveka, did not accept these natures' reality.¹²² Dharmapāla was not alone in performing this feat of doctrinal legerdemain: there were (at least) two Vijñānavāda commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, viz. those by Sthiramati and Guṇamati. The commentary by Guṇamati is no longer extant, but Sthiramati's commentary on MMK is conserved in Chinese. Tāranātha informs us that another commentator on MMK, Devaśarman, was supposedly a disciple of Dharmapāla; hence he would have been Vijñānavādin too, although this might seem to ill accord with Bhāvaviveka's apparent approval of Devaśarman's commentary.¹²³ At any rate, judging from the information

¹²¹ T. 1571 x 248a25- b2: 此依遍計所執自性說自性空無生滅等 以諸愚夫隨自心變色等諸法周遍計度 執有真實自性差別 世尊依彼說色等法 自性皆空無生滅等 依他起性由無遍計所執性故 亦說爲空 非自性空無生滅等 如來處處說三自性皆言遍計所執性空依他圓成二性是有故知空教別有意趣。

¹²² See e.g. *Prajñāpradīpa* XXV, Lindtner (1984) p. 81 et seq. "*paratantrasvabhāva*" and p. 93 et seq. "*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*"; transl. Eckel (1985) p. 52 et seq. and p. 70 et seq. For a comparison between Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti's commentaries on CS, particularly on the question of the three nature doctrine and *niḥsvabhāvatā*, see Mitsukawa (1976).

¹²³ I.e. T. 1567 *Dà chéng zhōng guān shì lùn* 大乘中觀釋論. In fact, we learn from Avalokita-vrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* that there were supposedly eight commentaries on MMK, viz. those of Nāgārjuna himself (the **Akuobhayā*), Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati, Sthiramati and Bhāvaviveka. *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* P. 85a7-85b1 ... *bstan bcos 'di'i* [i.e. MMK] *'grel pa byed pa mañ ste / 'di lia ste / slob dpon gyi žal sña nas dan / gnas brian buddha pā li ta dan / tsandra kīrti dan / de ba śarma dan / gu ṇa śrī dan / gu ṇa ma ti dan / sthi ra ma ti dan / slob dpon legs ldan 'byed nīd la thug pa'i bar dag yod pa las* ... See the discussion in Kajiyama (1963) pp. 37-38.

Yamaguchi (1947) p. 2 cites Tāranātha (transl. Schiefner p. 160, 174) to show that Guṇamati was a disciple of Sthiramati, but Frauwallner (1961) pp. 136-137 refers to Guṇamati as a teacher of Sthiramati, an opinion followed by Kajiyama (1963) and Ruegg (1981). Tāranātha himself (ed. Schiefner p. 123.16-20 states that Guṇamati was a follower of Sthiramati: *slob dpon yon tan blo gros ni rig pa'i gnas thās cad la mkhas pa / mñon pa mdzod kyi 'grel bśad byas / dbu ma rtsa ba la blo brian gyi rjes 'brañs te / legs ldan 'gog pa'i 'grel pa byas / legs ldan gyi slob ma sañ pra du tañ yañ 'di dan dus mñam du byuri / śar phyogs ba la pū rir rtsod pa yun rin du byas pas / yon tan blo gros rgyal lo žes grags so* /. "Ācārya Guṇamati was learned in all the sciences. He commented on the *Abhidharmakośa*. On the root text of the Madhyamaka [i.e. MMK] he followed Sthiramati and composed a commentary which was refuted by Bhāvaviveka. The disciple of Bhāvaviveka, Sampraduta, also lived at this same time and debated [with him] for a long time in the East at Balapūri. It is generally said that Guṇamati won."

which we can glean, a common move in such Yogācāra commentaries may well have been to interpret the Madhyamaka's refutations of various entities as merely negating their *parikalpitasvabhāva* — certainly this tactic is very clear in the case of Dharmapāla. In other words, for Dharmapāla's Yogācāra the conclusion of a Nāgārjunian or Āryadevan argument is, in effect, that no entity exists different from the mind which apprehends it: there are no external objects (*wài jìng* 外境 = *bāhyārtha*). Naturally, the conclusion of virtually every Madhyamaka argument is phrased in terms of entities being void (*śūnya*) of nature (*svabhāva*), but the Yogācāra can turn this to his advantage by arguing that the ultimate nature of dharmas, their *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* or thusness (*tathatā*), is "voidness" (*śūnyatā*) because these dharmas are void of all characters (*lakṣaṇa*), the latter all being *parikalpitasvabhāva* and without nature (*niḥsvabhāva*).¹²⁴ So long as the Yogācāra stresses exclusively the fact that *pariniṣpanna* is voidness and that all *lakṣaṇa* are purely imagined, he can make sense of most Madhyamaka argumentation. Indeed if one reads Dharmapāla's first seven chapters without reading the eighth, where he explains his standpoint on the three natures, his commentary on Āryadeva will, with a few exceptions, look like a Madhyamaka treatise. It is only when one arrives at the end that one fully realizes that one has to reinterpret all that came before in a Yogācāra light.

While the talk of voidness at least superficially concords with the Madhyamaka's use of terms, what clearly differentiates the usual Yogācāra position from the Madhyamaka is that for the former philosopher dharmas, when suitably purified of *parikalpita*, do really exist. Indeed the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* goes so far as to say that the ultimate nature of dharmas, or *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*, can also be said to be "existence" (*sattā*) in that dharmas, when we consider them free of these *parikalpitasvabhāva*, do exist purely as *paratantrasvabhāva*, as phenomena, dependent on causes and conditions,

As for Devaśarman, Tāranātha states (ed. Schiefner 133.17-19): *de'i dus na slob dpon chos skyon'i gi slob ma de wa śar ma źes bya bas zla grags 'gog par bśam nas dbu ma'i 'grel pa dkar po mam par 'char ba byas* / "At that time the disciple of Ācārya Dharmapāla known as Devaśarman composed the Madhyamaka commentary *dKar po mam par 'char ba* in the intention of refuting Candrakīrti." See also Yamaguchi (1947) p. 2. Devaśarman's connection with Dharmapāla would however seem somewhat problematic in the light of the fact that Bhāvaviveka and Avalokitavrata apparently approved of his commentary. See *Prajñāpradīpāikā* P. 225a7 et seq., Kajiya (1963) p. 37, Ruegg (1981) p. 62, n. 187 and p. 67, n. 217.

If we accept Tāranātha's account, though, then of the eight commentators plus Dharmapāla, at least four would have been Vijñānavādins: Sthiramati, Guṇamati, Devaśarman and Dharmapāla. Asaṅga himself may have written such a commentary on MMK. T. 1565 on the eight negations in MMK's opening verse was translated by Gautama Prajñāruci and is attributed to Asaṅga; see *Inde Classique* §2138. See Ruegg (1981) p. 49 for these and other early commentaries on MMK.

¹²⁴ Cf. *Siddhi* p. 528: "Le Pariniṣpanna est la perpétuelle privation (*rahitatā* = *śūnyatā*) de Parikalpita (première nature) du Paratantra (deuxième nature)." As for "*niḥsvabhāva*" ("no-nature"), the Yogācāra in fact has a doctrine of three *niḥsvabhāvatā*. See Lamotte (1935) pp. 193-196; *Siddhi* p. 556 et seq.; D. Shimaji, "Historique du système *vijñaptimātra*" in Lévi (1932) p. 38. What interests us here for the moment is the *niḥsvabhāvatā* which pertains to *parikalpita*, viz. *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāva*, no nature-qua-characters. See en. 50.

but free of the duality of subject and object.¹²⁵ The *Madhyāntavibhāga* and *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* arrive at the same result, in that their theory of voidness presupposes the real existence of something (i.e. *paratantra*) which is void of something else (*parikalpita*), the latter being inexistent, while the former exists.¹²⁶

There is, however, an oddity in Dharmapāla's method: while he says that all *lakṣaṇa*, and especially existence and inexistence, are unreal fabrications of the imagination, he still, as a good Yogācārin, attributes existence to *paratantra* and *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva*. But on numerous occasions he describes existence and inexistence as "proliferations (*prapañca*) of conceptualization" and says that ultimate nature, or thusness, is neither existence nor voidness. In the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* and in Kuī jī we find an attempt at differentiating between *sūnya* and *sat* on the one hand and *sūnyatā* and *sattā*, on the other, but if we look at Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XII k. 286cd (§219b20 et seq.), it is doubtful that he is invoking that point: instead he wants to give both existence and voidness the status of conventional truth — mere metaphorical descriptions used for methodological purposes as antidotes to grasping. This he justifies by the typical Madhyamaka assertion that even voidness is void — here he might seem to be

¹²⁵ See *Siddhi* pp. 528-529.

¹²⁶ See e.g. Vasubandhu's comment on *Madhyāntavibhāga* I,1: *evaṃ yad yatra nāsti tat tena sūnyam iti yathābhūtaṃ samanupaśyati yat punar atrāvaśiṣaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāntīti aviparītaṃ sūnyatālakṣaṇam udbhāvitaṃ bhavati*. Transl. Nagao (1978) p. 69: "Thus [in this verse] the characteristic of emptiness has been shown in an unperverted way as stated: 'It is perceived as it really is that, when anything does not exist in something, the latter is empty with regard to the former; and further it is understood as it really is that, when, in this place, something remains, it exists here as a real existent.'" In fact, as Nagao brings out, the Yogācāra are using a theory of voidness explained in the *Cūḷasuvāṇāsutta*, where voidness is a lack of something unreal in something real: for the Yogācāra, the unreal is the *parikalpiyasvabhāva* while the real is the *paratantra*. Thus the *paratantra* is "what remains" and exists after subtraction of all the *parikalpita*. As Nagao points out, this theory of voidness is explained in detail in Asaṅga's *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, *Tattvārtha* chapter p. 32 ed. Dutt: *kathaṃ punar durghṛtā bhavati sūnyatā / yaḥ kaścic chramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā tac ca necchati yena sūnyam / tad api necchati yat sūnyam / iyaṃ evaṃrūpā durghṛtā sūnyatēty ucyate / tat kasya hetoḥ / yena hi sūnyam tadasadbhāvāt / yac ca sūnyam tatsadbhāvāc chūnyatā yujyate / sarvābhāvāc ca kutra kiṃ kena sūnyam bhaviṣyati / na ca tena tasyaiva sūnyatā yujyate / tasmād evaṃ durghṛtā sūnyatā bhavati / kathaṃ ca punaḥ sugṛhṛtā sūnyatā bhavati / yataś ca yad yatra na bhavati tat tena sūnyam iti samanupaśyati / yat punar atrāvaśiṣaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāntīti /* "How then is voidness misconceived? It is said that when a śramaṇa or brahmin does not accept that of which something is void and does not accept that which is void, this sort of voidness is misconceived. Why is that so? For the following reason: When that of which the thing is void is inexistent and that which is void is existent, voidness is correct. Now since [according to this mistaken śramaṇa or brahmin] everything is inexistent, then what would ever be void of what? It is incoherent that the very thing be void of itself. So therefore, in this way voidness is misconceived. But how is voidness properly conceived of? [Reply:] One sees that x is void of the y which does not exist in x. [Lit. 'One sees that it is void of that which does not exist in it.'] However, one correctly acknowledges that the entity which remains here does indeed exist here." Cf. the transl. in LVP (1933b) p. 50. Finally note that in the Tibetan debate between advocates of "voidness of self" (*ran ston*) and "voidness of other" (*gzan ston*), the latter definition of Asaṅga is often invoked as the theory of voidness for the *gZan ston* pa. See e.g. Mi pham's *gZan ston ser ge'i na ro*, pp. 366-367 (ff. 4b, 6 - 5a, 1), which cites this definition by Asaṅga.

leaning towards a more Madhyamaka than Yogācāra stance, in that he in effect dismisses these predications as not really true at all, but simply practical.

It is possible that Dharmapāla's Yogācāra side and his Madhyamaka were in something of an uneasy tension, the Yogācāra becoming dominant in the last chapter, while the other chapters were predominantly Madhyamaka. In fact, we see in his commentary to k. 323ab et seq. that he is also prepared to deny reality to consciousness (cf. §229a11), what is obviously a pleasing proposition for a Mādhyamika, but, at first sight, anathema for a Yogācārin. There is, however, a solution to these apparent conflicts: when Dharmapāla negates existence, inexistence, real consciousness and the like, he is negating characters which are essentially *parikalpita* and are misconceived; one can only regard such notions as conventional truths, void of *svabhāva*, but used for the sake of method in guiding disciples — even voidness, *qua parikalpita*, is no different on this score. On the other hand, when Dharmapāla subsequently affirms the existence of *paratantra*, *pariniṣpanna* and consciousness, he has changed perspective and is speaking of *paratantra*, etc. without distortions. In short, Dharmapāla's position seems to operate on two levels: a) his Madhyamaka-style critique is directed against misconceived notions of existence, inexistence, identity, difference, real consciousness and even voidness; b) his Yogācāra philosophy affirms the existence of consciousness and ultimate truth, what remains after misconceptions and errors are stripped away.¹²⁷ Taken in this light, it

¹²⁷ See *Siddhi* p. 523: "D'après Dharmapāla — Les Citta-caittas se développent (*pariṇam*) en deux Bhāgas par la force du parfumage (*vāsanā*). Ces deux Bhāgas, ainsi développés, naissent de causes et sont Paratantra au même titre que le Svaṣaṃvittibhāga. — Mais l'imagination (pien-ki, *vikalpa*), par rapport aux deux Bhāgas, conçoit les fausses notions de réelles existence, non-existence, identité, différence, existence plus non-existence, identité plus différence, ni existence ni non-existence, ni identité ni différence: les deux Bhāgas, conçus sous ces divers modes, prennent le nom de Parikalpita." Cf. also §225a10 and the verse in §229a11, which show that characters (*lakṣaṇa*) are unreal.

Kuī jī in the *Wéi shī ēr shī lùn shù jì*, T. 1830 *shàng* p. 982c 12-16 brings out the *paratantra* nature of the parts of consciousness so long as they are not misapprehended due to grasping at externality. 若護法等以後聖說言內識生似外境現謂有依他自證見相三分而生不離識故名爲唯識 愚夫依此不離識法執爲離心有實境相此實所取心外二取體性都無。

¹According to later Āryas such as Dharmapāla, it is explained that the inner consciousness gives rise to manifestations which resemble external objects. It is said that [the consciousness] arises having three parts which are dependent natures (*paratantra*), viz. the self-awareness, the perception and the characters — because [these parts] are not separate from the consciousness they are termed "just consciousness" (*vijñaptimātra*). Fools, in reference to these dharmas which are not separate from consciousness, grasp that there are real characters of objects separate from the mind [and that] these realities are what is apprehended. [These] natures [due to] dualistic apprehension of the mind and the exterior are completely inexistent." See fn. 25, 131.

Note that in fact this acceptance/rejection of existence from two different perspectives is nothing really new in Yogācāra. Asaṅga, whose theory of voidness demands the existence of *paratantra* (see fn. 126), also has many passages in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* where he speaks pejoratively of "existence" as (mis)conceived by ordinary people, which is the root of all the world's conceptual proliferations. E.g. p. 26 ed. Dutt: *tatra bhāvo yaḥ prajñaptivādasvabhāvo vyavasthāpitah / tathaiva ca dīrghakālam abhinivīṣo lokena / sarvavikalpaprapañcamūlaṃ lokasya* /. In the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and commentaries, the deliberate complexity of the various affirmations and denials of "existence" virtually precludes any attempt at detailed summary here. See

could perhaps be argued that there are even some advantages to his approach. He can safely deny all the lemmas of the *catuṣkoṭi*, for example, and not (like some Mādhyamikas) be prey to the frequently levelled charge of irrational nihilism, for he can maintain that the existence and inexistence which he is denying are *parikalpita* notions, and being fundamentally unreal, fictitious properties, they do not simply or in any combination qualify real entities like *paratantra*.¹²⁸

Given this background on Dharmapāla's position, we can now make an attempt at answering our principal query, "In what sense is he an idealist?" The question, which on first sight seemed facile, now becomes considerably more complicated.

First of all, we should distinguish between epistemological and metaphysical arguments for Buddhist idealism.¹²⁹ The typical epistemological type of argument is what we find in Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*, and is not far from Western idealists' "argument from illusion": since inexistent things, such as objects in a dream or hallucinations, appear qualitatively similar to objects which appear in the waking state, the latter are also mind-created, just like the former.¹³⁰ Another type of fundamentally epistemological argument is what we find in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* of Dignāga. It goes like this: 1) the object of consciousness must satisfy two conditions, i.e. it must be causally related to the consciousness, and it must itself resemble the representation, or image (*ākāra*), which consciousness has of it. 2) External objects do not satisfy these criteria, in particular they do not satisfy the second criterion. 3) Therefore, external objects are not the objects of consciousness.¹³¹

Ruegg (1977) p. 22 et seq. Suffice it to make two remarks: a) As far as I can see, the conjunctions of seemingly contradictory affirmations and denials as in 1.3 (*satvād asatvād satvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā*) are not in fact contradictions. They are affirmations and denials of existence to different things, or to different aspects of the same thing, but never are we saying that the very same thing or aspect both exists and does not exist. The paradoxical way of expression is probably deliberate, but there is, I think, no real paradox. Cf. similar remarks of Ruegg on pp. 25-26; Nagao (1978) p. 75, however, does take 1.3 as saying that "one and the same entity is the subject of both 'is not' and 'is'." b) The most complicated case is that of the "unreal notion" (*abhūtaparikalpa*) which, as a notion, exists as *paratantra* and is the basis for voidness; it is inexistent, void or unreal in the sense that it is not as it seems. One has the nagging feeling that after the verbiage has been stripped away the point is fairly simple: the mistaken thought exists but the mistaken object it imagines doesn't. Cf. Nagao (1979), who is more charitable.

¹²⁸ See Appendix II.

¹²⁹ Matilal (1974) makes this distinction and summarizes most of the principal Buddhist arguments for idealism. A minor detail: he seems to include some arguments (such as those in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*) under the rubric of "metaphysical" which I would say are more epistemological in nature.

¹³⁰ Cf. *Viṃśatikā*, k. 1: *vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthābhāvabhāsanāt / yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādi-darśanam* // On the *Viṃśatikā*'s response to four objections, see Hattori (1988) pp. 24-27.

¹³¹ Note that *à la rigueur* this argument could also lead to what is commonly known as "representational realism", i.e. the position that what we perceive is not external objects but sense-data, but that there are external objects behind the "veil of perception". It does lead to idealism if we take the familiar idealist tack of saying that what is behind the "veil of perception", and is never itself perceived, does not exist. But while

These two sorts of argument are alluded to here and there by Dharmapāla in his commentary on Āryadeva, but are not of nearly as great an importance for him there as the metaphysical arguments, in particular, a variation on an argument which

it is perhaps not one hundred percent clear where exactly Dignāga made that supplementary move in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* itself, it is abundantly clear that the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* gives external objects no role whatsoever in our cognition, and is explicitly arguing against different versions of *bāhyārtha* ("external objects"; Tib. *phyi rol gyi don*) being the object of cognition, as we already see from the introduction to k. 1. See Yamaguchi (1929) pp. 6 and 27.

Wayman (1979) p. 65 promulgates a confusion by writing: "Of course, if indeed the Yogācāra school denies the reality of an external object, it would hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow, since Dignāga and his successors, especially Dharmakīrti, do not deny an external object; rather they call it a *svalakṣaṇa* (the 'particular') and even sometimes describe it as *paramārthasat* ('absolute existence'), to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)." There is no reason to equate Yogācāra's *svalakṣaṇas* with external objects, nor would *svalakṣaṇa* necessarily be *unreal* in this school if they were of the same nature as the mind. In fact, contrary to Wayman, I have little doubt that Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were denying that external objects exist at all, just as was Dharmapāla. That is certainly the way their knowledgeable Hindu adversaries, like Uddyotakara and Kumārila, took them and it is also the way the Tibetan doxographers took them. See Matilal (1974) for Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Jayanta's arguments against these three authors. Dharmapāla in his commentary on the *Catuhśataka*, of course, repeatedly denies that there are any external objects. See e.g. §217a2 and en. 36. (The case of Asaṅga in the *Yogācārabhūmi* is more complex. See Schmithausen [1987] p.32 n. 221 and 222.) Moreover, if we come up with the contrived interpretation that Yogācāra authors were not denying external objects, we have to say that Śāntarakṣita and the other Yogācāra-Mādhyanikas were also hopelessly confused on their interpretations of Yogācāra.

For Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's denials of external objects, we have to refer to the arguments from *svasaṃvitti* / *svasaṃvedana* (i.e. self-awareness) to get a balanced picture of how these authors proceed. See PVin I, k. 38 ≡ PV III, k. 327, which summarizes Dharmakīrti's idealism: *nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyā 'sti tasyā nānubhāvo 'paraḥ / grāhyagrāhakaivaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate* // "[Apart from consciousness itself] there is nothing else which is experienced by the mind. Nor does the [mind] have any other experience. As there is nothing apprehended and no apprehender, it is the [mind] itself which illuminates itself." Skt. found in Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*; see Kajiyama (1966) n. 413, Tosaki (1985) n. 31. Cf. PV III, k. 327 in Tosaki (1985) p. 10: *nānyo 'nubhāvyas tenāsti tasya nānubhavo 'paraḥ / tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate* // See also Mimaki (1980), p. 158 and n. 43.

Following Iwata (1984a) there seem to be two principal arguments turning on *svasaṃvedana*, however, the most well-known is the *sahopalambhaniyama* inference: "Blue and the consciousness of blue are not different, because they must always be apprehended together, just like when one [falsely] sees two moons." See Iwata (1981), (1984a), (1984b); Hattori (1988) pp. 50-51; Matilal (1974) and PV III k. 388-391 translated in Matilal (1974) pp. 159-160 as well as Tosaki (1985) pp. 71-75. The other inference, to be found in PVin I (p. 98. ed. Vetter [1966]) and called the "*saṃvedana* inference" in Iwata (1984a), is as follows: the object is not different from the cognizing consciousness, because it is being cognized (*saṃvedyamāna*); only what has essential identity (*tādātmya*) with consciousness is cognizable. (In short, external objects would be unknowable.) So, both of these arguments make it clear that ordinary objects, like blue, etc., are not external.

I am equally unconvinced by the arguments in Hall (1986) which maintain that Vasubandhu's *vijñaptimātratā* was not a metaphysical position, but "a practical injunction to suspend judgment: 'Stop at the bare percept; no need to posit any entity behind it.' (p. 18)" I fail to see why the practical aspects of the Abhidharmic Vasubandhu should have precluded him from taking metaphysical positions.

later writers would term the "neither one nor many" reasoning (*ekānekaviyogahetu*).¹³² This is basically an argument which takes two forms: that any entity is neither one individual nor many different things, or that the part-whole relationship is impossible, for the parts are neither one with nor different from the whole. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the two forms of the argument are closely related, but the first usually turns on the second.¹³³

Because the argument turns on the problem of the part-whole relationship, it can be generalized and used for a multitude of purposes, e.g. Vasubandhu used it to refute the relationship between a composite and the subtle atoms composing it, Dharmakīrti used it to show the impossibility of universals and their instantiations, space and time and their parts, and finally Mādhyamikas, such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, used it to show the incoherence of any relation between an ordinary object, like a cart, and its parts — indeed the reasoning is so wide in scope that the encyclopedic writer, Śāntarakṣita, was able to construct a treatise on the basis of this argument alone which would refute all entities, be they postulated by Buddhists or non-Buddhists.¹³⁴

No doubt this is one of the most important, if not the principal reasoning which occurs in Dharmapāla.¹³⁵ He uses it to refute gross, external objects, universals,

¹³² Of course in his commentary on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, the *Guān suǒ yuán lùn shì*, T. 1625, Dharmapāla is using the Dignāgean argument. Indeed the arguments from the *Vimśatikā* and *Ālambanaparīkṣā* seem to overlap, for the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* ad k. 6a-c equally appeals to hallucinations to show that no external cause for perception is necessary.

¹³³ See Tillemans (1983). The usual logic which we find in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, and which is elaborated in Tsoñ kha pa's *Drañ nes legs bśad sñin po* p. 137, is as follows: for an entity to be one individual thing, it would have to be one with or different from its parts, but both hypotheses are impossible. The entity cannot be many different things, because, by the previous reasoning, the individuals needed to make up a collection of many different things do not exist as ones. See also en. 37.

¹³⁴ Cf. the opening "programmatic" verse of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*: *niḥsvabhāvaṃ amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat*. Cited in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, 173, 17-18. Transl. "Entities as asserted by ourselves and others, in reality, have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness. Therefore, they are without any nature, like a reflection." For some references to Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti's uses of the argument, see Tillemans (1984c), n. 2.

¹³⁵ In §229c11 he also uses the following reasoning: "the sense organs and their objects are all conventional, but not true [i.e. ultimate], in that they are objects of consciousness, like whirling firebrands' circles and other such [non-entities]." This could be variety of what T. Iwata (1984a) terms the *saṃvedana*-inference; see our fn. 131 and Iwata's p. 397. Note, however, that in TSP's introduction to the chapter on refutation of external objects we find a similar reasoning, and interesting enough, Kamalaśīla argues that the *vyāpti* ("implication"; "pervasion") holds in that nothing which is cognized can be an external thing, because it is neither one nor many, like a reflection. TSP p. 671: *tatra prayogaḥ yad yaj jñānaṃ tat tat grāhyagrāhakatva-dvayarahitam jñānatvāt pratibimbajñānavat / jñānaṃ cedam svasthanetrādijñānaṃ vivādāspadibhūtam iī svabhāvahetuḥ / na cāvyaṭpūr aśya hetor mantavyā / tathā hi na tāvat pṛthivyādibāhyo 'rtho 'śya grāhyo vidyate tasyaikānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvāt* /. Transl. "Here there is the following reasoning: Every consciousness is free of the duality between apprehended and apprehender because it is a consciousness, like the consciousness of a

atoms, consciousness, etc., the conclusion being that since these would-be entities are contradictory, they do not exist externally, but are mind-created. But the very scope of the argument gives rise to the following qualm: "If Dharmapāla and other Yogācāras are using exactly the same arguments as the Mādhyamikas, do they in fact arrive at the same conclusions, and if not, what is the difference between the idealist and non-idealist conclusions of these arguments?"

There is a surprising vagueness in our definition of the term "idealism", a vagueness which becomes especially important in this discussion. If we follow dictionaries of philosophical terminology, we find statements like "the philosophical tendency which consists in reducing all existence to thought". And some authors have maintained that Yogācāra is idealist in this sense.¹³⁶

While Yogācārin are indeed "idealists" in that sense, the problem is that in the Yogācāra vs. Mādhyamika discussion such a sense of "idealism" is too vague to be of much use in making the necessary distinction between the two schools: it seems to be trivially true of both. Indeed, a little reflection reveals to us that on *this* definition Mādhyamika writers — such as Candrakīrti, and what is really absurd, a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika like Bhāvaviveka — might very well end up being idealists. After all, they too hold that all existence is, at least ultimately, mind-dependent or reducible to thought, for it is the mind which produces designations (*prajñapti*), and it is a cardinal tenet of Mādhyamikas that existents are only *prajñaptisat* or *upādāya prajñapti* ("dependent designations").¹³⁷ Moreover the recurring Madhyamaka theme is, of course, that nothing is substantially existent, but exists due to ignorance or error, like the illusions of a mesh of hairs for someone suffering from the eye disease, *timira*. A world existing

reflection. Now, the consciousnesses under discussion, viz. those of the healthy eye and other such [sense organs], are consciousness. The above is a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvaheṭu*). Nor should it be thought that this reason has no *vyāpti*. For indeed, the [consciousness] has no external object, like earth, etc., which is apprehended (*grāhya*) because the latter is void of any nature of being one or many."

¹³⁶ Cf. May (1971) pp. 265-266: "Les catégories qui gouvernent la pensée philosophique en Occident s'appliquent mal, en général, à la pensée indienne. Pourtant on peut admettre, sans trop forcer les choses, que le Vijñānavāda est un idéalisme. Encore faut-il s'entendre sur le sens de ce dernier terme, qui en a beaucoup. Il s'agit de l'idéalisme entendu comme 'la tendance philosophique qui consiste à ramener toute existence à la pensée'. Nous verrons que le Vijñānavāda peut être considéré comme tributaire de cette tendance." The definition quoted here is from André Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, Paris, 1962, p. 435. Cf. also Schmithausen (1987) n. 222. Matilal (1974) p. 139: "Philosophical idealism is usually characterized as a denial of the common-sense view that material/external objects exist independently of the mind, i.e. independently of their being perceived. And this general character of idealistic philosophy was undoubtedly present in the Vijñānavāda theory of reality." In Matilal's definition, the problem is to define on which level of truth this denial takes place. All Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas would deny that the common-sense view is coherent from the point of view of ultimate truth. In short, in some sense they all make that denial.

¹³⁷ See en. 40, 185, 363. Svātantrikas emphasize mind-dependence of all conventional entities. See p. 45 and fn. 100.

due to our ignorance, or like a dream — why isn't this idealism pure and simple? In brief, this definition commits the fault of *ativyāpti*: it includes too much.

In fact, Candrakīrti provides the basis for the differentiation between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in his discussion of the dream example, arguing: "Because, in a dream, thought does not exist either for me, you have no [valid] example."¹³⁸ Tsoñ kha pa elaborates on this solution in his *rTsa ba'i šes rab kyi dka' gnas brgyad*: the difference between the Mādhyamika (in particular, the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika) and the Yogācāra is that the latter considers the mind to be more consistent and real than the imagined external objects.¹³⁹ Here is Tsoñ kha pa's résumé of the fundamental point as to why a Mādhyamika like Candrakīrti is *not* an idealist:

"So, from the point of view of convention, [external] objects and the mind are the same in being real. From the point of view of one contemplating the truth, object and mind are both the same in being unreal. Therefore, [for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika] it is incoherent that the object is unreal, while the mind is real."¹⁴⁰

It is precisely this asymmetry or ontological hierarchy which Candrakīrti rejects, but which is crucial to the Yogācāra. Consequently, if we are to use the term "idealism" in the context of Buddhist philosophy, we have to redefine it so that the idealist is not just saying that objects are always dependent upon the mind, but rather that objects and the mind have a different ontological status. Both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka maintain that objects are reducible to mind, but the Yogācārin, in addition, maintains that the mind is more real than the object. For a Mādhyamika like Candrakīrti, however, the same arguments which he applies to objects are also applied to the mind, and hence both are on the same footing, neither is more real nor more logically consistent than the other and both have the same conventional existence.¹⁴¹

So in what sense is Dharmapāla an idealist given that, as we saw earlier, he also in some sense resists the tendency to reify mind? Applying our revised understanding of "idealism" we would have to say that Dharmapāla and other Yogācāras are idea-

¹³⁸ M. av. VI, 48cd: *svapne 'pi me naiva hi citam asti yadā tadā nāsti nidarśanam te ||*.

¹³⁹ A more complicated case is that of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka system of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who maintain that the mind is more real than the material on the level of conventional truth, but that ultimately both are unreal. (See Kajiyama [1978] p. 137 et seq. on Kamalaśīla's assimilation of the Yogācāra system as a stage in meditation to be subsequently transcended.) Candrakīrti makes no such distinction with regard to conventional truth.

¹⁴⁰ *rTsa še dka' gnas brgyad* p. 17: *des na tha snad pa'i nor don sems gñis ka yod par mtshurṣ la / de kho na nid sems pa'i nor don sems gñis ka med par mtshurṣ pas / don med la sems yod par mi rigs so l.*

¹⁴¹ For the point of view that early Yogācāra does *not* make such a difference in status between mind and external objects, see Nagao (1979) pp. 39-40. Unfortunately, like Candrakīrti, I do not see how the Yogācārin can deny duality and affirm mind *qua paratantra* without making *some* form of an ontological hierarchy.

lists *to the degree* that they do make the mind more fundamentally real than external objects. But curiously enough, while we see that Dharmapāla does accept the reality of mind *qua paratantra*, this is a very slim ontological commitment, for he is prepared to use Madhyamaka-style arguments to dismiss all its characters as mere *parikalpita*, and with these *parikalpitasvabhāva* goes not just the mind we conceive or talk about, but even our ordinary categories of existence and inexistence. The margin of difference between Dharmapāla's idealism and Candrakīrti's acceptance of external objects is thus fine indeed and turns on the acceptance or rejection of the mind *qua paratantra*, a mind which we cannot conceive of or say what it is, and whose mode of being we fundamentally do not understand. For Yogācārins the core of their position is that this inexpressible mind *qua paratantra* is a necessary condition for cognition, illusion and spiritual progress. In effect, then, their proofs of the reality of mind *qua paratantra* are transcendental arguments, and typically such arguments only show that something must be, but show nothing of its properties.

IV. A SUMMARY OF OUR ARGUMENTS IN CHAPTERS II AND III

A. The problem of scriptural authority

1. It is not only meaningful to speak of a common stance of the Epistemological school stance on questions of authority, but this same position is also found in Āryadeva and his two commentators. A connection between Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti is very possible, even if we do not accept the account of Dharmapāla being a teacher of Dharmakīrti.

2. This common position on authority is developed further by Dharmakīrti. In theory at least, the role of authoritative people or scriptures is very limited: they can in no way challenge the results of inferences which function due to real states of affairs (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*).

3. Indeed, the Buddhist logicians' rational orientation finally leads him to the position that most of our "knowledge", which inevitably depends on testimony, books, etc., is mere true presumption (*vid dpyod*), to use the category of the Tibetan scholastic.

B. Candrakīrti on perception and the status of the given

1. Candrakīrti, besides arguing logically against *svabhāva*, elaborated a complementary theory of perception directed against various versions of the given, viz. a type of *seeming-object* which, according to the adversaries, has a *svabhāva*.

2. Contrary to most of his Buddhist adversaries, Candrakīrti rejected perception as an immediate, non-deceptive form of knowledge. Whereas his adversaries used a definition of perception which would make a rigid separation between the latter and concepts, Candrakīrti was alone in rejecting such a definition and any such separation.

3. Most Yogācāras and Svātantrikas accepted some type of an unconceptualized, uninterpreted given which we perceive directly and which might then be misinterpreted by conceptualization. These are real *ākāra* in the case of the Yogācāras, and for the Svātantrika they are mind-dependent phenomena which we share in common

and which may be judged conventionally real (i.e. *tathyaśaṃvṛti*) or unreal (i.e. *mithyāśaṃvṛti*) if they satisfy the tests of practical efficacy (*arthakriyā*).

4. Candrakīrti rejects such an uninterpreted given which appears similarly to everyone and which can then be judged as conventionally real or unreal. For him an object of perception is always interpreted, in particular, it is *seen* as real by those who have not realized voidness. Thus, the Svātantrika's distinction in terms of *tathyaśaṃvṛti* and *mithyāśaṃvṛti* is rejected and with it their notion of a given.

5. Candrakīrti's works are best read as arguing for the position that there is no perceptual given at all.

C. Dharmapāla on perception

1. Dharmapāla, in spite of ostensibly commenting on a Madhyamaka text, adopts classic Yogācāra positions, construing Āryadeva's text as a refutation of *parikalpitasvabhāva*.

2. If we wish to satisfactorily answer the question as to whether Yogācārins, like Dharmapāla, were idealists, we must change our usual understanding of that term. A Buddhist idealist does not just accept mind-dependence or a reduction of existence to mind, but also that mind has a preferred ontological status and is more real than external objects.

3. While Dharmapāla's acceptance of the reality of mind *qua paratantra* does seem to make him an idealist in our revised sense, the structure of his system guarantees that any attempt to conceptualize or formulate what that mind is like or how it exists is impossible.

APPENDIX I: TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS FROM PSV AND PST; A NOTE ON DHARMAKĪRTI'S AND DIGNĀGA'S APOHA

a) PSV ad k. 5.

The text is that of PSV(a) P. 29b6-30a1, unless otherwise indicated: *ji ltar de rjes su dpag pa ñid yin te / mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra rnams kyis don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin no** // *yid ches tshig kyañ mi slu bar / mtshuñs phyir rjes su dpag pa ñid / yid ches pa'i tshig ñid gzuñ nas kyañ mi slu bar mtshuñs pa'i phyir de yañ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do* // *de skad du yañ / miñ gi las ni mñon sum sñon du 'gro ba can zes bya ba yin no*** // *phyogs 'dis ni gtso bo la sogs pa'i rañ bžin rnams la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no+* // *de'i phyir rjes su dpag pa'i yul ni rañ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no* //.

b) Text-critical remarks and translation:

* Based on PSV(b) P. 111a3. PSV(a) turns the whole sentence into an objection: *gal te mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgras don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin na ji ltar rjes su dpag pa ñid du 'gyur ze na*. This does not concord with PST which takes *mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra ... ma yin no* as Dignāga's reply.

** Based on PSV(b) 111a4-5. PSV(a) reads *miñ gi las rnams kyi sñon du mñon sum soñ ba'i phyir ro zes 'byuñ ño*.

+ Based on PSV(b) 111a5. PSVa reads *de dag gis ni phyogs dañ gtso bo la sogs pa'i rañ bžin la yañ rjes su dpag pa dgag par bya'o*. As Hayes correctly pointed out (Op. cit. p. 250, n. 6), PSV(b)'s reading is supported by Jinendrabuddhi.

Hayes renders *don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin no* as "Words such as heaven do not express any object at all", which is, I think, a major cause of his problems. For the rest his translation is correct. What is also important is the conclusion, *de'i phyir ...rañ gi mtshan ñid ma yin no* which figures in PSV(a) and (with some insignificant variants) in PSV(b): Hayes left it out.

My translation: "How can they [i.e. authoritative words] be inferences? [Reply:] Words such as 'heaven' and the like do not express just the object (*don tsam*) [consisting in the speech-intention]. Because authoritative words are also similar in not belying, they are an inference. When one apprehends authoritative words, they are similar in not belying, and therefore, they too are said to be inferences. Furthermore it is stated that the act of naming is preceded by a direct perception. This position refutes inferences with regard to natures such as *pradhāna* and so forth. Therefore the object of inference is not a *svalakṣaṇa*."

c) PST P. 103b8-104a4:

'o na yañ ji ltar yid ches pa ma yin pas rab tu sbyar ba'i sgra rnams ni brjod par 'dod pa'i mtshan ñid kyi don tsam gañ yin pa de tshig las rjes su dpag pa ñid yin gyi / phyi rol gyi don brjod par byed pa las ni ma yin pa de lta yid ches pas rab tu sbyar ba rnams kyañ 'gyur ro ze na bśad pa / ma yin zes pa la sogs pa ste / 'di ltar bsams pa ste / yid ches pa'i tshig ni brjod par 'dod pa'i don tsam la tshad ma ñid du 'dod par bya ba ma yin gyi

/ 'on kyañ phyi rol gyi don la yañ ste / rnam pa gžan du na de dañ yid ches pa ma yin pa'i tshig la khyad par cir 'gyur / de'i phyir yid ches pas rab tu sbyar ba'i mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra mams kyi don tsam brjod pa ma yin gyi(s) / 'o na ci že na 'jig rten pa'i sgra dañ thun moñ ma yin pa'i phyi rol gyi don yañ ño zes pa'o // rañ gi mishan ñid brjod par byed pa las luñ mams rjes su dpag pa ñid ma yin gyi (l) 'o na ci že na / rnam pa de lta bu'i don la rnam par rtog pa tsam ñe bar skyed pa mams kyi spyi'i rnam pas don gsal bar byed pa'i phyir /.

d) My translation:

"Objection: In the case of words employed by the unauthoritative, it is only the object which has the character of a speech-intention (*brjod par 'dod pa* = *vivakṣā*) which is inferred from the words, but the external object is not [inferred] from the expressions. So too, [words] used by the authoritative would be similar. [Reply:] 'No' (*ma yin*)* etc. That is to say, we should think as follows: Authoritative words should not be held to be valid just for the object which is the speech-intention, but also for the external object. Otherwise what difference would there be between it and unauthoritative words? Therefore the words "heaven" and so forth employed by authoritative [people] do not express *just the object* [consisting in the speech-intention], but rather, they also [express] the external object which is specific to the word [used] by the worldly people. Scriptures are not [classified as] inference because of [directly] expressing *svalakṣaṇa*. Rather, [they are classified as inference] because the [external] object is clarified by means of the universal aspects which are creations of mere conceptualization with regard to this type of object."

* *ma yin zes pa la sogs pa* refers to PSV's *mtho ris la sogs pa'i sgra mams kyi don tsam brjod pa ni ma yin no*, and shows that Dignāga's reply starts at that point.

e) PST P. 105a6-105b1:

de skad du yañ smras pa / zes pa 'dis rañ gi 'dod pa bstan bcos gžan der sgrigs par byed te / yid ches pa mams mñon sum du mtho ris la sogs pa mams kyi rañ bžin bzuñ nas miñ byed do // miñ gi las ni ñe bar mtshon pa tsam du rig(s) par bya ste / de mams ni thams cad du yañ don mthoñ ba sñon ma can kho nar tha sñad byed la / rnam pa gžan du na yid ches pa mams kho nar mi 'gyur ro // de'i phyir de mams kyi tshig thams cad mi bslu ba ste / des na rjes su dpag pa'o zes pa'o // phyogs 'dis zes pa ste / gtso bo la sogs pa mams dañ de mams kyi rtags 'brel ba ma mthoñ ba ñid kyi phyir / gtso bo la sogs pa mams ni luñ las ma grub pa* kho na'o zes sñar kyi rjes su 'brañs nas brjod par bya'o //

* P. reads *grub pa* instead of *ma grub pa*. But note that PST is commenting on PSV's words *phyogs 'dis ni gtso bo la sogs pa'i rañ bžin mams la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no*, which clearly imply a negation (= *ma grub*) rather than establishment (*grub*).

f) My translation:

"When it is said 'Furthermore it is stated', this lays out here another treatise which we accept. When authoritative people have directly apprehended the natures of things such as the heavens they give them names. The action of naming should be understood as simply pointing out. Indeed, the [authoritative people] in all cases apply

designations to only those objects which have been seen before. Otherwise, they would not in fact be authoritative. Thus, all their words are non-belying and hence are said to be inference. 'This position' means that because a relation is not observed between *pradhāna*, etc. and their [linguistic] signs, then in keeping with what was [said] previously, one has to say that *pradhāna* and the like are not in fact established through scripture."

g) *A few remarks on R. Herzberger's view on Dignāga vs. Dharmakīrti on apoha.*

Radhika Herzberger presents the position of M. Hattori and then argues for a frankly incredible counter-thesis to the effect that Dignāga did *not* maintain that words refer to conceptually created entities, but apply directly to the perceptual objects. For this she exhorts us to read the "details of Dignāga's text", and then proceeds to cite a passage from PS V k. 36c and PSV, in reconstructed Sanskrit, where Dignāga said that names apply directly (*sākṣādvṛtti*). See R. Herzberger (1986) p. 109; p. 138, note 4.; p. 163. Cf. the Tibetan text in Hattori (1982) pp. 136-137; p. 202, §49 for PST; Hayes (1988) p. 299. It seems to me, however, that Dignāga did not say that the name applies directly to the particular, but rather that it applies directly to the *apoha without reliance on other qualities*. Compare PST §49, Hattori (1982) p. 202, lines 33-35: 'dir ni yod pa ñid la sogs pa'i yon tan gzan la ma ltos par yod pa ma yin pa bsal ba'i dños po la sgra 'jug go //'. "Here without reliance on other qualities such as existence, etc., the word applies to the entity which is the exclusion of non-existence." This entity is an *apoha* and is conceptual. R. Herzberger also proposes an explanation of PS V, k. 1 which differs from that of the commentator, Jinendrabuddhi. See e.g. her p. 121 et seq.. For PS V k. 1, PST and PV IV k. 16, see Tillemans (1987) pp. 143-144. Now, it might be said that I'm not allowed to cite Jinendrabuddhi's PST because the author is too pro-Dharmakīrti. Let's say that the minimum which I should be able to uncontroversially claim is that R. Herzberger's citations of Dignāga give no hard evidence; they can and will be interpreted by Dharmakīrtians. It seems to me that for her controversial claims she needs much stronger evidence than the quotations which she gives, all the more so because her translation of PS V k. 36 is very doubtful. Cf. Hayes (1988) p. 299 and the article by S. Katsura, "Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *apoha*", which gives a detailed critique of Herzberger's interpretation of *sākṣādvṛtti* and her translation of k. 36 (forthcoming in the proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Congress, Vienna).

APPENDIX II: REMARKS ON THE *CATUṢKOṬI*

We see that in Dharmapāla's Chapter IV the true nature of things is said to be, in some sense, beyond existence and inexistence — see e.g. §219c1. In Candrakīrti's CSV XII, too, we are repeatedly exhorted to avoid such extremes — see e.g. the quotations from the *Samādhirājasūtra* and *Ratnāvalī* in CSV XII §§13, 17. This is, of course, at the heart of Madhyamaka thought; its seemingly paradoxical aspects, therefore, merit some investigation here.

If we generalize this avoidance of extremes, we arrive at the four negations of the *catuṣkoṭi* ("tetralemma"), a classic statement of which occurs in k. 346 in Chapter XIV of the *Catuhśataka*:

sad asat sadasac ceti sadasan neti ca kramah / eṣa prayojoyo vidvadbhir ekatvādiṣu nityaśaḥ // "Existent, inexistent, both existent and inexistent, neither existent nor inexistent, that is the method which the learned should always use with regard to oneness and other such [theses]."

Negating these four alternatives, we have denials that anything exists, is inexistent, is both or neither. The commentaries make it clear, however, that this fourfold negation also applies to other dichotomies, such as one /many, and so forth — in other words, it can be generalized to apply to any proposition *P*, and not just to the usual context of "...exists", "...is inexistent", etc. Ruegg (1977) p. 9 sums up the Mādhyamika use of this schema:

"This type of analysis of a problem thus constitutes one of the basic methods used by the Mādhyamikas to establish the inapplicability of any imaginable conceptual position — positive, negative or some combination of these — that might be taken as the subject of an existential proposition and become one of a set of binary doctrinal extremes (*antadvaya*)."

Prima facie, it looks as if denying all four lemmas would lead to a deviant logic, a fact which, of course, has not gone unnoticed by Western interpreters — see Ruegg (1977) Appendix II for a history of the various modern attempts to interpret the tetralemma. See Haack (1974), Chapter I, for a precise specification of what is meant by the term "deviant logic". Roughly speaking, a deviant logic will have the same set of well-formed formulae (*wff*) and use the same vocabulary as classical logic, but will have a different set of theorems. Modal logic, for example, which uses additional "vocabulary", is not deviant, but intuitionist logic, which denies the laws of excluded middle and double negation, is.

In Tillemans (1989a) I looked at some versions of the *catuṣkoṭi*, the "Tibetan" version chosen being what we find in Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *sKabs dan po'i spyi don* f. 104a5-104b2 and 104b7-105a1 and in Tsoñ kha pa's *rTsa še ſik chen* p.

15 *et passim*. There are, it seems to me, two main approaches: the unqualified *catuṣkoṭi*, and the qualified one. The former is where one interprets the texts as denying existence, etc. and one does not add any qualifying phrases to the text. This approach is undoubtedly the most difficult to rationalize in that we need all our acumen to avoid violating some fundamental logical laws like double negation and excluded middle, or even the law of contradiction. In the latter approach, one adds qualifying phrases to the text and interprets "existence" as "true existence" (*bden par yod pa*; *rañ bžin gyis yod pa*). As I tried to show in the above-mentioned article, the Tibetans' move to qualify "existence" as "true existence" leads to a type of modal logic which can handle the *catuṣkoṭi*'s fourfold denials in a relatively banal, non-paradoxical, non-deviant way. Its general exegetical disadvantage, however, is that it tends to strain credibility by making too many additions to the text.

B.K. Matilal (1986) suggests an approach which would also avoid deviancy, but which would not need recourse to the extensive qualification which we find in the Tibetan versions. He argues (on his p. 66) that

"the [Mādhyamika] sceptic's use of negation, perhaps, can be better understood as an act of refutation, an illocutionary act where one negates some illocutionary force rather than a proposition."

In brief, the point (see his pp. 88-89) is that the Mādhyamika refuses to make *assertions* of P or of $\neg P$. If we represent assertion by the symbol " $\vdash$ ", then we get perfectly compatible denials: $\neg \vdash P$ and $\neg \vdash \neg P$, i.e. "I do not assert P "; "I do not assert not- P ". This can, of course, be generalized to the *catuṣkoṭi* and yields a logic which is quite unproblematical.

Ruegg (1983) p. 236 *et seq.* suggests a similar approach to that of Matilal, using some concepts from J. Lyons *Semantics* Vol. 2 and other speech act theorists to take the negation in the *catuṣkoṭi* as denying the tropic ("it is so") and neustic ("I say so") illocutionary components of assertions, rather than the phrastic component, or propositional content, of the assertion. Ruegg's main reason for construing the negation in this way is that negation of the phrastic presupposes the existence of entities, and that *presupposition* is never accepted by Mādhyamikas. Ruegg (p. 237) writes:

"...propositional negation is logically implicative and presuppositional; that is, in propositional negation (e.g. in the utterance: 'The grass is not red') just as much as in assertion (e.g. in the utterance: 'The grass is green') the producer of the utterance is committed to (the truth of the underlying proposition) presupposing the existence of an entity (e.g. the grass)."

From this presuppositional failure, Ruegg concludes:

"It is in any case fairly clear that a form of 'external' negation of the assertion sign (Frege's $\vdash$) — i.e. negation of the tropic and negation of the neustic — rather than 'internal' negation — i.e. negation of the phrastic — is to be taken

into consideration when the subject of the embedded proposition (*bhāvas*, etc.) is empty (*śūnya*) and null, in other words when the existential presupposition fails or is not determinable in terms of the positions of the binary *vikalpa* and the quaternary *catuṣkoṭi*."

While this approach does have some advantages — e.g. it might be thought to account for the irenic aspect of the *Madhyamaka*, standing outside the fray conflicting assertions — it is certainly not the *only* way to handle presuppositional failure. Furthermore, I think that this approach has a serious philosophical drawback: the point about Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti's argumentation is that they do not *just* refuse to commit themselves to certain positive or negative propositions, but they usually provide strong arguments (largely, but not exclusively, by *reductio ad absurdum*) as to why the propositions cannot be true. And if we look at these actual arguments, it does not seem to be just a matter of performing deconstructive therapy on the opponent, while one remains oneself uncommitted to the truth or falsity of it all. To take, for example, the case of the person being one with or different from the aggregates, both alternatives lead to absurdities and thus *cannot* be so — it seems difficult to maintain that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti did not themselves wish to assert that both positions were false. In short, this seems much closer to asserting *some form* of a negated proposition, i.e. $\neg P$, rather than simply being unwilling to assert P .

Our problem, then, is to see whether a plausible interpretation of the unqualified *catuṣkoṭi* can be formulated in terms of negated propositions, all the while remaining faithful to the *Mādhyamika*'s view that existential presuppositions of statements must fail. The *catuṣkoṭi* as we find it in various places in *Dharmapāla* (especially in the last chapter) and *Asaṅga* would probably have to be classified as an unqualified version in that it does not add phrases like "truly" or "by its own nature" to the text. I would maintain that with some ingenuity it can also be made to avoid a deviant logic. Let me, therefore, add my contribution to the already numerous attempts to "rationalize" the *catuṣkoṭi*. To take *Dharmapāla*'s system, suppose we grant that all *lakṣaṇa*, or predicates, are *parikalpita*, and that *paratantra* are all outside the range of language and concepts; no *paratantra* possesses any such *lakṣaṇa*. In that case, in constructing an artificial semantics (along usual logic-textbook lines), the domain of our models will contain no real entities (i.e. no *paratantra* or *pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*), and will in fact be an empty domain. The *Mādhyamika* version can be accommodated too, if we simply speak of empty domains as domains with no *vastu*, no entities existing in themselves.

Take the fourfold negation in the *catuṣkoṭi* as the conjunction of four negated existentially quantified statements ($\neg$ = "not", $\&$ = "and", $\vee$ = "or"):

$\neg(Ex)Fx$; $\neg(Ex)\neg Fx$; $\neg(Ex)(Fx \& \neg Fx)$; $\neg(Ex)(\neg Fx \& \neg\neg Fx)$. Read: "There is not an x such that x has F ; There is not an x such that x does not have F ; There is not an x such that x has F and x does not have F ; There is not an x such that x does not have F and does not not have F ."

The fourth conjunct negates the possibility that something is neither F nor not F , viz. the possibility that $(Ex)(\neg Fx \ \& \ \neg \neg Fx)$. This conjunct could be equivalently presented as $\neg(Ex)\neg(Fx \vee \neg Fx)$ and would read "There is not an x such that x neither has F nor does not have F ." In short, the third conjunct says there is no entity which combines the two lemmas, F and $\neg F$; the fourth conjunct says that there is no entity which combines the negations of the first two lemmas. Note that we can take F as any predicate we wish.

If we interpret quantification in the usual referential manner as ranging over entities in the domain, then we can deny all four lemmas without problem: the fourfold denial just shows that the domain is empty of objects, for any sentence beginning with an existential quantifier will be false in the empty domain. (A perhaps somewhat counterintuitive result which we have to live with is that if the domain is empty we would also have to assert the truth of the universally generalized statement $(x)Fx$. See W.V. Quine, "Quantification and the empty domain", *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 19, 1954, pp. 177-179.)

All Buddhists must, of course, find a way to preserve conventional designations. One way for us to do this is to make use of the fairly frequently used gambit of interpreting quantification substitutionally rather than referentially: on a substitutional interpretation, $(Ex)Fx$ does not mean that there is really some entity in the world which has F , but rather that there is a name a , such that substituting a for the free variable x in Fx yields a true atomic sentence, Fa . The domain of our interpretation will be a set of names, some of which may even be names for absurd pseudo-entities like rabbit's horns. In effect, we maintain conventional predication and existence-statements in saying, in accordance with the world's beliefs and practices, that certain atomic sentences are true and others false. The Buddhist's two truths then cease to be "things" or "objects", but are two different ways (i.e. referential vs substitutional) of interpreting the quantification in the one and the same sentence. The reconstructed *śūnyavādin* can, thus, use the world's language to communicate about whichever day-to-day affair the world concerns itself with: his *śūnyavāda*, however, dictates that he never accepts a referential interpretation of such language. To sum up, if we accept the Yogācāra's or Mādhyamika's position, then all fourfold denials of existentially quantified statements will be true on the referential interpretation. Most will be false on the substitutional, and that, I am prepared to argue, is about the best we can hope for as an unqualified interpretation of the *catuṣkoṭi* as a series of negated propositions. While substitutional quantification exhibits some fairly well-known deviant results when dealing with non-denumerably infinite sets (like irrational numbers), that is no doubt of little consequence for our purposes — let us say then that this interpretation would yield a logic which is not *significantly* deviant.

Finally, note that Nāgārjuna's famous phrase in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, "I have no thesis", is (as Ruegg 1986 and various Tibetan sources point out) probably better seen as not being a simple reluctance to assert anything whatsoever, but rather as a more nuanced statement: "I have no thesis which posits real entities". Ruegg (pp. 232-233) shows that in fact there are a number of places where the Mādhyamika *does* speak about his theses (*pakṣa*; *pratijñā*), e.g. that things are not produced from self, other,

etc. On our reconstructed version, then, "not having a thesis" means that every existentially quantified proposition interpreted referentially will be false for a Mādhyamika-style philosopher. These subjects are further developed in my article, "La logique bouddhique est-elle une logique non-classique ou déviante? Remarques sur le tétralemmes", appearing in the Felicitation Volume for Jacques May, *Etudes Asiatiques*.

A few references on substitutional interpretations of quantification: J. Michael Dunn and Nuel D. Belnap Jr., "The substitution interpretation of the quantifiers", *Noûs* 2, n°2, 1968 pp. 177-184. Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Interpreting quantification", *Inquiry* 5, n°3 1962 pp. 252-259 and "Quantification and ontology", *Noûs* 6, n°3 1972 pp. 240 - 250. Saul Kripke, "Is there a problem about substitutional quantification?" in M. Evans and J.H. McDowell eds., *Truth and Meaning; Essays in Semantics*. Oxford, Clarendon, 1976. For an introduction and summary, see D. Vernant, "Quantification substitutionnelle, contextes intensionnels et question d'existence", *Dialectica* 40, n°4, 1986 pp. 273-296.

APPENDIX III: RGYAL TSHAB RJE'S TOPICAL OUTLINES TO CATUḤŚATAKA- VRTTI XII

1. *chos 'di la 'jig rten phal cher mi 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason why the world for the most part does not apply itself to this Dharma".¹⁴²

1.1. *ñan po'i mtshan ñid dan ldan pa rñed par dka' ba*. "It is difficult to find auditors which have the [required] characteristics [for understanding the Dharma]."

1.1.1. *ñan pa po'i mtshan ñid*. "The [required] characteristics of the auditors." (See §1-6; k.276)

1.1.2. *mtshan ñid ma tshañ ba'i ñes dmigs*. "The faults of not fulfilling [these] characteristics." (See §7-10; k.277)

1.1.3. *rtsod pa spañ ba*. "Rebutting objections."

1.1.3.1. *thub pa kun mkhyen du sgrub pa*. "Proving that the Sage is omniscient."

1.1.3.1.1. *sdug kun sun 'byin pa'i stoñ pa ñid bstan pa la dga' bar rigs pa*. "One should rejoice in the doctrine of voidness which puts an end to all suffering." (See §11-17; k.278)

1.1.3.1.2. *ston pa'i bstan pa las gzan la thar pa med pa'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason why there is no liberation apart from the doctrine of the Teacher [Śākyamuni]." (See §18-20; k.279)

1.1.3.1.3. *ston pa'i gsuñs pa'i śin tu lkog gyur gyi don rnams ñes par byed pa'i thabs*. "The way one ascertains the various completely imperceptible (*śin tu lkog gyur* = *āyanta-parokṣa*) states of affairs spoken about by the Teacher." (See §21-23; k.280)

1.1.3.2. *gzan gyi ston pa ltar snañ du bstan pa*. "Showing that the other teachers are bogus." (See §24-27; k.281)

1.2. *gnas lugs kyi don rtogs dka' ba*. "The state of affairs of things as they are is difficult to realize."

1.2.1. *stoñ pa ñid la skrag pa'i rgyu*. "The cause for fear of voidness."

1.2.1.1. *thar pa 'dod kyañ kha cig mu stegs byed kyi rjes su 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason why some, even though they desire liberation, follow Outsiders." (See §28-31; k.282)

1.2.1.2. *stoñ pa ñid la skrag pa'i gañ zag ños bzuñ ba*. "Recognizing which people are afraid of voidness." (See §31-34; k.283)

1.2.1.3. *byis pa rnams stoñ pa ñid la skrag pa'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason why the infantile fear voidness." (See §34-36; k.284)

¹⁴² In fact, the first topical outline (*sa bcad*) in each chapter is: *le'u'i gzuñ bśad pa dan le'u'i mtshan bstan pa* ("Explaining the text of the chapter and showing the title of the chapter"). But this division is trivial and I have left it out, presenting only the subdivisions of *le'u'i gzuñ bśad pa*.

1.2.2. *ston pa ñid rtogs pa la gegs byed pa'i ñes dmigs*. "The faults of impeding [others] in realizing voidness." (See §37-38; k.285)

1.2.3. *de kho na ñid kyi lta ba ma ñams pa la bag dan ldan par bya ba*. "One should be heedful that the view of the truth does not degenerate." (See §39-40; k.286)

1.2.4. *de kho na ñid la bkri ba'i rim pa*. "The stages in bringing [people] to the truth." (See §41-45; k.287)

1.2.5. *de kho na ñid ños bzuñ ba*. "Recognizing what is the truth."

1.2.5.1. *gnas lugs ños bzuñ ba*. "Recognizing the way things are." (See §46-51; k.288)

1.2.5.2. *dman pa skrag pa skye ba'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason inferior [people] become afraid." (See §52-53; k.289)

1.3. *zab mo rtsod pa mdzad pa'i ched du gsuñs pa min pa*. "The profound [i.e. voidness] was not explained for the sake of argumentation."

1.3.1. *chos 'di rtsod pa'i ched du ma gsuñs kyañ smra ba ñan pa mtha' dag bsreg pa chos ñid yin pa*. "Although this dharma [i.e. voidness] was not explained for argumentation, burning up the numerous wrong positions is its nature. (See §54-56; k.290)

1.3.2. *de'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason for that, [i.e. why voidness destroys the numerous wrong positions]."

1.3.2.1. *dños*. "The actual [explanation]." (See §57-59; k.291)

1.3.2.2. *'phags pa mams la skrag pa mi skye ba'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason why the Āryas do not become afraid." (See §60-61; k.292)

1.3.3. *lam grol bar¹⁴³ žugs pa la sñiñ rje bya bar rigs pa*. "One should have compassion on those who set out on the path to deliverance." (See §62-63; k.293)

1.4. *rañ bžin gyi bstan pa'i phra rags bstan pa*. "Showing the [various degrees] of subtlety and coarseness of the [different] doctrines on nature (*rañ bžin* = *svabhāva*)."

1.4.1. *blo dman pa gžan gyi bstan pa la gus sñiñ ston pa 'i bstan pa la mi gus pa'i rgyu mtshan spyir bstan pa*. "General explanation of the reasons why those of inferior intelligence respect rival doctrines and do not respect the doctrine of the Teacher [Śākyamuni]." (See §64-66; k.294)

1.4.2. *so sor bśad pa*. "Specific explanations."

¹⁴³ rGyal (p. 10) reads *lam gol bar žugs pa*, which would necessitate the translation, "One should have compassion on those who set out on a *mistaken* path." This, however, would fit badly with the sense of k. 293 and CSV §63, which clearly says that we should have compassion for those who have seen the disadvantages of the Outsiders' paths and set out on the Buddhist path.

1.4.2.1. *lugs nan de dag thar 'dod kyi dpyad bya min pa*. "These wrong traditions are not worthy of consideration by those desirous of liberation." (See §67-68; k.295)¹⁴⁴

1.4.2.2. *dbaṅ po dman pa gus pa skye ba'i tshul*. "How those of inferior faculties generate respect." (See §69-70; k.296)

1.4.2.3. *lugs de dag dam pa'i chos [mi] len pa'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reason these traditions do [not] obtain the Holy Dharma." (See §71; k.297)

2. *legs bśad mdor bsdus te bstan pa*. "Résumé of what was well explained [by the Buddha]."

2.1. *dños*. "The actual [résumé] (See §72-75; k.298)

2.2. *phyi rol pa'i chos la mi gus pa'i rgyu mtshan*. "The reasons for not respecting the Outsiders' Dharma." (See §76-77; k.299)

3. *grol ba don gñer legs bśad blaṅ bar gdams pa*. "The advice that those who strive for deliverance should accept what is well explained." (See §77-78; k.300)

¹⁴⁴ rGyal tshab rje on p. 13 twice reads *dpyad bya ma yin pa / min pa*. It is clear that he must have read the text of CSV §68 as *thar pa 'dod pa mams kyis dpyad par bya ba ma yin pa* ("is not to be considered by those who seek liberation"), instead of *...spyad par bya ba ma yin pa...* ("is not be practised..."), and then commented accordingly.

APPENDIX IV: RGYAL TSHAB RJE'S TOPICAL OUTLINES TO CATUḤŚATAKA- VṚTTI XIII

1. *bden grub 'gog pa'i rigs pa rgyas par bśad pa*. "Extensive explanation of the reasonings which refute that [the sense organs and their objects] are truly established."

1.1. *gzun bya dbaṅ don bden pa dgag pa*. "Refuting that what is apprehended, viz. the objects of the sense organs, is true."

1.1.1. *spyir dgag pa*. "A general refutation."

1.1.1.1. *dños*. "The actual [refutation]."

1.1.1.1.1. *bum pa raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa dbaṅ śes kyi mñon sum du mthoṅ ba dgag pa*. "Refuting that vases established by their own defining characteristics are seen to be perceptible [objects] of the physical sense consciousnesses." (See §1-17; k.301)

1.1.1.1.2. *rigs pa de gzan la sbyar ba*. "Applying this reasoning to the other [constituents]."

1.1.1.1.3. *gzugs raṅ mtshan mthoṅ bas gzan mthoṅ bar 'jog pa ha caṅ thal ba*. "The absurd consequence that by seeing the particular form one would see the other [constituents of vases, etc.]."

1.1.1.1.4. *gzugs raṅ mtshan pa kho na la mñon sum yin pa dgag pa*. "Refuting that only the particular form is perceptible." (See §23-24; k.304)

1.1.1.1.5. *sgrub byed bsgrub bya dan mtshuṅs par bstan pa*. "Showing that the *sādhana* [i.e. the reason] is similar [in being doubtful] to what is to be proven (*bsgrub bya dan mtshuṅs pa* = *sādhyasama*)." (See §24-25; k.305)

1.1.1.2. *rigs pa gzan bstan pa*. "Showing other reasonings." (See §27-30; k.306)

1.1.2. *so sor dgag pa*. "Specific refutations."

1.1.2.1. *yul raṅ gi ño bos grub pa dbaṅ pos 'dzin pa dgag pa*. "Refuting that the sense organs apprehend objects which are established by their own essences."

1.1.2.1.1. *blta bya bden grub dgag pa*. "Refuting that the visible is truly established."

1.1.2.1.1.1. *yul dgag pa*. "Refuting the object."

1.1.2.1.1.1.1. *raṅ sde dgag pa*. "Refuting our co-religionists."

1.1.2.1.1.1.1.1. *kha dog dan dbyibs kyis bsdus pa'i gzugs raṅ mtshan mig śes kyi gzun don du byed pa de gñis raṅ bzin gcig*

dañ tha dad brtags la dgag pa.

"Refutation by examining the particular forms which serve as the objects apprehended by the eye-consciousness and which are included amongst colours and shapes, [i.e. examination] as to whether those two [sorts of form, viz. colour and shape] are of the same or different natures." (See §31-33; k.307)

1.1.2.1.1.1.2. *'byuñ ba yod pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis gzugs gzuñ don byed pa'i mig śes kyis gñis ka 'dzin par thal bas dgag pa.*

"Refutation in that it would follow absurdly that if the eye-consciousness takes [particular] forms as its apprehended objects because the elements [which cause the forms] do exist, it would have to apprehend both [the form and the elements]." (See §34-37; k.308)

1.1.2.1.1.1.3. *'dod pa la gnod pa bstan pa.* "Presenting a refutation of [our co-religionists'] position [that the elements are the cause of form]." (§37-40; k.309)

1.1.2.1.1.2. *gžan sde dgag pa.* "Refuting the [non-Buddhist] rival schools." (See §41-44; k.310)

1.1.2.1.2. *yul can dgag pa.* "Refuting the subject."

1.1.2.1.2.1. *mig gzugs la lta byed du ño bo ñid kyis grub pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that the eye is established by its essence as something which sees form." (See §45-53; k.311)

1.1.2.1.2.2. *rnam śes byed pa po yin pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that consciousness is an agent." (See §54-57; k.312)

1.1.2.1.2.3. *mig byed pa po yin pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that the eye is an agent."

1.1.2.1.2.3.1. *mig gzugs la blta ba'i 'gros dañ ldan na ha cañ thal ba.* "There are absurd

consequences if the eye moves to see the form." (See §58-60; k.313)

1.1.2.1.1.2.3.2. *gzugs mthoñ nas lta ba'i ched du 'gro na dgos pa med pa.* "If [the eye] has [already] seen the form and then goes out to see it, there is no point [in such a movement]." (See §61-62; k.314)

1.1.2.1.1.2.3.3. *mig ma soñ bar ño bo ñid yis gzugs 'dzin na yul kun mthoñ bar thal ba.* "If the eye apprehends forms by its own essence, without going out [to the place of the object], then it would follow absurdly that it should see all objects." (See §63-65; k.315)

1.1.2.1.1.2.4. *mig de mig la ltos nas lta byed du thal ba.* "It would follow absurdly that the eye would [also] see the eye [itself]."¹⁴⁵ (See §66-67; k.316)

1.1.2.1.1.2.5. *rkyen gsum tshogs pa gzugs la lta byed yin pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that the collection of the three conditions is what sees form." (See §68-70; k.317)

1.1.2.1.2. *mñan bya bden grub dgag pa.* "Refuting that the audible is truly established."

1.1.2.1.2.1. *sgra smra ba'i byed pa po yin min brtags la dgag pa.* "Refutation by examining whether sounds are or are not the agents of speech." (See §71-73; k.318)

1.1.2.1.2.2. *sgra dañ phrad nas 'dzin mi 'dzin brtags la dgag pa.* "Refutation by examining whether one does or does not apprehend [a sound] through [the ear's] contact with the sound." (See §74-75; k.319)

1.1.2.1.2.3. *sgra'i cha dañ po mi 'dzin pa la gnod pa bstan pa.* "Presenting a refutation to [the idea that] one does not apprehend the initial part of the sound." (See §76-78; k.320)

1.1.2.2. *yid kyis 'dzin pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that the mind apprehends [objects which are established by their own essences.]" (See §79-83; k.321)

¹⁴⁵ Literally, "It would follow absurdly that the eye would be a seer with reference to the eye."

1.2. *'dzin byed yul can bden pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that the apprehender, viz. the subject, is true."

1.2.1. *'du śes kyi phuñ po'i mtshan ñid.* "The defining characteristics of the aggregate of notions (*'du śes kyi phuñ po* = *saṃjñāskandha*)." (See §84-87; k. 322)

1.2.2. *de bden par grub pa dgag pa.* "Refuting that this [aggregate of notions] is truly established." (See §88-93; k.323)

1.3. *bden med mig 'khrul lta bu no mtshar gyi rgyur bstan pa.* "Showing that things without truth, like optical illusions, are causes for astonishment." (See §94-97; k.324)

2. *bden pas stoñ pa sgyu ma sogs dan mtshuñs par bstan pa.* "Showing that [the sense organs and their objects] are similar to [magical] illusions and the like in being void of truth." (See §98-111; k.325)

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY TO THE CATUḤŚATAKA

Chapter IV: Refutation of Heretical Views (*jiàn* 見 = *dṛṣṭi*)

(215c14) [Objection:] Now, if the nature and character of all dharmas (*zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* 諸法性相)⁽¹⁾, as they have been [previously] explained, is existence as things from the point of view of worldly convention and voidness from the point of view of the principle of ultimate reality (*shèng yì* 勝義 = *paramārtha*); [and if] the Tathāgata has unobstructed insightful vision (*zhì jiàn* 智見 = *jñānadarśana*)⁽²⁾ into these matters, knows how to explain them in words and skillfully comprehends others' minds, then why is it that the world is still bewitched by various mistaken views and [thus] has thoroughly confused debates?

A. The qualities of the auditors of the teaching

(215c16) [Reply:] It is because the auditors [of the teaching] have [various] faults. What are termed "faults of the auditors"? As follows: attachment to one's own [wrong] views, not seeking zealous application (*shèng jiě* 勝解 = *adhimukti*) and not discriminating between good and bad teachings. [Accordingly,] if he does not have these three kinds of faults, then that [person] is said to be a vessel for hearing the true Dharma. In order to show this point, [Āryadeva] pronounces the following verse:

One who is naturally harmonious, aspires to zealous application⁽³⁾ and is intelligent should be considered a vessel for the Dharma. Otherwise, even if he has the assistance of a master⁽⁴⁾, that will not enable him to obtain excellent qualities (*shèng lì* 勝利 = *guṇa*). (k.276)

(215c23) Commentary. [A person] needs to possess three qualities to be termed a vessel of the Dharma. First of all, [he should be] naturally gentle, without biases for factions; [he should] constantly examine things himself and not be attached to his own views. Secondly, he should always aspire to zealous application and untiringly seek the Dharma, not being satisfied with preserving his own lot. Thirdly, because he is naturally intelligent, he correctly perceives the different virtues and faults in good and bad explanations.

(215c26) If, however, he lacks the three qualities as they were just explained, then even if he has the assistance of a master, ultimately he will not [develop] any excellent qualities. "Excellent qualities" means the understanding and realizations (*zhèng dé* 證得 = *sākṣātkarāṇa*; *sākṣātkriyā*) [coming] from the assistance of a master, in their due order (*rú qí cì dì* 如其次第 = *yathākramam*).⁽⁵⁾ Outsiders, like those six [heretical] masters⁽⁶⁾ and others, realize nothing at all, even if they should [happen to] hear the true Dharma. It is not that the Buddha does not feel pity and wish to help these [Outsiders], or that the noble teaching falls short⁽⁷⁾ of [the standards of] reason (*zhèng lǐ* 正理 = *nyāya*; *yukti*), for those in the world who were to be delivered have

all been finally delivered by hearing the Buddha's noble teaching. To show this point, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

[If] the world itself does not understand when [the Buddha] explains existence, the cause of existence, purification and the means to purification⁽⁸⁾, then how could the fault lie with the Sage? (k.277)

(216a5) Commentary. The unobstructed insightful vision of the tathāgata buddhas, in seeing which things benefit others, is of four sorts and no more, namely, what is to be abandoned (*suǒ shě* 所捨) and what is to be realized (*suǒ zhèng* 所證), as well as their [respective] two causes. The meaning (*tǐ yì* 體義) is completely true, [and so this] statement [of the Buddha] is free from any error. In other words, these four [noble] truths are a summary (*suǒ shè* 所攝 = *saṃgraha*) of the noble teaching. Although the Buddha extensively explains [this teaching], they [i.e. the world] do not understand; the fault [thus] lies with the world and not with the Sage. Because the Outsiders' intelligence (*jué huì* 覺慧 = *buddhi*) is mediocre, and because they lack the correct practice, they therefore do not attain any understanding. It is like when the fiery sun sends forth a thousand rays and yet the blind still cannot see: the fault is not with the sun.

B. The Outsiders' and Buddhist notions of liberation compared

(216a11) Now, these Outsiders, definitely have [their] minds ensnared⁽⁹⁾ through ignorance (*wú míng* 無明 = *avidyā*), carelessness (*fàng yì* 放逸 = *pramāda*) and sloth (*shuì mián* 睡眠 = *middha*)⁽¹⁰⁾, [with the result that] they do not place any confidence in what they themselves recognize. How so? Thus [in response], [Āryadeva] states in the next verse:

*The heretical schools all accept that the abandonment of all existents is nirvāṇa. [So] why are they not pleased when voidness (zhēn kōng 真空 = *sūnyatā*)⁽¹¹⁾ refutes all? (k.278)*

(216a16) Commentary. All the Outsider schools assert that what one terms "nirvāṇa" is the abandonment of the possessions of the self (*wǒ suǒ yǒu shì* 我所有事 = *ātmīya*), [so that] only the self remains, free from bonds, isolated, liberated, inactive and indifferent. [Now] voidness, which lacks any characters (*xiāng* 相 = *lakṣaṇa*), puts an end to all erroneous objects and is free from any [dichotomizing] conceptualization (*fēn bié* 分別 = *vikalpa*) which grasps at existence, etc. [i.e. existence or inexistence]. When one has insight into this [voidness], then all the objects of the mind will be eliminated, what [in fact] correctly comes down to the unexcelled great *parinirvāṇa*, and is not in contradiction with the liberation which you [heretics] seek. Why then are you hostile and not pleased [instead]?

(216a20) For us, nirvāṇa is not⁽¹²⁾ just the elimination of the possessions of the self, but voidness also dispels the self: thus [we] know what is to be rejoiced in.⁽¹³⁾ As for you [however], if the self exists in nirvāṇa, then necessarily it will not be free of

the [self's] possessions. So how is [your type of] nirvāṇa possible? The self, which has been refuted, as previously⁽¹⁴⁾ [shown], should not be clung to again; therefore, one should be pleased with this voidness which is free from self.

(216a23) If a thing exists it can accordingly be eliminated, but voidness never ceases (*qiǎn 遣* = *vinivṛtti*). Grasping at existence gives rise to errors, but the insight into voidness is precisely what eliminates [these errors]. So the two paths of voidness and existence are far apart in [terms of their respective] merits and faults. Why then do you subscribe to existence and defame voidness? The pitiful followers of the heretics, are irrational, without any wisdom and do not accept the voidness which would bring them benefit. [Rather], continually attracted to heresies and seeking false existents which lack any benefit, they thus oppose the true teaching and generate anger. They are like those evil children who go to wild excesses of confusion⁽¹⁵⁾, become addicted to forms and sounds, and on their rampage lack all propriety. They do not know how to respect and follow their mother's loving counsel, but themselves give rein to an unfortunate stubbornness, [so that,] on the contrary, they generate injury.

(216b1) Now, if one repudiates voidness, then there is absolutely no other method for the abandonments and realizations. Thus, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

He who does not know the causes⁽¹⁶⁾ for the abandonments and realizations lacks the means to abandon [saṃsāra] and realize [nirvāṇa]. For this reason, the Sage has said that tranquillity (qīng liáng 清涼 = śiva⁽¹⁷⁾) is certainly not [found] elsewhere. (k.279)

(216b5) Commentary. The Outsiders, even if they repeatedly apply themselves⁽¹⁸⁾ and seek to realize nirvāṇa and to abandon saṃsāra, will in the end attain nothing with regard to what is to be abandoned and what is to be realized, for they do not know well [the requisite] method for abandonments and realizations. [Instead] they turn their backs on voidness and indulge in the pursuit of false existents. Hence, concerning the method, one says that they do not know it well. For apart from the insight into voidness, there is no other method for abandoning saṃsāra and realizing nirvāṇa. All who thirst after the Outsiders' views will not, in the end, obtain supramundane (*chū shì 出世* = *lokottara*) tranquillity. [Here] the word "tranquillity" means the complete pacification of all suffering and the causes of suffering; it is only the insight into voidness which can cause this realization, for apart from such [an insight] there is no other method. [Now] such an insight into voidness is [to be found] in the Buddha-dharma, and it is absent in all the Outsiders' heretical treatises. Thus the Sage stated, "The four fruits of religious practice (*shā mén guǒ 沙門果* = *śrāmaṇyaphala*) are [to be found] in my Dharma and are certainly absent in that of others."⁽¹⁹⁾ Because the Outsiders cling to their own views and defame the insight into voidness, they do not realize nirvāṇa.

(216b14) [Query:] How should one know that our [i.e. the Outsiders'] position is definitely not a correct method for the abandonments and realizations?

(216b15) [Reply:] It has already been stated earlier on [in previous chapters] that grasping permanent entities (*jù yì 句義* = *padārtha*) and maintaining that there

is really time is completely fault-ridden.⁽²⁰⁾ Later, [in the next chapter⁽²¹⁾] grasping at the sense organs and their objects, etc. is to be extensively refuted, and thus it will be understood that you hold an incorrect method.

(216b17) Furthermore, the Outsiders, in their [type of] state of nirvāṇa, do not really free themselves from such views as [grasping at] the possessions of the self, etc. But, nonetheless, they say that this state, when [just] their inner self exists, liberated from its possessions, is to be termed nirvāṇa. Why [would they be unable to free themselves]? It is because the self and its possessions are things which are completely mutually inseparable (*wú yǒu xiāng lí* 無有相離).⁽²²⁾ You cannot say that dharma-s such as suffering, pleasure, etc. are absent in the self in [your so-called] state of nirvāṇa, for you yourself maintain that they are possessions of the self, just like the nature (*zì tǐ* 自體 = *svabhāva*) of the self which you accept.⁽²³⁾ And you cannot say that the nature of the self is not the possession of the self [and that] the homologous example (*tóng yù* 同喻 = *sādharmyadṛṣānta*) [in the previous reasoning] lacks the reason (*yīn* 因 = *hetu*).⁽²⁴⁾ Nor should [you say that] the self which you accept does not have a nature: it would then be like a flower in the sky, and you would commit the fault of contradicting [your own] thesis.⁽²⁵⁾ Therefore the position of you Outsiders does not finally [enable one to] abandon saṃsāra; nor does it [lead to] realizing final nirvāṇa. So it should be understood that [the Outsider's position] is not a correct method.

C. The problem of the authority of the Outsiders' and Buddhists' treatises and scriptures

(216b26) Now, the Outsiders and others set forth [various] treatises whose teachings are to some extent true. For instance, they say that giving, etc. (*shī děng* 施等 = *dānādi*), bring forth fortunate states of existence (*shàn qù* 善趣 = *sugati*) and other felicities, as it is their propelling cause (*qiān yīn yīn* 牽引因 = *ākṣepa-hetu*).⁽²⁶⁾ Or they say that killing, etc. will bring forth unfortunate states of existence and other intense sufferings, as it is the propelling cause for that. However, [be this as it may,] their treatises' prior and subsequent [parts] are mutually contradictory. Also, [these treatises] advocate the taking of life [i.e. sacrifices] and such actions, or they give rise to evil heresies (*jiàn qù* 見趣 = *dṛṣṭigata* (?)) and adopt what results from these kinds of heresies. Just as there are blind men who [temporarily] happen to travel the correct path but at some time or another, through their confusion, revert to their mistaken course, so also the Outsiders' treatises are analogous to that [blind man]: there are some truths and some falsehoods, but one cannot trust [such treatises].

1. The Outsider's objection

(216c3) [Objection:] In that case, the noble teaching in the Tripiṭaka of the Tathāgata [also] sometimes has statements which are scarcely believable, and so all the Insiders' [i.e. Buddhists'] and the Outsiders' texts would be untrustworthy; thus a gross

absurdity (*tài guò shī* 太過失 = *atiprasaṅga*) would ensue. How so? [Because] in the Buddha's sūtras are mentioned various miraculous transformations (*shén biàn* 神變 = *vikurvaṇa*; *ṛddhi* ⁽²⁷⁾) which are unimaginable. Or [these sūtras] speak about states of affairs which are extremely profound (*shèn shēn* 甚深 = *atyantaparokṣa* (?) ⁽²⁸⁾) truths (*zhēn shí* 真實 = *tattva*); no sentient beings fathom [these things].

(216c7) [Objection continued:] Moreover, [the sūtras] state that the operation (*zuò yòng* 作用 = *kāritra*) of the three activities ⁽²⁹⁾ of the Tathāgata cannot be understood by [those who follow] the vehicle of the hearers (*śrāvakayāna*), etc. [Specifically,] it is said that [the Tathāgata] effortlessly, everywhere in [each of] the immeasurable, infinite, extremely remote worlds of the ten directions, and according to each of the sentient beings' myriad ⁽³⁰⁾ and innumerable different kinds of faculties, simultaneously manifests at will his magnificent body so that there is no end to the benefit. And even though he has eliminated all ratiocination, investigation (*xún sì* 尋伺 = *vitarkavicāra*) and conceptualizing (*fēn bié* 分別 = *vikalpa*) ⁽³¹⁾, to all those myriad sentient beings he preaches words of the infinite, extremely profound and vast Dharma, which is a truth of boundless splendour. [Moreover], in one moment he removes sentient beings' immeasurable and infinite stains of mind and conduct. Although his mind does not in reality arise or cease and lacks [any differentiation between] apprehender (*néng yuán* 能緣 = *grāhaka*) and apprehended (*suǒ yuán* 所緣 = *grāhya*), still in one moment he directly perceives absolutely all objects which can be known, and when he has [this] direct perception (*xiàn jiàn* 現見 = *pratyakṣa*), he is completely free of all conceptual discursive thought about what perceives (*néng jiàn* 能見) and what is perceived (*suǒ jiàn* 所見).

(216c16) [Furthermore] although [the Tathāgata] has eliminated all propensities [for passions] (*suí mián* 隨眠 = *anuśaya*) and all ensnarements (*chán fú* 纏縛 = *pariyavasthāna*) ⁽³²⁾ still he experiences death and birth in the three [forms of] existence. And although he has long since been free of desire, still he takes birth in the desire realm (*yù jiè* 欲界 = *kāmadhātu*), manifestly dwelling in the prison of one who is confined to live as a householder. He accumulates all varieties of riches, grains and precious treasures, and looks after wife, children, relatives and servants. As things such as these are all hardly credible, we harbour deep reservations about them.

2. The Buddhist reply appealing to voidness

(216c20) [Reply:] Phenomena, if they merely existed, could indeed give rise to [such types of] doubts. But phenomena are also void. Hence [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

When someone gives rise to doubt concerning the profound (shēn 深 = parokṣa; Tib. llog gyur) things taught by the Buddha, then he can rely on the voidness which is free of all [defining] characters, and [can thus] gain sure faith. (k.280)

(216c24) Commentary. The thought behind this verse asserts ⁽³³⁾ the following: The Tathāgata, in order to frighten the Outsiders, who are [like] a herd of deer, sets

forth voidness with a great lion's roar. Accordingly, this state of affairs, voidness, is certain and is clearly proven through both scripture and logic. All the intelligent take [the teaching of voidness] as certain; no refined, difficult or clever thought surpasses it. When, by hewing to voidness, one practises without error, one will then be dignified with a host of virtues and will attain the unexcelled fruit [of buddhahood]. [So] one should generate sureness and conviction in that [i.e. voidness]. For only voidness is true; all else is not the truth, but is [just] the Tathāgata using skillful means (*shàn quán fāng biàn* 善權方便 = *upāyakauśalya*) to preach and publicize [the Dharma] in accordance with the desires of sentient beings.⁽³⁴⁾

(217a1) Although the Buddha's teachings know no limit, they can be condensed into simply two sorts: voidness and non-voidness. When there are doubts regarding non-voidness [i.e. about the teachings concerning subjects other than voidness], one can, by relying on voidness, infer [the truth of] what is to be understood.

3. Voidness

(217a2) [Query:] But how can one see that all dharmas are void? [Reply:] Because neither the objects of consciousness nor those of words are established as [really] existent entities. When one resumes the nature and characters (*tǐ xiāng* 體相) of all dharmas, there are two types: what is understood by consciousness and what is expressed by words.⁽³⁵⁾ [Now] one object at the same time gives rise to many consciousnesses, and the object's character varies according to different perceptions. [Thus] these consciousnesses could not arise in conformity with an external object, for the nature of one object is not established as many [different] characters. Therefore we know that what is understood by cognition definitely does not exist.⁽³⁶⁾

(217a7) As for words, they are designations (*jiǎ lì* 假立 = *prajñapti*) and only express universal characters (*gòng xiāng* 共相 = *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*): No universal characters are ever substantially existent (*shí yǒu* 實有 = *dravyato 'sti; dravyasat; asty eva*), because they are established in many [different] dharmas, just like armies, forests, etc.⁽³⁷⁾ Furthermore, universal characters will all depend on the particular (*bié* 別 = *viśeṣa*) dharmas [which are their instances]. As the particulars which are the bases [for the universal] are infinite in number, those [people] of limited insight cannot perceive them all. And since they do not perceive the particulars, then necessarily they [also] will not perceive the universal (*zǒng* 總).⁽³⁸⁾ It is like the case of "two", etc. (*èr xìng děng* 二性等 = *dviṭvādī*), which are [qualities] depending on pairs, etc. of things: if we do not perceive the bases [for "two"], we can in no way perceive [the quality "two"].⁽³⁹⁾ So, since universal characters are not perceived, how could referring expressions (*néng quán* 能詮) be established in dependence on that [type of pseudo-entity]? Thus, universal characters are just designations⁽⁴⁰⁾; they should not be taken as substantially existent, [but] can be considered to be figures of speech (*yán quán* 言詮).

(217a13) Also, if universal characters substantially existed, they could not be established as either⁽⁴¹⁾ wholly or partially existent in each individual dharma. If it were wholly existent in each individual dharma, then the universal character could never be

established at all, being just like the particular dharmas. If [however] it were [only] partially existent in each individual dharma, then it would have to have many parts, and could not be one [unique] universal character. Moreover, in substance (*shí* 實 = *dravya*), etc. [i.e. in the six categories (*padārtha*) of the Vaiśeṣikas],⁽⁴²⁾ there cannot be a separately existing unique universal nature (*zǒng xìng* 總性)⁽⁴³⁾ of substance, etc., for [such a universal nature] would be an object [created] by the mind, just like something which is not a substance or other such [category]. [This type of] universal nature would be nothing less than a universal character of all dharmas [and hence could not be included amongst any of the six categories.]⁽⁴⁴⁾ Thus [for the above-mentioned reasons], universal characters do not have substantial natures, but are [just] designated in common by the world. In this fashion, then, all dharmas reduce to two kinds, viz. either what is understood by consciousness or what is expressed by words, but neither [of these two sorts of dharmas] is substantially existent. And there are no other [kinds of] dharmas apart from these two [types of] objects. So therefore, one should be convinced⁽⁴⁵⁾ of the voidness of all dharmas.

(217a21) In this vein, the sūtra states the following: "The true nature (*shí xìng* 實性) of all dharmas is indescribable (*wú shì* 無示 = *anidarśana*), without resistance (*wú duì* 無對 = *apratigha*) and completely one in character; it is said to be without characters."⁽⁴⁶⁾ The existential character (*xìng xiāng* 性相 = *bhāvalakṣaṇa*)⁽⁴⁷⁾ of all dharmas is not an object (*suǒ xíng* 所行 = *gocara*) of words, and words do not express it. Thus it is said to be "indescribable". Since it is not an object of minds and mental factors (*xīn xīn fǎ* 心心法 = *cittacaitta*) and since we do not perceive that it is either resisted by or is a resister of objects which [themselves] have resistance (*yǒu duì* 有對 = *sapratigha*), it is said to be "without resistance".⁽⁴⁸⁾ [Also,] [the true nature of dharmas] does not, in addition, have a different character over and above the characters of the two types of objects [viz. those of consciousness and those of words]. Thus one says that [the real nature of dharmas] is "without characters". Because voidness and characters are non-dual, it is said to be one in character.⁽⁴⁹⁾ When [people] are not afflicted by the poisoned arrows of erroneous grasping (*wàng zhí* 妄執 = *abhiniveśa*), desire and other such [passions], then voidness, which is to be realized by the correct view, can be clearly perceived; thus we say that it is "the [true] character".

(217a27) Furthermore, as the principle of voidness is free from all characters of dharmas, such as existence, [inexistence,] etc., we can say that it is without characters;⁽⁵⁰⁾ what is without [such] characters is non-dual; thus [voidness] is said to be one. That is to say, we take this type of lack of [imagined] characters as the [ultimate] character [of dharmas], and so we say that it can be considered to be a character, but not a character which is a distinct entity (*bié yǒu* 別有 = *bhāvāntara*).⁽⁵¹⁾

4. The Outsiders are untrustworthy

(217b1) Now, the Outsiders pose the following objection: All the Buddha's statements can be resumed as two sorts: [those concerning] voidness and [those concerning] non-voidness. [But] if the assertions of voidness are true (*shí* 實), then the

other statements will necessarily be deceptive (*xū* 虛). [You argue that] when one part of the Buddha's assertions are true, then similarly the other part must also be non-deceptive; so our assertions must also be like that [given that you admit that some of them are true]. Why then are [our assertions] entirely rejected and said to be unworthy of belief?

(217b4) [Reply:] It is because you Outsiders err with regard to things of the present [world] that [your doctrine] is not trustworthy. Why? Hence, in the following verse [Āryadeva] states:

When [someone's] view on the present [world] (xiàn 現) has errors, then we know that [his account of] the next [world] will certainly be deceptive. (k.281ab)

(217b8) Commentary. These Outsiders, due to their wrong understandings and confused minds, are mistaken about even simple phenomena; *a fortiori*, why would they not err in [their account of] the profound and difficult to understand principle of cause and effect concerning the next world. So their assertions are not trustworthy.

(217b10) [Objection:] Which simple things are we mistaken about?⁽⁵²⁾

5. Arguments against the Vaiśeṣikas

(217b10) [Reply:] The Vaiśeṣikas think that limited universals (*tóng yì* 同異 = *sāmānyaviśeṣa*) and the like are objects of direct perception (*xiàn liáng* 現量 = *pratyakṣa*),⁽⁵³⁾ and the Sāṃkhya think that *rajas*, *sattva*, etc. are objects of direct perception.⁽⁵⁴⁾ These types of phenomena are infinite in number, and all are erroneous. How so? [It is because] it is incoherent (*lǐ bù chéng* 理不成 = *na yuktah; na siddhah*) for limited universal natures, etc. to be objects of direct perception, as the Vaiśeṣikas hold. Cowness, horseness and the like, due to conceptual mental cognition (*yì shí* 意識 = *manovijñāna*), exist as designations (*jiǎ shī shè yǒu* 假施設有 = *prajñaptisat; prajñaptito 'sti*)⁽⁵⁵⁾ upon various dharmas such as colour, etc. (*sè děng* 色等 = *rūpādi*).⁽⁵⁶⁾ They are beyond the scope of the senses and hence are not apprehended by direct perception, because they are present everywhere in their bases (*suǒ yī* 所依 = *āśraya*) and without any difference, just like the nature of inherence (*hé hé* 和合 = *samavāya*). [Now] the [Vaiśeṣika] accepts that in the case of the sixth category (*jù yì* 句義 = *padārtha*), inherence, its nature is one and is present everywhere in its bases, [but] beyond the scope of the senses and *not* apprehended by direct perception. [But if we consider] natures such as the limited universals and so forth, these entities are also analogous [in these respects]. Why then does [the Vaiśeṣika] hold that they *are* objects of direct perception?⁽⁵⁷⁾

(217b18) Moreover, when the [Vaiśeṣika's] treatise asserts that there is a category of substance (*shí* 實 = *dravya*) and that these [substances] are objects of direct perception, [this] is also incoherent. Why? [Because] things such as vases, cloths and so forth [i.e. substances], due to conceptual mental cognition, exist as designations upon various dharmas such as colour, etc. Why then hold them to be objects of direct perception?⁽⁵⁸⁾

(217b21) However, the [Vaiśeṣika's] treatise asserts that things such as vases and cloths, etc. can be seen by the eyes and touched by the body due to connections (*hé 合* = *yoga*) with qualities (*dé 德* = *guṇa*), actions (*yè 業* = *karman*)⁽⁵⁹⁾, substances [and] limited universals. Thus, they are sense objects and are known by direct perception.⁽⁶⁰⁾ But this could never be so.

(217b23) Firstly, it is clear that substance cognitions⁽⁶¹⁾ which are brought about by qualities cannot be included among direct perceptions. In other words, a substance cognition which is brought about by such [colour] qualities as blue, etc. and such [tactile] qualities as warmth, etc. definitely cannot be included among visual or tactile direct perceptions; for [these cognitions] are not produced by action, limited universals or substances, but are produced through the connection with an another character [viz. qualities such as blue, warm, etc.], as in the case of substance cognitions brought about by [qualities such as] smell and taste. Substance cognitions which are brought about by action are also analogous. They can be duly (*rú qí suǒ yīng 如其所應* = *yathā-yogam*) refuted by means of the following inference: substance cognitions which are brought about by action also cannot be included among visual or tactile direct perceptions, because they are not produced by limited universal natures and substances, but are produced through the connection with another character [viz. an action], just as [in the case of] substance cognitions which are brought about by smell and taste.

(217c1) All substance cognitions which are brought about by substances are like for example seeing a vase or knowing that such-and-such is a cow, and since we refute [the members of] the category of substance, such as vases, etc., [arguing that] they cannot be seen or touched, then we have in fact already refuted the substance cognitions which are brought about by these [substances]. For cognitions of vases, etc. can only arise through qualities and actions, and this has been refuted previously.⁽⁶²⁾ Hence [substance cognitions brought about by substances] also cannot be included among direct perceptions.

(217c4) Substance cognitions which are brought about by limited universal natures also cannot be included among visual or tactile direct perceptions, for they are produced through connections with characters other [than substances], just as are all cognitions of non-substances, etc. That is to say, cognitions of non-substances affirm with regard to qualities, actions, and the like that these [latter categories] are not substances, because they [, i.e. the cognitions of non-substances,] are produced through connections with other characters. [Therefore] they [, i.e. substance cognitions brought about by limited universals,] are definitely not included among visual and tactile direct perceptions.

(217c8) The other cognitions [, i.e. those of the remaining categories,] are analogous.⁽⁶³⁾ Thus, it should be understood that all categories give rise to [their respective] cognitions by virtue of [merely] designated connections (*jiǎ hé 假合*), but that [these cognitions] are all not, in reality, direct perceptions apprehending those [categories].⁽⁶⁴⁾ To elaborate: a cognition which apprehends a substance is not, in reality, a direct perception which apprehends [that] substance, because it arises by virtue of a [merely] designated connection, as [in the case of] cognitions of qualities, etc.

Similarly, the cognitions apprehending [the other categories] up to (*nǎi zhì* 乃至 = *yāvat*) inherence are also not, in reality, direct perceptions which apprehend these [categories], because they arise by virtue of [merely] designated connections, just like the cognitions of substances, etc. Therefore one should not hold that there are any objects of direct perception among the six categories, and thus the Vaiśeṣikas are also mistaken with regard to these simple phenomena of the present world.

6. Arguments against the Sāṃkhyas

(217c14) Next, turning to the Sāṃkhyas, they hold that dharmas such as form, etc. are established as composites of the three qualities (*dé* 德 = *guṇa*), but are real, are not [mere] designations and are apprehended by direct perception.⁽⁶⁵⁾ This is also incoherent, for they would be established in many dharmas, just like armies, forests and so forth, and thus form, etc. would have to be [mere] designations.⁽⁶⁶⁾ How could they be said to be real?

(217c16) Moreover, the triad, *sattva*, etc. (*lè děng* 樂等)⁽⁶⁷⁾ could never become one [thing such as a form], because they would have [mutually] different natures (*xìng* 性), just as they do in their untransformed state (*wèi biàn wèi* 未變位).⁽⁶⁸⁾ And also, if form and such dharmas [which are supposedly transformations of the three qualities] were to really exist, then they could never be composed of three [things] like *sattva*, etc. Or, in the case of the triad, *sattva*, etc., if their characters were each distinct, then how could they all become one character [such as form, etc.] by combining together? When they are combined they cannot turn into one character, because their substances (*tǐ* 體 = *dravya*?) do not differ from when they were not yet combined. Or, as the three natures, *sattva*, etc., are each distinct, then the character [existing when these natures are combined] could not be identical [i.e. it could not be one and the same thing, but would have to be many different things]. Because you maintain that the natures [i.e. the *guṇas*] and characters [such as form, etc.] are definitely the same⁽⁶⁹⁾, then the natures must [all] be identical, just like the character [into which they transform], or the character must be [many] different things, just like its natures.⁽⁷⁰⁾

(217c22) Alternatively, [it might be argued that] *sattva*, etc. are particulars (*bié* 別), while form, and the others [viz. sound, taste, touch and smell]⁽⁷¹⁾ are syntheses (*zǒng* 總 = *samudāya*?).⁽⁷²⁾ [But] since you maintain that the synthesis and the particulars must in fact be the same, then the synthesis would have to be three [different things], just like the particulars, and would not be one, or the particulars would have to be one, just like the synthesis and would not be three. How then could the three which are the particulars become the one which is the synthesis? Or, suppose that when the three qualities, *sattva*, etc., transform, they do not combine to establish one character. Then just as the [three qualities'] characters are different when untransformed, so also we could never perceive that they are one form, etc. If the three combine to establish one character, then they will have to lose their three types of particular characters, viz. *sattva*, etc: we can not say that the three qualities, *sattva*, etc.,

each have two characters, a synthetic one and a particular one.⁽⁷³⁾ Why? [Because] the synthetic character, if it were one, could never be three, and if the synthetic character were three[fold], then it could never be perceived as one.

(217c29) [Objection:] Suppose it is said that each of [the qualities], *sattva*, etc., has all three characters, i.e. *sattva*, etc., but that as the characters are mixed together, they can [only] be discriminated with difficulty. Therefore we perceive them as [making up] one thing.⁽⁷⁴⁾

(218a1) [Reply:] This is also incorrect. If each [quality] had three characters, then we would still have to perceive three things. Why do we perceive [just] one thing? And how could we ever know that *sattva*, etc. are [in fact] different? Or if each [quality] had all three characters, then why should they combine together to establish form, etc.? In other words, each should [individually] establish the different sense objects such as form and so forth and bring about the enjoyment (*shòu yòng* 受用 = *bhoga*) of the self.⁽⁷⁵⁾

(218a5) Also, if these three qualities each had three characters and [these characters] were mutually different, then why would a character such as form be one thing? Or suppose that *sattva* and the other [two qualities] all individually established dharmas like form, etc., but that the substance of each dharma was established through the combinations of all three [qualities]. Then, all dharmas would be without any differences, whether in nature or in character, for by the same three qualities the [same] three characters are established. In that case, all the differences between [things such as] the causes and effects of *mahat*, etc., the subtle elements (*wéi liáng* 唯量 = *tanmātra*), the gross elements (*dà* 大 = *mahābhūta*) and the organs (*gēn* 根 = *indriya*)⁽⁷⁶⁾, would be without exception unestablished, [with the result that] to the world's perception there would also be no difference between sentient beings and insentient [matter], pure and impure things and the like, and direct and inferential means of valid cognition (*liáng* 量 = *pramāṇa*), etc. Because this contradicts what all the world perceives, it would be an enormous absurdity.

(218a11) There are many such positions like the above sorts [which are put forth] by the Outsiders' heretical teachers; but they are all [in fact] incoherent. Who would ever bother with [such] a pile of crap? Since in the Buddhadharma many masters of the doctrine have already vanquished these opponents, I will not belabour the point.

7. Conclusions and rhetorical exhortations

(218a14) Thus [in conclusion], the Outsiders even manage to stumble in places which are simple, that is, level roads in broad daylight. Why then should they be free of error in the thick, dark, deep night of a dense forest which is profound and precipitous? Who with any intelligence at all would believe their mistaken words? So, to put a stop to reversion to error, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

All those who practise on the basis of their doctrines will be deceived forever.

(k.281cd)

(218a18) Commentary. If sentient beings follow the doctrine explained in these Outsiders' stupid views and mistaken positions, then due to the influence of the heretical doctrines [espoused by] evil friends, they [themselves] will come to harbour tendencies (*xūn xí* 熏習 = *vāsanā*) towards these erroneous views; thus they will defame the Dharma which is produced from the Tathāgata's realizations and will obtain extremely bad karma whose measure is limitless. Given these causes and conditions they will fall into unfortunate states of existence, [with the result that] there will be no end to their experience of great suffering. So the intelligent should not, like fools, follow evil friends and thus deceive themselves; rather they should practise in accordance with the buddhas' true, irreproachable, noble doctrine which speedily realizes deliverance (*chū lí* 出離 = *nihsaraṇa*).

(218a24) Now, the following had been stated above:⁽⁷⁷⁾ "In the Buddha's sūtras are mentioned various miraculous transformations which are unimaginable. Or [these sūtras] speak about states of affairs which are extremely profound truths; no sentient beings fathom [these things]", up until "things such as these are hardly credible." [All this] is indeed as it was depicted. As the virtues of the buddhas and the states of affairs mentioned [above] are all extremely profound, it is hard for one to be able to believe in them. [But] you fools, being of limited merit (*fú* 福 = *punya*) and scant wisdom, only seek your own interest and are unwilling to help others. Not having drunk in the flavour of the Dharma, the sweet nectar of great compassion, how then could you ever have conviction in such Dharma approaches (*fǎ mén* 法門 = *dharmaparyāya*) [as miraculous powers, etc.]? [But] if one has the light of wisdom one will dispel the darkness of ignorance and profoundly take compassion on all sentient beings. One will seek the buddhas' enlightenment, will come to have vast merit and so will have conviction in these types of Dharma approaches.

(218b2) To elaborate: In the case of the tathāgatas, throughout countless previous aeons the lineage (*zhǒng xìng* 種姓 = *gotra*)⁽⁷⁸⁾ of compassion and wisdom latently conditioned their minds. In order to uproot sentient beings' great sufferings of saṃsāra and in order to seek unexcelled perfect enlightenment (*wú shàng zhèng děng pú tí* 無上正等菩提 = *anuttarasamyakṣambodhi*), they paid homage and respect to the buddhas and so heard the true Dharma. Through being fully conscious and mindful (*xì niàn sī wéi* 繫念思惟 = *samprajānāḥ pratisṃtāḥ*)⁽⁷⁹⁾ they gained complete mastery of the limitless practices which are in keeping with the Dharma (*fǎ suí fǎ xíng* 法隨法行 = *dharmānudharmapratipatti*)⁽⁸⁰⁾, viz. the various difficult to practise and subtle perfections (*pāramitā*) such as giving (*dāna*), moral discipline (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), vigour (*vīrya*), meditative trances (*dhyāna*), wisdom (*prajñā*), and so forth. [In these] they zealously and continuously trained until full accomplishment, and so they realized the unexcelled perfect enlightenment and acquired inconceivable masteries (*zì zài* 自在 = *vaśitā*) and miraculous powers.⁽⁸¹⁾ The excellent action brought forth by their [bodhisattva] vow (*běn yuàn* 本願 = *praṇidhāna*) is inexhaustible. Why then do you not have conviction in such things?

(218b9) Things of the manifest world, such as implements, etc., move automatically after being set in motion by a previous force. Similarly, the Tathāgata's special

miraculous powers operate automatically after having been brought forth by the [bodhisattva] vows. Also, in the world, if a practitioner of magical arts attains great accomplishment, his excellent action will be difficult to comprehend by the multitude of people. How then, in the case of the Tathāgatha, whose mastery of the long-practised various meditative absorptions (*shèng dìng* 勝定 = *samāpatti-viśeṣa*; *samādhi-viśeṣa*) is complete, could the operation of [his] miraculous powers ever be fathomed! So therefore you should generate conviction in these inconceivable qualities of the tathāgatas; you should sincerely strive for the masteries and miraculous powers from among the Buddha's perfections and not harbour carelessness (*fàng yì* 放逸 = *pramāda*). There are [inferior Buddhist practitioners] such as śrāvakas, who, when they have themselves completely understood the Buddha's limitless, inconceivable powers, pitifully cry out mournful lamentations, the sound of which arouses the three thousand [worlds] (*sān qiān* 三千).⁽⁸²⁾ How can it be that you, then, would denigrate [these powers] rather than having faith [in them]?

D. The fear of nirvāṇa

(218b18) Now, the intelligent proceed to nirvāṇa by themselves, but the dull of mind, [even if they] meet a teacher, do not learn [from him]. To show this point [Āryadeva] states the [following] verse:

The intelligent [proceed] by themselves to nirvāṇa; they accomplish what is difficult to do. Fools [however], even if they meet an excellent guide, lack the courage to follow. (k.282)

(218b22) Commentary. The ensnarements of the passions (*fán nǎo* 煩惱 = *kleśa*) are ingrained from beginningless time, strong, resistant and difficult to break through. Nirvāṇa is empty, still and without characters or words; its qualities are limitless, it is profound and difficult to realize. The intelligent, by themselves, and not through another's doctrine, cross over the great ocean of saṃsāra and obtain the ultimate great *parinirvāṇa*. [Thus] these superior individuals accomplish what is difficult to do. Fools [however], who have long sunk into the mire of desires, are addicted to pleasure and do not seek deliverance. Like a dog who wants to gnaw on putrid blood and dry bones and will not give them up even when driven away with a cane, so too is the fool: he relishes desires, has contempt for the noble words [of the Dharma] and does not turn away [from saṃsāra]. The intelligent, thus, by themselves, bring forth understanding and realize *parinirvāṇa*. They accomplish what is difficult to do. But the fool, in his carelessness, understands nothing; even if he happens upon the [Dharma's] noble words, he is uninterested in the cessation [of suffering] (*jí miè* 寂滅 = *nirodha*; *śānti*).⁽⁸³⁾

(218c2) Now, while saṃsāra is extreme suffering, nirvāṇa is great bliss — the [respective] faults and virtues are obvious and easily recognized. Why then are sentient beings blithely unwilling to turn their backs on saṃsāra and rejoice in proceeding to nirvāṇa? It is because they are afraid due to their bewilderment (*yú chī* 愚癡 =

moha), that is to say, they harbour self-cherishing (*wǒ ài* 我愛 = *ātmasneha*), so that when they hear that *nirvāṇa* is voidness, they fear that if one attains [a state of] no remainder (*wú yú* 無餘 = *aśeṣa*)⁽⁸⁴⁾, then the self will be destroyed. Hence they are afraid, and consequently they do not wish to turn their backs on *saṃsāra* or take pleasure in proceeding to *nirvāṇa*. In this manner does fear arise due to a little intelligence. Why is this? Hence, in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

When one does not understand, one is without fear, and when one understands fully it is again like that [viz. one is unafraid]. It is certain that when one understands a little bit, one will become afraid. (k.283)

(218c10) Commentary. If sentient beings are completely without any intelligence and fail to understand any dharmas, then they will not become afraid of *nirvāṇa*. If someone fully understands the correct principle of all dharmas, he will ascertain what *saṃsāra* as well as *nirvāṇa* are: when *saṃsāra* arises, there is merely a designated (*jiǎ* 假) arising of suffering, and when *saṃsāra* ceases, there is merely a designated cessation of suffering. All dharmas, being fundamentally without self, are without exception void, and thus [one who knows this fact] is absolutely unafraid of *nirvāṇa*.

(218c14) If, however, someone only understands that at the time of *parinirvāṇa* all conditionings (*xíng* 行 = *saṃskāra*) completely cease and there is nothing at all, [but] he does not know that [at that time] the suffering due to conditioning (*xíng kǔ* 行苦 = *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*)⁽⁸⁵⁾ automatically ceases by itself and that lacking substance, nature and function, there is no self nor possessions of the self, then such [a person], due to his [false] view concerning the personality (*shēn jiàn* 身見 = *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*)⁽⁸⁶⁾, will be gripped by self-cherishing, [and] on hearing that in *nirvāṇa* there is [just] voidness and nothingness, he will dread that the self is being destroyed and will become afraid. So in such a manner does fear arise due to a little intelligence. Therefore the [truly] intelligent should correctly reject [such misconceptions].

(218c18) Moreover, fear arises due to lack of training (*chuàn xí* 串習 = *abhyāsa*). Why is this? Thus [Āryadeva] explains in the following verse:

Fools have long trained in dharmas which are conducive to saṃsāra. Because they are untrained in what is in opposition [to saṃsāra], they are afraid. (k.284)

(218c22) Commentary. It is the profane (*yì shēng* 異生 = *prthagjana*) who are termed "fools". They give themselves over to [their] passions (*fán nǎo* 煩惱 = *kleśa*) and [latent] propensities (*suí mián* 隨眠 = *anuśaya*)⁽⁸⁷⁾, and are thus attracted to birth, have aversion towards death and do not take pleasure in *nirvāṇa*. Since beginningless [time] they have repeatedly experienced desirable [karmic] retributions (*kě ài yì shú* 可愛異熟 = *īṣṭavipāka*), such as superior states of existence, but they have not trained in [i.e. are unfamiliar with] what is ultimately excellent (*jué dìng shèng dào* 決定勝道 = *niḥśreyasa*)⁽⁸⁸⁾. Effects of [karmic] retribution, such as superior states of existence, are [however] based upon propensities such as desire and the like. Although [a fool] gets burned for a long time by the fire of suffering, he does not comprehend [his situation] and enjoys himself in various amusements. Because he has so long

trained in the suffering of saṃsāra, he does not know its misfortunes and [therefore] lacks any revulsion (*yàn lí* 厭離 = *nirveda*) [towards saṃsāra]; not knowing the flawless bliss of liberation (*jiě tuō* 解脫 = *mokṣa*), he takes no joy in practice or realizations. Just as in the world filthy pigs are addicted to enjoying dung and do not relish a pure, tranquil and attractive meal, so also the fool revels in saṃsāra's suffering and is without any inclination towards the bliss of liberation. Due to his lack of training, when he hears mention of the name of [liberation], he does not believe in it, but rather, is afraid. The intelligent, through their powers of discrimination (*sī zé* 思擇 = *nidhyāna*; *vicāra*) should correctly strive for the bliss of liberation and, contrary to the fool, should not be mistakenly distressed [by the idea of nirvāṇa].

(219a5) Now, all the faithful seek non-erroneous (*wú dào* 無倒 = *aviparīta*) liberation. [So] when through their virtuous characters or through their powers of wisdom they practise the method for perceiving the truth (*zhēn shí* 真實 = *tattva*), then if [at that time one] impedes [them] in this, the bad karma obtained will be limitless in measure. In order to show this point, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

People who, possessed of bewilderment (yú chī 愚癡 = moha), impede others in perceiving the truth will not [even] have fortunate states of existence as rebirths. So how could they ever realize nirvāṇa? (k.285)

(219a10) Commentary. The perception of the truth, i.e. voidness, is the cause for realizing the perfect, unexcelled wisdom and is the method for [attaining] nirvāṇa, which is the complete absence of objects, i.e. permanent extinction.⁽⁸⁹⁾ This method is the source which gives rise to inconceivable qualities, and through it step by step (*zhǎn zhuǎn* 展轉 = *pārampariyena*) one speedily attains enlightenment. When one does not dwell in nirvāṇa, then the benefit [for other sentient beings] is inexhaustible. One establishes various seeds (*zhǒng zǐ* 種子 = *bīja*), maturations (*chéng shú* 成熟 = *paripāka*),⁽⁹⁰⁾ etc. in accordance with the differences in faculties of the immeasurable [number of] sentient beings to be trained (*suǒ huà* 所化 = *vineya*), [and] the benefit is limitless.

(219a14) As for people who are possessed of bewilderment [however], the darkness of ignorance covers their eyes of wisdom (*huì yǎn* 慧眼 = *prajñācakṣus*)⁽⁹¹⁾ with the result that they do not perceive voidness. Furthermore, due to their heretical explanations and other [wrong] methods, they place obstacles to what others practise, just as [they do] to previous virtues. The bad karma which such [people] obtain is immeasurable and limitless; only the Tathāgata knows its extent. Because this heavy bad karma defiles their minds, it will be extremely long for them to subsequently take birth in a fortunate state of existence, the continuity of the propensities and ensnarements remains firm, the various karmic causes pose grave impediments [to practice] and the patience of amenability (*shùn rěn* 順忍 = *ānulomikī kṣānti*)⁽⁹²⁾ to the method cannot arise either. [So] how could [such a person] realize the correct view or nirvāṇa? Knowing that the bad karma of impeding the true Dharma is profound, the intelligent should be on their guard not to commit downfalls [in this respect].

E. Moral and philosophical faults compared

(219a22) Now, all those who impede others' practice of the true Dharma themselves later cause heretical views to arise. The evil of these heretical views exceeds that of breaking moral discipline (*jiè 戒* = *śīla*). To show this point, then, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

It is better to break moral discipline than to destroy the correct view. (k.286ab)

(219a26) Commentary. As it is said in the sūtra, "It is better to break pure moral discipline than to destroy the correct view."⁽⁹³⁾ What does this mean? [Response:] Those who break pure moral discipline only harm themselves, whereas if one destroys the correct view, one harms oneself as well as others, leading to countless births where one experiences enormous suffering as a result as well as to the loss of immeasurable, limitless benefit. Furthermore, those who break moral discipline constantly harbour shame and guilt and upbraid themselves for their moral downfalls, but those who destroy the correct view are without shame or guilt; they commend heretical views and constantly vaunt themselves. While those who break moral discipline do not develop heretical views, if one destroys the correct view, the [as yet] unproduced evil of destroying moral discipline will be made to arise, and that which has already arisen will develop further and become entrenched so that it will be difficult to eliminate.

(219b3) In breaking pure moral discipline one only bars rebirth in the heavens, but he who destroys the correct view [also] rules out the bliss of nirvāṇa. Why? Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

By moral discipline one takes birth in a fortunate state of existence, by means of the correct view one attains nirvāṇa. (k.286cd)

(219b6) Commentary. Although breaking moral discipline and destroying the [correct] view both annul virtuous causes and block the effect [of such causes], i.e. happiness, still breaking moral discipline is [comparatively] light, while destroying the view is extremely heavy. How so? [Response:] When one has moral discipline, one will be born in the heavens, but will develop more and more attachment [to these states] and so experience the suffering of saṃsāra. Through the correct view [however] one realizes the enlightenment of the three vehicles (*chéng 乘* = *yāna*)⁽⁹⁴⁾ and thus attains the bliss of nirvāṇa. Hence the intelligent should not destroy the correct view.

F. Selflessness

1. Debates

(219b10) [Query:] But what is the true nature (*zhēn lǐ 真理* = *tattva*) of all dharmas?⁽⁹⁵⁾ [Response:] It is the principle that all dharmas are without self (*kōng wú wǒ 空無我* = *nairātmya*).⁽⁹⁶⁾ [Objection:] In that case, such a principle would also have faults. Why? It is like when some people (*yī lèi 一類* = *ke cit*) people hear

about selflessness, they say that dharmas are all inexistent, deny the rationality of any causality and so on and so forth until they [finally] sever all their roots of virtue (*shàn gēn* 善根 = *kuśalamūla*).⁽⁹⁷⁾

(219b13) [Reply:] This is [because] their own views have faults; it is not a defect pertaining to selflessness. Due to their evil grasping at voidness they erroneously give rise to heretical views and engage in various evil practices. [But] as for the principle of selflessness, thought and words cannot fathom it, [and as such,] it is not something which can be realized by these [people]. The fool, when he hears it said that dharmas are all void, does not understand the noble meaning, and so he negates conventional (*shì sú* 世俗 = *vyavahāra; saṃvṛti*) causality as also inexistent, [with the consequence that] he eliminates all virtuous dharmas. How could this ever be a fault in selflessness?

(219b17) [Query:] What is the point then in the Noble One's explanation of the doctrine of voidness?⁽⁹⁸⁾ [Response:] It is in order to dispel all false (*xū wàng* 虛妄) grasping at existence. [Objection:] If that were the case, then he should also say that all dharmas exist in order to dispel erroneous grasping at the voidness of all dharmas. [Reply:] That is true. If someone grasps dharmas as void, then the Tathāgata also states that dharmas exist.⁽⁹⁹⁾

(219b20) [Objection:] Since, to dispel grasping, he teaches existence and he teaches voidness, then is the true nature of all dharmas voidness or existence? [Reply:] The true nature of all dharmas is neither existence nor voidness; it completely transcends the proliferations of [dichotomizing] conceptualization (*fēn bié* 分別 = *vikalpa; xì lùn* 戲論 = *prapañca*).⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

(219b22) [Objection:] Then why are the Noble One's statements not false? [Reply:] It is because they are destined to exclude mistaken grasping that [the Noble One's statements] are not false. [Objection:] The teachings of voidness and those of existence both exclude grasping, so why then does the Tathāgata more often preach the teaching of voidness? [Reply:] It is because sentient beings for the most part grasp at existence, [and] saṃsāra mostly comes about from grasping at existence. Therefore, the Tathāgata, in order to exclude grasping at existence and to extinguish the suffering of saṃsāra, mostly preaches the teaching of voidness.

(219b25) [Objection:] Whether [dharmas are] void or whether they are existent, this is all a [question of] teaching approaches. Why then was it previously stated [cf. §219b10] that voidness is the true nature [of dharmas]?

(219b26) [Reply:] Method and metaphorical description (*jiǎ shuō* 假說 = *upacāra*) are not contradictory (*xiāng wéi* 相違 = *viruddha*).⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Besides which, this statement of voidness is a negation (*zhē* 遮 = *pratiśedha*) and not a positive assertion (*biǎo* 表).⁽¹⁰²⁾ Not just is there voidness, but voidness is void too. By dispelling completely all grasping thoughts one brings oneself into conformity with the ultimate true nature of all dharmas which is neither existence nor voidness.⁽¹⁰³⁾ The true nature of all dharmas is not really voidness (*kōng xìng* 空性 = *sūnyatā*), but since one takes voidness as an approach (*mén* 門 = *pariāya*), then metaphorically [the true nature of dharmas] is taken to be voidness.

(219c1) [Objection:] If the true nature [of dharmas] is not voidness, but voidness is taken as the approach, then [similarly] given that the true nature [of dharmas] is not existence, existence should be taken as an approach. [Reply:] One explains [various] approaches according to [different] occasions [i.e. according to the disciples' capacities], so existence too is not wrong. Still, the essential point of the [Buddha's] approach accords with voidness. The [notions of] existence, existence of existence, etc. (*yǒu yǒu yǒu děng* 有有有等), are all in accordance with the grasping mind, while the [notions of] voidness, voidness of voidness, etc. (*kōng kōng kōng děng* 空空空等), are all opposed to erroneous grasping (*wàng zhí* 妄執 = *abhiniveśa*). Therefore, the intelligent, when they hear the word "voidness" said, should be free from all grasping at existence, inexistence and so forth, and come to understand that the true nature of dharmas is not existence nor is it inexistence. Thus they should not give rise to proliferations of [dichotomizing] conceptualization such as existence and inexistence.

2. Consequences of inappropriately teaching selflessness

(219c6) Now, in the presence of those of inferior intelligence one should never preach selflessness, [for] it will increase their evil views. Why? Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

It is better that he [i.e. one of inferior intelligence] gives rise to the conception of an I (wǒ zhí 我執 = ahaṃkāra) rather than the view of selflessness. In the latter case he will in addition go to an unfortunate state of existence, while in the former he will only turn his back on nirvāṇa. (k.287)

(219c10) Commentary. "He" means those of inferior intelligence in the world. "The conception of an I" means their [erroneous] view with regard to the personality (*sà jiā yé jiàn* 薩迦耶見 = *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*).⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ Such a [person's] view of the possessions of the self (*wǒ suǒ jiàn* 我所見 = *ātmiya-dṛṣṭi*) also leads to the conception of an I, and hence the term "conception of an I" also refers to this [erroneous] view. Now, while the conception of an I is not said to be correct, still it is better that the [person of inferior intelligence] should give rise to it, for the fault is light. Although the view of selflessness is [in fact] said to be correct, nonetheless, he does not understand it correctly and thus negates all dharmas as inexistent. Because [such a] fault is serious, he had better not give rise [to the view of selflessness].

(219c14) Why are these two faults [respectively] light and serious? [Response:] In the former case, i.e. the conception of an I, he only turns his back on nirvāṇa, while in the latter, viz. when he misapprehends voidness, he will in addition go to an unfortunate state of existence. Those of inferior intelligence, when they misapprehend voidness, will also turn away from their roots of virtue.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ What need to speak about [rejecting] sentient beings!⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ Because [those who misapprehend voidness] turn their back on virtue as well as the world, they will destroy [their] roots of virtue and harm [other] sentient beings. Not only will they cast away peace and nirvāṇa, but, in their egotism, they will also go to the fires of hell (*dì yù* 地獄 = *naraka*).

(219c19) These types of things [however] do not happen to those who give rise to the view of the self. Why? [It is because] they desire the self's happiness and wish that the self be free of suffering. So they do not commit the various evil actions (*zui 罪* = *pāpa*), but [instead] extensively cultivate merit; thus they abandon unfortunate states of existence and do not lose [their birth] as a man or god. However, as they fear *nirvāṇa*, they do not realize liberation. So [in this connection] it is said in the [*Kāśyapa-parivarta* of the *Ratnakūṭa*-] *sūtra*, "It is better to give rise to the view of the self, which is like Mount Sumeru, than to be conceited in misapprehending voidness."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

(219c22) [Objection:] In that case the principle of the selflessness of all dharmas is manifestly (*lín jìn* 隣近 = *sāksāt*) a dangerous path (*qù* 趣 = *gati*), and the Noble One should not teach it. [Reply:] He should indeed not teach it in the presence of those of inferior intelligence, but superior intellects reap great benefit by practising in accordance with it, and hence he ought to teach it [to them]. Why? Thus [to explain this], [Āryadeva] states in the next verse:

The excellent principle of selflessness (kōng wú wǒ 空無我 = nairātmya) is the true sphere of all the buddhas, the terror of evil views [and] the unrivalled door to nirvāṇa.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ (k.288)

(219c28) Commentary. For those who seek liberation, there is no other method to realize *nirvāṇa* apart from the excellent insight into voidness. When the intelligent wish to dispel the stains of evil views, then there is no other better method than this one. As the view of existence (*yǒu jiàn* 有見 = *astidṛṣṭi*; *bhavadṛṣṭi*) grasps the objects which it apprehends as an entity, then like other views of entities, it does not realize *nirvāṇa*, nor does it dispel the stains of evil views. Those who meditate on this sphere of voidness (*kōng xíng* 空行) to perfection realize the final fruit, unexcelled enlightenment. They then teach with skillful means everywhere for the sake of sentient beings, and thus bring about the complete realization of the excellent fruit which is sought after. For all which accomplishes the welfare of oneself and others, the insight into selflessness is the first and foremost cause. Therefore, knowing well the faculties of sentient beings, one should teach with skillful means and thus cause them to attain understanding.

(220a7) Now, the Tathāgata, in order to dispel the demon of evil views, explained the antidote (*ā jiē tuó* 阿揭陀 = *agada*), i.e. selflessness.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ How so? [Because] those who have evil views all become afraid when they hear mention of voidness pronounced, and gradually, as they become subdued, naturally stop [holding such views]. To show this point [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

Fools, when they hear mention⁽¹¹⁰⁾ *of the doctrine of voidness, all become greatly frightened, just as those who see someone powerful, become cowardly and without exception run away.* (k.289)

(220a12) Commentary. "Fool" means that evil views blind [his] eye of wisdom (*huì yǎn* 慧眼 = *prajñācakṣus*).⁽¹¹¹⁾ If such [a person] hears mention of voidness, the life [force] of his evil views is automatically destroyed. Although voidness does not

consciously wish to destroy evil views, still, because it is so powerful, [simply] hearing mention of it makes one desist of one's own accord. It is like the timid who believe themselves lost (*zì sàng* 自喪) when they hear [just a mere] mention of a tiger. Or, just as in the world there are tamed elephants across whose jowls flow impressive streams of sweat: although they do not consciously harm living beings, still, because such an elephant's awesome power is so great, he who sees or hears of him becomes wild with fear and runs away. The principle of voidness is also like that. As its awesome power is so great, it makes those who have evil views wild with fear on [simply] hearing mention of it, so that they naturally put an end [to such views].

3. *Selflessness was not taught for the sake of argumentation*

(220a18) [Qualm:] The principle of voidness, being unconscious, does not [itself] bring about harm to any beings, but those who realize such a principle will bring injury to others. [Response:] But if someone realizes voidness, then his mind will be pacified and his equanimity (*píng děng* 平等 = *samatā*) will be unrivalled; so how could he wish to injure others? Rather, in order to benefit all sentient beings, he teaches through skillful means the principle of selflessness, and those who harbour evil views, when they hear this [teaching], desist of their own accord. To show this point, then, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

The buddhas did not consciously state a doctrine which refutes rival assertions⁽¹¹²⁾, but rival assertions are destroyed by themselves, just as a raging fire⁽¹¹³⁾ burns up fuel. (k.290)

(220a24) Commentary. The buddhas did not consciously wish to refute rival assertions, but instead, to benefit sentient beings who are to be trained, they taught the great path of all the previous buddhas, viz. that the nature and characters (*xìng xiāng* 性相)⁽¹¹⁴⁾ of all dharmas are completely void. And thus the previous and subsequent tathāgatas are actively engaged (*wú bù yóu lǚ* 無不遊履)⁽¹¹⁵⁾ in guiding the flock of the confused [sentient beings] from the cause to the fruit. The evil views and arguments of the heretical followers of the Outsiders cease naturally when confronted with this teaching of voidness. It is like the leaping flames of a raging fire in a mountain forest: when woodpiles of wet fuel have been dried by the hot sun, then even though no one [expressly] brings any fire near, still, when the fuel is in the vicinity of fire, it ignites, as if by itself. So similarly for the arguments of the heretical followers of evil views: they too collapse by themselves in the face of the power of the teaching of voidness.

(220b2) Now, the Outsiders' traditions all assert erroneous entities. [So] voidness is explained in order to dispel [their assertions]. Why? Hence the next verse states:

Whoever understands the true Dharma will certainly be unattracted to heretical traditions. [Thus] [the Tathāgata] taught the meaning of voidness so that others would leave behind [such] false teaching approaches. (k. 291)

(220b6) Commentary. The intelligent by themselves distinguish between truth and falsity, so that when they meet the true Dharma of the [Tathāgata], they are then unattracted to the heretical traditions, just as a connoisseur of jewels, on obtaining a priceless jewel, is never again attracted to other crystals (*shuǐ jīng zhū* 水精珠 = *sphaṭika*).⁽¹¹⁶⁾ The Outsiders' traditions all invent erroneous entities and stray far from the true Dharma; like a deceptive method, they mislead sentient beings and deprive them of enormous benefit. Therefore we set forth the voidness [as found] in the Buddha's teaching in order to make these heretical followers turn to the truth and reject falsehoods.

(220b11) Now, why do the Outsiders relish heretical traditions and turn their backs on the noble doctrine? It is because of the strength of their [erroneous] view with regard to the personality (*shēn jiàn* 身見 = *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*).⁽¹¹⁷⁾ If they understood selflessness, then inevitably they would no longer have desire or aversion. Why? Hence the next verse:

If one understands the principle of selflessness explained by the Buddha, then one will not rejoice in what is favourable nor be afraid⁽¹¹⁸⁾ of what is unfavourable.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ (k.292)

(220b16) Commentary. If one understands the principle of selflessness in the Buddha's doctrine, one will dispel the [latent] propensities which are brought about by the [erroneous] view with regard to the personality, [and] one will see the world as like an empty dwelling: a cycle of saṃsāra whose conditionings (*xíng* 行 = *saṃskāra*) are false. [Thus] one will no longer rejoice in fortune nor fear misfortune, one will be without despondency, joy or fear, and hence, unperturbed. Should one [however] have the [erroneous] view with regard to the personality, then, because one thinks, "I will lose or profit", one will become despondent or joyful when misfortune or fortune present themselves. Because of this [view of the personality] one is then endlessly fearful. Thus the intelligent should dispel the conception of the I (*wǒ zhí* 我執 = *ahamkāra*).

(220b21) Now, the host of Outsiders, because of their attachment to the conception of the I, enslave themselves and enslave [other] sentient beings too. As many [beings] have been harmed, one ought to feel deeply compassion. To illustrate this point [Āryadeva] states:

Having seen that the host of the Outsiders are [just] many causes for misfortune, who⁽¹²⁰⁾ will not [then] feel deep compassion for sentient beings attracted to the true Dharma? (k.293)

(220b26) Commentary. The host of Outsiders, in their attachment to the conception of the I, make themselves and others commit immeasurable sins, for it is the [erroneous] view with regard to the personality which is the root for the arising of all evil. As it is said, "All evil, unwholesome, dharmas without exception arise rooted in the view with regard to the personality (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*)."⁽¹²¹⁾

(220b28) Amongst beings those who have an attraction to the excellent Dharma do not of themselves necessarily grasp [at wrong views], but rather by following others. They are deceived because of the heretical words of the Outsiders, and are also attached to the view of self; thus they commit immeasurable sins. It is in this manner that the Outsiders make themselves and others alike give rise to various sorts of strong ensnarements. Who⁽¹²²⁾ among the intelligent would not be filled with compassion? Therefore, sentient beings of pure intention who are attracted to the true Dharma, when they generate the desire to be of aid, should feel deep compassion and diligently explain selflessness and voidness so that they will bring [beings] to practise the correct view and thus free them from bondage.

G. Arguments against the Brahmins and the Jains

(220c6) [Objection:] Now, buddhas and bodhisattvas have always resided in the world and truly have the pure wish to aid others. Why then does the world still have [an] immeasurable [number of] sentient beings who believe in heretical, perverted views and slander the Dharma? [Reply:] It is because the objects and cognitions expounded by the Buddha are extremely profound, subtle and difficult to comprehend. However, [those of] the Outsiders are not like that. How so? Hence in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

The doctrines (suǒ zōng 所宗) of the three [traditions], i.e. of the Brahmins (pó luó mén 婆羅門 = brāhmaṇa), Jains (lí xì 離繫 = nirgrantha) and the Tathāgata, are [respectively] understood by the ears,^(122a) the eyes and the mind. Therefore, the Buddhadharma is more subtle. (k.294)

(220c12) Commentary. The Brahmins just have endless recitation of empty formulae as their path. The ear consciousness understands it; it is [thus] not profound or subtle. The Jain Outsiders merely take exposing their bodies' foulness and [inflicting] suffering on themselves through numerous cruelties as being the path. The eye consciousness understands it, and so it too is neither profound nor subtle. The Tathāgata's noble teaching, by its sword of undefiled (wú lòu 無漏 = anāsrava) wisdom which realizes voidness, permanently destroys all the thieving^(122b) inner passions and leads to the attainment of unexcelled perfect enlightenment; it benefits and brings happiness to all sentient beings; [in this fashion] the thought (yì qù 意趣 = abhiprāya) behind its reasonings and scriptures is extremely profound and subtle.

(220c17) Those people who understand things correctly (rú shí lǐ 如實理) comprehend some of the Buddha's noble teachings and do not comprehend others. As the Buddhist reasonings and scriptures are so extremely profound and subtle, the Outsiders, fools that they are, do not understand them; most [people]⁽¹²³⁾ believe in the coarse and superficial heretical words of the Outsiders, while [only] few believe in the profound and subtle noble teaching of the Tathāgata.

(220c20) The fact that the world mostly believes in the Brahmins is because the Brahmins largely practise deception: they recite spells (zhòu 呪 = mantra), worship fire

and purify themselves through asceticism; they falsely establish auspiciousness and erroneously explain [what constitutes] fortune and misfortune. They [employ] various methods for [their own] livelihood: they trick women, Śūdras (*shù dá luó* 戍達羅) and the like to impress them with their status so that [the Śūdras, etc.] will provide them with the necessities of life and extend them veneration.

1. Refutation of the Vedas

(220c24) The ancient Brahmins, in their shrewdness, secretly invented the *Vedas* (*míng shū* 明書) and then said that they existed naturally (*zì rán yǒu* 自然有), that they just came to be incanted of themselves and were not acknowledged as dependent on anything else.⁽¹²⁴⁾ The Brahmins were commended as being the most worthy of veneration, while the Kṣatriyas (*chà dì lì* 刹帝利) and the rest were all [said to be] inferior; if [the latter] provided [the Brahmins] with the necessities of life, then they would obtain immeasurable merit. Fools, who lack intelligence, do not fathom [the Brahmins' various deceptions]; they wait upon [the Brahmins] with trust and respect, saying that they are a true field of merit (*fú tián* 福田 = *puṇyakṣetra*).⁽¹²⁵⁾

(220c27) However, it is not so that these *Vedas* exist naturally, for they have been articulated, just like conventional speech. Moreover, these *Vedas* are not coherent (*chēng lǐ* 稱理 = *yukta*) at all, for they are not noble explanations, just like lies (*xū kuáng yán* 虛誑言). And the Brahmin caste is not in fact worthy of veneration, nor are they a true field of merit, for they continuously engage in asking for alms all the while that they support a wife and children, just as do greedy lepers.⁽¹²⁶⁾ So the intelligent should not take refuge [in such false teachers].

2. Jains and Brahmins compared

(221a2) Granted the Brahmins' doctrine is largely deception, what about the [teaching] which is studied by the Jain Outsiders? [Reply:] The doctrine studied by this [school] is by and large in keeping with bewilderment (*yú chī* 愚癡 = *moha*). How so? Hence the next verse:

The Brahmins' doctrine by and large makes one practise deception, but the doctrine of the Jain Outsiders is for the most part [just] in keeping with bewilderment.
(k.295)

(221a7) Commentary. The Jain Outsiders all fail to understand the truth. They just desire happiness in the next [world], but in the present [world] they subject themselves to intense suffering. Of all which is professed [by them], most is incoherent. Such sorts of bewildered [people], when they join together to form a group, [just] serve as a refuge for the bewildered of the world. How do we know for certain that they are [in fact] bewildered? Because they shamelessly expose their naked bodies, just like madmen, or like animals, or little different from babies.

(221a11) If the Brahmins are not actually worthy of veneration, then why do [people] esteem and revere them? [Reply:] It is because they recite the *Vedas* (*míng lùn* 明論). In fact, the Brahmins know nothing, but, for [their own] livelihood, they continually recite the *Vedas* and fraudulently present another character. As they sway men's hearts, the world esteems them but does not subject them to investigation, saying that one reveres the [Brahmins] because they have good qualities. Also, although there is nothing really true (*shèng yì* 勝義 = *paramārtha*; *pāramāthika*) in the *Vedas*, they do nonetheless have some few worldly rituals. So because of the world's esteem for learning, it also extends reverence [to the Brahmins] even though [the latter] are [in fact] without any good qualities. As for the other [Outsiders' traditions], which do not recite the *Vedas*, as they are of the same sort (*tóng lèi* 同類 = *sārūpya*) [i.e. as they also conform to the *Vedas*], worldly tradition does not subject them to investigation, and reveres them as well.

(221a18) [Objection:] The Jain Outsiders are [however] not like [these latter orthodox traditions]. Why then does the world for the most part also revere them? [Response:] It is because they know a little about astronomical calculations, and because they watch birds, interpret dreams and divine fortunes. Therefore, common fools by and large extend [them] reverence.

(221a20) Now furthermore, as the Brahmins' [way of] reciting the *Vedas* is difficult to execute, the world generally reveres them, and as the Jain Outsiders practise asceticism, the world generally feels pity for them: [but] none [of these traditions] gain liberation from *samsāra*. The intelligent should correctly understand [this fact] and not follow these views. Thus, in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

[The world] respects the Brahmins for reciting the *Vedas*,⁽¹²⁷⁾ and it takes pity on the Jains for voluntarily inflicting suffering on their own bodies. (k.296)

(221a26) Commentary. The Dharma of the Brahmins consists in diligently reciting the *Vedas*; because this is difficult, the world in general respects [the Brahmins]. However, the *Vedas* (*míng lùn* 明論) are not [in fact] a cause for liberation, for they just have empty words without truth. The Jain Outsiders voluntarily inflict extreme suffering on their bodies; as this is also difficult [to execute], the world takes pity on them.

3. Refutation of asceticism and high birth as means to liberation

(221a28) Why is self-inflicted suffering not a cause for liberation? [Reply:] Because such a retributive effect (*yì shú guǒ* 異熟果 = *vipākaphala*) is not a virtuous dharma.⁽¹²⁸⁾ These physical sufferings which are brought about by [such practices as] pulling out one's hair and so on are the consequences of evil actions in past lives. Such karmic retributions are not virtuous dharmas, and therefore, just like pleasurable retributions, they are not a cause for liberation.⁽¹²⁹⁾

(221b2) [Objection:] Suppose it is said that these sufferings are the creation of a present effort (*gōng lì* 功力 = *prayāsa*) and are not retributive effects, [and thus]

the reason [in the above argument⁽¹³⁰⁾] is not established. [Reply:] This is also not the case. These sufferings which are experienced *are* retributive effects, because, without any benefit, they inflict pain on both the physical senses (*sè gēn* 色根 = *rūpīndriya*) and consciousness, just as do the physical sufferings which are experienced in hell. If among our coreligionists too there are those who do not recognize that these [self-inflicted] sufferings are retributive effects [of karma], they should ascertain this fact by means of such a *pramāṇa*.

(221b6) When physical sufferings are not retributions [of past actions], they also are not the direct (*qīn* 親 = *sākṣāt*) cause for realizing liberation, in that [such] defiled (*yǒu lòu* 有漏 = *sāsrava*) physical feelings arise through present conditions [viz. bewilderment], just as in the case of sexual pleasure.⁽¹³¹⁾ Furthermore, these self-inflicted sufferings cannot be the cause for liberation, because they contradict the noble teaching, as does suffering due to self-destruction. What these [Jain] masters explain is not the noble teaching [at all], for it is something which no tathāgatas and the like would ever propound, just like treatises on erotica, etc. So, these self-inflicted sufferings are just consequences of evil actions in previous lives and products of present bewilderment. They certainly are not the cause for realizing true liberation.

(221b13) Now, some say the following: One attains liberation on the basis of a superior birth (*shēn* 身).⁽¹³²⁾ The superior [people] of the world are said to be the Brahmins, and therefore, Brahmins realize liberation, but other types [of people] cannot attain nirvāṇa. This assertion is not correct, and therefore, in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

Just as suffering is a retribution (gǎn 感 = vi-PAC) of karma [and is therefore] not a cause for true liberation, so superior birth is a product of karma and does not lead to realizing liberation either. (k.297)

(221b18) Commentary. Just as for the Jain tradition the physical suffering which they experience is not a cause for liberation because it is a karmic retribution, so too the Brahmins' birth, which is supposed to be superior, is [just] a retribution of karma and is not a cause for liberation either.

(221b20) [Objection:] Although birth does not directly lead to realizing liberation, still the virtues present in [certain types of] birth are a cause for liberation. [Reply:] If that were so, then the virtues of other births should be analogous in this respect too. Why do you only speak of the Brahmins? Moreover, the dharmas which serve as the sense organs, objects, etc. of Brahmins are all exactly the same as those of the other castes. Why then do [the Brahmins] themselves say that they are superior and that the others are inferior? Consequently, these assertions just [serve to] cheat fools; the intelligent should not believe them. The Brahmins are, on the contrary, *not* superior to the other castes, for they are people of this continent (*zhōu* 洲 = *dvīpa*), just as are the Śūdras. And the Śūdras, etc. are not inferior to this caste [i.e. the Brahmins], because they [too] are people of this continent, as are the Brahmins.

H. Résumé of the Buddhadharmā

(221b26) It has by now been explained that the Outsiders' teachings are completely false (*xū* 虛 = *mṛṣā*), but it is not yet understood what truth the Tathāgata's Dharma might possess. So to dispel this doubt, [Āryadeva] states the following verse.

In brief (lüè yán 略言 = samāsatas), the Buddha's teachings have two [features] setting them apart from other traditions: through non-violence one is born as a man or god, and through the insight into voidness one realizes liberation.⁽¹³³⁾
(k.298)

(221c1) Commentary. The Buddha stated an immeasurable [number of] profoundly excellent approaches to the Dharma, but to benefit sentient beings, there need be just two sorts: firstly, through non-violence one experiences [birth as] a man or a god; secondly, through insight into voidness one realizes liberation. We collectively apply the term "violence" to the intentions to harm others as well as to both the physical and verbal karma which ensues [from such intentions]. If one eliminates these just-explained violent dharmas and practises the causes for virtue, then this is what is termed "non-violence". In other words: the ten virtuous actions (*shí shàn yè* 十善業 = *daśakuśalākarmapatha*), giving (*bù shī* 布施 = *dāna*), pleasant speech (*ài yǔ* 愛語 = *priyavacana*), beneficial conduct (*lì xíng* 利行 = *arthacaryā*), sameness of goal (*tóng shì* 同事 = *samānārthatā*) as well as the [four] trances (*jìng lǜ* 靜慮 = *dhyāna*) and the [four] formless meditative absorptions (*wú sè dìng* 無色定 = *ārūpyasamāpatti*), and so forth.⁽¹³⁴⁾ By means of these [practices] one obtains a birth in fortunate states of existence, such as those of a man or god, and experiences excellent, undefiled (*wú rǎn* 無染 = *akliṣa*) fruitions. Relying on these [practices], one eliminates all the passions and develops immeasurable causes for virtue.

(221c7) Thusness (*zhēn rú* 眞如 = *tathatā*), the true endpoint (*shí jì* 實際 = *bhūtakoti*) [and] the lack of characters (*lí xiāng* 離相 = *animitta*) are termed "voidness".⁽¹³⁵⁾ If one correctly has insight into this voidness, one will attain the bliss of nirvāṇa. The principle of selflessness is the lack of characters and inexpressibility of all dharmas⁽¹³⁶⁾ so that they all have the same taste of tranquillity and bliss: this, in other words, is nirvāṇa. It [i.e. nirvāṇa] must be an insight into voidness, for only [by such an insight] can it be realized.

(221c10) So in this fashion, the two causes for fortunate states of existence and liberation [respectively] are only fully attainable in the Buddhadharmā. Although the Outsiders do speak somewhat about giving, etc. being the cause for birth as a man or god, still [their explanations] are incomplete. Why? Because these Outsiders do not have the intelligence to clearly explain cause and effect, do not explain that it is the mind (*yì sī* 意思 = *manas*) which gives rise to excellent merit, and lack the Dharma [to be found] in the *Prātimokṣasaṃvara* (*bié jiě tuō lǜ yí* 別解脫律儀),⁽¹³⁷⁾ they therefore do not yet really know the gross actions [necessary] for fortunate states of existence. As nirvāṇa has superior causes, it is ruled out [for them].

I. Conclusions

(221c15) If the reasonings and scriptures put forth by the Tathāgata are completely perfect, why do the heretical followers of the Outsiders not rejoice [in them]? [Reply:] As the true teaching of the Buddha is opposed to what is perversely coveted by these heretical positions, [the latter], as a result, have no liking [for the Buddhist teachings]. To illustrate this point, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

*Worldly people long for their own positions just as they love their native places.
[So] the heretical schools will not be pleased if the true Dharma defeats [them].*
(k.299)

(221c20) Commentary. Even if one's native place is not fertile, nonetheless, when one has lived there a long time, one will be reluctant to abandon it. It is similar in the case of one's own [philosophical] position. Although it might be irrational, it was received from one's teacher, and hence one will not relinquish it. If one is even uninterested in other Outsiders' positions, what need to mention being attracted to the noble teaching which is the sweet nectar of the Tathāgata? The fire of the knowledge of voidness, i.e. the extremely profound true character [of things] (*shí xiāng* 實相 = *bhūtalakṣaṇa*)⁽¹³⁸⁾, burns up the accumulated fuel of the Outsiders' heretical grasplings, but because such [knowledge] contradicts [worldly people's] own way of thinking, they have no liking [for it]. The intelligent should well direct their minds and not contradict the true Dharma by means of defiled heretical positions.

(221c26) Now, the Buddhadharma illumines all, just like the brilliant sun; people who seek superior understanding should rely on it. To show this point, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

*The intelligent person, who seeks excellent qualities, should accept true positions.
The true Dharma, like the sun, causes those with eyes to see.* (k.300)

(222a1) Commentary. Here [Āryadeva] shows that one needs to possess two qualities to have faith in the Mahāyāna. The first is that one be intelligent.⁽¹³⁹⁾ The second is that one long for excellent qualities.

(222a2) The Mahāyāna eliminates all heretical positions. When one follows the Mahāyāna, those who are benefited are numerous: one realizes the unexcelled nirvāṇa [oneself] and causes other sentient beings to leave saṃsāra behind too. The true Dharma of the Mahāyāna is like the sun in that for the world, everywhere, it disperses the darkness of ignorance. Those who have the eye of wisdom will, by the light of this Dharma, clearly discern true and false appearances, turn their backs on the heretics and follow the truth, avoiding precipices and seeking safety, so that the benefit to self and others will in no way be incomplete (*chéng bàn* 成辦 = *abhinispatti*).

(222a7) The intelligent should [thus] place their faith in the Mahāyāna and not hanker after heretical positions. He who defames the true Dharma will himself come to be drowned in the mire of saṃsāra and will deceive sentient beings, making them lose much benefit. The difference between intelligence and foolishness is said to be

knowing what is and is not the case: the intelligent [then] should not, like fools, fail to distinguish true from false. If one really wishes to benefit others, one should, by means of the Mahāyāna, dispel heresies and establish the truth; diligently training in the insight into voidness one will speedily realize enlightenment and the benefit to sentient beings will exhaust the bounds of the [limitless] future.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

CATUḤŚATAKAVṚTTI XII: REFUTATION OF HERETICAL VIEWS (*dr̥ṣṭi*)

§1. Here, there is the following objection: You have very clearly and extensively explained selflessness. But if the Tathāgata understands this [principle] and commends it [to others], then why is it that the world for the most part does not follow this Dharma? Since this Dharma is purer [than the others] on account of the superiority of its founder, exponents and doctrine, then all those who aspire to liberation (*thar pa* = *mokṣa*) should follow it. How is it that there are differing assertions in the various traditions?

A. The qualities of the auditors of the teaching

§2. Reply: Although this Dharma does have superiority with regard to its promulgator, exponents and the very nature of the doctrine [expounded], nonetheless, it is extremely difficult to find auditors who are superior. Thus:

One says that an auditor who is impartial, intelligent and industrious is a vessel [for the Dharma]. (k.276ab)

§3. In this context, impartiality means not falling into factions. Now, who [is said to] have not fallen into factions? [Reply:] He who is free from attachment for his own faction and contempt for another's. Such [a person], because his mind-stream is undefiled (*ñon ma moṅs pa* = *akliṣṭa*), will indeed dedicate himself to seeking various precious excellent explanations; thus the root for abandoning the orientation towards the completely defiled (*kun nas ñon moṅs pa'i phyogs*) is impartiality. Therefore, in this fashion, the impartial auditor is the vessel for the supreme ambrosia of the sacred Dharma.

§4. If, in addition to being impartial, he is also intelligent, he will be skilled in differentiating what is sound and unsound in good and bad explanations. And such [a person], through his intelligence, will reject the unsound [doctrines] and embrace [only] what is sound. So, when the auditor is intelligent, he will [indeed] be a vessel [for the Dharma]. Thus he who is impartial as well as intelligent will strive to hear good explanations and will not, like a [mere] simulacrum (*ri mo'i skyes bu'i nam pa ltar*), fail to exert himself. Therefore:

"One says that an auditor who is impartial, intelligent and industrious is a vessel [for the Dharma]."

Now, if the auditor is [indeed] like that, then certainly,

the teacher's good qualities will not be anything other [than good] and nor will those of [his] auditor. (k.276cd)

§5. In this context, the good qualities of the teacher are: impartiality, freedom from error, clarity and unconfused speech⁽¹⁴¹⁾, [the ability] to understand the dispositions (*lhag pa'i bsam pa* = *adhyāśaya*) of [his] auditors, having a mind which is

free from worldliness (*zañ ziñ med pa = nirāmaṣa*) and so on and so forth. The auditor, on the other hand, has respect for both the Dharma and the teacher of the Dharma, he is concentrated, impartial, intelligent and industrious. One understands his "industriousness" as being his respect for the Dharma and its teacher, his concentration and the other such [above-mentioned] qualities.

§6. Now, in such a case [when teacher and auditor are as described above], then the teacher's good qualities will not be anything other [than good], and equally the auditor's good qualities will not be otherwise either.⁽¹⁴²⁾ When the auditor is as [described] above, the teacher's good qualities will not [seem to] turn into faults. It is because of the auditor's faults that the [teacher's] good qualities turn into faults and [his own] faults turn into good qualities. But when the auditor who possesses the above-described characteristics is a basis for the collection of non-erroneous good qualities which stem from listening and so forth [i.e. listening, reflection and meditation], then the teacher's good qualities will not be anything other [than good] and nor will the auditor's qualities become faults.⁽¹⁴³⁾

§7. Thus, even though the teacher is much purer [than the auditors], the auditors do not reckon their own defects, but make [their teacher seem to] have faults.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Fools, praising themselves, will say,⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ "How could it be us who are without intelligence? There is no one who [could] understand." This can be known from the *Adhyāśayasamcodanasūtra*.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Therefore, the Illustrious One,

explained the [four noble truths]: existence, the means for existence, the means for peace and similarly, peace [itself]. When the world completely misunderstands something, they regard this [error] as if it were attributable to the Sage.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ (k.277)

§8. In this context, "existence" is the five appropriated aggregates which are the result [of conditionings]. The "means for existence" are the various conditionings (*'du byed = saṃskāra*) which are the cause [of the aggregates]. "Peace" means *nirvāṇa*, for its nature is free from anything which can harm. The "means for peace" is the noble eightfold path. Thus the Illustrious One taught the four noble truths to those desirous of liberation, for he taught what was to be realized (*blañ bar bya ba = upādeya*) and what was to be abandoned (*dor bar bya ba = heya*) along with their [resultant] effects.

§9. Now, the meaning taught by the Illustrious One is completely correct to the [mind]-streams of those who are endowed with listening, reflection and meditation and who themselves personally understand things as they really are. However, those who dislike (*sdañ ba*) exerting themselves in listening, reflection and meditation, being unaware that they are not [suitable] vessels, will think: "Since we don't understand the meaning correctly, surely it was not properly explained". And thus they will certainly take this error as if it were attributable to the Sage.

§10. [But] this much does not make the Illustrious Buddha also reproachable. By teaching the four noble truths he teaches all of man's goals without exception; so how could the teacher be at fault? Thus, it is said [in the *kārikā*] "as if it were attributable to the Sage", for these people did not correctly ascertain the truth (*de kho na nīd*

= *tattva*) of the things taught by the [Buddha]. The fact that the congenitally blind do not see is not the fault of the sun which is shining [on them], for those who are not blind do [in fact] see this [sun].

B. The Outsiders' and Buddhists' notions of liberation compared

§11. Here there is the following objection: While all the Tathāgata's account of [how to obtain] a good position [in the world] (*mñon par tho ba = abhyudaya*) is very clear in its sense, [his] account of what is supremely excellent (*ñes par legs pa = niḥśreyasa*) [i.e. liberation and buddhahood] is incomprehensible for people like us in that it seeks above all to teach that all entities are inexistent. The Illustrious One, thus, strives to refute the natures of all entities, and consequently we are repelled [by such a doctrine]. [Āryadeva's] reply:

The heretics (ya mtshan can = pāṣaṇḍin) all accept that nirvāṇa is [realized] through abandoning all [entities]. [So] why are they not pleased when all is refuted? (k.278)

§12. The heretics, such as Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and so forth, are all sure that liberation is obtained by the abandonment of all defiled entities such as pleasure, pain, etc. Since all the heretics [already] believe that nirvāṇa [is realized] through abandoning everything, we have not undertaken anything⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ unprecedented in this regard which might cause them to be repelled [by such a doctrine]. Indeed, we are [merely] cleansing the path leading to the city of nirvāṇa by means of this treatise which is designed to pull out the thorns of bad views and which seeks to teach the lack of nature of those very entities whose cessation [you] strive for in that [you hold that] they will not once again begin to function in [the state of] nirvāṇa.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ So why, after etching an impious apprehension into your heart⁽¹⁵⁰⁾, are you thus afraid? Put great joy [in your heart]! Make this Dharma your own! Let the account of [how to] turn away defiled entities be firmly installed in your mind!

1. Citations and some grammatical remarks

§13. As the Illustrious One stated [in the *Samādhiraśasūtra*]:
"In extinction dharmas are without dharmas (*nivṛtti dharmāṇa na asti dharmā*). Whatever is inexistent in this [state] does not exist at all. For those who imagine 'existence' and 'inexistence' and practise accordingly, suffering will not cease."⁽¹⁵¹⁾

§14. Nirvāṇa, or passing beyond suffering, is the realm of nirvāṇa without the aggregates remaining; it is like the extinction of a lamp when the wick and butter are used up. We think that for those who understand correctly, the force of the fire of the wisdom of thusness (*de kho na ñid = tathatā*) causes the attachment to the possessions

of the self (*bdag gi ba = ātmīya*)⁽¹⁵²⁾ to cease, and thus attachment, aversion, bewilderment, conceit, pride and the other [passions] become absolutely inexistent. As you heretics all accept [this], you should be pleased by the Illustrious Buddha's explanations. However, the Outsiders (*mu stegs byed pa = tīrthakara*) do not ascertain that this is true. Here [in the words *nivṛtti dharmāṇa na asti dharmā* of the *Samādhirājasūtra* quotation] the seventh case [i.e. the locative] does not appear [in *nivṛtti*]⁽¹⁵³⁾, in accordance with the [grammatical] sūtra [of Pāṇini], "[the following elements are substitutes] for the case-endings (*sup*) [in the Vedas]: *su* [i.e. the nominative singular *s*], *luk* [i.e. suppression of the ending] ..., etc."⁽¹⁵⁴⁾

§15. In this vein, the Illustrious One states:

"Now, that which is extinct is non-existent. Just as the [mesh of] hair (*skra śad*)⁽¹⁵⁵⁾, the flies, and so forth, which are observed by those suffering from [ocular problems such as] *timira* (*rab rib can = taimirika*)⁽¹⁵⁶⁾, [do not exist] when there is no more *timira*; or just as when there is a light and one thinks that there is [just] empty space in the house, this will dissipate the doubt that one is going to be infected with the poison of something which one saw, [a doubt which arose] because of the fear at having seen a [striped] rope as being a snake; so too these [illusory entities], which in no way [really] appear or exist, are like the hair, flies, etc. of the *taimirikas* when they [actually] suffer from [the disease,] *timira*. And, just as when there is light there are no 'snakes', and one therefore no longer thinks that the rope is a snake, so too [one realizes that] in the dark there was no real snake [either], and hence one does not think that there was a snake at all. Analogously, the state of *saṃsāra* is also completely inexistent."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

§16. [Objection:] Well then how could *saṃsāra* arise from the defilements (*kun nas ñon moṅs pa = saṃkleśa*) and karma? Reply: *saṃsāra* is like the collection of mind-created entities, i.e. the hair and so forth which are perceived by those who are suffering from *timira*, and is like mistakenly fearing the snake when it is dark. It [i.e. *saṃsāra*] too pertains to those infantile people whose eye of intelligence is blinded by the darkness of mistakes about unrealities. To explain this it was said:

"For those who imagine 'existence' and 'inexistence' and practise accordingly, suffering does not cease."

[Further grammatical remarks on the *Samādhirājasūtra*'s use of *nivṛtti dharmāṇa na asti dharmā*:] Correctly speaking, one would say *rnams yod min* [i.e. *na santi* instead of *nāsti*]. But in accordance with the [*Mahābhāṣya*'s] rule (*mushan ñid = lakṣaṇa*) to the effect that "it should be said that verbal endings (*iñ*) are [substituted] for [other] verbal endings", [the *Samādhirājasūtra* passage cited above] states *chos yod min* [i.e. *nāsti dharmā*].⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ *dharmāṇām* is what ought to be stated, but here [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*] the letters *ā* and *m* did not appear [and one finds *dharmāṇa* instead of the normal genitive plural *dharmāṇām*].

§17. "Those who imagine 'existence'" refers to you Sāṃkhyas, Aulūkyas, Kaṇāda, Kapila and the Vaibhāṣikas, while "those who imagine 'inexistence'" refers to the Vaiśeṣikas(?), the Sautrāntikas and the Vijñānavādins.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ Those who practise accordingly, i.e. those possessed by the demons of "existence" and "inexistence", are like the *taimirikas* when under the influence of *timira* and like those who think that a rope in the dark is a snake: the suffering of these [individuals] with mistaken views — i.e. the sufferings, sorrows, etc. of birth, old age, sickness, and death in the saṃsāra [composed of] five states of existence — will not cease. The analysis of these things has already been taught here in various places, so we have not explained it [again]. Thus it is said [in the *Ratnāvalī*]:

"Ask the world as well the Sāṃkhyas, Aulūkyas, Nirgranthas [and] those who assert that the person is the aggregates if they assert [a doctrine] that is beyond existence and inexistence."

"Thus, know that the ambrosia of the buddhas' teaching, which is termed 'profound', is the 'present of the Dharma' beyond existence and inexistence."⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

2. *The Outsiders do not know the method for liberation*

§18. Objection: If this very same thought is also shared by all the heretics, that is to say, that by abandoning everything one [realizes] nirvāṇa, then, I ask you, what is the difference between you [Buddhists] and the Outsiders? [Reply:] The difference is that for the Outsiders abandoning everything is no more than an idea; they do not, however, state a method for abandoning everything. Now, when the method for abandoning all is not taught,

how will he who does not know the method for abandoning effectuate [this] abandon? (k.279ab)

§19. Even if he should wish to abandon all, how will one who relies on the Outsiders' opinions, and who [hence] does not know the method for abandoning, ever effectuate [this] abandon when he does not know the method for abandoning all, viz. the ultimate truth, which is characterized as the voidness of nature of all dharmas? Thus,

it is assuredly for this [reason] that the Sage has said that peace is not [found] elsewhere. (k.279cd)

§20. It is certainly with this very intention in mind that the Sage spoke as follows [in the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*]: "Here is the one who is the first mendicant, here is the second" and so on up to the fourth [mendicant]. "The opponents' systems are void of [true] mendicants."⁽¹⁶¹⁾ Now, it is precisely on account of this complete explanation of the method to abandon everything that one realizes that the Illustrious

Buddha is a true teacher in that his wisdom functions everywhere without any impediment. Also, the fact that the Outsiders have false understandings on other sorts of things too need not be proven, for it has already been established by their inability to give a complete explanation of the method for abandoning everything.⁽¹⁶²⁾

C. The problem of the authority of the Outsiders' and Buddhists' treatises and scriptures

§21. Objection: But, given that there is no limit to what is knowable, then with regard to the suprasensible things which are explained, surely, since these [things] are unobservable, the doubt must also occur to you [Buddhists] as to whether this thing really is as it was explained or whether it is otherwise. Indeed, there is no way to be certain concerning such [things]. [Reply:] To this also [Āryadeva] says:

When someone entertains doubt concerning the imperceptible [things] (parokṣa) taught by the Buddha, he should develop conviction in these very things on account of voidness (śūnyatā). (k.280)

§22. Indeed, not all entities are cognizable by means of perceptual consciousness; there are also those which are cognizable by inference. Now, with regard to these [imperceptible things], we are able to make an inference because there does in fact exist an example. In this context, the means for abandoning [everything] is the voidness of nature of all dharmas. This [voidness] is such that nothing can cause it to be otherwise, and this state of affairs, although always at hand, is subtle, for no [ordinary] people can observe it. However, its truth is proven through reasoning in that it stops one from believing in the nature of any dharmas. [So] it is on precisely this [point] that one should first of all ground [one's] certainty. But if in this matter there is any reason at all for uncertainty as to whether this [state of affairs, viz. voidness,] is actually so or otherwise, then let this [reason for uncertainty] be stated, providing it has not [already] been dissipated by the certitudes established in the [previously] taught chapters or in those to come. Now, the [adversary] cannot state even the slightest reason for any uncertainty, and thus this example [viz. voidness] is indeed proven. Therefore, you should understand by means of your own principles that the other statements of the Illustrious One, which establish unobservable states of affairs, are also true, for they were taught by the Tathāgata, just as were the statements setting forth [that] state of affairs which is the voidness of nature. How then could there be any place for doubt concerning the imperceptible things taught by the Buddha?

1. Citations

§23. States the Illustrious One [in the *Samādhiraṅgāsūtra*]:

"The sūtras which I have preached in the thousands of worlds have differing letters, but the meaning is the same; it cannot be widely proclaimed."

"When one has contemplated one single phenomenon, one is acquainted with them all. However many [different] dharmas were taught by all the buddhas,

all [such] dharmas are selfless. Whichever people are experienced, they will find the Buddha's dharmas without any difficulty when they have trained in this matter."

Similarly, as was stated [by the Buddha in the *Samādhirājasūtra*]:

"Just as one has understood the notion of the self, so one should direct the mind in precisely the same way with regard to everything [else]. Now, all dharmas are of that nature: pure, like the sky."

2. The untrustworthiness of the Outsiders

§24. Moreover, one cannot be sure that the Outsiders also speak about non-erroneous states of affairs, as does the Tathāgata, for they are mistaken with regard to what is in fact empirical (*dṛṣya*). Thus, for example, they teach that the origin of this world has an antecedent cause which is [itself] permanent. Now, such an [origin] cannot be advocated, it being in contradiction with both experience and reason. And so:

He who has difficulty observing this world will [inevitably] be completely confused about the next one. (k.281ab)

§25. Indeed, one can suppose that he who cannot see the full moon well will not see the North Star (*dhruva*) or Alcor (*arundhatī*).⁽¹⁶³⁾ Analogously, when this Outsider, being confused about the causality of the world — in other words [about the causality] of the living beings and the "receptacle" —, does not [even] correctly view what is actually just a gross [type of] state of affairs, then one can wonder how he will ever understand a state of affairs which is extremely subtle, is far away in space and time and is highly diversified. Therefore,

those who, (k.281d)

wishing to drink the pure waters of the understanding of the true nature [of reality] in order to relieve their fatigue and weariness on the path of saṃsāra,

follow this (k.281d)

Outsider, who himself has a completely erroneous view and who, like the water in a mirage, does not merit any attention at all,

will be deceived for a very long time. (k.281c)

§26. Those who reject the true teacher, the Illustrious Buddha, and then, in their desire for liberation, follow an Outsider, who is thoroughly confused about the natures of both empirical (*dṛṣya*) and non-empirical (*adṛṣya*) entities, will, alas, be deceived in an interminable saṃsāra which is without any endpoint.

§27. Here the following is stated:

"Just as on Ratnadvīpa some bad merchants who are ignorant about jewels, desire precious stones, but in their confusion end up choosing rhinestones after rejecting a very valuable jewel, so similarly those on Jambudvīpa who are of poor intelligence [and] who are ignorant about [philosophical] systems, have hopes for liberation, but in their confusion end up choosing the Outsiders' system after casting aside the Buddha's system."⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

D. Fear of voidness and nirvāṇa

§28. [Query:] But why do those desirous of liberation follow an Outsider who has a view which is mistaken in this way? [Reply:] Because they are afraid to hear the teaching of the Dharma on the voidness of nature. This fear comes from the terror [which they feel] due to [the idea] ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾: "The I does not exist, nor will I exist; the mine does not exist, nor will it exist."⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Now, this fear stems from longstanding habituation to the conceptions of the I (*ahaṃkāra*) and the mine (*mamakāra*). Thus,

those who of themselves go to nirvāṇa, (k.282a)

after having, thanks to the care of a spiritual friend, cast aside [their] defiled attachment to the nature of entities, all be [this attachment] a longstanding habit,

they accomplish what is extremely difficult to do. (k.282b)

§29. Having himself become a buddha, an Illustrious One, he proceeds of himself alone to the city of nirvāṇa.

The mediocre person [however] lacks the courage in his heart⁽¹⁶⁷⁾ to go [to nirvāṇa], even following a guide, (k.282cd)

who, in this respect, accomplishes [an action] which is so difficult to do.

§30. Mediocre people, who remain fixed in their conceptions of the I and the mine, not only lack the courage in their hearts to go alone by themselves to nirvāṇa, but, what is more, even when he follows a guide as was previously described, the mediocre person does not exhibit the courage in his heart to go to nirvāṇa.

§31. But why does the mediocre person lack the courage in his heart to go to nirvāṇa, even when he follows this [sort of] guide? It is because he is afraid of voidness. And who has a fear of this [voidness]? To show this [type of person] who has [such a fear], [Āryadeva] states:

When one has not seen [anything], fear does not arise, [and] when one has seen [it], the [fear] completely vanishes. So therefore, certainly, it is when one understands a little bit that fear will occur.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ (k.283)

§32. Indeed, those who are unversed in scientific conventions, viz. cowherds and other such [illiterates], even if one explains voidness a hundred times [to them], they will not enter into it at all, and thus they will have no fear of it, in that they will

not have seen the point of voidness, just as with regard to momentary destruction (*kṣaṇabhāṅga*), he who understands nothing about this [is also unafraid], or just as he whose [mind-]stream is supported by wrong views [is unafraid] of the fires of the hells.

"When one has seen [it], the [fear] completely vanishes."

§33. Indeed, when they have seen the dharma known as "voidness", this terror [of which we spoke] will completely vanish for those who are experts in this [voidness], for they will be free of the attachment to the self and its possessions which is the cause for fear. Similarly, someone who came to mistake a rope for a snake will cease to fear [that it is actually] a snake once he sees the rope [for what it is]. However, fear will certainly, i.e. inevitably, occur to him who knows [just] a little bit [about voidness]. Indeed, one who is well-trained in driving elephants in rut will not be afraid when he is carried off on an elephant⁽¹⁶⁹⁾. And nor will the stupidest of stupid villagers, who is eager for a ride on that [animal], [be afraid]. As he does not see the harm [which would come] from [accidents such as] falling off and so forth, he values [the elephant] just as a ride and is not afraid of it. But he who understands a little bit [about the dangers] will be extremely afraid when he thinks about discovering⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ himself sitting there on the [elephant]. Now then, it is certain that a person who [only] understands a little will be afraid in every action [he might undertake] when he does it under such conditions (*evam*). But it is not so for someone who knows the matter at hand, for he is confident, nor is it so for someone who is completely ignorant, for he is thoroughly in the grip of bewilderment. Rather, it is he who understands a little [about what could happen] who is afraid, for he wonders whether this thing could occur or not.

§34. [Query:] But why do those who understand a little not strive for a higher level until they fully attain what they need to know? Response: Because of fear. And what causes the fear? — No training. And what is the cause of that? — Wrong training. To show this very [point] [Āryadeva] states:

The infantile definitely have a training in the dharma which activates (pravartaka) [saṃsāra]. [But] they are afraid of the dharma which quietens (nivartaka) [saṃsāra] because they are untrained [in it]. (k.284)

§35. "Dharma which activates" [refers to] the one which is conducive to developing saṃsāra. Now, beings who reside on the level belonging to the profane (*prthagjana*)⁽¹⁷¹⁾ are trained in only the dharma which activates. "Dharma which quietens" [refers to] the voidness of nature, for it is that which is conducive to the cessation of saṃsāra.⁽¹⁷²⁾ What stops one from training in this is self-cherishing (*ātma-sneha*). Because their mind-streams are in keeping with this [self-cherishing], the profane are all the more afraid of the dharma which would put an end to this latter [attitude]. They regard the voidness of nature as something similar to a precipice, and [hence] cannot bear to understand it as it is.

§36. Thus, suppose that some or another person, having lost the proper path⁽¹⁷³⁾ in the great jungle forest of saṃsāra whose outer limit cannot be seen and

where the true nature of things is enveloped in the thick darkness of ignorance, then devotes himself to the account of the voidness of nature. Just as this [person] acquires faith in voidness because conditions conducive to such [faith] are realized, so [he too] should act in the same fashion: he who is compassionate and grateful (*kṛtajña*) to the Illustrious Tathāgata and who wishes to abandon acts which cause obstacles to the true Dharma [and] are the cause of great downfalls for himself,⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ should teach this true Dharma to those who are its vessel, gathering [disciples] by means of the four ways of gathering (*saṃgrahavastu*) after having [himself] plunged into even the impassable and given even what is difficult to give.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

§37. On the other hand, he who not only has no esteem [for the Dharma] as it has been taught, but, what is more,

who, obscured by some form of bewilderment (moha), would create an impediment to the truth, such a person will not [even] have a fortunate state of existence. What is the point in speaking about liberation? (k.285)

§38. He who "by some form of bewilderment" — i.e. by jealousy, miserliness, laziness, fear, hatred towards [his] auditor, and so forth —, impedes someone in listening [reflecting,] etc. to an explanation of the truth when [that latter] person is [indeed] a vessel for the teaching on the truth, this [bewildered person] will certainly go to an unfortunate state, and therefore already has not even the possibility of a fortunate state of existence, be it divine or human. All the more so then, why would there be any occasion to speak about liberation for him? Indeed, has he not done harm to his own and others' [mind]-streams? For, he seeks to obstruct the lamp of wisdom when it arises in the [mind]-stream, [a lamp] which pervades all directions without exception, whose light is extremely brilliant, whose force goes forth unweakened throughout the three times, whose amount of light is ever-increasing in order to destroy day by day the obscurities of ignorance, [and] whose power consists in revealing all the thought-processes of beings.

E. Moral and philosophical faults compared

§39. It is precisely in this vein that the Illustrious Tathāgatā, seeing fully the extreme harm to self and others, stated:

It is better to fall from moral discipline than [to fall] in any way from the view. (k.286ab)

The sūtra states: "It is better to have failed in moral discipline than to have failed in the view".⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ Therefore, the Master [Āryadeva] brings out the correctness of these words of the Tathāgata by saying the following:

By moral discipline one goes to heaven, by means of the view one attains the supreme state. (k.286cd)

§40. Indeed, a failure in moral discipline for those who accumulate minor, middling and major degrees [of such a failure] will lead to its result — i.e. birth as a hungry ghost (*preta*), an animal or a hell-being according to the measure of the magnitude of the retribution (*vipāka*) [for such a failure] — provided that it does not come to perish in Noble Ones (*ārya*) who have attained the correct view. For the profane, who have not yet attained the correct view, purity of moral discipline will, however, at its best, have [birth in] paradise as its result. But a failure with regard to the view, no matter how minor it might be, cannot be even equalled, much less surpassed, in the magnitude of its retribution (*vipāka*)⁽¹⁷⁷⁾, albeit by uncountable hundreds of thousands of failures in moral discipline. But if a person, through conviction (*pratyaya*)⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ [gained] in one way or another, happened to perfect the correct view by giving rise to the noble path (*āryamārga*), then he would definitely shake off the obscurities of ignorance existing in beginningless *samsāra* and would reach *nirvāṇa*, honoured by the whole realm of sentient beings. Thus, having understood the immense importance of this [correct] view on the true nature [of reality], the learned should strive to abolish [all] impediments [to this view].

F. Selflessness

1. Consequences of teaching selflessness

§41. Furthermore, this [learned person], who sees the danger of impediments to the [correct view], should not teach this view of selflessness (*nairātmyadarśana*) everywhere, to those who are not [fitting] vessels [to receive it], and without having first ascertained [that his auditor is] an excellent vessel. Indeed, for one who is not a [fitting] vessel this teaching would be just calamitous. As it is said [in the *Pañcatantra*]:

"For fools, teaching is [just] agitating rather than calming. For snakes, drinking milk just increases their poison."

§42. Also the Illustrious One said [in the *Kāśyapaparivarta*]:

"Kāśyapa, the view that there is a personality, [a view] which is as gross as Mount Sumeru, is indeed better than a self-conceited person's view on voidness. Why is that? Voidness, Kāśyapa, is what delivers one from all views. He who has a view on voidness, him I declare incurable."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾

§43. Therefore:

For a mediocre person, the conception of an I (ahaṃkāra) is better than the view⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ of selflessness. (k.287ab)

§44. One calls "mediocre" him who is lacking in zealous application towards the Dharma of selflessness, is attached to self-grasping [and] seeks the impenetrable thicket of [heretical] views because he bases himself on something other than the true Dharma. To this mediocre person it is better to teach [that there is a] self in that such [a teaching] will be conducive to [his] ceasing bad actions. For indeed, due to his self-cherishing, he desires his own welfare and thus will place great importance on ceasing bad actions: one who has stopped evil conduct will easily obtain a fortunate state of existence. The teaching of selflessness will [however] definitely harm his mental and physical continuum in that he will mistakenly understand [such a teaching] or cast it aside. Therefore:

The first just goes to an unfortunate state of existence, while the one who is out of the ordinary (netara) goes to only peace. (k.287cd)

§45. Indeed, an unlearned person who errs with regard to the view of selflessness will just simply go to an unfortunate state of existence, and not to peace. However, he who is out of the ordinary will go to only peace, and not to an unfortunate state. The word *itara* ("ordinary") means someone who is not superior. And who is "not superior"? He who mistakenly understands the meaning of voidness or who casts it aside. Negating ["ordinary"] yields "out of the ordinary" (*netara*)⁽¹⁸¹⁾; "out of the ordinary" [thus] means "superior" (*utkṛṣṭa*). The very teaching on voidness on account of which an ordinary person ends up in an unfortunate state of existence, that same teaching on voidness is what enables a person who is out of the ordinary to attain nirvāṇa. He who is conditioned by the view of voidness and conquers the horde of the passions and karma in that he completely abandons attachment, is certain to reach cessation (*nirvṛtti*).⁽¹⁸²⁾ Alternatively, [it could be said that] a mediocre person who listens to the Dharma of selflessness will cast it aside or misunderstand it, and thus he will go to just an unfortunate state. He who does not listen [to such a teaching] will, due to [his] meritorious karma, go to a fortunate state.

2. Explaining what selflessness is

§46. [Query:] But what is this so-called "selflessness" which one is not supposed to teach to the mediocre and which one is supposed to teach to the excellent? To set it forth [Āryadeva] states:

Selflessness is said to be the unrivalled door to peace, the terror of evil views [and] the sphere of all the buddhas.⁽¹⁸³⁾ (k.288)

§47. Selflessness is "the unrivalled door to peace". Selflessness is "the terror of evil views". Selflessness is said to be "the sphere of all the buddhas." Now, what one terms "self" is entities' nature (*svabhāva*), or essence (*svarūpa*), which does not depend on anything else; the absence of this ["self"] is selflessness.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ Moreover, this [selflessness] is understood to be of two sorts on account of its division in [terms of]

dharmas and in [terms of] the person, namely, the "selflessness of dharmas" (*dharmānairātmya*) and the "selflessness of the person" (*pudgalanairātmya*) [respectively]. In this vein, what one terms the "person" is the appropriator (*upādātṛ*) of the five aggregates (*skandha*), which are said to be "the appropriated object" (*upādāna*); it is designated in dependence upon the [five] aggregates (*skandhān upādāya prajñāpyate*).⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ If one searches for it amongst the aggregates by means of the five ways (*pañcadhā*)⁽¹⁸⁶⁾, it cannot exist. Dharmas, on the other hand, are the entities which we term the aggregates, the domains (*āyatana*)⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ [and] the elements (*dhātu*).⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ So, because these dharmas, as well as the person, arise [each] according to their individuality in dependence upon their causes and conditions, and are dependently designated (*upādāya prajñāpyamānatva*), they do not have an uncreated essence which would be dependent on [only] itself, independent of anything else [and] innate. Dharmas and the person are, thus, established as lacking natures.

§48. Now, when an object is not established by its essence, by what other nature might it then be established? So, entities, whose own proper characters (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) are never actually in any way established, exist dependently (*pratītya*) or [in other words] on account of [other things] (*upādāya*), and according to a nature which is deceptive for fools⁽¹⁸⁹⁾; they become the focus of foolish minds' attachment. However, when [such entities] are scrutinized according to their [actual] nature by those who have the correct [philosophical] vision⁽¹⁹⁰⁾, they set in motion the complete destruction of [all] attachment to the dharmas and the person. And [this] complete destruction of attachment is the cause for attaining nirvāṇa. There is no [other] Dharma, apart from the view of no nature, which is the cause for completely destroying attachment in this manner.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

§49. Therefore, this selflessness, which is characterized as the lack of nature, is the "unrivalled door to peace".⁽¹⁹²⁾ For entering the city of nirvāṇa, this alone is the one and only door. Although there are three "accesses to liberation" (*vimokṣamukha*), namely "voidness" (*śūnyatā*), the "lack of characters" (*ānimitta*) and the "no focusing [on objects]" (*apraṇihita*), nonetheless, it is the view of selflessness which alone is the essential.⁽¹⁹³⁾ For indeed, he who has understood selflessness [and] whose attachment to entities is [thus] destroyed, will have absolutely no wishes for anything whatsoever; or [what is more], how could he ever perceive any characters (*nimitta*) [of things]?⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ Therefore, this selflessness is indeed the unrivalled door to peace.

§50. And so the **Bodhisambhāra* states:

"Since [dharmas] lack nature they are void; and being void, how could they ever have characters? As all characters have ceased, why would the wise seek anything?"⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

§51. Furthermore, this [selflessness] is the "terror of evil views". "Evil views" means views which are reprehensible. Indeed, no entity is perceived at all in selflessness, and thus this selflessness is a "terror" in that it is a vision⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ of the complete destruction of evil views, since they are wholly based on imagining essences of entities.

Selflessness is the "sphere of all the buddhas": "all the buddhas" means the hearers (*śrāvaka*), solitary realizers (*pratyekabuddha*)⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ and unexcelled perfectly enlightened ones (*anuttarasamyaksambuddha*). It is said to be the "sphere of all the buddhas" because it is established as being the sphere of [their] special wisdom. Or alternatively, to show all the perfectly enlightened ones' condition of not being distinct from the Body of the Dharma, he said "the sphere of all the buddhas".⁽¹⁹⁸⁾ [Thus] the Master [Āryadeva] described selflessness by means of the [above-explained] series of qualifications.

§52. Now, this selflessness should not be taught by the superior person to one who is dull of mind, since

even mention⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ *of this doctrine frightens the mediocre.* (k.289ab)

So unfathomable and profound is this doctrine that the mediocre [person] is afraid to even hear the word "selflessness". Indeed,

what powerful being can we see that does not frighten others? (k.289cd)

§53. The view of selflessness is powerful in that it is able to uproot all mediocre views. A mediocre view is weak in that it can be uprooted. Now, it is inevitable that one who is weak is afraid of one who is strong. And therefore, this doctrine [of selflessness] should not be taught to a weak person whose mind-stream is possessed by evil views, for it is [just] a cause for fear.

3. *Selflessness was not taught for the sake of argumentation*

§54. Objection: But, in fact, shouldn't this doctrine be taught [to him], since it extirpates all [his] evil views? For indeed, rival teachers (*parapravādin*)⁽²⁰⁰⁾ are certainly to be defeated with the Dharma. So therefore, one who seeks out arguments and who wishes to vanquish the opposing position should teach this doctrine even to unworthy vessels. Reply: No, this is not so, for

the tathāgatas did not state this doctrine for the sake of argument. (k.290ab)

§55. Now, if this doctrine had been taught for the sake of argument, then it would be as you say. But it was not taught for the sake of debate, for it was taught as an access to liberation (*vimokṣamukha*). Even so,

nonetheless, it burns up rival assertions, just as fire [burns up] fuel.⁽²⁰¹⁾ (k.290cd)

§56. Although it was not taught for the sake of argument, this doctrine does indeed dispel rival assertions. The use of fire is for the sake of such actions as cooking and so forth, but not for the sake of burning up fuel. Nonetheless, because its nature is to burn, it accomplishes the desired actions and burns up the fuel. When the consciousness arises in the [mind]-stream of the faithful that all dharmas are by nature selfless, this should also be understood just as [the example of] fire, for [such a consciousness] has a nature which is to burn up all the bonds of the passions.

§57. [Query:] But how will this doctrine, when it has arisen in the [mind-] stream of the faithful, burn up rival assertions? Reply:

Whoever understands this doctrine will be unattracted to another⁽²⁰²⁾ (k.291ab)

§58. He who has tasted the nectar of the excellent Dharma's vision of the true nature [of reality] will not relish⁽²⁰³⁾ the taste of views other than this one, and therefore will be unattracted to any other views. The Master [Āryadeva] states [the following] *pādas* to gratify intelligent people such as those who have tasted the nectar of the excellent Dharma:

Therefore, it seems to me that this doctrine is like the door to destruction [of rival views]. (k.291cd)

§59. To the Master [Āryadeva] it seems that this doctrine is the cause for the destruction of all the mediocre views [there might be] in a [mind-]stream which realizes the doctrine of selflessness, for one observes the destruction [of these views] in that they do not once again arise. According to some people, because this [selflessness] is of the nature of a non-perception (*mi dmigs pa = anupalabdhi*), it is not a cause for destruction, and hence was said to be "like the door to destruction". Or alternatively, [Āryadeva] meant the doctrine which is stated [in the scriptures] and then [in that sense] said that [the doctrine of selflessness] is "like the door to destruction". The point is as follows: *nirvāṇa* is complete destruction, and the access for entering it, i.e. the voidness which is the access to liberation, is of the nature of a realization. But the stated doctrine also seems like this [i.e. like the door to destruction of rival views] to the Master, [for] just as the faithful are unattached to rival views once they have understood in their hearts the nature of the noble doctrine, so too when they understand the doctrine in the scriptures they will be unattracted to rival [doctrines].⁽²⁰⁴⁾

§60. Objection: But why does this [doctrine] not also cause fear in the Noble Ones (*'phags pa = ārya*)? [Reply:] It is because they are free from attachment to the self. Whoever has attachment to the self will accept realist views (*dños po'i lta ba*)⁽²⁰⁵⁾ which are in accord with this [attachment], but not the view of selflessness, as it is in disaccord with this.

How could

a Noble One,

who [firmly] abides in the thought that in reality there is no self, rejoice in existence, [and] how could he be afraid in the face of inexistence? (k.292)

§61. He who [firmly] abides in the thought that no entities exist by their natures in that he does not imagine any essences of external and internal entities, what does he see as inexistent so that he becomes afraid that it is selfless? [And] how could he delight in seeing something as existent? Therefore, one says that he is free of the attachment and aversion to these two [i.e. existence and inexistence], for he is without

attachment to the view of existence and he is without aversion to the view of selflessness. So, one who does not engage in either of these two [i.e. attachment and aversion] and is without arguments will easily go to the city of nirvāṇa. Thus, as [a Noble One thinks that] nirvāṇa is a superior state, this selflessness will not cause him fear.

§62. The Outsiders, who are attached to realist views and consider nirvāṇa to be a [dangerous] precipice, take the world as being annihilated by nirvāṇa and provide people with realist views which cause infinite suffering; in so doing they are the seed for endless suffering for sentient beings. Therefore:

When he has seen that the Outsiders, who are seeds for misfortune, are many, who would not feel compassion for people who are attracted to the Dharma? (k.293)

§63. This world is diverted off the excellent path by the extremely thick tangle of thorns which are the Outsiders' impious views on illusory entities and non-entities. Once one has entered the tangle of thorns of [such] views, day by day [these views] kill by eliminating the virtuous vital faculty (*dge ba'i srog gi dbaṅ po* = *kuśalajīvitendriya*), which is conducive to liberation.⁽²⁰⁶⁾ Whoever in some way by human effort saves himself from this [condition] and then relies on the excellent path, this [person] — i.e. one who frees himself from resorting to problematic and superficial friendships —, should be pitied by friends, whose hearts melt on hearing the account of [his] previous misfortunes (*rgyud pa* = *vipatti*; *vyasana*). So equally, who of the lineage of bodhisattvas would not feel compassion for such kinds of people? Because of [the bodhisattvas'] compassion, [such people] will respect [the bodhisattvas], with the result that [these people], who will never again be robbed by the illusory words of the Outsiders, can be taught the path of no nature.

§64. Objection: Now, why is it that although sentient beings have virtuous intentions, they mostly follow the Outsiders' traditions rather than that of the Buddhists?⁽²⁰⁷⁾ [Reply:] Because the latter is more subtle. Indeed, [people] who have erroneous views after observing [just] gross [aspects] and after having focused chiefly on the Buddhists' temples, food, monk's robes and the like, do not fathom the depths of the profound meaning of the Tathāgata's speech, [depths] which should be understood by the wise and learned, but [rather] they are deceived by mere observation and hearsay, and [thus] come to respect the traditions of the [various] Outsiders.

G. Arguments against the Brahmins and Jains

§65. To show how the Buddhists' Dharma is subtle and its rivals are gross, [Āryadeva] states:

The doctrines of the three [traditions], i.e. of the Buddha, the Jains and the Brahmins, are [respectively] apprehended by the mind, the eyes and the ears.⁽²⁰⁸⁾ Therefore, the tradition of the Sage is more subtle. (k.294)

§66. The Brahmins take recitation as being essential; this [practice] of theirs is an object for the ears. As for the Jains — who lack any practice of hygiene and are hence clothed [only] by the ever-increasing filth of their foul-smelling bodies⁽²⁰⁹⁾, their bodies lacking [even] a bathing cloth — they support various sufferings such as cold, wind, the sun and the plucking out of their hairs. Their tradition can be understood by [mere] observation; as such, their doctrine is understandable [simply] by the eye-consciousness. [However, turning to] the Buddha, the fact that his mind-stream has been illuminated by the sun[light] of the view that all entities are without nature, that the thick and dense darkness of ignorance stemming from false views has been overcome, that conditioned [phenomena] are seen as being like a dream, like Indra's net⁽²¹⁰⁾, like an illusory young girl, a reflection, or a being created by magic, [and] that his mind-stream has become immaculate through eliminating all the passions' stains — [all these things] can only be ascertained as such through meditative equipoises. Therefore, the [Buddha's] virtuous thought must be understood by means of the mental-consciousness; in that sense the Sage's tradition is more subtle. So, although [people] might wish for merit, still because they do not understand with certainty, they do not apply themselves to the Dharma of the Buddhists.

1. Jains and Brahmins compared

§67. Here there is the following objection: If the world, due to coarse intelligence, applies itself in reliance on the Outsiders, then in this case you should comply [with them] too.⁽²¹¹⁾ [Reply:] The Outsiders' actions are not in compliance [with their doctrines]. So:

Just as the Brahmins' doctrine is said to be mostly outward show (phyi 'chos)⁽²¹²⁾, so too the Jains' doctrine is said to be mostly stupidity. (k.295)

§68. The Brahmins, through recitation of formulae, fire offerings (*sbyin sreg = homa*), auspiciousness (*bkra śis = maṅgala*), penitence and other such similar activities, seek profit, respect and such [worldly benefits] from others. Thus, they are held to be hypocrites. Their doctrine being "mostly outward show" means that it is primarily like this. This doctrine is opposed to those people who seek liberation. Because it accords with saṃsāra and because it is a cause for increasing depraved [practices] such as the obtention [of things] through vaunting oneself (*kha gsag = lapanā*), it [i.e. the Brahmins' doctrine] is not taught to Buddhists. Just as the Brahmins' doctrine, which is mostly outward show, is not to be practised by those who seek liberation in that it impedes liberation, so too the Jains' doctrine, which stupefies the mind, is also not to be practised, for it is largely stupidity. Therefore, [its] teaching is also not to be complied with.

§69. As the Brahmins' doctrine is mostly outward show, the world for the most part

respects the Brahmins for their acquisition of knowledge. Similarly it takes pity on the Jains for their acquisition of passions. (k.296)

§70. Just as the world, whose minds are coarse, respects the Brahmins for their acquisition of knowledge simply because [the latter] recite [the *Vedas*], so similarly it takes pity on the Jains for their acquisition of passions, that is to say, for mortifying their bodies in various ways such as plucking [the hairs off] their heads.

2. Refutation of asceticism and high birth as means to liberation

§71. The [Jains'] experience of the suffering of their thoroughly defiled bodies cannot be for the sake of the Dharma, as it is the effect of [past] evil actions. To explain this [Āryadeva] states:

Just as suffering is a retribution (mam smin = vipāka) of karma⁽²¹³⁾ and is therefore not the Dharma. (k.297ab)

Just as for those who practise nakedness, the experience of such a type of suffering is not for the sake of the Dharma any more than is an experience of the suffering of hell, so too the [superior] birth (k.297c)

of the Brahmins

is a retribution of karma and is therefore not the Dharma either. (k.297cd)

H. Résumé of the Buddhadharma

§72. [Objection:] If suffering and [superior] birth, being retributions of [past] karma, are not the Dharma any more than are the eyes [which are also just karmic retributions], then what is the Dharma? Reply:

In brief, the tathāgatas taught that the Dharma is non-violence. (k.298ab)

§73. Violence, being the harming of others, is the intention to harm sentient beings, as well as the physical and verbal actions arising due to that [intention]. Non-violence is the path of the ten virtuous actions [attained] by turning away from this. Whatever benefits others, even slightly, is all included in the category of non-violence. The tathāgatas taught that the Dharma, in brief, is simply non-violence.

Voidness is nirvāṇa. Here [in the Buddhadharma] these two [principles] are pure ('ba' zig = kevala).⁽²¹⁴⁾ (k.298cd)

§74. What we explained as the voidness of nature is precisely what the illustrious buddhas termed nirvāṇa. The complete pacification of the suffering which is of the nature of the five aggregates is nirvāṇa. When one sees that there is no production by nature, one understands that suffering does not arise by its nature [either]. Therefore, as error is eliminated and because it [i.e. suffering] cannot be once more imagined as existing in some other way, one thinks that suffering has definitively

ceased. And in this sense the Tathāgata said that it is the vision that entities are void of nature which is nirvāṇa, but he did not mean that it is nirvāṇa because [suffering] will not once again arise in the form of an entity's nature, for natures do not cease. Therefore, nirvāṇa is only the vision that there is no arising by nature.⁽²¹⁵⁾

§75. The two doctrines termed "non-violence" and "voidness" lead [respectively] to one's attainment of heaven (*mtho ris* = *svarga*) and emancipation (*byañ grol* = *apavarga*; *vimukti*). Thus,

"Here [in the Buddhadharma] these two [principles] are pure ('ba' *zig* = *kevala*)."

"*kevala*" means "pure" (*yoñs su dag pa* = *pariśuddha*). Those who wish to correctly bring about the happiness of heaven and emancipation for themselves and others should understand that it is only in the Tathāgata's teaching that one apprehends these two [principles] extremely purely, but not elsewhere.

I. Conclusions

§76. Query: Now, why is it that Outsiders, in spite of the fact that they are aware of the Sugata's teaching, have no respect for these two doctrines? [Reply:] It is because they are attached to their own positions. Thus:

When all worldly people hold their own positions dear just like their native places, then how will something which causes the defeat of this [position of yours] be pleasing to you?⁽²¹⁶⁾ (k.299)

§77. Attachment to one's own positions is something which we have trained in since beginningless saṃsāra. The worldly person is unable to relinquish this [attachment] just as [he cannot relinquish attachment] to his own native place. Thus, the infantile do not apply themselves to this Dharma of the Tathāgatha, because they grasp at their own views. As for the learned [however], even in the case of their own native place, when it is destined to ruin⁽²¹⁷⁾, they should abandon hope and then rely upon [another] country which is prosperous.⁽²¹⁸⁾ So similarly, [the learned] should abandon attachment to their own positions and commit themselves to what has excellent qualities, even be it the position of a rival. Thus, since in this way he is without sectarianism,

the intelligent person, who seeks excellence, accepts things which are correct, even from rivals. [After all], is not the sun common to all those on earth who have eyes? (k.300)

§78. The intelligent person should accept whatever he perceives to be well explained from whoever it may be by thinking that it is as if it were his own. This Dharma does not jealously exist for [just] some, for it is the same for everyone. For example, just as the sun's illuminating action is common to all who have eyes in that [the sun] is free of attachment or anger towards anyone, so too this Dharma, if it is

[indeed] perfect because of being [logically] proven, will benefit all our coreligionists and rivals [alike]. Therefore, having understood this, the respectful should then take this Dharma for their own.

§79. [Here ends] the commentary to the twelfth chapter, entitled "Training in the refutation of [heretical] views", from the Master Āryadeva's *Bodhisattvayogācāra-catuhśataka*.

DHARMAPĀLA'S COMMENTARY TO THE CATUḤŚATAKA

Chapt. V: Refutation of the sense organs and their objects (*gēn jìng* 根境 = *indriyārtha*)

(222a21) Now, as had been stated above [in §216b15 of the previous chapter], viz. "later we shall extensively refute the sense organs, their objects and so forth," I shall at this time explain [this refutation]. The sense organs are the bases for cognizing (*liǎo* 了別 = *vi-JÑĀ*; *pari-CHID*) objects. When one wishes to refute [these] sense organs, one should first of all refute their objects. Once one has refuted the objects, the sense organs will accordingly be eliminated too.

PART I: SENSE OBJECTS

A. Against Sāṃkhya. Refuting sense objects because one never sees the whole.

(222a23) [The Sāṃkhya philosopher] Kapila asserts [the following]: Things such as vases and cloths are established simply as [visual] forms (*sè* 色 = *rūpa*) and other such [properties]; the natures (*tǐ* 體 = *svabhāva*; *dravya*?), which are the objects of the sense organs, do really exist.⁽²¹⁹⁾ To refute this opinion [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

Amongst the parts of the vase, it is only the form which can be seen. Which [person] who knows the truth would say that the vase is visible in its entirety?
(k.301)

(222a28) Commentary. According to your own tradition, you yourself say that the eyes and the other sense organs each apprehend their own objects: they do not mix up [such objects]. The eye [for example] just sees [visual] form. [Now] a vase is composed of four objects (*chén* 塵 = *artha*; *viṣaya*) [viz. form, smell, taste and tactile sensations].⁽²²⁰⁾ How then can one see the vase's nature (*píng tǐ* 瓶體) in its entirety when one sees [only] its form? This indicates that the vase's nature is not seen by the eyes, for it is not merely a [visual] form, just as sounds and other [invisible] things [are not seen] either.

(222b1) [Objection:] But surely the vase's nature is also [visual] form! [Reply:] I do not say that the vase's nature is absolutely not form, but rather I say that the vase's nature is not established as being only form. Therefore, the reason for the [proposition] to be proved (*suǒ lì* 所立 = *sādhya*) does not have the fault of being unestablished (*bù chéng* 不成 = *asiddha*). Since you make errors concerning present states of affairs and still say that [you] understand the truth, why should we believe this [assertion of yours to the effect that vases are visual forms]?

B. All sense objects are to be similarly refuted

(222b4) Just as it is only the [visual] form which is seen by the eyes, and not the vase, so too for smells and the like [which are experienced by their respective sense organs]. Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

By means of the points explained earlier those people of supreme intelligence should refute everything, viz. smells, tastes, and tactile sensations. (k.302)

(222b8) Commentary. The nose, tongue and corporal sense organs all have their different objects, [so that] they too do not establish an object [such as] the vase's nature apprehended in its entirety. The vase is [therefore] not apprehended by these three organs: the individual inferences (*bǐ liáng* 比量 = *anumāna*) [in question] should be understood along the lines of what was explained previously [i.e. one should use, *mutatis mutandis*, the same argument which showed that the eyes do not see the whole vase]. As sound is not always [present in objects] it is not said to be of the same sort as these [visual] forms and so forth. But sound too must be analogous [in that when one perceives it one does not perceive the whole object].

(222b10) All these things, such as vases, cloths, carts and the like, are not objects apprehended by the physical sense organs (*sè gēn* 色根 = *rūpīndriya*). Nor must the mental consciousness (*yì shí* 意識 = *manovijñāna*) apprehend an external object; [*manovijñāna*] must follow upon the physical sense organs. Since vases and so forth are not objects of the physical sense organs, they can not be [objects] of the mind either. If this were not so, then blind and deaf people should also cognize external objects such as [visual] forms and the like [for they would perceive them solely by means of *manovijñāna*]. Thus vases and the like are not objects of the [physical or mental] organs, but are completely produced by the [dichotomizing] conceptualizations of one's own mind.

(222b15) [Objection:] Suppose one argues that because the natures of the vases, etc. are not different from the dharmas such as [visual] form and so forth, the sense organs such as the eyes, etc. also apprehend the vases, etc., just as they do their own objects [viz. form, etc.], and that therefore the sense organs also indirectly apprehend objects such as vases.

(222b17) [Reply:] If that were so then vases, etc. would have to be objects of all the physical sense organs. This would contradict [the fact] that the sense organs each apprehend their own object. Either one nature such as a vase would have to be many [different things], or you must accept that the sense organs do *not* apprehend vases and the like because it is only the natures such as [visual] form and so forth which are the objects of the senses. As the form, [smell, taste] etc. are each different, they are not the vase. How then could they be a real vase-nature when they combine together?

C. One cannot see the whole object by merely seeing its visual form

(222b20) It might be said that vases and the like are established as the combination of their various parts so that when you see one part it is said that you see the vase, just as when you see one part of a city it is said that you see the city [itself]. [Reply:] This is also incorrect, for a city is not real. The city's nature is established as a designation (*jià* 假 = *prajñapti*) on the combination of its various parts, [but] when you see one part it is not said that you see the whole. Vases and so forth, if they are like that [viz. combinations of their parts], are designations and [hence] not real. Why do you hold that they really can be seen?

(222b24) Now, if someone sees one part and then says that he can see [the whole], this is irrational. Thus [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

Suppose you said that you saw the vase by merely seeing the [visual] form. Then, as you did not perceive the smells and so forth, you ought to say that you did not see the vase. (k.303)

(222b28) Commentary. Suppose [you argue] that in a collection (*hé hé* 和合 = *saṃghāta*; *sāmagrī*) there are many parts and that the whole receives its name in virtue of one part. In other words, one vase has parts such as [visual] form and so forth, and because you see the form you say that you see the vase. [Reply:] As the other [parts] such as smell and so forth are not visible, then on account of the many parts [which you do not see], you should say that you do *not* see the vase.

1. Discussion as to whether the visual form itself is indeed perceptible

(222c2) Nor should it be said that the form-nature is special, for it is [simply] one part of the vase, just like smells and other such [constituents]. As [visual] form and the other [constituents] do not have any hierarchy in the vase, one ought to say that due to [the invisible constituents such as] the smell and so forth one cannot see [the vase]. The world's application of terms either conforms to [objects'] many parts or conforms to the principal [part], but there is nothing superior in [visual] form: smell and the other [constituents] are equal. Therefore one should say that vases and the like, in keeping with [their invisible constituents such as] smells, etc., cannot be seen. That being the case, external form cannot be real either, for it is [supposedly] visible and it is included as one constituent amongst invisible dharmas of [imperceptible things] such as vases, cloths, etc., just like the smells and so forth.

(222c7) [Objection:] But the world commonly knows that a vase's form can be seen! How can you prove that it cannot be seen? [Reply:] What the world knows is based on the transformations of their own minds and is metaphorically designated (*jiǎ shuō* 假說) as visible, but is not an external real form. Since we deny that there is really anything visible external to the mind, there is no contradiction [with what the world knows].

(222c10) [Objection:] Invisible dharmas do not exist at all (*wú suǒ yǒu* 無所有 = *nāsti kiṃcit*), so they could not be spoken about. Why? One says that [something] is invisible because it lacks anything visible. Absences of dharmas are all inexistent, so how could they be spoken about? It is because dharmas which are visible have natures (*tǐ* 體) that they can be spoken about to others.⁽²²¹⁾

(222c12) [Reply:] This is also not correct, [for] dharmas which are without natures are also causes for descriptions. If that were not so, then the word "invisible" would obviously have to be inexistent [given that you hold that invisible dharmas do not exist at all and that what is inexistent cannot be spoken about].

(222c14) Moreover, the fact of seeing [visual] form is absolutely inconsequential. Why say that form is considered to be visible and not that it is invisible? How so? It is not because one sees or does not see it that the form [itself] will be any different. So why should one say that form is visible because one sees it and not say that it is invisible because one does not see it?⁽²²²⁾ Just as one says that a vase is visible because the form of the vase is visible, so too one should say that the vase is invisible because the smell, etc. of the vase are invisible: the logic is the same. When the eyes see it one says that the form is visible. So when the eyes do not see it, one should also say that the form is invisible: the logic is the same.

(222c20) [Objection:] Since the vase and the [visual] form are [both] visible and invisible objects, then why at this point do you completely refute that they are visible and establish that they are invisible? [Reply:] [Thinking that] they are visible leads to grasping, [and so] I refute visibility, and therefore I state that they are not visible, [but] I do not *establish* that the vase and the form are invisible.⁽²²³⁾

2. The whole form cannot be seen

(222c22) Furthermore, [visual] form is also such that the whole nature cannot be seen. How can one say that one sees the vase on account of the form? Why? Thus [Āryadeva] states:

All forms, which are resistant (yǒu zhàng ài 有障礙 = sāvaraṇa),⁽²²⁴⁾ cannot themselves be seen in their entirety. Their parts and center are blocked by this [outer] part. (k.304)

(222c27) Commentary. Forms, which are resistant, cannot be seen in their entirety. Their parts and center are blocked by this [outer] part, just like all the forms of things such as walls and the like: although you see one part you do not see the others, and so, just like the vase, you have to say that [the form] cannot be seen. Amongst the various parts, this [outer] part [which you see] is not special. The other parts are many, [so that] in keeping with [its] many [invisible parts] you would have to say that this [form] cannot be seen.

D. Against Buddhist Vaibhāṣikas and other realists. Part-whole arguments used against various positions on the reality of atoms

(223a1) When the gross [visual] form is divided step by step, one does not arrive at [indivisible, subtle] atoms (*jī wēi* 極微 = *paramāṇu*), for there are always many parts. If one did arrive at atoms, they would not be objects of the physical sense organs, and therefore forms would all be invisible.⁽²²⁵⁾

(223a3) [Objection:] But surely when atoms' outer sides are laid out⁽²²⁶⁾ without obstruction and exist bordering on each other, the whole is visible? [Reply:] The universal character (*zōng xiāng* 總相 = *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of the collection of the atoms is a designation and is not substantial. The individual particular characters [of the atoms] are not objects of the physical senses. The sides of resistant atoms [also] have the one and the other [features]. How can one establish that the dharma, [visual] form, substantially exists [and that] the whole nature can be seen?

1. *Sādhyasama*

(223a6) [Objection:] Although the universal character of the atoms is a designation, and each particular state is substantial but not visible, nonetheless the atoms cooperate together in a collection which is indivisible. Their sides [also] have the one and the other [features]. So, this [collective] nature of the individual atoms does substantially exist and is wholly visible.⁽²²⁷⁾

(223a9) [Reply:] This is also incorrect. Thus, in the next verse [Āryadeva] states: *One should analyse as to whether atoms do or do not have parts. One cannot finally prove a state of affairs which is to be proved by invoking something which is not proven.* (k.305)

(223a12) Commentary. Atoms are also connected with other things and hence, just like gross things, they too must have parts and are designations. In the chapter on refuting permanent entities [i.e. Chapter I = CS IX] we have already explained that atoms have parts and are not substantial. Since atoms cannot be seen one by one, then why should they be visible when they cooperate together in a collection? If they do not lose their original characters when they cooperate together, then they can not cooperate [to form a visible whole]. If [however] they do lose their original characters, then they cannot be atoms. When they cooperate together, then if they are [still] minute, as they were originally, they should not be able to cooperate and thus should be invisible. If they transform into gross [objects], they cannot be atoms and must be designations rather than substantial [things].

(223a17) When one analyzes atoms, then, because they are resistant, they have parts, are not substantial and cannot be seen in their entirety. Therefore, you cannot prove that forms are substantial and visible. Just as in the case of form, which, by the

previously explained reasoning, had parts, was not substantial and was not an object of the physical sense organs, so it is analogous for all resistant dharmas: they are established through their parts and are not objects of the physical sense organs. To show this point [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

All resistant dharmas are established through [their] parts. (k.306ab)

(223a23) Commentary. All resistant dharmas can be intellectually divided; as they all have parts, they are dependently established. If the division is not completed, then just like gross things, the collections of the parts will always be designations and not substantial. If [however] the division is complete, then [the entities] revert to space: just like something absolutely inexistent, they are outside the realm of the physical senses.⁽²²⁸⁾

(223a25) The world commonly knows that visible things are all established on account of their parts — so they are entirely designations and not substantial. As for the minute parts, they are resistant and cannot be seen in their entirety. The atoms' cooperating is also incoherent: all resistant things can be divided, and when the incomplete [division] is completed, the [objects in question] which revert to space are [seen to be just] designations and therefore all without any real, substantial, dharmas of form [= matter]⁽²²⁹⁾ which could be seen, heard, smelled, tasted and so on.

2. Atoms and akṣara are analogous

(223a29) Now, because the dharmas of form which are referred to [by words] are not sense objects, so also the referring expressions are not either. Thus [in this vein], the following verse states:

Utterances of syllables (zì 字 = akṣara) are also like that. Thus, they are not apprehended by the sense organs. (k.306cd)

(223b3) Commentary. When you divide step by step all the utterances of words which you hear, you arrive at the individual syllable. And this is also just like [the atoms discussed] previously [in that] it still has minute parts. When you again divide these parts step by step until the atoms, these [atoms] will not be audible and will still have minute parts. You in turn divide [these] parts until they are all no more: [this] division proceeds without end, for as the [parts] have resistance, they always [in turn] have minute parts. They are [thus] designations and not substantial.

(223b6) The minute parts of words do not form a sequence of previous and subsequent states; their nature is not composite, they do not really refer (*quán biǎo* 詮表 = *pratīyāka*) nor are they really audible. In order that this logic [i.e. the parallel with the discussion concerning atoms] be clear, [Āryadeva] explained it separately again [in the verse]. If [however, it is argued that] the minute parts of words come into being simultaneously and do not exist as previous and subsequent states like the minute parts of form, then syllables such as *sa*, *ra*, (*saras* = "lake") [and] *ra*, *sa* (*rasa* = "taste")

could be heard simultaneously [without any difference in their order], [and thus] the meanings [of *sara* and *rasa*] would have to be without any differences.⁽²³⁰⁾ Thus [in conclusion] we have now refuted that the natures of the five [sense] objects such as [visual] form, etc. are substantially existent and are attainable by the physical senses.

E. Examination of the Abhidharma's notion of the domain of visual form (*rūpāyatana*): the relationship between shape and colour

1. Shape is not different from colour

(223b12) Now, it might be said that shape (*xíng sè* 形色 = *saṃsthāna*) is seen by the eyes. Here one should inquire: So is shape considered to be different from colour (*xiǎn sè* 顯色 = *varṇa*) or identical with colour? If it were different from colour, then the eyes would not see it, for it would be different from [colours such as] blue, etc., just like music and other such things [which the eyes do not see either.] If it were identical with colour, then it would be like colours [rather than shapes] and the eyes would not see it either. This has been extensively discussed previously [?] and now [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

If the shape were different⁽²³¹⁾ from the colour, then how would one apprehend the shape? (k.307ab)

(223b17) Commentary. If shape existed separately as something different from colour, then how would one apprehend the shape by means of [an apprehension of] colour [as does seem to occur]? Just as in the case of [sounds such as] music, etc., which are different from colours, so too when one's own sense organs apprehended [shape], this would not be by means of the colour. However, if [shape were different from colour and] one did apprehend shape by means of colour, then it would be like seeing fire in the distance and then [inferentially] understanding its universal character (*zǒng xiāng* 總相 = *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), heat.⁽²³²⁾ Thus, certainly [in such a case], shape would not be apprehended by the physical senses nor seen by the eyes.

(223b20) [Objection:] It might be argued that one does apprehend shapes without relying upon [colours such as] blue, etc. [Reply:] This should be refuted in the following way: when a cognition of a shape does not act upon the domain of colour⁽²³³⁾, it must be preceded (*wéi xiān* 爲先 = *pūrvaka*) by a cognition of an object of the physical senses, for it does apprehend the shape (*xíng xiāng* 形相 = *saṃsthāna*). Apprehensions of shapes must be preceded by cognitions of physical sense objects, just like a cognition of the shape of a circle which was traced by a whirling firebrand (*shī huǒ lún* 施火輪 = *alātacakra*) or like the cognition of a shape in the dark [and as such they are indirect, conceptual, understandings].⁽²³⁴⁾

(223b24) Some say the following: The natures of the two [sorts of] form, viz. shape and colour, are each different, for their cognitions are different, just like smells,

tastes and other such things [which are substantially different and have different cognitions]. In the perceptible world cognitions of [shapes] such as length, etc. and those of [colours] such as blue and so forth are different.⁽²³⁵⁾

(223b26) [Dharmapāla's reply:] If that were so, then for the world the [colours, shapes, smells, tastes which are] [matter] derived (*zào sè* 造色 = *bhautika*) from the elements (*dà* 大 = *mahābhūta*) and [the objects] such as gold and silver [which are composites of the elements]⁽²³⁶⁾ would necessarily have different natures, because their cognitions are different. Since the reason is inconclusive (*bù dìng* 不定 = *anai-kāntika*) how can your thesis be established?⁽²³⁷⁾ Or, again, how does one apprehend shape? If shape substantially existed it should [just] be seen by the eyes.⁽²³⁸⁾ How could one apprehend shape by means of the sense of touch [eg. in the dark]? When one does not see [colours] such as blue and so forth, but apprehends [a shape] by means of touch, then since shapes are cognizable by means of touch, they cannot be seen by the eyes, just like roughness.⁽²³⁹⁾

(223c2) [Objection:] If, through this reasoning, you asserted that you must necessarily cognize shapes [only] by means of touch, then you could not cognize shapes in reliance upon colours [at all]. If you asserted that by touch you must necessarily cognize shapes, then when you touched air, water, and other [such shapeless things] you should also cognize shapes.

(223c4) [Reply:] This difficulty is illogical. My point is merely to assert that shapes *are cognizable* by touch, and therefore that they are not [really] seen by the eyes. I do not say that shape-cognitions' dependence on touch is necessary.⁽²⁴⁰⁾

(223c5) [Opponent's rejoinder:] If [what you just said] were true, then colour is [in fact] also cognized by means of touch and [according to your reasoning] it could not be seen. For example, on account of the [sense of] touch one does know the colour, etc. of fire.⁽²⁴¹⁾

(223c6) [Reply:] This [i.e. the colour of fire which is known via the sense of touch] can only be cognized when it is mediated by various [shapes such as] length and so forth. Therefore, the reason [viz. "... is cognizable by the sense of touch"] for what is to be proved [viz. "...cannot be seen by the eyes"] does not have the fault of being inconclusive. Why is this so? If you know [colours such as] blue, etc. by means of touch, this [cognition] must necessarily be an inference (*bǐ zhī* 比知 = *anumāna*): [the colour] is not seen by the eyes. The universal characters (*gòng xiāng* 共相 = *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) [which one infers], viz. blue and so forth, must be mediated by various [shapes such as] length, etc., but are not [cognized] directly (*qīn* 親 = *sākṣāt*) by means of touch.

(223c10) You cannot criticize [our position] by saying that shape must also be analogous [to colour in that cognition of shape by means of vision must also be indirect], for shape has no necessity with regard to touch [viz. it is not only touch which apprehends shapes.] Colour does have necessity [with regard to vision, in that it is only visual perception which directly apprehends colour], and thus [the two] are not similar.⁽²⁴²⁾

2. Shape is not the same as colour

(223c11) In this manner we have now refuted that shape exists different from colour. It is also not identical with colour. Thus, the following verse states:

If [shape] were identical with colour, then why wouldn't the apprehension of colour be by means of the body? (k.307cd)

(223c14) Commentary. If shape were identical with colours such as blue and the like, then the colours, just like the shapes, would have to be apprehended by means of the body. In that case colours would have to be cognized by the body's sense of touch, for they are identical with shapes, just like shape [itself]. The body's sense of touch cognizes shapes, but does not cognize their colours, and therefore, we know that colour is not identical with its shape. This means that shape is not identical with colour, for they do not have the same cognitions, just as music [is not identical with colour].⁽²⁴³⁾

(223c17) If shape were neither identical with colour nor different from it, then its nature could not be real, just like that of a cart, etc. [which is neither identical with nor different from its parts].⁽²⁴⁴⁾ If shape's nature were substantial [i.e. real], then like blue colours, etc., it should be either identical with the colours or different from them.

3. Shape, colour and atoms

(223c19) Moreover, the various sorts of shapes do not have separate atoms, for each individual atom is without [shapes such as] length, etc.⁽²⁴⁵⁾ If, apart from colour atoms, there separately existed atoms of [shapes] such as length, etc., then their nature (*zì xìng* 自性 = *svabhāva*) would be hardly comprehensible. The size (*liàng* 量 = *parimāṇa*) of the atoms for colours and shapes would not differ, so how could there be a separately existing substantial shape different from colour? Nor can it be said that each individual atom has characters such as length and so forth: length, etc., just like gross objects, can be divided, so why say that they are atoms?

(223c24) Now, the size of atoms is not different — this is commonly accepted. But here you say that atoms do have characters such as length and so forth, and thus you contradict your own tradition. The [Abhidharmic] tradition which you study accepts that there is no difference in the size of atoms. So you also must accept that there is no shape apart from colour.

(223c26) Suppose it is said that although atoms are without length and other such [shapes], still the collection [of such atoms] establishes shapes such as length and so forth, and it will be atoms identical with the colours which will collectively establish length and the like. Then [we reply], why should one separately hold that there are atoms of shape?

(223c28) Also, shapes such as length, etc. are not like [colours] such as blue and so forth in that when one divides the atoms [of colour] into minute parts, their original character still remains. Therefore, length, etc. are not objects of the physical

senses, for they do not have any substantial nature, like flowers in the sky. If the atoms are not really long, etc. then how can their collection be long, etc.?(246) You hold that atoms in their nature are not massive (*cū dà* 龐大), so how could their collection be massive? So therefore, length and other such [shapes] are not substantially existent, but are established by the collection of [coloured atoms such as] blue and the like.

F. Critique of Vaiśeṣika positions

(224a5) Now, in the Vaiśeṣika tradition they establish that there really are limited universal natures (*tóng yì* 同異 = *sāmānyaviśeṣa*)(247) and other such [categories] distinct from colour (*sè* 色 = *rūpa*) and such [qualities].(248) These [limited universals], due to relying on colour and other such [visible qualities], are [themselves] objects of the physical senses. [Reply:] This is also incoherent: since it has been previously explained [by us in this chapter, §§222c2-223b6,] that form, etc. are not apprehended by the physical senses, these [limited universals] will not be objects of the physical senses either.

(224a7) This tradition [i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas] asserts that one can only see substances, etc. when they are connected with the quality, "large", and with the quality, "colour".(249) If these two qualities are lacking, [the substance] will be like atoms and the air in space: even though they exist, one does not see them. [Reply:] This is equally incoherent. "Large", just like length and such [shapes], reverts to inexistence when divided and colour cannot be seen. Furthermore, as we previously discussed [in chapter four §§217b21-217b23], how does one see substances and the like because of these [qualities]?

(224a11) Some of the [Vaiśeṣikas] say the following: Bases such as substances, etc. must be visible by depending on colour, just as in the case of hot water where [the substance], water, covers up the colour of fire — although the substance, fire, is present, it cannot be seen.

(224a13) Then in this [Vaiśeṣika] tradition there are those who refute this latter [Vaiśeṣika view] by saying that when blue dye-colour dyes a white cloth, you do not see the white colour, and [as a result] you should not see the cloth [which is absurd]. [They continue by arguing that] you cannot say that by seeing the dye-colour you see the [substance] which is the basis of the dye and that because there is a connexion between the substance which is the basis of the dye and the cloth, you therefore also can see the cloth. Why [shouldn't this be said]? Since the two substances, water and fire, are in contact together, then by seeing the colour of water, one would then see water, and for this reason one should also see the substance, fire.

1. Refuting the Vaiśeṣika views on colours and their causes: substances are not the cause for colour

(224a17) [Dharmapāla:] The two teachers of this [Vaiśeṣika] tradition are both wrong. First of all, if we suppose that first [teacher's views], we take the [second teacher's] refutation of his theses as refuting his position. Next, [Āryadeva] states the following verse [against the Vaiśeṣika's general position]:

If there were a cause for colour distinct from colour [itself], it could not be seen by the eyes. Since both dharmas' natures are different then why doesn't one see them separately? (k.308)

(224a22) Commentary. The substances which are the bases of colour are termed "the causes of colour". Thus, if the causes of colour were distinct from [colours such as] blue, etc., then, just like tastes and other such [invisible] things, they could not be seen by the eyes. If colour and the causes of colour had different natures and characters, then, just like [distinct qualities] such as blue and yellow, one should be able to see them separately [too]. Since substances cannot be seen separately, distinct from colours, then just as colours have no separate substanceness (*shí xìng* 實性 = *dravyatva*), so colour could not⁽²⁵⁰⁾ be separately seen from substances. Since [you say that] the two cognitions are separate, like seeing blue and yellow, then in this way the two cognitions cannot be physical sense consciousnesses, for they arise through [merely] designated connections, just like awarenesses of non-substances.⁽²⁵¹⁾

(224a28) Now some Vaiśeṣikas say the following: Colours really exist, but because collections of colours do not really exist, [these collections of] colours cannot be seen. If you were to hold that one [and the same] locus (*chù* 處 = *āśraya*; *adhikaraṇa*(?))⁽²⁵²⁾ had a collection of many [different] colours, then these faults [as described above] could occur [viz. the fault that one would not directly see coloured substances.] [But] we say that loci of same kinds (*tóng lèi* 同類 = *samānajāti*)^(252a) cannot be identical, and thus, in one locus there is only one colour: we do not have these faults.

(224b2) [Dharmapāla:] This is also incoherent. If colour really existed, then it could not be visible, for it would be without minute parts, just like space and other such [partless] things.

(224b3) [Vaiśeṣika:] This reason is inconclusive (*bù dìng* 不定 = *anai-kāntika*) due to the fact that colourness (*sè xìng* 色性 = *rūpatva*) and such [universals] do not have minute parts either, but can nonetheless be seen.

2. Refuting the Vaiśeṣika views on colours and their causes: colourness is not the cause for colour.

(224b4) [Dharmapāla:] How do you know that there separately exists a [universal,] colourness, distinct from the colours themselves? And how do you know that colourness can be seen? In order to refute these positions, [Āryadeva] said:

"If there were a cause for colour distinct from colour [itself]," etc., etc. [i.e. "it could not be seen by the eyes"].

(224b6) Here colourness is taken to be the "cause for colour" in that cognitions of colour and the words for colour [supposedly] arise in reliance on this [universal]. If this colourness were different from colours themselves and were one [indivisible, partless thing], then it would completely pervade all loci which are without [any colours such as] blue, etc, and one should also be able to see loci which do not have blue, etc. [given that colourness is visible.] Since [such loci] cannot be seen, colourness would have to be something which the eyes do not see at all [, which is absurd].

(224b9) A [Vaiśeṣika] may say: If you hold that the nature of colourness is all-pervasive, then this fault would perhaps occur. We say that colourness conforms to its own bases [i.e. loci] and is thus not the same in each [locus]: we do not have these faults [which you attribute to us].

(224b11) [Dharmapāla's reply:] This is incoherent too. If colourness and other such [universals] conformed to their own bases and their natures were not uniform [everywhere], then loci without blue and such [colours] would abruptly become blue, etc., and in the case of loci which did have blue and so forth, the blue, etc. would abruptly disappear.⁽²⁵³⁾ So in such a case, colourness as well as the colour [qualities] which are its bases would have loci which are not uniform and each [colourness conforming to a specific locus] would have to be established as different. But you do not accept that, so how are you without faults?

(224b14) Suppose it is said that colourness has mobility: it moves to other loci or it newly arises. [Reply:] In that case this [universal] nature is not one [and the same] thing, nor is it permanent. Since you maintain that [universals] are unique and permanent natures, they must be all-pervasive, and so again we return to the same fault as before: one would also have to be able to see loci which are without blue and such [colours]. Since [such loci] cannot be seen, the [universals] cannot be objects of the eyes.

(224b17) [Objection:] But surely something is [only] invisible insofar as there are no causes for cognition in it or in the other dharmas?

(224b18) [Dharmapāla's reply:] What do you term a "cause for cognition"? [Adversary's answer:] Particular shapes and sizes. [Dharmapāla:] In that case, colourness would be invisible, for the colours which are its basis are without shape or size.⁽²⁵⁴⁾

(224b20) This colourness can not be seen by the eyes because its nature is all-pervasive, just like soundness (*shēng xìng* 聲性 = *śabdatva*) and other such [universals]. If colours as well as colourness were different in nature and character, then you should be able to see them separately, like blue, yellow and so forth, but you cannot see these two kinds of things separately, [and know that] one is the colour and the other is the universal. Therefore, they are not different. Nor can you say that you see but do not understand the two characters' difference, viz. that one is the colour and the other is the universal. The difference in character between colours and the universal would have to be like [that between] blue and yellow, because in order for perception

to occur it must resemble what is seen.⁽²⁵⁵⁾ Since the perception [of colour and colourness] is the same, the perceived object(s) must be identical, and thus there is no separate colourness existing apart from colours.

(224b25) [In sum:] Since there is no colourness which can be seen as distinct from colours, then why should the reason in the inference [that colour qualities are invisible because they are without minute parts, like space] be inconclusive? As for the other [universals] such as soundness and the like, when you in due order investigate them one by one, [these] examples are like the previous refutation [of colourness].

3. *The Vaiśeṣika view that the eye and the body apprehend earth, water and fire*

(224b28) Now, in the Vaiśeṣika tradition the following is said: Earth, water and fire have [both] colour and touch-sensations (*chù 觸* = *sparśa*) and thus can all be apprehended by the eye and corporal sense organs, for the world commonly acknowledges that [these] three elements, viz. earth, etc., can be seen by the eyes and cognized by the body. Air is only apprehended by the body, for it is colourless.

(224c1) [Reply:] This is not correct either. We have already refuted the eyes' seeing [such things]; now it remains to refute cognition by the body [i.e. the sense of touch]. If we follow what the world commonly acknowledges, then the body only cognizes touch-qualities and no others. Why is this? Thus [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

The bodily feelings (jué 覺 = sparśana) of hardness, etc. are commonly termed "earth", etc. Therefore, it is just to [these] touch-sensations that one ascribes qualifications such as earth, etc. (k.309)

(224c6) Commentary. The world, when the body feels hardness, wetness, heat and motion, commonly designates [these touch-sensations as] earth, water, fire and air.⁽²⁵⁶⁾ Thus, it is just touch-sensations which are termed "earth", etc: apart from touch-sensations there are no four substances of earth, etc. which are separate bases. To explain this point: The four substances, earth, etc., are not distinct from touch-sensations, because they are felt by the body, just like touch-sensations such as hardness, etc. If you hold that earth, etc. are not included amongst touch-sensations, then it would follow that they are not felt by the body, just like tastes, [colours, sounds], etc. If [however] you apply names such as "earth", etc. to hardness and so forth, then this is not disputed (*zhēng 諍* = *vivāda*), for the natures are not different. If you maintain that earth, etc. are bases for touch-sensations but are not identical with hardness and such [touch-sensations], then you contradict the [above-described] inference [viz. the inference proving that earth, etc. are *not* distinct from touch-sensations, because they are felt by the body, just like hardness.]

(224c12) In the verse, the first half shows that the bodily feelings which are the particular characters (*zì xiāng 自相* = *svalakṣaṇa*) of earth and the other elements are

the same as what is included amongst the touch-sensations. The latter half shows that their universal characters (*gòng xiāng* 共相 = *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), viz. earth, etc., are not included amongst touch-sensations; the body does not feel [such universal characters]; [rather] they are only cognized by conceptual mental consciousness. The particular and universal characters of colourness, etc. [discussed] previously [in §224b3 et seq.] would respectively be analogous to [the sensation of hardness and the universal character, earth.]

4. Substances like earth, etc. are in fact imperceptible

(224c16) Now, the elements, such as earth and the others, do not become different in character when they are heated (*shāo* 燒), etc.⁽²⁵⁷⁾, and thus they are not objects of the senses. [Example:] When, for example, one heats a vase and other such [gross, perceptible objects], they *do* become different in character in their heated state, namely red in colour, etc.⁽²⁵⁸⁾ These different characters are included in the category of qualities (*dé* 德 = *guṇa*); apart from these [qualities], no different characters belonging to the category of substances ever arise. How then could one assert that apart from qualities, there is a separate category of substances, such as earth and so forth, which can be felt by the corporal organ? To show this point [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

When a perceptible [quality, such as the colour red] arises, one does not see that [apart from the new colour, etc.] the vase has some different quality [so that the state of the substance itself would be different]. A [separately existing] entity [such as a vase] would have to become [different during heating] just like perceptible [qualities]. So, [such a substance] must be completely without reality.⁽²⁵⁹⁾ (k.310)

(224c23) Commentary. When vases and the like are heated there arise qualitative characters such as red colours and so forth, and one perceives them as being other than before (*yì qián* 異前 = *anyathātva*). Except for those [qualities], in the category of substances there are no vase-entities which become different from [what they were in] the non-heated state. If things belonging to the category of substances, such as vases and so forth, were separately existing entities, they would have to have different characters which would arise [during heating], just like the category of qualities. In states such as that of contact between a heating [object] and something being heated, no different characters of [things belonging to] the category of substances arise, and thus, just like space, etc., they would not be really existent. Also [these supposed substances] are not objects apprehended by the physical senses, but are cognized by conceptualizing mental consciousness. They are accepted as conventional truths (*shì sú dī* 世俗諦 = *saṃvṛtisatya*), are designations, but are not real.

5. General refutation of the Outsiders and the other Buddhist vehicles

(224c29) Next, after having summarily refuted the characters of gross objects as they are accepted in various different ways by the Outsiders and the other [Buddhist] vehicles, we shall, in general, refute all the characters of the objects thoroughly imagined (*biàn jì suǒ zhí* 遍計所執 = *parikalpita*) by the Outsiders and the other [Buddhist] vehicles by saying that these objects' characters are, in brief, of two types: having resistance and not having resistance. Objects which have resistance are all divisible because of their having resistance, just like a house or like a forest. When divided they revert to space or there is the fault of an infinite regress⁽²⁶⁰⁾, and therefore one cannot hold that [resistant objects] are substantially existent. Objects which do not have resistance are not substantially existent either, for they are without any resistance, like flowers in the sky.

(225a5) Also, the objects which are accepted can be resumed as being of two types: those that are conditioned (*yǒu wéi* 有爲 = *saṃskṛta*) and those that are unconditioned (*wú wéi* 無爲 = *asaṃskṛta*). Conditioned dharmas⁽²⁶¹⁾, because they come into being from causes, are like illusions (*huàn shì* 幻事 = *māyā*) and are not substantially existent entities. Unconditioned dharmas⁽²⁶²⁾ are not substantially existent either, for they do not come into being [at all], like for example the hairs of a tortoise.

(225a8) What is more, each dharma of the objects which [the Outsiders] accept has many [different] natures according to the various accesses to the entity (*yì mén* 義門). If these [natures] substantially existed, they would be mutually contradictory.⁽²⁶³⁾ And when one again divides [dharmas] they either revert to space or there will be the fault of an infinite regress.

(225a10) Moreover, the colours which [the Outsiders] accept can not be real colours, for they are objects of cognition (*suǒ zhī* 所知 = *jñeya*), just like sound, etc., and so on and so forth until [we assert that] all the dharmas which they accept cannot be real dharmas, for they are objects of cognition, just like colours, etc. By these reasonings, then, everything which they accept, be it existent or inexistent, is unreal. The wise should correctly understand that existents, inexistents, and other such objects all depend on worldly convention, are metaphorically termed characters, but are not ultimate.

PART II: SENSE ORGANS

A. Refuting other Buddhist schools' positions on the reality of the sense organs

1. All sense organs are alike in being derivatives from the elements. Why then do only the eyes see?

(225a15) Next, having refuted the objects of the [sense organs], we now refute the sense organs [themselves], and to do this we first of all refute the other [Buddhist] vehicles [i.e. the Śrāvakayāna]. Thus, [Āryadeva] states the following verse:

The eye and the other [sense organs] are all derived from the elements (dà zào 大造 = bhautika). Why then does the eye see, but the other [sense organs] do not? (k.311ab)

(225a18) Commentary. The five sense organs, such as the eyes and so on, all have subtle matter (jīng sè 淨色 = rūpaprasāda) derived from the four elements (dà zhǒng 大種 = mahābhūta) as their nature.⁽²⁶⁴⁾ Thus, the sūtra says that the subtle matter derived from the four elements is termed the eyes and other such sense organs.⁽²⁶⁵⁾ These [however] are conventional statements, but not ultimate assertions. If one holds them to be true, then their meaning will not be established. Why? The [sense organs] are the same derived matter, so why does the function of vision only belong to the eyes and not to the others? One does not observe that two dharmas in the world can be identical in character, but that the functions to which they give rise are dissimilar.

(225a22) [Opponent's objection:] But surely the characters of the sense organs are different, that is to say they each act as the basis of their respective consciousnesses.

(225a23) [Dharmapāla's reply:] Their effects [viz. the consciousnesses] being different does not constitute a difference in their characters. As the characters are not different, then how could the effects differ [because of them]?

2. The view that the sense organs' characters are the same but their functions differ

(225a24) [Opponent:] The effects of the [sense organs] differ because the [sense organs'] functions (yòng 用) differ. In the perceptible world functions may differ while the character is the same, as in the case of [certain] medicinal plants whose harmful and beneficial functions may differ but whose characters of hardness and so forth are the same.

(225a26) [Dharmapāla:] If the characters were the same the functions could not possibly differ. Now, [according to you] the sense organs would have to be identical with the elements, but the difference in functions to produce consciousnesses would be termed the eye and other such senses. [Your example is:] just as things whose [characters] such as hardness, etc. are identical but whose functions differ get different sorts

of names for medicinal plants. This cannot be correct, for the [plants'] characters and functions would be identical, but it would [just] be the names which differ. As vision and other such functions are [indeed] different, then it is apparent that the characters of the eyes and other [senses] are different: differing functions do not depend on non-differing characters.

3. *Could the eyes and other organs have different characters because they exist separately from the elements?*

(225b1) [Opponent:] Since the functions are not the same, then [I acknowledge that] the characters must be different. Therefore, [the eyes, etc.] are established as separate entities existing distinct from the elements.

(225b2) [Dharmapāla:] If that were so, then since the functions of the medicinal plants are not the same, [the plants] should also have separately existing natures distinct from the elements.

(225b3) [Opponent:] If we accept that they do have separate natures, what is the contradiction in [such] entities?

(225b4) [Dharmapāla:] If, like vision and other such [mental entities], the [sense organs] were completely distinct from the elements, then [these] entities could be non-contradictory. But they are not completely distinct [from the elements], so how could they be non-contradictory?

(225b5) If you argue that although the natures (*xìng lèi* 性類) of the eyes and so forth are identical, their characters (*xiāng* 相) differ, then this would contradict your own [Abhidharmic] tradition. In your tradition the nature [of an entity] equals the characters of [its] dharmas: since the natures are identical how could the characters be different?⁽²⁶⁶⁾ One thing cannot be both the same and not the same. Two different characters are not both substantially existent,⁽²⁶⁷⁾ just as one form does not have the two different characters blueness and yellowness. If one dharma-nature could be divided into two characters, then here each [character] should once again be divisible, and like this step by step you would divide until you arrived at [just] space, or you would continue infinitely: there still is nothing substantially existent.

(225b10) Now, why should the sense organs, such as the eyes and the others, actually be different? [Opponent:] It is because the causes for vision, [hearing], etc. differ.

(225b11) [Dharmapāla:] How is it that vision and so forth are not the same in using the elements? Why should [vision, etc.] be different on account of their causes? If, because of the differences among the elements, the vision and so forth produced [from such elements] were to be different, then the eye consciousness and the other [such sense consciousnesses] should arise [simply] in dependence upon these different elements. What use are the eyes and other such [organs]?⁽²⁶⁸⁾

4. The view that it is the combination of karma and the elements which produces the different effects, such as vision, hearing, etc.

(225b14) [Opponent:] It is not just the elements which cause vision and so forth. How can you say that because they [i.e. the elements] are not different, vision, etc. would not be different [either]? [Dharmapāla:] What other causes are there? [Opponent:] Good and bad acts (yè 業 = *karman*). These karmas, due to various conditions such as desiring pleasant sights and so forth, come into being as mutually different, and because of these [distinct] karmas, vision and so forth are different.

5. Does one karma cause different effects?

(225b17) [Dharmapāla:] If many different accomplishing karmas (*mǎn yè* 滿業 = *paripūrakakarman*)⁽²⁶⁹⁾ [each] individually projected (*gǎn* 感 = *ā-KṢIP*) vision and the other [sense perceptions], then this point could be so.⁽²⁷⁰⁾ If [however] it is just one karma that completely projects one [whole] birth, then how could there be any differences [between the sense perceptions]?

(225b19) Now, the karmas for birth in the realm of form (*sè jiè* 色界 = *rūpadhātu*) are not different,⁽²⁷¹⁾ and [thus] the sense organs in this realm, which are elicited by just one karma, such as disgust [at *samsāra*] and so forth, could not be different. If you say that one karma has many different powers (*gōng néng* 功能 = *śakti*; *sāmarthyā*) and that therefore the sense organs of the birth which is projected do differ, then [we reply that] the karma and the power are both functions, so how can one function also have many different functions?

(225b22)[Opponent:] We do not say that one function also has many different functions, but rather say that the one entity (*tǐ* 體) has many different powers. Thus the powers produce many different effects; just as in the case of the eye which has its own proper activity (*tóng fēn* 同分 = *sabhāga*)⁽²⁷²⁾, the entity is one but it gives rise to consciousnesses as well as giving rise to things of its own kind [i.e. the subsequent moments of the eye organ].

(225b24) [Dharmapāla:] Metaphorically speaking, this could be so. But really, how is it possible? For, it is incoherent (*lǐ xiāng wéi* 理相違 = *ayukta*) when one [thing] is many. Should you maintain that one karma has many powers and projects the many different sense organs, then why not maintain that the karma just projects one sense organ which [in turn] gives rise to many different consciousnesses? Such [consequences] are irrepressible; so logically what value is there [in this view]?

(225b27) Also, when one sense domain (*gēn chù* 根處 = *indriyāyatana*)⁽²⁷³⁾ is impaired or aided, the other senses should also be equally impaired or aided [due to the force of the same karma].⁽²⁷⁴⁾ And if one sense organ [is inferior], the [whole] body would have to be inferior. We do not force upon you that there is just one [identical] sense organ(?),⁽²⁷⁵⁾ but rather we seek to refute your [position that] one karma has many different functions.

(225c1) Now, the sense organs are not impaired or aided at the same time due to the force of karma, just as in hell sentient beings' sense organs are not destroyed even though fierce fires may burn their bodies. Also, on account of [certain] sense domains the body's features may be well-formed, just as in the case of a youthful blind person whose physical form is not inferior.

(225c3) If one karma produced many effects, then when you prove that there are different sense organs because they produce different consciousnesses, such an inference could not be established. When one exists, the other does too [and] when one does not exist, the other does not either. But [according to you] we can establish different powers without having to prove that there are different characters [so why would the sense organs have to be different in order to have differing functions to produce their respective consciousnesses]?⁽²⁷⁶⁾

6. *Could the powers of karma alone produce the different effects?*

(225c6) [A hypothetical debate:] Now why don't the different powers of this karma alone (*jī* 即 = *eva*) produce the different consciousnesses? At the time the consciousnesses arise the karma has already ceased, and therefore it does not have the function to produce.⁽²⁷⁷⁾ Then in that case the eyes and other [sense organs] could not arise because of these karmic functions. If the tendencies (*xí qì* 習氣 = *vāsanā*) produced by the karma still exist they will produce the eyes and so forth.⁽²⁷⁸⁾ Why then should not the [sense] consciousnesses arise because of those karmically produced tendencies?

(225c10) [Dharmapāla's reply:] This could not be so. [There would be the absurdity that] when one is born in the formless realm (*wú sè jiè* 無色界 = *ārūpya-dhātu*), the five [sense] consciousnesses, such as the eye [consciousness] and so forth, would also have to operate, for they are consciousnesses which depend on karmic tendencies. When it is established that there are physical sense organs, then there is no fault of this sort, but when one is born in the formless realms the elements are nonexistent, and so the matter which is derived [from the elements, viz. the sense organs] is also nonexistent. How is it that one takes birth in this [realm] without elements?

(225c13) [Opponent:] It is because one is without any craving for form that one therefore destroys the seeds (*zhōng* 種 = *bīja*) for [sense] consciousnesses, and thus the eye and other such [sense's] consciousnesses do not arise here. [Dharmapāla:] [But] this cannot be correct. It is not so that just because one is free of desire towards objects, the seeds of the consciousnesses which apprehend [these objects] will also be destroyed. When someone has become desireless with regard to the realm of desire (*yù jiè* 欲界 = *kāmadhātu*), or when he has become desireless with regard to all three realms, his consciousness which apprehends [objects] does not completely fail to arise!

(225c17) Suppose it is said that the bases [i.e. the sense organs], by being produced by karma of their own realm, produce the consciousnesses.⁽²⁷⁹⁾ [Dharmapāla's reply:] Then, when the body is born in the form realm there could be no apprehension

of objects in the desire realm. And if that were so, then one would have to say that when one is born in the formless realm, then because there are no objects [at all in this realm], consciousnesses of them do not arise [either].⁽²⁸⁰⁾ Why should they not arise as apprehending objects of lower realms?

(225c20) If it is asserted that they do not apprehend [these objects] because they are free of craving for them, then this has already been replied to before [and was shown in §§225c13-225c17 to be absurd]. What was replied before? It was said [in §225c17] that when born in higher realms one would not apprehend the objects of lower realms [with the consequence that consciousness would not arise in the formless realm.]

(225c22) [Dharmapāla's own position:] If karmic seeds alone produce the five [sense] consciousnesses, then the consciousnesses do not have to be respectively impaired or aided because of impaired or aided [conditions of] sense domains. Why? The karmic tendencies do not take the [sense organs] as bases, since the [sense organs themselves] are *developments* (*biàn yì* 變異 = *pariṇāma*)⁽²⁸¹⁾ [of karmic tendencies]. The consciousnesses conform to [these] developments, for [the latter] manifest their consciousnesses as impaired or aided. On account of karmic tendencies, [consciousness] is then also impaired or aided. How can all this be? The [causal] condition (*yuán* 緣 = *pratyaya*) for the world's manifest existents is only one's erroneous conceptual cognition of mental objects; it makes other dharmas established as impaired or-aided things, just as in dreams when one erroneously views⁽²⁸²⁾ the mind.⁽²⁸³⁾

(225c27) [Opponent:] If you do not know that the sense domain has been impaired or aided, then the impairment or aid to the consciousness which depends [on the sense organ] cannot exist. [Reply:] Here there must be a subtle experience. These sorts of debates are endless, so as I fear that one will tire of my loquacity, I must stop for now.

7. Conclusion: Karma is responsible for the sense organs, but is unanalysable and inconceivable

(225c29) The nature and character of dharmas (*zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* 諸法性相) is subtle and extremely profound and the host of [people with] superficial minds understand it [only] with extreme difficulty. Now, first of all, one has to say, in accordance with [worldly] conventions, that there are sense organs. Ultimately, [however,] if one investigates thoroughly, one will not adopt [such] entities as real. Thus, [Aryadeva] states in the following verse:

Consequently, the Sage rightly said that the effects of karma are difficult to imagine.
(k.311cd)

(226a4) Commentary. The meaning of this verse is as follows: The retributive causes and effects of karma, such as in the case of the eyes and the other [sense

organs], is inconceivable. Only the Tathāgata understands it profoundly; it is not an object of the intellectual powers of the other superficial minds. In keeping with the world, one must to that degree (*qiě 且* = *tāvat*) say that [karmic cause and effect] does exist, but [this] provisional analysis does not understand its true nature. The true thusness (*shí xìng 實性* = *bhūtatathatā*) of dharmas is known by an inner realization and is not an object understandable by the world's ratiocination and investigation (*xún sī 尋思* = *vitarkavicāra*).⁽²⁸⁴⁾

(226a7) Should one hold [karmic retributions such as the sense organs] to be substantially existent, this [position] must be incorrect. Why? Because it contradicts the following inference: the eyes do not [in fact] see, just as the ears and other [organs do not see]; the ears do not hear either, just as the eye organ, etc.; the nose does not smell, just as the tongue and other such sense organs [do not smell]; the tongue does not taste, just as the nose and other such organs; the body does not feel, just as the above sense organs [do not feel either]. [Reason:] For all of these [sense organs] are derived from the elements, or they are the elements, or they are the effects of karma.

(226a12) Moreover, the eyes and the other [sense organs] all have resistance and can thus be divided, so that they either completely revert to space or there occurs the fault of an infinite regress. In conclusion, one should not hold them to be substantially existent, but rather, they are one's own mind's false (*xū jiǎ 虛假*) conjurings (*biàn xiàn 變現*)⁽²⁸⁵⁾ due to the influence of causes and conditions, just like illusions and such things. They are conventionally existent but ultimately inexistent.

B. Refutation of the Sāṃkhyas' view that form, etc. are apprehended by the sense organs and the inner mind

(226a16) Now, the Sāṃkhya Outsiders say the following: Objects such as [visual] form and so forth are all apprehended by two organs, i.e. the eyes, etc. see [these objects] and the inner mind (*nèi zhì 內智*) understands them.⁽²⁸⁶⁾ This should be examined at this time. Do sight⁽²⁸⁷⁾ and the mind act simultaneously with regard to the object or do they act sequentially?⁽²⁸⁸⁾ Supposing that one accepts [that they act] sequentially, then which comes after and which comes before? Sequential or simultaneous, both are incoherent. Why? Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

Because the condition for the mind would not yet exist, the mind would not exist before sight. But if it existed after [sight], then the mind would be pointless (táng juān 唐捐 = vyartha). If they were simultaneous, then sight would be useless.
(k.312)

(226a22) Commentary. Sight is the condition of the mind; the mind arises on account of sight. If sight did not yet exist, then the mind could not come into being, just as a congenitally blind person does not have a mind which understands form. Therefore, the mind definitely does not arise before sight.

(226a24) If it existed after the sight, then the mind would be pointless: sight has already cognized the form, so what further use would there be for the mind? In your [Sāṃkhya] tradition, the production of dharmas must be for the needs of the self, for they do not arise automatically, simply on account of causes.⁽²⁸⁹⁾ If one who had already cognized something needed to again give rise to the mind [which cognizes the same thing], there would have to be an infinite number of cognitions of cognitions with regard to one [and the same] object.

(226a26) If the two [viz. the mind and sight] were simultaneous, then sight would be useless. When two dharmas coexist they are not established as causes or effects [of one another], just as two horns of an ox [are not causally related], or like *rajas*, *sattva* and so forth. [So] you could not hold [the Sāṃkhya position] that sight is the cause of the mind.

(226a28) If the mind cognized an object without sight occurring, then the blind or deaf and other such people [with defective sense organs] should also clearly cognize the object. Also, there would not be any blind or deaf people, for all would clearly cognize form and other such [sense-data, in spite of their defective senses.] Nor would the five sense organs of sentient beings exist, for the mind and touch [alone] would cognize objects such as form and so forth.

C. Refuting prāpyakāritvavāda — contact between the object and the sense organ

(226b3) Now, some argue that cognition only occurs when there is contact between the eye or the ear and their objects.⁽²⁹⁰⁾ This is [also] mistaken. Thus, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

It would take a long time for the eye to see a form far away, if it were to go out to [its] object. And why wouldn't it clearly illuminate forms whether they were very far or near? (k.313)

(226b7) Commentary. "Eye" means the eye's light-rays (*yǎn guāng* 眼光). Because they constitute the functioning of the eye and are not distinct from the eye, they are also termed "the eye".⁽²⁹¹⁾ If these light-rays of the eye went out to the place of the form, then why wouldn't it take a long time to see a far away form? How is it that the [distant] moon and nearby forms are all seen at the same speed by glancing at them? One does not observe that in the world something mobile can in the same time go to two [different] places, far away as well as nearby. For this reason, the following inferences must be established: Sight which illuminates a far away form does not go out to the far away form, because the time taken is no different from that of sight which illuminates a nearby form. [Example:] Just like the sight of a nearby form. Sight which illuminates a nearby form does not go out to the nearby form, because the time taken is no different from that of sight which illuminates a far away form. [Example:] Just like the sight of a far away form.⁽²⁹²⁾

(226b13) Furthermore, if sight only occurred when the light-rays of the eyes went out to the form, then one would clearly see forms whether very far away or nearby,⁽²⁹³⁾ and there would be no difference from seeing equidistant things. Since there is [such] a difference, [the eye] does not go out to its object.⁽²⁹⁴⁾ The nose and the other sense organs [which are said to function by contact⁽²⁹⁵⁾], do not have such differences of clarity vs. distance with regard to smells, tastes and touch sensations. Thus it is inferred that the eye does not go out to its object, for it functions differently with regard to nearby and far away objects, just like a magnet.⁽²⁹⁶⁾

(226b17) Now, when the eye goes out to the form, does it first see it or does it not see it? Both [hypotheses] are absurd, and thus [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

If [the eye] only went out [to the form] after having seen it, then there would be no advantage in going. If it went without seeing [the form], then it would not be so that one would definitely [see] what one wished to see. (k.314)

(226b21) Commentary. The fundamental [position in the discussion] is that in order to see a form, there is movement to the object. When this form has already been seen, what would going again accomplish?

"[The eye] only went out [to the form] after having seen it".

Also, there would be a contradiction with the earlier position that it is only when there is contact with the eye's and ear's objects that there can be cognition, [for the eye would first cognize its object without contacting it and *then* would go out and come into contact with its object.]

(226b23) Nor could it be said that [the eye] goes without seeing [its object]. How could it move [anywhere] vaguely and without any indications? Like a blind man, it could never reach its desired destination. There would also be the following consequence: If [the eye] went without seeing, it would either not stop, or it would meet a form in the middle [of its journey] and then stop. If the [sense] basis (*qī xīn* 期心 = *āśaya*) moved, it would either attain its goal or its force would be used up and it would then stop along the route.⁽²⁹⁷⁾ Since these two types of cases are not established and there is no third, [the eye] therefore does not come into contact with its object.

D. Refuting aprāpyakāritvavāda — no contact between the object and the sense organ

(226b28) Now, it might be asserted that the eye organ sees without coming into contact [with its object]. This is also absurd. Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:
If the eye apprehended [its object] without going out [to it], then it would see all forms. Since the eye is without any movement, there is nothing which is far away or hidden. (k.315)

(226c3) Commentary. If there were no contact, then things (*nī* 體) would be without characters and without differences, with the result that one would see everything or one would see nothing at all. Why? [Response:] The perceptions would

not differ, and in keeping with the [undifferentiated] perceptions, there could not be any differences amongst the dharmas.

(226c5) [Objection:] But surely one would not see forms when they were far away or hidden?

(226c5) [Reply:] Since the eye does not go [anywhere], how could being far away or being hidden prevent one from seeing? If the eye sees without coming into contact with the form, there would be no differences such as far away, near, hidden or unhidden, for the factor⁽²⁹⁸⁾ of not coming into contact [with the object] would be no different. So seeing and not seeing could not be established.⁽²⁹⁹⁾

(226c8) Moreover, the term "very far away"⁽³⁰⁰⁾ would lack any real meaning. How could there be any impediment which would prevent sight from occurring? Two dharmas which are set apart (*zhōng jiàn* 中間 = *antara; sāntara*?⁽³⁰¹⁾) would not be termed "far away", for this would pose no impediment to the functioning of sight. If [however] it were held that set apart dharmas were termed "far away" and impeded the functioning of sight, then being far away and being hidden would have to be the same [for in neither case would the eye be prevented from seeing].

(226c11) If one asserts that the eye does go out to the form there will also be this fault, viz. the term "very far away" will lack any real meaning and so on and so forth. When one holds that the eye is permanent and goes out to the form, there will really be this fault. Why? [Because] if one held that the eye was *impermanent* and went out to the form, then one could say that the force [of the eye's motion] was used up and [hence] that it did not reach the far away place. [But] if one holds that the eye functions *permanently*, without any degeneration [in its force], and goes out to the form, then the fault will be the same as before [i.e. there would be no reason for anything to be far away]. Going and not going are both faulty, and therefore when the eye sees form it neither goes nor does it not go.

(226c15) [Objection:] But surely the light-rays do aid the eye to see. Because the light-rays are blocked one does not see.⁽³⁰²⁾

(226c16) [Reply:] During the night one gazes far away at the forms of various lights⁽³⁰³⁾, but since they are separated [from us] by the obstacle of darkness, one ought not to see them.

(226c17) [Objection:] Suppose one says that the eye organ, although it does not go out to the form, is nonetheless just the same as a magnet in that it functions differently according to what is near or far.⁽³⁰⁴⁾ [Reply:] This is also not correct, for [the example has faults] such as being doubtful. [Opponent's rejoinder:] The world commonly observes [this], so why is it doubtful?

(226c19) [Dharmapāla's reply:] This is incorrect too on account of the difference between the ultimate (*zhēn* 眞 = *paramārtha*) and the conventional (*sú* 俗 = *vyavahāra; saṃvṛti*). What the world observes is conventional, but you hold it to be ultimate. Nor does the world know that one sees without coming into contact [with the object]: how can you say that it is just the same as a magnet?

(226c22) In the previous verses, although one does correctly refute the eye [organ], one equally refutes the ear [organ], for it is similar.⁽³⁰⁵⁾ To elaborate: If the ear organ were to cognize its object by coming into contact with it, then it should not hear things which are far away and near both at the same time. Sounds come [to our ears] from substances: since [the latter] have farness or nearness, [sounds] should not all equally reach the ear organ in one moment. The ear does not have any light-rays and so could not go out to its object, but if it did go out to its object, the faults would be the same as those for the eye organ. Moreover, if sound came without any substances [causing it], entered the ear and was heard, this would also be absurd in that the sounds of things such as bells and drums are clearly not without [such] substances, and [these things] can be heard as far away. If there were no [relation of] hearing between the ear and the sounds, but still apprehension occurred,⁽³⁰⁶⁾ then like odours and other [directionless] things, so too one would not distinguish the direction⁽³⁰⁷⁾ [of the sounds]. If the ear apprehended without coming into contact with sound, it would hear everything as neither far away nor near, for if there were no contact, the objects would be without characters [such as nearness and farness] and without differences. [Either that,] or it would not hear anything at all. Consequently, whether [one says that] the ear organ really apprehends its object by coming into contact or by not coming into contact with sound, both [positions] are unestablished.

E. Refutation of the Sāṃkhyas' position that the eye and its object are fundamentally identical

(227a3) Now, if one holds that the eye organ does see form, then it should see its nature. Why? Thus, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

The svabhāva, characters and functions of dharmas would, of necessity, be constantly the same. Why then would this eye organ not see the eye's [Primordial] Nature?⁽³⁰⁸⁾ (k.316)

(227a7) Commentary. Dharmas' *svabhāva* (tǐ 體), characters and functions would constantly have to be the same, for they would have a mutually undifferentiated Primordial Nature (xìng 性 = *prakṛti*). If the eye saw, then it would always have sight as its *svabhāva*, just like the conscious principle, the Spirit (wǒ 我 = *ātman*; *puruṣa*).⁽³⁰⁹⁾ In that case, even in the situation where it was not confronting an object, the eye organ would always have to see, just as [it sees] when it does confront an object. In such a situation, if [the eye still] had its function of sight even in the absence of form, then it would have to be the *svabhāva* of the eye which is being seen by the [eye]. If [however] the eye did *not* see in the absence of form, then in a situation where there was form, it would not see either.

(227a11) Furthermore, if the eye organ had sight as its *svabhāva*, it would have to see itself, just as [it sees] its light-rays. This would contradict your own thesis that the sense organ is not the object of the [same] sense organ.⁽³¹⁰⁾ If [however] it did not

see itself, it would not see other things, just as absolutely nothing is seen by a person who is born blind.

(227a14) Now, your [Sāṃkhya] tradition asserts that the characters and functions of dharmas such as the eye, etc. and form, etc. are established by *sattva* and the other [*guṇas*];⁽³¹¹⁾ while the characters and functions may differ, their *svabhāva* (體)⁽³¹²⁾ remains undifferentiated. [Reply:] Then when the eye sees the *svabhāva*, form, it is just seeing itself, and this too contradicts your own thesis that the sense organ is not the object of the sense organ. Now, with regard to the eye's seeing form, if you say that this is true and that it does see, then the *svabhāva* of the form and that of the eye organ [must] really be identical: just as [the eye] sees form it would have to see the eye organ. Since it does not see the organ [however], it could not see the form. Nor can the *svabhāva* of the eye and that of the form be truly different: don't contradict your own thesis that their Primordial Nature (*xìng* 性 = *prakṛti*) consisting in [the three *guṇas* such as] *sattva* and so forth is the same!⁽³¹³⁾ You cannot reply that you do not say that [the eyes] truly see: don't contradict your own thesis that they are included among perceptual *pramāṇas*!⁽³¹⁴⁾

(227a20) If you say that [the eye] seeing itself is in contradiction with worldly states of affairs, this will not be correct either, for the *svabhāva* (體) is undifferentiated.⁽³¹⁵⁾ If you say that the function of sight is just *sattva* and the other [*guṇas*], then [objects such as] blue, etc. are also similar [in being just simply the *guṇas*], and [hence, as there is nothing which sees itself] they could not be seen. If you say that the *svabhāva* of the sense organs and of their objects differs, then this would contradict your own thesis that both are the Primordial Nature consisting of *sattva*, etc.

(227a23) It is not possible that the one Primordial Nature has many different *svabhāva*; the transformations [of *prakṛti*] are also like that [viz. they could not be many different *svabhāva*], in that they are not distinct from the Primordial Nature. If it is asserted that their *svabhāva* are both different and the same, who would say such a thing apart from clever talkers like you! This sort of thesis to the effect that the sense organs and their objects are the same *svabhāva* but that [the sense organ] perceives the object and does not [perceive] the sense organ [itself] is extremely difficult to believe in. Just as we refuted that the eye could see, the ear and the other [sense organs] would be similar, for [on the Sāṃkhya view] the sense organs and their objects are all of the same Primordial Nature consisting of *sattva*, etc. One [and the same] object would become all the sense spheres and one sense sphere would become all objects. In that case, the [respective] states of being sense organs and objects would not be possible; thus [the Sāṃkhya] cannot assert that the sense organs [as he conceives them] truly exist.

F. Refutation of the Aulūkyas (Vaiśeṣikas)

(227a29) Now, the followers of Ulūka (*xiū liú* 鳩鷗)⁽³¹⁶⁾ say: In our tradition the natures of the sense organs and those of their objects are different. We are not the

same [as the Sāṃkhyas] in having this fault. Why? [Because] the five sense organs, i.e. the eyes and so forth, respectively consist in the substances, fire, space, earth, water and air.⁽³¹⁷⁾ The eye sees three substances, i.e. fire, earth and water, and also sees colours. The body feels four substances, i.e. all except space, and also feels touch-sensations. The ear only hears sound, the nose only smells odours and the tongue only tastes flavors. Thus our Master's tradition is not the same [as the Sāṃkhyas'] in having this fault.

(227b4) [Reply:] In that case the sense organs and their objects are different and the same. Being different is indeed possible, but being the same is like the [Sāṃkhyas'] fault. The eyes and the other [organs] and fire and the other [elements] do not have the same characters.⁽³¹⁸⁾ Why then should the five sense organs have the five substances as their natures? Because substances such as earth, water and fire are different from [qualities] such as blue, they would not be seen by the eyes. As for earth, water, fire and air, if their natures were different from touch-sensations, then the body would not feel them.⁽³¹⁹⁾ So therefore [in conclusion], your tradition too has many faults.

1. Refuting the Vaiśeṣikas' four conditions for vision

(227b8) Moreover, this [Vaiśeṣika] tradition holds that one sees colour (*rūpa*) because of the contact between four dharmas, viz. the eye, the *rūpa*, the mental organ (*yì* 意 = *manas*) and the self (*wǒ* 我 = *ātman*).⁽³²⁰⁾ This is also absurd. Thus [Āryadeva] states in the next verse:

The eye has no rūpa and no consciousness⁽³²¹⁾, consciousness has no rūpa nor eye and rūpa has neither the one nor the other. How can they see when in contact [with each other]? (k.317)

(227b13) Commentary. The three⁽³²²⁾, viz. the eye, *rūpa*, and consciousness, because they each individually lack the two [other necessary factors] and are not in contact, do not give rise to the function of sight. [But] when the three dharmas are in contact, they are no different from [when they were] apart, so how could one maintain that they [then] have the function of sight?

2. Buddhist Hīnayāna views also refuted by the same arguments

(227b15) Some Hīnayānists say: This difficulty is absurd. Who would say that when they are in contact they are no different from when they were apart? Although the individual dharmas are each powerless, when they are in contact, they have the function [of sight] in dependence upon each other.

(227b16) [Reply:] If, in their state of contact, they arose as different characters and were not the same as before, they would not be [things] such as eyes, [*rūpa* and consciousness]. But if, in their state of contact, they did not arise as different characters, then since they would be the same as before, they would not have the function of sight.

If it is said that the same kind [of thing] (*lèi* 類 = *jān*) arises as different characters, this is also absurd, in that it is contradictory: the nature of a kind is not different from that of a character, so how can you say that the kind is the same, but the characters are different? The two things, sameness and difference, are mutually contradictory, and yet you say that the nature [of the eyes, etc.] remains identical — this cannot be coherent.

(227b21) If the three [factors], viz. the eyes [*rūpa* and consciousness], gave rise to the function of sight, then at the same time the function of sight would also give rise to the three [factors]. It is impossible that cause and effect exist simultaneously and that the three produce sight, but that sight does not produce the three. If at one moment the former [i.e. the cause] and the latter [i.e. the effect] both existed, then why would they have [the relationship of] cause and non-cause relative to each other? Also, if simultaneous, [the three] would have to be without causality (*yīn guǒ yì* 因果義 = *hetuphalabhāva*; *kāryakāraṇabhāva*): if the effect's nature already existed, then why would it again need a cause?⁽³²³⁾ If they were not simultaneous, then you would have to admit a temporal sequence. And when simultaneity is not established, how could the temporal sequence come about? [For,] at the time of the effect, there is no cause: so the effect is the effect of what? At the time of the cause, there is no effect: so the cause is the cause of what?⁽³²⁴⁾ In that case, there would be no causes or effects at all. Yet if you do not accept that they exist, how could you admit that they are inexistent and still say that the various causes and effects are not the same?⁽³²⁵⁾ This [difference between cause and effect] is a conventional assertion but is not ultimate.

3. Conclusions

(227b29) When one correctly refutes the [Vaiśeṣika] Outsiders one also refutes the Hīnayāna. So in this verse there is just a refutation of the eye and the other [factors, viz. *rūpa* and consciousness]; the self has already been refuted [in Chapter II] and hence will not be discussed anew.⁽³²⁶⁾ Just like the refutation [showing] that one does not see form because the eye and the other [factors] enter into contact [with each other], so too the ear and the other [factors, viz. sound and consciousness] should be similarly refuted.

G. Critique of sounds and words

(227c3) Now, sounds heard by the ear make it so that names (*míng* 名 = *nāman*) and phrases (*jù* 句 = *pada*)⁽³²⁷⁾ refer to (*quán biǎo* 詮表)⁽³²⁸⁾ states of affairs (*fǎ yì* 法義 = *artha*) and objects such as particular forms. Consequently, here again we should analyze [things] so that we understand that reference conventionally exists but ultimately does not exist. Do the sounds which we hear refer to entities or not? What would be wrong if they did? To show that the first [hypothesis] is absurd [Āryadeva] states in the next verse:

If what is heard did refer, then why wouldn't it be a non-sound? (k.318ab)

(227c8) Commentary. *Suǒ wén* 所聞 ("what is heard") and *yīn* 音 ("sound") are synonyms of *shēng* 聲 (= śabda; "sound"); they both describe entities. *Biǎo* 表 ("state"; "describe"; "show") is the same as *quán* 詮 : here it is shown that a sound does not refer [to anything]. Suppose it did refer, then it would lose its nature of being a sound, for the particular character (*zì xiāng* 自相 = svalakṣaṇa), sound, could not possibly refer, as it is cognized by a non-conceptual consciousness, just as other particular characters [are also cognized by non-conceptual consciousnesses].⁽³²⁹⁾ Also, the sounds *qua* particular characters could not possibly refer to the entities which one wishes to describe, for there would be no homologous examples [in arguments], just like when a [logical] reason is [too] exclusive (*bù gòng yīn* 不共因 = asādhāraṇahetu).^(329a)

(227c12) The universal characters (*gòng xiāng* 共相 = sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of sound [however] are not things which are heard by the ears, for they each are established in dependence upon many [different] dharmas and have subtle parts, just like non-substances, etc.⁽³³⁰⁾ If they referred, they would lose their nature of being sounds, for they would be inaudible, like pleasure, and other [feelings]. [But] there are no audible things existing separately without the nature of sound, for, like forms and so forth, they would have the nature of being non-sounds.

(227c15) The latter [alternative mentioned above, viz. that sounds do not refer,] is also absurd. Thus [Āryadeva] says in the following verse:

If sound did not refer, then why would it produce knowledge? (k.318cd)

(227c18) Commentary. If the sounds which are heard did not refer, then understanding could not arise on account of these names and phrases. It is because only phrases and names refer to states of affairs that in this context we do not mention the collection of letters (*wén shēn* 文身 = vyañjanakāya).⁽³³¹⁾

(227c20) Now if sentences (*yǔ* 語 = vākya) and sounds [i.e. words] did not refer, then, just like [any] other noises, they would not be causes for understanding states of affairs. In that case, we would not listen to sounds to understand states of affairs, but since hearing does lead to understanding states, [sounds] must refer.

1. Critique of sound's universal characters

(227c21) [Objection:] But surely the mental consciousness (*yì shí* 意識 = manovijñāna) arises after the ear consciousness and designates a universal character in reliance upon the sounds which are heard. This is the reference which brings forth understanding of states of affairs.

(227c23) [Reply:] When the mental consciousness arises, the sound and the ear consciousness have both already ceased, so what does the universal character rely upon? As the sound's nature is no more, then of what is there a universal character?

(227c24) Should it be said that by the force of memory (*niàn 念* = *smṛti*) one recalls (*zhuī yì 追憶* = *SMR*) the previous sound and that the mind and the other [mental factors] designate the universal character in reliance upon this [remembered sound], then [we reply that] the minds and mental factors (*xīn xīn fǎ 心心法* = *cittacaitta*) would have separate objects (*suǒ yuán 所緣* = *ālambana*). But an apprehension which is not in accordance with the *citta* would not be a *caitta*.⁽³³²⁾

(227c26) If it is said that the universal character does not need to depend upon sounds, but is a [false] notion (*jiǎ xiǎng 假想* = *saṃjñā*) constructed simply by the conceptual mind, then why should this character only belong to sounds? And if it is said that [the universal character] does come into being because of sounds, then why shouldn't the ear organ, consciousness and so forth [also] be its causes?⁽³³³⁾

(227c28) Moreover, when the ear consciousness arises it does not perceive universal characters, so how could we establish with certainty what causes the universal character? It might be replied that [the case] is like [that of] form: after [form] has been seen it then predominates [in causing the universal character]. But this is equally doubtful and cannot be demonstrated. If it is retorted that the various [causal] powers of dharmas are difficult to imagine, then since that is so, how can you say that [sound] does definitively establish the universal character?

(228a2) It might be said that both characters [viz. the universal and the particular] equally depend upon one [and the same] sound: the particular character is heard first, and then subsequently the mind (*yì 意* = *manas*) cognizes both. Then, because the characters of the sound would be different, how can you say that its nature is the same? As the cognitions and characters differ, the nature [of the sound] must differ too. It is impossible that the mental consciousness would apprehend the two characters together, for memory just recalls a previously apprehended character; if the memory of the sound's universal character was not due to hearing [this universal character], then the particular character would equally be remembered without hearing it. [In sum] if the two [characters] were previously cognized separately, they could subsequently be apprehended together, but since [such] separate cognitions do not exist [because only the particular character is heard], how can there be a joint apprehension [of the particular and universal characters]?

(228a7) Therefore in conclusion, the universal character [of the sounds] does not in fact refer. Nor is it possible that non-sounds refer. Although there are extensive debates [on these questions] and hardly any end to the arguments, I must stop these digressions (*bàng yán 傍言* = *atiprasaṅga*)⁽³³⁴⁾ and push forward the investigation of the fundamental points in question.

2. Refuting *prāpyakāritvavāda* and *aprāpyakāritvavāda* with regard to sound

(228a10) Next, whether one holds that hearing [occurs] when sound and the ear come into contact or without coming into contact, the refutation is for the most part the same as in the case of form. Hearing being due to contact between sound and the ear is absurd. Thus [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

If sound is heard after it has reached the ear, then how does one cognize the origin (běn 本)⁽³³⁵⁾ of the sound? (k.319ab)

(228a13) Commentary. "Origin" (běn 本) means the speaker in that he is the source (yuán 源) of the sound's arising. If the sound left its origin, came to the ear and was heard, then how could one know what produced the sound? As one does [in fact] know from where [the sound] is produced, the sound cannot come [to the ear]. Nor could one say that the ear goes out to the locus of the sound; it functions without light-rays or matter, so how could we know that it goes [anywhere]?⁽³³⁶⁾

3. Sounds cannot be cognized in their totality

(228a15) Next, referring sounds cannot be cognized in their totality. Why? Thus, [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

If sound is not spoken all at once (dùn 頓)⁽³³⁷⁾, then how could one know it in its totality? (k.319cd)

(228a18) Commentary. The subtle parts of names and phrases are produced in stages [with the result that] the ear does not hear them all at once. How then does one know them in their totality? Nor can you say that you know them because of memory: a memory must resemble what was earlier and be completely⁽³³⁸⁾ like the initial discernment.

(228a20) But it is not possible to know [a sound] without memory and randomly (*shuài ěr* 率爾): [otherwise] the mind would separately cognize [the sound] without relying on hearing, and if that were the case, then the deaf would spontaneously cognize sounds. Or alternatively, the sounds of the speaker's speech would become useless [in that one would understand even without hearing anything].

(228a22) If it is said that hearing a sound [in its totality] is brought about through the influence of the immediately preceding condition (*cì dì yuán* 次第緣 = *samanantarapratyaya*),⁽³³⁹⁾ and that one therefore cognizes the whole [sound], this is also absurd, for the subsequent cognition of the whole [sound] could not arise. Suppose it is said that the cognition of the whole must arise right after hearing [the parts of the sound]. This too cannot be so [for the following reasons:] (a) after the super-knowledge known as the "divine ear" (*tiān ěr tōng* 天耳通 = *divyaśrotrābhijñā*), the mind in meditative trance (*dìng xīn* 定心 = *dhyānacitta*; *samāpatticitta*) would necessarily be interrupted, but it is only then that one would cognize the whole

[sound];⁽³⁴⁰⁾ (b) the different mental consciousnesses which follow after one has heard the sound(s) would *also* stretch out over a considerable time, and it is only then that one would cognize the whole.⁽³⁴¹⁾

(228a25) [In conclusion:] It is impossible to maintain that real referring sounds exist and that the ear hears them first and the mind cognizes them afterwards. Rather, it is sounds which are manifestations of false conceptual (*xū wàng fēn bié* 虚妄分别 = *abhūtaparikalpa*) consciousness which are thought to refer.

4. Temporal arguments against the reality of sounds

(228a28) Next we should examine as to which dharmas are being termed sound: its nature is [supposedly] substantially existent and it is heard by the ear. To show that in that case there would be absurdities, [Āryadeva] says in the next verse:

Insofar as [something] is not heard, it will not be of the nature of sound. Being first inexistent and then later existent is definitely absurd. (k.320)

(228b3) Commentary. The nature of a future sound is not heard by the ear, for the five sense organs, such as the eyes and so forth, apprehend present objects. In that case, a future sound would not be of the nature of sound (*shēng xìng* 聲性 = *śabda-tva*) in that it is not heard, like forms and other objects.

(228b5) Suppose that because future sounds are similar to present ones and the present [sounds] can be heard, they [i.e. the future sounds] are also termed sounds. Then because the present sound and the [future one] are similar and the latter is not a sound, it would follow that the present one is not a sound either.

(228b6) Moreover, if [sounds] passed over (*liú rù* 流入 = *saṃ-CAR*) to the present from the future, then the present [sound] could accordingly be said to be a non-sound. The future [sounds] do not pass over from the present, so why, on account of the present [sound], do you say that the [future one] is a sound [too]?

(228b8) If [just] what can be heard in the present is of the nature of sound (*śabdatva*), then it would follow that this *śabdatva* was originally inexistent but came into being, and that would contradict your own position that *śabdatva* existed from the first [i.e. the opponent's position that the future sound already had *śabdatva*]. If *śabdatva* did exist from the first, then it would not begin to come into being, and since it would not begin to come into being, it would not later cease. A *śabdatva* which neither comes into being nor ceases would have to be permanent.

(228b11) A past sound would not be of the nature of sound, because it is not heard, just like a future sound. Suppose that because a future sound^(341a) passes over to the present and the present [sound] is a sound, we therefore say that the former is a sound. Then because the present sound passes over to the past and the past [sound] is not a sound, it would follow that the present one is not a sound either. If that is the case, then it follows that in the three temporal realms [i.e. past, present and future]

(*sān shì* 三世 = *tryadhvan; trikāla*) none of what is established in dependence on *śabdatva* is ever really a sound.

(228b15) If the present sound came from the future and could be said to come into being, then the past sound which came from the present would also be said to come into being. Hence, the past sound would be said to be present [because what is produced is present] and would subsequently have to cease once again. If the past sound came from the present and could be said to have ceased, then the present sound coming from the future would also be said to have ceased, and in that case the present sound would be termed past and could not subsequently cease.⁽³⁴²⁾ The future, which lacks both [coming into being and cessation], must be said to be permanent, while that which has cessation and that which has coming into being (*yǒu shēng* 有生 = *jātimant*) must [respectively] be termed past and present. If we examine in this way, the nature of sound (*śabdatva*) crumbles to pieces (*sàn huài* 散壞 = *vi-SR̄*). Form and other such [entities] should be considered analogously.

H. Critique of some Sāṃkhyas' views on the mind (*manas*)

(228b22) Now some Sāṃkhyas make the following assertion: It is only when the mind goes to the locus of the object that there is cognition. [Reply:] This is just like the previous refutation of the sense organs going out to their objects. One cannot say that the mind, alone, without the sense organs, cognizes the object, and thus in the following verse [Āryadeva] states:

If the mind were without sense organs, its going would also be useless. (k.321ab)

(228b26) Commentary. If the mind without sense organs definitely does not cognize dharmas such as form and so forth, then its going would also be pointless. Should the mind, alone, without relying on the sense organ, cognize its object, then the blind, deaf and other such sorts [of people who have deficient sense organs] would cognize the various objects. [Either that,] or there would be no people who are blind, deaf and so forth. This was already examined previously [in §§222b10 and 226a28 of this chapter] and will not be discussed again.

(228b29) When one cultivates the senses, the mind becomes keen (*míng lì* 明利 = *paṭu*); thus it is certain that the mind cannot be separated from the sense organs. Some [Sāṃkhyas] maintain that the inner mind's nature is all-pervasive, but that its operation (*yòng* 用 = *ṛtti*) depends on individually going out to the objects which are cognized.⁽³⁴³⁾

(228c1) "Operation" is that the mind manifests aspects (*xíng xiāng* 行相 = *ākāra*) of the objects.⁽³⁴⁴⁾ But the functioning (*qǐ* 起 = *pravṛtti?*)⁽³⁴⁵⁾ of the mind consists in its cognizing the object. So again what does the going accomplish? You cannot maintain that the manifestations are one thing and cognitions are another. Let it not be [said] that when [the mind] manifests form and so forth it cognizes objects

such as sound! Also, the mind would not uselessly go out to its object. If you held that [the mind's] nature was everywhere, then to which place would it go?

(228c4) Now, this [hypothesis that the mind goes out to its object] is absurd, and so [Āryadeva] states in the next verse:

In that case the living being in question would be forever mindless. (k.321cd)

(228c7) Commentary. If the mind went out to the object, then its nature would not be everywhere, and if the mind was constantly going out to its object, the self would remain without a mind. However, [in fact] the subtle mind is always present in the body. It is constantly active when one is in states such as sleep and unconsciousness (*mēn* 悶 = *murchā*), for there are [animal functions] such as breath, there can be dreams, fatigue grows, [the subtle mind] causes one to awaken, it controls the body and experiences physical sensations.

(228c10) If there was constantly no mind in the body (*nèi shēn* 內身 = *ātmabhāva*), then, as in the case of [inanimate things] such as corpses (*sǐ shī* 死屍 = *kuṇapa*), killing would not be reprehensible, nor would respect be meritorious. In that case the view of voidness and that of the Outsiders would be just the same.

(228c12) Some [Sāṃkhyas] maintain that the nature of the mind is not everywhere and that it does not go out [to its object], but that the operations (*yòng* 用 = *ṛtti*) do go. [Such a view] has the same fault, for [in the Sāṃkhya view] the operations of the mind and the mind's nature are not separate from each other.⁽³⁴⁶⁾

(228c13) If the mind's nature did go out to an object in front, then when [someone or something] touches one's body, one would feel nothing, and even if one concentrated intensely [on the sensations] the inner mind would be unperturbed.

(228c15) If one holds that this mind does not come into contact with its object, then, just as [it does not cognize] the objects of others, it would not cognize [its own object] either. Each individual mind would cognize all objects or each object would be cognized by all minds. So, these positions, which hold that there are real objects of the senses, are all illogical and must be taken to be untrue.

I. Discussion of "notions" (*saṃjñā*)

(228c17) [Objection:] But surely the Mahāyāna also has these same faults. [Reply:] If one accepts the slightest substance, then these faults will be the same.

(228c18) [Opponent:] In that case [if there are no substances], there would be no worldly entities, for [the world's] notions (*xiǎng* 想 = *saṃjñā*) would become erroneous (*diān dǎo* 顛倒 = *viparīta*). [But] it is said that these [worldly entities] are not nonexistent. What then are these so-called "notions" so that error causes one to say that worldly things are existent and not nonexistent?

(228c20) [Reply:] "Notions" means the aggregate of notions (*xiǎng yùn* 想蘊 = *saṃjñāskandha*), and thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

The object which causes the mind to apprehend erroneously is based upon a previous perception, just like a mirage (yàn 焰 = marīci). This should be understood to be the aggregate of notions for the [different] erroneous determinations of all dharmas.⁽³⁴⁷⁾ (k.322)

(228c24) Commentary. When the mind first arises, it apprehends characters such as blue and so forth. Just as one uses symbols (*biāo zhì* 標幟) to later recall [something], so one apprehends characters of an object which is [now] outside the range of the physical sense organs, and therefore one terms [these representations] *saṃjñā*.⁽³⁴⁸⁾ Due to these notions, at a later time [after the perception] one recalls a representation (*fēn míng* 分明) of the object's character. Although every mind has these notions, still, [Āryadeva] says "based on a previous [perception]" to insist upon the state of being an effect; the subsequent representation shows what existed previously.

(228c28) These notions erroneously determine the characters of all states of affairs, be they the worlds' sentient beings or its insentient [matter], just as when due to a mirage (*yáng yàn* 陽焰 = *marīci*) a notion arises that there is water — it tricks one's mind and one then tells others [about the "water"]. Thus, erroneous notions establish the senses, their objects and the various other different things in the world. In order to show that these notions are established in dependence upon many [different] dharmas, and are hence designations and unreal, [Āryadeva] speaks of "the aggregate of notions". Also, to show that the different states of affairs in the world are all established by notions, he says "should be understood".

(229a3) [Objection:] But surely the five [sense] consciousnesses perceive substantially existing objects. The mental consciousness (*yì shì* 意識 = *manovijñāna*), which follows upon the five [sense] consciousnesses, would be similar [in apprehending substantially existent objects]. Notions and the objects of the consciousnesses must be similar, so how can you say with certainty that notions are erroneous?

J. The unreality of consciousness

(229a5) [Reply:] Who says that the [sense] consciousnesses perceive substantially existent objects and that [their] erroneousness is hardly possible? Thus in the next verse [Āryadeva] states:

The consciousnesses arise in dependence upon the eye, form, etc., like an illusion (huàn 幻) = māyā. (k.323ab)

(229a8) Commentary. Just as in the case of illusions, their natures do not really exist, and yet [these illusions] produce various erroneous consciousnesses, so also in the case of the eyes and the other such [causes of consciousness]: their nature and characters are all false (*xū* 虛 = *mṛṣā*). Notions arise due to these [causes], just as they do when an illusionist induces erroneous consciousnesses in others. How could the objects be real? Sense objects are all false. As we explained before [?], the conscious-

nesses which arise due to these [objects] are not real either. All which is perceived is false, just like illusions. The natures of the consciousnesses are not identical with the objects perceived: unlike their objects, consciousnesses cannot be without ideation (*yuán lù* 緣慮).⁽³⁴⁹⁾ Nor do the natures of consciousness exist separately, different from the objects; the characters of consciousnesses equally do not exist as different from the objects which are perceived. So how can you say that the natures of consciousnesses really exist? As was said in the [following] verse:

"These perceiving consciousnesses are not identical with the objects which are perceived. Nor are they different from their objects. Therefore they have no characters which can be apprehended."⁽³⁵⁰⁾

1. *Debates about illusions*

(229a17) Some argue as follows: Illusions are all real and not false. The powers of spells (*zhòu shù* 呪術 = *mantra*), when applied to [things] such as wood and stones, make them appear to have the characters of chariots, horses and so forth. These characters either have the sounds [of the incantations] and the other [materials] as their nature, or their nature is identical with one part of the consciousness. To refute this reply (*jiù* 救 = *parihāra*), [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

If it were held that they were really existent, then the comparison with an illusion would not be established. (k.323cd)

(229a21) Commentary. If an illusion really had sounds and other such things as its nature, then, like other sounds, etc., it could not be termed "an illusion". If it is said that the illusion is fleeting and does not remain, like something created by magic (*huà* 化 = *nirmāṇa*), and that therefore it is termed "an illusion", this is also not correct. Since the [illusion's] nature really exists, like other sounds and so forth, then why not say that it is true? What is fleeting and does not remain does not have the character of an illusion either: don't say that lightning and such things must also be called "illusions"!

(229a25) If it is said that what deceives the world is termed "an illusion", but that the character of the illusion is not false, then why say that it deceives! If it is said that it is because it gives rise to errors such as [belief in] permanence and so forth, then other dharmas must also be termed "illusions".

(229a26) Nor should it be said that the illusion is a part of consciousness: if it does not have the nature of cognition how can it be mind? [There are two possibilities:] a) ["illusion"] would be a synonym (*yì míng* 異名 = *pariāyaśabda*) for saying "an object of consciousness alone". One must accept that all dharmas whatsoever are not different from mind: how then could the one mind really have many parts? b) One has to accept that the nature of consciousness is unreal.

(229a29) If consciousness were real and was accepted as having many parts, then all dharmas would be of that same nature. If the nature of the consciousness were one, but it appeared as dual, then just as in a mirage there [merely] seems to be water, so one could not say that the illusion is a part of consciousness, for the real consciousness which is its nature is non-dual. The "water" which one apprehends is not a part of the mirage, so how does it illustrate consciousness' nature being one and the parts many?

2. *Dharmapāla's position*

(229b4) [Objection:] In that case, what does the Mahāyāna explain as being an illusion? [Reply:] The illusion which we speak about is like what is commonly understood by the world. When one analyzes with intelligence, no natures to illusions are to be found in fact. How [could] words [for them] be referring [to anything]? So thus all dharmas are likened to illusions: in them not the slightest substance whatsoever can be found. As was said in the verse:

"When one analyzes with intelligence, the natures of dharmas are inexistent. Thus, they are said to be without natures and are not referred to by [conceptual] proliferations (*xì lùn* 戲論 = *prapañca*)."⁽³⁵¹⁾

Thus, dharmas are produced by causes and conditions; their natures are all void, like an illusion.

K. Replying to the charge that the Madhyamaka is simply counterintuitive

(229b10) [Objection:] If the natures of dharmas are void and yet they appear to exist, how do they differ from [absurdities, such as] snares capturing space?

(229b12) [Reply:] Why are you amazed that natures of dharmas are [conventionally] established? Worldly states of affairs are hard to fathom (*nán cè* 難測): their varieties are in fact complex. To establish this assertion [Āryadeva] states in the following verse:

Nothing in the world is not hard to fathom. The sense organs and their objects are similar [in that respect], so why should the wise be amazed? (k.324)

(229b16) Commentary. One mental karma ripens into endless different sorts of inner and outer effects in the future, something an extremely skilled craftsman could not perform: this is said to be the first "hard to fathom thing in the world". An external seed grows into a sprout and stalk and [then] immeasurable [numbers of] branches, twigs, flowers, leaves, roots and fruit with all sorts of shapes, as if they were ornaments: this is said to be the second "hard to fathom thing in the world".

(229b19) The body of a libidinous woman is like a manure pit, its nine orifices constantly flowing with all sorts of filth. Nonetheless, someone filled with desire will

see [her] and become sexually aroused: this is said to be the third "hard to fathom thing in the world". Flowery trees are said to be without [feelings of] love⁽³⁵²⁾, and yet when a libidinous woman touches them, the flowers vie to develop and the branches brush near her as if [the tree] were in love: this is said to be the fourth "hard to fathom thing in the world". Flowery trees are said to like music; when they hear pleasant sounds, they raise themselves up and sway back and forth, their branches curving gracefully, just like dancers. This is said to be the fifth "hard to fathom thing in the world". Flowery trees are said to like the singing of birds; when they hear the sounds of the birds' songs, they immediately sway back and forth, their branches waving gracefully, like people joyfully clapping. This is said to be the sixth "hard to fathom thing in the world".

(229b27) In previous lives one has passed through innumerable births. When one dies and is reborn, one seeks the mother's breast, frolics about, plays, sleeps, eats and has desires: this is said to be the seventh "hard to fathom thing in the world". If one rejoices in unsurpassed enlightenment, one should correctly practise the subtle, excellent, Dharma. But [in fact] one practices carelessness (*fàng yì* 放逸 = *pramāda*) and denigrates (*bō* 撥 = *apavāda*) the Dharma as being nothing at all: this is said to be the eighth "hard to fathom thing in the world". Someone renounces the confines of the home and sets out for the seat of enlightenment (*dào chǎng* 道場 = *bodhimāṇḍa*), but still engages in everyday affairs, coveting wealth without any scruples: this is called the ninth "hard to fathom thing in the world". The excellent operation of the miraculous powers developed in the pure meditative trances (*jìng dìng* 淨定 = *śuddha-kadhyanā*)⁽³⁵³⁾ are without limit and unobstructed; anything and everything is established by the mind's [mere] wishes. This is said to be the tenth "hard to fathom thing in the world".⁽³⁵⁴⁾

(229c5) Thus there is no end to hard to fathom worldly states of affairs. The existence or inexistence of the sense organs and their objects is a convenience of method: from the point of view of worldly conventions they exist; from the point of view of the ultimate they are void. The wise should not be amazed [at this].

L. Similes for dharmas' mode of existence

(229c7) In order to show that dharmas are conventionally existent but in truth void, [Āryadeva] at the end of the chapter now states the following verse:

Dharmas are like the circle of a whirling firebrand, a magical being, a dream, an illusion, the moon [reflected] in water, a comet (huì xīng 彗星), an echo, a mirage or floating clouds.⁽³⁵⁵⁾ (k.325)

(229c11) Commentary. A circle of a whirling firebrand, a magical being, a dream and so forth, although they appear to exist, are all, nonetheless, actually void. So too for dharmas: the fool, due to conceptual grasping, says that they exist, but their natures are actually inexistent. When one is free of grasping then none of them are

seen at all, just as someone whose eyes are healthy does not see flowers in the sky. The unconditioned (*wú wéi* 無爲 = *asaṃskṛta*)⁽³⁵⁶⁾ is seen by the noble wisdom and is true (*zhēn* 眞) in that the aspects (*xíng xiāng* 行相 = *ākāra*) of apprehender (*néng yuán* 能緣 = *grāhaka*) and apprehended (*suǒ yuán* 所緣 = *grāhya*) have ceased. This conforms well with the sūtra's statement: "Conditioned consciousnesses and objects are not real." Thus the sense organs and their objects are all conventional, but not true [i.e. ultimate], in that they are objects of consciousness, like whirling firebrands' circles and other such [non-entities].⁽³⁵⁷⁾

(229c16) What the Outsiders establish is untrue due to their grasping at existence and inexistence, as in the case of someone with [eye diseases] such as *timira* (*xuàn yī* 眩醫) [who grasps at illusory appearances]. If one wishes to strive for the noble wisdom, exclude falsities and adopt the truth, one should conform to the Tathāgata's immaculate teaching of the Dharma.

CATUḤŚATAKAVṚTTI XIII: REFUTATION OF THE SENSE ORGANS AND THEIR OBJECTS (*indriyārtha*)

PART I: SENSE OBJECTS

§1. Here, when it is stated [in k. 300],

"The intelligent person, who seeks excellence, accepts things which are correct, even from rivals."

it might then be said, "What are these 'things which are correct' which are to be accepted by the intelligent?" Reply: It is seeing that all entities, outer or inner, are by nature (*rañ bzin gyis = svabhāvena*) selfless.

A. Refuting sense objects because one never sees the whole

§2. Objection: One cannot establish this [statement] that all entities are without natures, for while things such as donkey's horns and the like, which are inexistent, are not perceptible (*mñon sum = pratyakṣa*), vases and the like, as well as [patches of] blue, etc., are perceptible.⁽³⁵⁸⁾ Therefore, entities such as vases and so forth do in fact all have natures. [Reply:] This is incorrect, for

when one sees the [visual] form, indeed, one will not see the whole vase. Which [person] who knows the truth would also say that the vase is perceptible (pratyakṣa)? (k.301)

§3. By the word *api* ("also") [Āryadeva means,] "Which [person] who knows the truth would say that the blue [colour] and the other [eight substances]⁽³⁵⁹⁾ which are the substrata (*ñer bar len pa = upādāna*) of the [vase] are also perceptible?" In this regard some say that the vase is established as being essentially a transformation of the three *guṇas*, while others say that what one terms the vase is a substance which is a whole (*yan lag can = avayavin*) that is seen separately from its parts and [that the vase] is established as something apprehendable by the sense of touch. These [philosophers, viz. the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools respectively]⁽³⁶⁰⁾ are also refuted by [the verse which states]

"How could something produced from a permanent entity be impermanent? Never does one see a disparity of character between causes and [their] effects."⁽³⁶¹⁾

Thus, as there is nothing which is simply the vase itself, how could it be perceptible?

§4. Objection: If [the vase] were thus impossible, then how could one know that such-and-such a vase is established? Reply: The vase is designated in dependence (*bten nas 'dogs pa = upādāya prajñapti*) upon the eight substances (*rdzas = dravya*), i.e. the four elements (*'byuñ ba chen po = mahābhūta*) and the four [types] of form which depend upon [the elements].⁽³⁶²⁾ Just as fire is designated in dependence on fuel, houses in dependence upon grass and wood, and the self in dependence upon the

aggregates, but if one searches [for these entities] among their causes by means of the fivefold [reasoning] one will not perceive them, so too a vase, which is something perceptible for the world because it is understood by the sense faculty which sees that it can scoop up honey, water and milk, is established in dependence on its causes as being the appropriator (*ñe bar len pa po = upādātṛ*) [of the eight substances].⁽³⁶³⁾ However, rival conceptions, which do not hold that [things] are dependently designated as just explained, are unable to establish [anything] as being a vase.

§5. It might be thought that because the vase is not perceived separately from its form, etc., therefore a cognition of a vase is only of the relevant form and the like, but that there is absolutely no entity which one terms a vase. According to such a proponent, because absurdities such as [fire's having to] burn forever and so forth would [otherwise] follow, fire does not exist without an object (*las = karman*) [and] apart from fuel, and thus it is just completely imagined by the mind.⁽³⁶⁴⁾ [Reply:] But, similarly, because the elements as well as the mind and mental factors (*sems dan sems las byuñ ba = cittacaitta*) cannot arise without the other [elements and mental factors], they would [also] be merely imagined by the mind, just as the vase, and would be unestablished by their natures. This [consequence] is not accepted by these [philosophers]. Therefore, why don't they accept that vases, just like the mind and the mental or the elements, are dependent arisings or [in other words] are dependently designated? So the vase, which has the eight substances as substrata, is the appropriator of what it appropriates, and the agent of the action of appropriation (*ñe bar len pa'i bya ba*); the whole, which is something perceptible for the world, exists in this manner, [but] should one analyse it [then],

"when one sees the [visual] form, indeed, one will not see the whole vase," for the vase is of the nature of the eight substances.

§6. The eye sees only the [visual] form, but not odours and other such [substances], for they are different objects. Thus, as the whole vase is not seen by the eye, then, making no analyses of the nature of the entity, we take the world's own conceptions as valid, whatever they might be, and so we can then say that for us the vase is perceptible. But whoever analyzes, knows the nature of entities [and] does not take it to be possible that one sees the whole by [merely] seeing one side [of it] cannot say things such as "the vase is perceptible".

1. Debate with the logicians on *pratyakṣa*

§7. On this point the logicians (*rtog ge ba = tārṅkika*) argue as follows: The vase is not at all *pratyakṣa*;⁽³⁶⁵⁾ the particular characters (*rañ gi nushan ñid = svalakṣaṇa*) of [visual] form and the other [eight substances] are inexpressible and are designated as "*pratyakṣa*" because they are the objects of the visual consciousnesses, etc., which is what is [really] said to be *pratyakṣa*.⁽³⁶⁶⁾ Because the vase is merely something completely imaginary, it does not exist as a particular character, and whatever lacks a particular character cannot in reality be *pratyakṣa*, not only that but it cannot even be

metaphorically designated as *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, as there is no need to refute [the vase's] being *pratyakṣa*, then just like refuting [an obviously false proposition, such as] that sound is apprehendable by the eyes, so too it is incorrect to refute the vase in this regard.

§8. This logician, because he is completely unversed in mundane objects, must be instructed from the very beginning just like a young child. Therefore, in order to teach him he should be questioned, "What is *pratyakṣa* for you?"

§9. He answers: Consciousness is *pratyakṣa*. What sort of consciousness? One which is free from conceptualization (*rtog bral* = *kalpanāpoḍha*). But what is "conceptualization"? Any clear and distinct notion (*'du śes g.yer po*) which superimposes names and kinds on objects. Because they are free from such [conceptualizations], the five sense consciousnesses apply to nothing but the inexpressible particular character of the object, and thus they are to be termed *pratyakṣa* in that they "occur in connection with the various individual sense organs" (*dbañ po dañ dbañ po la gnas pa = akṣaṃ akṣaṃ prati vartate*).⁽³⁶⁷⁾

§10. [Candrakīrti:] But how could one momentary instant of a sense consciousness be a perception (*pratyakṣa*)? It cannot occur in dependence on various individual senses, for it is specific (*thun moñ ma yin pa* = *asādhāraṇa*) [to one sense],⁽³⁶⁸⁾ and [what is more,] the momentary instants of the sense organs and consciousnesses perish as soon as they have arisen.

§11. It might be argued: The fivefold collection of consciousness has bases [i.e. sense organs] and objects which are assemblages (*bsags pa*).⁽³⁶⁹⁾ Thus the atoms constituting the sense organs and those constituting the focus of perception are not each established as being the bases and objects, for one who suffers from [the eye disease known as] *timira* (*rab rib can* = *taimirika*) does not separately see the individual strands of hair [which would be the objects of his perception. He just sees a pile of hair].⁽³⁷⁰⁾ Just as the individual [hairs] in the collection are causes [for the perception of the collection], so too the collected atoms making up the eyes and other [sense organs] are each individually causes [for sensory perception].

§12. [Candrakīrti:] The example [of the person suffering from *timira*] is not similar. Since one who is free from *timira* does [in fact] see individual hairs, it is when the eyes are damaged that he does not see [separate strands of hair]. But in the case of the atoms constituting the sense organs, then apart from their collected state, one does not see that individually each atom is a basis for its consciousness. Therefore it is incorrect to imagine that the [atoms] forming the collection are individually bases [for the sensory consciousness in question].

§13. When one observes absolutely no [causal] efficacy in the parts, then although [the parts] might form a collection, one should conceive [of that collection] as being similar to its [parts in that it too must be causally inefficacious]. Thus, for instance, one observes that one blade of grass has the power to bind the legs of gadflies (*śa sbrañ*), mosquitoes (*sbrañ bu mchu riñs*) and the like,^(370a) and then [one supposes that] a collection of these [blades of grass] can go so far as to bind up ele-

phants. Similarly, each sesame seed can individually yield a little oil and the collection can yield a vase full of oil. But because the sense organ's atoms, independent of the collection, are not thus each and individually bases for the consciousness, then although [the collection] depends on the atoms, it cannot be efficacious.⁽³⁷¹⁾ Thus, "the eye organ", which depends on the organ's atoms, which is void of any conceptions of identity or difference from the atoms, which is the basis of its [corresponding] consciousness, [and] which is a worldly [notion existing] through dependent designation, does not [itself] possess the action of seeing an object. And since this [object] is momentary and hence ceases along with its consciousness, how could it [in fact] be capable [of producing a perception?]⁽³⁷²⁾ In conclusion, it is incorrect to say that a consciousness which occurs in connection with the various individual sense organs is *pratyakṣa*.

§14. But suppose it is objected that the collection of the [various] consciousnesses does occur in connection with the sense organs which are of the corresponding sorts and that [*pratyakṣa*] can thus be etymologically explained in this manner. [Reply:] This is not the case either. Why? Because it is impossible to etymologically explain one moment of an eye consciousness in this fashion, and [moreover] a collection, which is insubstantial, [can] not [in fact] depend on the sense organs. The establishment of form and so forth should be understood as being analogous to the establishment through dependent designation of the eye organ which is the basis for the [eye] consciousness, for these [objects of consciousness, such as form, etc.], when dependently designated, also become bases for consciousness. So therefore it is incorrect to understand consciousness as being *pratyakṣa*.

2. Candrakīrti's view: it is the object which is *pratyakṣa*, rather than the mind

§15. It is [however] correct [to understand] the object [as being *pratyakṣa*]. The crescent moon and other such things are all seen to be sense objects for people from many [different] extractions.⁽³⁷³⁾ In the case of worldly things, it is illogical to abandon the world's vision and then rely on something else. So, in the world it is just the object which is directly termed *pratyakṣa*; the consciousness is [so termed] metaphorically.⁽³⁷⁴⁾ But according to the opponent [i.e. the logician], the word "*pratyakṣa*" directly [refers] to the consciousness and metaphorically to the object. This is not in accordance with the world, for in the world there is no such [linguistic] convention (*kun tu tha snād = saṃvyavahāra*). So then, as there is a worldly convention [for objects being *pratyakṣa*], then just because of the world it is correct to say that a vase is *pratyakṣa*. But should one look for any nature, then he who understands the truth cannot make this type of an assertion, for in no respect is any nature of a vase perceived. For a worldly consciousness vases are *pratyakṣa* [i.e. perceptible], [visual] form and the like are also *pratyakṣa* and the material causes (*ñe bar len pa = upādāna*) of such [things] are *pratyakṣa* too. Thus there is no fault [here].

§16. He who fabricates the notion that this sense consciousness is *pratyakṣa* and then also imagines that it is a means of valid cognition (*tshad ma = pramāṇa*) is completely beside the point. While a non-belying (*mi slu ba = avisamvādin*) consciousness is regarded as being a *pramāṇa* in the world, the Illustrious One said that consciousness, since it is conditioned (*'dus byas = saṃskṛta*), is false and deceptive and is like an illusion (*sgyu ma = māyā*).⁽³⁷⁵⁾ Whatever is false and deceptive and is like an illusion is not non-belying, for it is an entity which exists in one way and appears in another. Something like that should not be imagined to be a *pramāṇa* in that [if it were] it would follow that every consciousness would also have to be a *pramāṇa*.⁽³⁷⁶⁾

3. Conclusions

§17. In conclusion, when this logician becomes intoxicated through imbibing the brew of dialectics, then, in his madness, he abandons the excellent path known as dependent origination and dependent designation, and completely fails to see through the collection of bad jokes propounding entities which is set forth in the Outsiders' treatises. He considers this world as being generally inferior too, and then this [logician], who is confused about the states of both worldly and transcendent entities, uses simply his own conceptions, blocks the path to heaven and liberation and totally meaninglessly embarks on the path of dialectics. Thus, just like one who has imbibed intoxicating drink, he cannot turn away from senseless jokes. But enough of these digressions (*spros pas chog = ity alaṃ prasaṅgena*)! It should be understood that this [logician], who denies that vases are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), will [end up] denying that any entity which is a visible sense object is perceptible at all.

B. All sense objects are to be similarly refuted

§18. Just as [Āryadeva] had previously explained [in k.301] that it would be incorrect [to consider] that vases and the like are [really] perceptible, so too he states the following in order to deny the perceptibility of things which are distinguished by other sense organs, i.e. the dependently designated [entities] which are smelled, tasted or felt.

By means of this very same analysis those of supreme intelligence should refute everything, viz. the fragrant, the sweet and the soft. (k.302)

§19. By saying "the fragrant" he indicates all the objects of the olfactory organ, such as [the fragrances of] nutmeg blossoms (*sna ma'i me tog = jātikusuma*), lotuses, *upalas* and sandalwood, which are [all] distinguishable by means of the nose; even in darkness one apprehends the smells alone without seeing the [visual] forms. Similarly, by saying "the sweet" he indicates all the objects of the gustatory organ, such as sugar, salt and Nimb.⁽³⁷⁷⁾ By "the soft" he indicates all the objects of the corporal organ, such as cotton, sand and stones. As these also have the eight substances as their material

causes (*ñe bar len pa = upādāna*), the corresponding appropriate sense organs apprehend each of their [respective] objects, but they do not apprehend all aspects [of the whole entity]. Therefore, which [person] who knows the truth would say that nutmeg blossoms, sugar, cotton and so forth are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) for him? The refutation of sounds will be explained *in extenso* later on.

C. One cannot see the whole object by merely seeing its visual form

§20. Objection: But, the vase is not different from its [visual] form (*rūpa*); given that it is pervaded by [this] form one will see the whole vase by [merely] seeing the form. [Reply:] To show that this [position] is also inconsistent [Āryadeva] states:
Suppose you were to see the whole [vase] by seeing the form. Then why not [think that] the form which you [supposedly] saw was not [actually] seen as you did not [in fact] see [the whole vase]? (k.303)

§21. Suppose that by merely seeing the [visual] form you were to see the whole vase, although [in fact] it is unseen. Then as you did not [in fact] see the vase, why not [think that] the form which you [supposedly] saw was not [actually] seen? Or alternatively, this [verse] has another meaning: the vase has the eight substances as its material cause, but if you think that you see the entire [eight substances] by seeing [just] one substance, viz. form, then equally, why not think that because you have not seen the other seven substances you have not [really] seen the form itself, which does not exist apart from those [other seven]? In the world too one observes that things are described in an approximate fashion, as [for example] when one calls what is actually something like *mudga*-beans a heap of *māṣa*-beans.⁽³⁷⁸⁾

§22. In conclusion, because you do not observe such things, i.e. because you do not distinguish the smells, etc., then the form must also be unseen, and thus because the form is not perceptible, the vase cannot be perceptible either.

D. Part-whole arguments applied to visual form and atoms

§23. Objection: Following the above-described analysis it is surely impossible that the vase be perceptible, but the [visual] form of the vase is indeed perceptible. Therefore, indirectly the vase will also be perceptible. [Reply:] This is not so. If the form were perceptible then this [type of indirect perception of the vase] would be the case as described, but [Āryadeva] states the following to show that form cannot possibly be perceived:

Form by itself is not perceptible, for it too has distant (pha rol = para), near (tshu rol = apara) and central parts. (k.304)

§24. Form by itself, i.e. [form] when one does not intend to describe it as related with smell and other such [sense domains], is also observed as always having

near, middle and distant parts, and thus it cannot properly be perceptible. The near, distant and central parts again have other near, distant and central parts. When one makes divisions in this way, thinking "these too have other [parts] and these in turn have others", then this form will end up being atoms. But these atoms which one imagines also have divisions into front and back parts as well as divisions into near, central and distant parts so that

the analysis as to whether the atoms do or do not have parts will apply there too.
(k.305ab)

1. *Sādhyasama*

§25. If they have divisions into front and back parts, then, just like a vase, they [too] will lose their quality of being atoms. But if they do not have [such divisions], then in that case such an invisible and unapprehended thing will not exist either. So how could they ever be perceptible?

It is thus not proper to establish something which is to be proved (bsgrub bya = sādhyā) by means of something [else] which is to be proved. (k.305cd)

§26. As the perceptibility [of atoms] is unestablished, it is not correct. So, because perceptibility is unestablished and is [itself] to be established, it is something to be proved. Entities which are [just] established by the opinions of our adversaries as having natures are not proper [for proving that vases and the like are perceptible].⁽³⁷⁹⁾

§27. Furthermore, if we examine the object apprehended by the physical sense organs, then

given that everything is a part, it will also be a whole. (k.306ab)

§28. A vase is a whole relative to its parts, the potsherds. These potsherds will also be wholes relative to their parts. One should equally apply [this line of analysis] up to and including the atoms: they too will again be wholes relative to their eight substances or relative to their front, back and central parts. So, nothing is ever a part or a whole by virtue of its essence (*rañ gi ño bo = svarūpa*). Consequently, [wholes] such as vases and the like are not perceptible.⁽³⁸⁰⁾

2. *Atoms and akṣara are analogous*

§29. The same type of analysis which was applied to atoms also applies to syllables (*yi ge = akṣara*), which are the ultimate components of words, in that just like the atoms they [too] are unestablished.

Thus, in such a case, utterances of syllables are also inexistent. (k.306cd)

§30. The point is that utterances of syllables are also impossible. In other words, if vases and so forth are inexistent, then the utterances of syllables which describe such things are also impossible, for when the object is inexistent consciousness and speech cannot function:

"In such a case, utterances of syllables are also inexistent."

E. Examination of the Abhidharma's notion of rūpāyatana: the relationship between shape and colour

§31. To those who posit a domain of [visual] form (*gzugs kyi skye mched* = *rūpāyatana*) having two natures, viz. colour (*kha dog* = *varṇa*) and shape (*dbiyib* = *saṃsthāna*),⁽³⁸¹⁾ and who imagine that vases are perceptible because of this [domain of form], one says the following: When you imagine this shape here, do you imagine it as being different from the colour or not different? Now first of all,

if the shape were different from the colour, then how would one apprehend the shape? (k.307ab)

§32. Supposing that colours, such as blue and the like, are objects of the eye organ, then if the shape were different from these [colours], it would not be apprehended by the eyes, for it would be something different from the colours, just like sounds and so forth [which are also different from colours and are not apprehended by the eyes.] But because the eyes do also apprehend [shapes], just as they do colours, [shapes] are not different from the [colours]. Contrary to the way in which [the eye] apprehends some or another [colour] from among various distinct colours, such as blue, yellow and so forth, and then also apprehends the others, it does not apprehend a [visual] form which is different from the colour.⁽³⁸²⁾

But if [shape] were not different [from colour] then why wouldn't the body also apprehend colour? (k.307cd)

§33. If, in the intention of avoiding the above-described faults, one imagines that shape is not different from colour, then just as in the dark the body apprehends [shapes] such as length and so forth, so too why wouldn't it also apprehend colours just like shapes, for [the colours] are not different from the [shapes]? Although they ought to be apprehended, they are not. Therefore, because [the body] does apprehend shapes but not [colours], shapes are not non-different from colours. One cannot [however] posit another conception apart those of identity and difference. Thus, shapes are also incoherent, just as are colours, and given that they do not [in fact] exist, it is then proven that nothing is ever perceptible.

F. Critique of visual form and its causes, i.e. the elements

§34. Here it might be argued as follows: The domain of [visual] form does in fact exist because its causes exist. Here the causes of form are the four elements, and they do indeed exist.⁽³⁸³⁾ Because they exist, their effect, viz. the domain of form, will also exist. [Reply:] In order to show that this is not correct either [Āryadeva] states:

The causes for form [viz. the elements] do not appear apart from the sight of a form.⁽³⁸⁴⁾ (k.308ab)

§35. One does not perceive a [visual] form apart from the four elements which must necessarily arise together with the eight substances.⁽³⁸⁵⁾ One does not perceive the causes of form apart from the domain of form. Now the domain of [visual] form is apprehendable by the eye organ, but the causes of form [viz. the elements] are apprehended by the corporal organ [i.e. the sense of touch].⁽³⁸⁶⁾ Therefore, if the so-called "causes of form" had been in the slightest established in their natures, form would also have been established in its nature, but it is impossible that the causes of form be established as something other than form. Consequently, when the causes of form are inexistent, it is proven that the form, which would be causeless, cannot exist either.

1. The view that form and its causes are not different

§36. The [opponent] might think: Well then let us grant that form is obtained from causes of form which are not different [from their effects, viz. form]. [Reply:] This too is impossible.

If [form and its causes] were like this [i.e. not different], then why wouldn't both be apprehended by the eye alone? (k.308cde)

§37. Since [according to the opponent] the causes for a form are also not different from the form, then the eye organ would have to apprehend both the causes and [their] effects. But this is also impossible in that the [causes and their effects] are objects of different sense organs and have differing [defining] characters (*mtshan űid = lakṣaṇa*). To express this fact [Āryadeva] states:

We see that the earth [element] is said to be hard.⁽³⁸⁷⁾ Now, the body apprehends this [hardness]. (k.309ab)

§38. Due to its action of supporting, [the earth element] exists as a basis.⁽³⁸⁸⁾ Thus, being a basis, it is hard and so [as Āryadeva says],

"We see that the earth [element] is said to be hard. Now, the body apprehends this [hardness],"

because the solidity of the [earth element] is something which is to be apprehended by the corporal organ. [Thus,] as the [earth element] is of such a nature,

therefore, it is just this touch-sensation which one calls "earth". (k.309cd)

§39. The domain of [visual] form is what is to be apprehended by the eye organ. Thus, in this way the cause [of form, viz. the elements] and [their] effects [viz. form itself] cannot be without difference, for their defining characters are different and the [organs] which apprehend them are different.

2. The view that form and its causes are different

§40. But when [one says that] they are different one will end up asserting that [form] has no cause, [for as shown in k.308ab and §35 the elements do not exist apart from their effect, form.] One cannot reasonably imagine that entities which are neither identical nor different could ever exist by their own essences, and therefore, the causes of form do not [in fact] exist. It is however shown that if the causes for form are inexistent then form cannot exist by its own essence. And thus for precisely this reason, the Illustrious One stated [in the *Vajracchedikasūtra*]:

"Whoever has seen me as a form, whoever has been guided by my voice, such people who have set out upon a mistaken course of action will not see me [at all]."

Well then how is [the Buddha] to be seen? It is stated [in the same sūtra]:

"It is by the Dharma that the buddhas are to be seen, for it is the Dharma-bodies (*dharmakāya*) which lead one. The nature of things (*dharmatā*), being beyond [our] understanding, cannot be known."⁽³⁸⁹⁾

G. Refuting perceptibility (*draṣṭavyatva*)

§41. Here some say the following: The vase is not perceptible by its own essence, but it is nonetheless certainly not imperceptible either. Rather, it becomes perceptible due to its connection with perceptibility (*lta bar bya ba ñid = draṣṭavyatva*).⁽³⁹⁰⁾ Thus, being perceptible, it is *pratyakṣa*. To show that this [position] is also incorrect, [Āryadeva] says:

The vase, in this case, would have absolutely no [special] quality due to its production as perceptible. Therefore, just like the [absurd] production of perceptibility [in imperceptible things], [the vase] does not have existence either.⁽³⁹¹⁾
(k.310)

§42. Whether perceptibility is a manifestation (*mñon par gsal ba = abhivyakti*) [of the object itself] or whether it is distinct [from the object], in both cases there is no need here for [the entity,] perceptibility. When one imagines this "perceptibility", does one think of it as being the perceptible object's own essence or as being the essence of something imperceptible? In the first case, if it is the perceptible object's

own essence, then what is the point in imagining it? Whatever might be the purpose for imagining [perceptibility], that [purpose] is in fact realized even without it. Thus it is illogical to imagine [an entity, perceptibility].

§43. But if one imagines that perceptibility belongs to something which is imperceptible, then this too is illogical in that: (a) it would follow absurdly that non-physical things would also be perceptible; (b) there is a contradiction with the fact that perceptibility is not produced [in the thing in question as it is imperceptible].

§44. [Now] perceptibility is not produced [in such things],

"therefore, just like the [absurd] production of perceptibility",

i.e. just as [perceptibility] could not be produced in that it is absurd for perceptibility to ever belong to vases which are [according to you, in essence] imperceptible, so too, the vases, which would not be perceptible, would not have existence either. And because one cannot imagine perceptibility as belonging to vases which do not even exist, this [entity] is illogical.

PART II: SENSE ORGANS

A. Refuting other Buddhist schools' positions on the reality of the sense organs

§45. At this point [the opponent] may say: Perceptible things (*mñon sum* = *pratyakṣa*), such as objects like [visual] form and so forth, do really exist, because the sense organs, such as the eyes, etc., which apprehend these [objects] do exist. These sense organs which exist must necessarily function with regard to their own objects; the objects like form, etc. to which these [sense organs] can apply are [thus] perceptible.

1. All sense organs are alike in being derivatives from the elements. Why then do only the eyes see?

§46. Reply: If the sense organs did have the power to discriminate (*yoñs su gcod pa* = *pariccheda*) [objects], then they would have [visual] form and so forth as their objects, but they do not have [this power]. Why? Here it is taught that the five [sense organs], such as the eye, etc., are all derived from the elements; it is their actions which differ according to the different objects. Thus, for example, the eye sees only [visual] form but does not hear sound, while the ear hears sound but does not see form.

§47. Since

the eye is derived from the elements ('byuñ 'gyur = *bhautika*), like the ear, [and] the eye sees [form] but the other [sense organs] do not, (k.311ab)

then, given that there cannot be an action [like vision, etc.] which is in contradiction with reason, how could one conceive of the eyes and other [sense organs'] own es-

sences? Just as the [sense organs] are all the same in being derived from the elements, so one cannot reasonably imagine that they apprehend their objects differently. If the existence of the eyes and other [sense organs] is inferred from the [different] apprehensions of objects, then this is contradictory and hence impossible. Therefore, it is illogical [to say that] objects are perceptible because the sense organs exist.

§48. Objection: If the eyes and so on thus cannot exist, then how can one establish that sense organs such as the eyes, etc. are retributions of [past] acts (*las = karman*)? [Reply:] Why should we deny that they are retributions? The [opponent] retorts: By proving that the [existence of the] eyes, etc. is negated, why wouldn't you have thereby denied [that they are retributions of karma?] [Reply:] It is because our analysis is primarily concerned with seeking out the natures of objects. In this context we are denying that entities exist by their [own] essences, but with regard to the eyes and the like, we do not deny that they are karmic retributions which dependently arise. Thus, the eyes and so forth do exist, for we say that they are retributions due to the existence of the [karma].

2. Karma is responsible for the sense organs, but is unanalysable and inconceivable

§49. Objection: In that case, would there not be the very faults which [were expressed in the verse,]

"The eye is derived from the elements, like the ear, [and] the eye sees [form] but the other [sense organs] do not?"

§50. These faults do not ensue, for the retributions (*rnam par smin pa = vipāka*) of the various karmas are inconceivable.⁽³⁹²⁾ Karmic retributions cannot be understood by applying reasonings, in that karma itself is not in fact established by its own essence. If [karma] were established by its essence, then it could never cease, and a karma whose retribution had already occurred would once again yield a retribution, or alternatively, [karma] would not yield any retribution [at all] because its nature could not change into anything different.

§51. The effects of karma are not [however] unobserved either. Consequently, the wise do not apply this sort of [logical] analysis, which pertains to the vision of the truth (*de kho na nīd = tattva*)⁽³⁹³⁾, to worldly states of affairs [such as karma and other such conventional truths]. [Instead] they accept that karmic retributions are inconceivable: everything worldly is to be thought of as [one] illusion proceeding from [another] illusion.

§52. When one observes something, one cannot then disavow it. Now, when it was said [above in §46] that the eye, albeit derived from the elements, sees only [visual] form but does not hear sound, this is also something which is observed. So consequently, the Sage said that the retributions of karma are definitely inconceivable. (k.311cd)

§53. Because entities, while lacking natures, do have definite effects which will be produced, the Illustrious One, in the following passages, said that the retributive effects of the various karmas are inconceivable:

"Due to the inconceivable retributions of sentient beings' karma this world arises from the winds (*rhuṇ* = *vāyu*). The seeds of the oceans, mountains and of the divine palaces, which have been made majestic with jewels, are scattered about. Rain falls because of the clouds which originate from the winds, and then the winds again dispel the clouds. Because of the winds the world's crops grow; thus the winds bring happiness to all beings."⁽³⁹⁴⁾

And similarly,

"Those who exist but are free from the faults of existence do not also cast aside the effects of karma when they profess voidness. Those who have burned away stains by means of knowledge but who are moistened by compassion and whose actions are governed by selflessness, they are also subject [to karma]."

B. The view that the eyes, etc. must exist because we observe their effects, viz. the sense consciousnesses

§54. Here there is the following objection: The eyes and the other [sense organs] do exist by their natures because we observe their effects, namely, the consciousnesses. Reply: If their effects, viz. the consciousnesses, did [in fact] exist, then the eyes and so forth would exist — but this is impossible. Why? First of all,

because the conditions (rkyen = pratyaya) would be incomplete, the consciousness could not exist before sight. But after [sight], the consciousness would be pointless. In the third case [viz. simultaneity], the instrument (byed pa = karaṇa)⁽³⁹⁵⁾ would be pointless.⁽³⁹⁶⁾ (k.312)

§55. First of all, the eye consciousness does not exist before [the organ of] sight, for eye-sight, i.e. the dominant condition (*bdag po'i rkyen* = *adhipatipratyaya*) [for the consciousness], is incomplete.⁽³⁹⁷⁾ If, however, one thought that [the eye consciousness existed] after [the organ of] sight, then the consciousness would be pointless, [for] if the eye could see form without there being consciousness, then there would be no point in imagining that there is a consciousness.

§56. "In the third case [viz. simultaneity], the instrument (*byed pa* = *karaṇa*) would be pointless"

That is to say, the third conception is that [the organ of] sight and the consciousness occur simultaneously: in that case the [eye being a] cause is pointless. [In other words,] in that case, [the organ of] sight, or the instrument (*byed pa* = *karaṇa*), would be pointless. If [the organ of] sight and the consciousness both existed simultaneously, then the consciousness which exists at the same time as [the organ of] sight could not arise

in dependence upon that [organ of] sight. The right and left horns of an ox exist concurrently and one cannot come into being in dependence upon the other. Similarly, the consciousness which exists concurrently with [the organ of] sight does not come into being in dependence upon [the organ of] sight. And thus, [the organ of] sight would be completely pointless.

§57. Objection: But, although they are simultaneous, [consciousness] does exist in dependence upon [the organ of] sight, just like a lamp and [its] light. [Reply:] This is not so either, for the issue (*brgal zin btag pa = paryanuyoga*) [concerning the relation between cause and effect] is the same here too. By means of a worldly understanding [such as the example of the lamp and its light] one cannot elucidate the understanding of the truth, because [the former understanding] is a *pramāṇa* only from the worldly point of view and the state of affairs which it apprehends is proven to be false and deceptive (*brdzun pa bslu ba'i chos can = mṛṣā moṣadharmaka*). Since the consciousness is thus [in reality] impossible, then the idea that the eyes and other [sense organs] exist because it exists is incorrect.

§58. Objection: The eye is not in fact the instrument (*byed pa = karaṇa*) [of the consciousness]. What is it then? It is the agent (*byed pa po = kartṛ*). Because we maintain that it is an entity which is an agent, it is incorrect to say,

"In the third case [viz. simultaneity], the instrument would be pointless."

C. Refuting prāpyakāritavāda — contact between the object and the sense organ

§59. [Reply:] Even if one imagined things as being like this, the eye would lack the action of seeing. Why? When the eye sees this [visual] form, would it see it by going to the place of its object or by not going? To show that both cases are faulty [Āryadeva] states:

It would take a long time for this eye to see far away, if it were to move. And why wouldn't this form be clear whether very near or far away? (k313)

§60. If the eye operated by contact (*prāptakāriṇa*) and therefore went out to the place of the object, then it would not apprehend [distant] things such as the moon and the stars by a mere glance.⁽³⁹⁸⁾ Something possessed of movement could not apprehend a nearby object and at the same time apprehend an object which is far away, for the times needed for the movement would differ. In fact, by a mere glance the eye does also see what is far away just as well as what is close by, so this [view that the eye moves] is incoherent. Furthermore, if the eye did operate by contact, then it would see the ointments or lancets applied to the eye, although they be very near, and it would see [things] clearly far in the distance. Now this cannot be, and thus this [position] is incoherent.

§61. Moreover, if the eye sees its object by going [to it], then does it go to the place of the object after having seen [that] object or without having [first] seen it? To show that both [hypotheses] are faulty [Āryadeva] states:

If the eye went out to the form after having seen it, then there would be absolutely no advantage in going. Or alternatively, [if the eye went out to the object without having first seen it], then it would be false that one would definitely [see] what one wished to see.⁽³⁹⁹⁾ (k.314)

§62. If it was thought that the eye goes out to the place of the [visual] form after having seen the form, then the eye would have absolutely no need to go [to the form] by means of this movement.⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾ Indeed, the eye would move in order to see its object, but this object was already seen earlier by the [sense organ] which remained here; so there would be absolutely no need for [the eye] to move. But if [the eye] went [out to its object] without having first seen it, then it definitely would not manage to see the object which it wished to see. For, given that it had not first seen [the object], it would be going to an unindicated place, just like a blind man. Therefore it definitely would not manage to see what it was supposed to see.

D. Refuting aprāpyakāritvavāda — no contact between the object and the organ

§63. However, wishing to avoid this fault, if [one then said that] *the eye apprehends [its object] without going out [to it], then it would see the whole universe. There is nothing which is far away or hidden for something which is without any movement. (k.315)*

§64. When someone thinks that the eye does not come into contact with its object because the scripture says, "The eye, ear and mind do not come into contact with their objects", we reply to him that there is in fact no contradiction with scripture, for [the scriptural passage] is above all concerned with negating the mere [proposition] that [these sense organs] operate by contact.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾ Affirmation (*vidhi*) is predominant wherever it is not contradicted; negation (*pratiṣedha*) is predominant wherever it is not contradicted. So, given that affirmation is not possible here, then the proposition that [these sense organs] do not come into contact with their objects (*aprāptaviśayatva*) is established as just simply negating that they operate by contact (*prāptakāritā*).

§65. If, however, one construes "not coming into contact with the object" (*aprāptaviśayatva*) as an affirmation, then [we reply that] the eye, which just remains here [immobile], would see the whole universe. Indeed, how could anything be far away for it when it does not move? For, without going [anywhere], it ought to see an object far in the distance just as well as one which is nearby. So though [the object] might be far away, there would be no difference. Since [the eye] sees without going [anywhere], it would see [things] far in the distance just as if they were right here. Similarly, it would see hidden things too.⁽⁴⁰²⁾ For indeed, if there is movement, then when something is hidden, there are obstacles to movement, and thus it would be coherent to say that one does not see what is hidden. However, since things are to be

seen without [the eye] going [anywhere], then there would be no obstacle to movement when something is hidden, and thus it would be seen just as when it is not hidden.

E. Sight is not the nature (svabhāva) of the eye

§66. Now, if the eye had sight as its nature (*svabhāva*), then it would also see itself, for nowhere would the nature be impeded. Indeed, in the world,
the nature of all entities is first seen in [the entities] themselves.⁽⁴⁰³⁾ Why then would the eye itself not apprehend the eye?⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾ (k.316)

§67. Just as the fragrance of yellow magnolia⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾, jasmine or other such [flowers] is first of all perceived in their own loci [i.e. in the flowers themselves] and is then later also [perceived] in oils and such things in which it is mixed, and just as fire's heat [first] exists due to [the fire] itself and is [then] also perceived in other things because they come into contact with it, so similarly if the eye had sight as its nature, then it would first of all see itself. Why then does the eye itself not apprehend the eye? Now, since the nature of entities is first and foremost in [the entities] themselves, the eye itself ought to apprehend the eye. [However] the eye does not [in fact] see itself, and thus it is also inconceivable that it sees other things, just as [for example] lumps of earth and so forth [do not have sight as their natures and cannot see other things either.]

F. Refuting the Buddhist's three conditions for vision

§68. As for the opinion that it is not just the eye alone which has the power to see form, but that one sees form when the three [factors], the eye, form, and the eye consciousness, come together⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾, this is also inconsistent. Since
the eye has no consciousness, consciousness no [organ of] sight⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾ [and] form has neither the one nor the other, how can these [three] see form? (k.317)

§69. First of all, the eye has no consciousness. For, the eye does not cognize an object, as it is unconscious in essence. Indeed, the eye is derived from the elements (*bhautika*).⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ Since it is inert matter (*jada*), it cannot have any comprehension of an object. Thus,

"the eye has no consciousness."

§70. Nor does consciousness have [an organ of] sight either.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾ It is not physical (*gzugs can* = *rūpavat*; *rūpin*), so how could it have [an organ of] sight? Lacking an [organ of sight], then like a blind man, it does not see.⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ As for form it has neither the one nor the other: it does not have consciousness in that it does not have comprehension as its own essence; nor does it have [an organ of] sight, for it does not [itself] perceive form.⁽⁴¹¹⁾ Now, when the sense organs, objects and consciousnesses are thus defective with regard to their mutual purpose, then it can be supposed that even

if they are brought together, they still will not see form. The point is that [they will not see even when brought together] because their [necessary] factors for seeing form are defective, just like a group of blind men [will not see either].

G. Critique of sounds and words

§71. Now, when seeing form is thus impossible, then which person who knows the truth could ever say that form is seen or could see it himself? Just as the person who knows the truth cannot see form, he will also be equally unable to hear sound, for in the same way as [it is impossible] to see form, it is impossible to hear sounds.

§72. In this vein, if sound is heard, then would it be heard after having reached (*saṃprāpta*) the locus of hearing [i.e. the ear], or without having reached it? On the first [hypothesis], if [a sound] is heard when it has reached [the ear], then when it is going to the locus of hearing would it make sounds⁽⁴¹²⁾ or would it go soundlessly? Taking the former idea, then

if sound went while speaking, why wouldn't it become a speaker (vaktṛ)? On the other hand, if it went without speaking, then how would there be any knowledge (pratyaya)⁽⁴¹³⁾ of it? (k.318)

§73. So because it is a speaker, like Devadatta, it is not a sound. However, if it went without speaking, then who could have the certainty that it was a sound, as this sound would go soundlessly? Nor could something unapprehended exist, and thus this [hypothesis] is absurd.

§74. What is more,

if sound is apprehended after it has reached [the ear] then what apprehends the beginning (ādi)⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ of the [sound]? Moreover, sound does not go alone (kevala)⁽⁴¹⁵⁾; how could it be apprehended alone? (k.319)

If sound is apprehended after it has reached the locus of the ear organ, then

"what apprehends the beginning of the [sound]?"

Since sound is apprehended after contact [with the ear], there would be no apprehension of a sound's beginning. Nor could any other sense organ serve to apprehend it — thus its beginning would not be apprehended by anything at all.⁽⁴¹⁶⁾ Consequently, being unapprehended, this [beginning moment] would not be a sound at all — such is the point [of the verse].

§75. Moreover, since an atom of sound has nine substances,⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

"sound does not go alone."

Now, you say that it is just sound, and nothing else, which is apprehended by the ear; smells and so forth are not. This is incoherent. Either sound must be unapprehended, or smells and the other [substances] must be apprehended too. But such is not the case, and thus sound is not the object which is contacted.

§76. [Objection:] But as for what you said [in k.319], viz.

"If sound is apprehended after it has reached [the ear] then what apprehends the beginning of the [sound]?"

what fault is there then if the beginning of the [sound] is not apprehended? [Reply:] The fault is that its very nature of being a sound is destroyed. Indeed,
insofar as a sound is not heard, it will not be a sound. And that a non-sound also ends up being a sound is absurd. (k.320)

§77. What is not heard is not a sound at all, for it is not being heard, like smells and other such [inaudible] things. Suppose you think that *when* it is heard, then *at that time* it will be a sound. This also must be considered to be impossible. For, smells and the like are not observed to become sounds later, and in precisely the same fashion, it is absurd that this non-sound too [viz. the beginning moments] would later become a sound.

§78. As the Illustrious One stated [in the *Upāliparipṛcchā*]:

"Also, when one hears an agreeable sound, it never penetrates inside. Nor does one perceive its movement. Rather, it is due to conceptualization (*kalpa*) that sound arises."⁽⁴¹⁸⁾

And similarly [in the *Lalitavistara*]:

"E.g. in reliance upon strings, wood and manual effort, then by the conjunction of [these] three [factors], musical instruments such as *tuṇa* and *vīṇā* ("lutes") issue a sound which arises due to these [factors]. But should a wise person search as to where it comes from and where it goes, then when he searches in all directions and intermediate directions, he does not find sound's going nor its coming."⁽⁴¹⁹⁾

H. Critique of the mind (*manas*)

§79. After having thus first of all shown that the sense organs are incapable of apprehending objects, [Āryadeva] now states the following to show that the mind (*manas*) is also incapable of apprehending objects:

Even having gone out [to the object], what will the mind (citta) accomplish without the sense organs? (k.321ab)

§80. If it is thought that the mind goes out to the locus of the object and then discriminates this object, this [idea] is absurd. In that case, the mind in question would go to the locus of the object either accompanied by the sense organs or alone. Now, first of all, it does not go accompanied by the sense organs, for sense organs always remain only in the vicinity of the body, and if they were to go [with the mind], it would follow absurdly that the body would be missing its sense organs.

§81. However, if [the mind] goes out [to its object] alone, then again,

"even having gone out [to the object], what will the mind accomplish without the sense organs?"

Indeed, when the [mind] has been deprived of the sense organs such as the eyes, which are its means of access⁽⁴²⁰⁾, it is incapable of seeing form and the like, for [otherwise] it would follow absurdly that the blind and other [people whose sense organs are damaged] would also in fact have sight and the other [types of perceptions].

§82. Moreover, if it was thought that the [mind] in one way or another perceives an entity by going out to the locus of the object, then too, given that [the mind] would never stop [going out] because the cognition of entities has no end,⁽⁴²¹⁾ *in that case, why wouldn't the living being in question be forever mindless?* (k.321cd)

§83. The self would become perpetually insentient. Now, it is not reasonable to suppose that something insentient has a self, for it is insentient, like pillars and other such [material] things. So in conclusion, the sense organs, objects and consciousnesses, if they are examined by means of logical reasonings, cannot be real, and hence their essences are not established.⁽⁴²²⁾ If the essences of these [sense organs, objects, etc.] were established, then when [these entities] are examined by reasonings, they would be perceived perfectly clearly according to their essences as [these essences] are. But they are not so perceived. Therefore, it is shown that they are void of nature.

I. Discussion of "notions" (saṃjñā)

§84. Objection: In that case, if the [sense organs, the objects and the consciousnesses] did not have anything which could be called a nature, then how could one teach that the notion (saṃjñā), which has as its nature their specific individuations (pariccheda), is the cause for establishing the various entities. Reply: If entities existed, then a notion, which has as its nature the specific individuation of the [entity] would exist. Now, since it is shown that these entities do not exist, then how could the essence [of this notion]⁽⁴²³⁾ be established through them?

§85. Objection: So then is there absolutely no individuation of objects? [Reply:] No, we can say that it is not inexistent, for things exist without natures. Indeed, *the object which is apprehended by the mind is [in fact something which was] seen earlier [and is] like a mirage.*⁽⁴²⁴⁾ *This [consciousness] is termed the 'aggregate of notions' (saṃjñāskandha) for the [different] determinations of all dharmas.* (k.322)

§86. In this regard, when visual consciousness ceases, after having arisen in dependence upon the eye and form, it ceases along with the sense organs and the objects. This [consciousness] having ceased, the very object which had been seen earlier is [then] apprehended later by the mind.⁽⁴²⁵⁾

§87. Objection: But how could one admit that something which is not present is being apprehended? [Reply:] 'Like a mirage', says [Āryadeva]. Although there is not

the slightest amount of water in a mirage, still, through the influence of causes and conditions, a notion which has the aspect (*ākāra*) of water does in fact occur. Similarly, even though the object which was apprehended earlier has no essence, like a mirage, the conceptual consciousness (*vikalpakaṃ vijñānam*) which arises is the cause of the [different] determinations of all the dharmas.⁽⁴²⁶⁾ Now, because [the conceptual consciousness] is the cause of the determinations of all dharmas, it is called the "aggregate of notions", for it has the [fivefold] association (*saṃprayoga*) with the various corresponding notions.⁽⁴²⁷⁾ It should be understood that the determination of any dharma is due to the notion, but is not caused by the essence of the entity [in question], for [entities' own] nature (*svabhāva*) is absurd in all cases whatsoever.⁽⁴²⁸⁾

J. The unreality of consciousness

§88. Objection: If that were so, then the aggregate of notions would exist by its nature, for if it did not exist, then one could not determine any dharmas. Reply: The notion is itself also associated with the consciousness, and thus does not exist without the [corresponding] consciousness, while the consciousness, in turn, is unestablished without the notion, and so does not exist by its essence. Also, for the following reason [consciousness] does not exist: because

the mind arises in dependence upon the eye and form⁽⁴²⁹⁾, like an illusion (*māyā*).
(k.323ab)

§89. Indeed, before [its] arising, there is no consciousness which would function as the basis of the action of production. Even when conditions such as the eyes [and form] are present, consciousness, as it has no essence, cannot arise, for the action of production cannot be set in motion.⁽⁴³⁰⁾ Now, this consciousness does [nonetheless] arise. So what can we ascertain other than that it has the quality of an illusion?

§90. The Illustrious One, indeed, said [in the *Samyuttanikāya*]:

"Monks, it is just as if an illusionist or an apprentice illusionist, at the crossroads of four great avenues, exhibited various sorts of magic, such as a corps of elephants, a cavalry corps,⁽⁴³¹⁾ a corps of chariots or an infantry corps. Should a man endowed with vision see that [magic], reflect upon it and properly analyse it, then when he sees it, reflects upon it and analyses it properly, it will appear to him as nonexistent (*asat*), empty (*rikta*), insignificant (*tuccha*) and insubstantial (*asāra*). Why is that? Because he wonders, 'Is there anything substantial in this magical creation?' In precisely the same fashion, whatever consciousness one takes, be it past, future, present, inner or outer, gross or subtle, low or high, be it far away or nearby, should a monk see that [consciousness], reflect upon it and properly analyse it, then when he sees it, reflects upon it and analyses it properly, it will appear to him as nonexistent, empty, insignificant, insubstantial, as a sickness (*roga*), an abscess (*gaṇḍa*), a splinter (*śalya*), as an impurity (*agha*), impermanent (*anitya*), painful (*duḥkha*),

void (*śūnya*) and selfless (*anātman*). Why is that? Because he wonders, 'Is there anything substantial in this aggregate of consciousness?'⁽⁴³²⁾

§91. When one examines⁽⁴³³⁾ it in just the way in which it is perceived, then it can be ascertained that consciousness resembles a young girl [created by magical] illusions in that it [too] does not have any essence. So therefore it was completely accurate [to assert that]

"the mind arises in dependence upon the eye and form, like an illusion."

If, however, the [mind] did have an essence, then

what has true existence (k.323c)

essentially,

could not be said to be an illusion. (k.323d)

§92. Indeed, in the world one could not say that a woman, who is not void of nature [and] exists, is an illusion. Similarly, as consciousness would also exist by its essence, it would not be comparable to an illusion. But it is [in fact] taught that consciousness *is* comparable to an illusion. So consciousness [must] be without any nature. And when consciousness has no nature, it is then established that a notion associated with a consciousness which lacks nature [must itself] be without any nature.

§93. The Illustrious One said [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*]:

"The notion is taught to be an apprehension which has knowledge as its aim. But this notion does not apprehend anything; it is shown to have separation as its aim."

"The notion consists in separation; [its] indication consists in separation. Now, when one knows the nature of notions, then accordingly the notion will not occur."⁽⁴³⁴⁾

"He to whom the notion 'We will abandon such a notion' occurs, is engaged in the proliferation of notions, [but] will not be delivered from notions."

"Of what does the notion arise? By what is a notion produced? By what is the notion perceived? By what is it stopped?"

"The Buddha has not found any dharma of which a notion arises. You should think of this point and thus notions will not occur."

K. Replying to the charge that the *Madhyamaka* is simply counterintuitive

§94. Objection: It is astonishing that on the one hand sense faculties can in no way apprehend objects and that on the other hand consciousness is produced in dependence upon the eye and various forms.

§95. Reply: Is this the only astonishing thing that you have observed? Aren't the following astonishing: a sprout cannot reasonably arise from a seed which has ceased, nor from one which has not ceased, and yet the sprout does [indeed] arise in dependence upon the seed; similarly, an act (*karman*) which has been performed and accumulated, once it has ceased cannot abide anywhere, but nonetheless, from an act whose cessation happened hundreds of thousands of eras ago there does manifestly arise an effect; furthermore, vases and such [objects], if examined as to whether they are identical with or different from their causes, cannot possibly exist, but still, due to dependent designation (*upādāya prajñapti*), they are suitable for performing actions such as containing and scooping honey, water and other such [liquids]? So therefore, *when there is nothing astonishing on earth for the wise, then what is so amazing about the sense organs' comprehension?*⁽⁴³⁵⁾ (k.324)

§96. It is seen that effects conform to their causes, i.e. in cases such as a cow [being born] from a cow, a horse from a horse, rice from rice. But for the elements (*bhūta*), as well as for the [*bhautikas* such as] form, sound and the like, this rule is not seen [to hold]. Thus, because they are apprehended by the corporal sense organ,⁽⁴³⁶⁾ the elements are neither visible nor audible, [and yet] due to them visible forms and audible sounds arise. This is supremely astonishing. The same thing applies to the objects of smell, etc. and also to the eyes and the other organs.

§97. Alternatively, [it could be said that] this fact that the sense organs comprehend objects is *not* a cause for amazement. For, if this strangeness only applied to just the sense organs' comprehension of objects, then it would be a source of amazement. But when absolutely the whole world, as we have said, is amazing for the wise, like Indra's net (*indrajāla*)^(436a), then this [one thing, viz. sense perception] is not [especially] astonishing. What is amazing is when some exceptional, inconceivable thing is perceived, but not something which is uniform everywhere: the fact that fire is hot is nothing amazing at all!

L. Similes for dharmas' mode of existence

1. Explanations

§98. On account of this very reason,
existence,

for the wise,

is like the circle of a whirling firebrand, a magical being, a dream, an illusion, the moon [reflected] in water, mist, an echo in [the mountains], a mirage or clouds⁽⁴³⁷⁾ (k.325)

in that, being without any fixed essence, it transforms in various manners in accordance with conditions.

§99. Just as when one quickly turns a flaming piece of wood, one perceives the aspect of a circle, the sight of the [wood's] movement being the cause of an error, but [nonetheless] there is not the slightest essence of a circle in that [aspect];

§100. Just as magical beings, which are made to come forth by means of special trances (*samādhi*), perform various types of actions and thus produce, by an error of sight and mind, the notion of a truly existent *yogin*,⁽⁴³⁸⁾ but for the *yogins* [themselves] these [magical beings] are not really existent in that they are without minds, mental factors and sense organs;

§101. Just as a body in a dream, which is conditioned by a body which has a consciousness associated with [the mental factor] sleep, causes the error of attachment to the self, as does a body in an awakened state,⁽⁴³⁹⁾ but this [body] is not really existent because someone who is awake does not see it like that;

§102. Just as the magically created young girls caused by the illusionist's talismans only have the purpose of bewildering the minds of those unaware as to what these ['girls'] are and come into being void of any really existent women;

§103. Just as the moon [reflected] in water, but void of any really existent moon, is produced as [a moon] because of dependent arising, and causes the erroneous perception of a moon for infantile people;

§104. Just as the mist which is produced simply due to dependent arising in reliance upon the appropriate times, places and causal factors will cause an erroneous perception of really existent smoke for those who are far away;

§105. Just as an echo in [places] such as mountain caverns and hollows arises dependently and gives rise to ignorant people's presumption of a really existent sound;

§106. Just as a mirage, conditioned by the rays of the sun which are concentrated together at a particular place and time, lacks any essence of water but gives rise to erroneous perception of water for those who are far away;

§107. Just as clouds in the distance produce an erroneous perception which has the aspect of mountains and such things;

§108. So, similarly, for the wise, who are well-versed in the nature of dependent arising as it is, the ocean of births — which starts with consciousness, which is conditioned by the karma projected by errors of ignorance, which arises along with the external receptacle, and which, like a whirling firebrand's circle and such things, is false and deceptive (*mṛṣā moṣadharmaka*) and completely void of nature — seems like a trick for the infantile. Now, those who know the nature of dharmas come to rely on deliverance, thanks to the complete elimination of attachment to anything whatsoever. Thus it is established that saṃsāra is without any nature, like a circle of a whirling firebrand and other such [illusory things].

2. Citations

§109. As it was said [in the *Ratnāvalī*]:

"Just as the eye, due to error, apprehends the circle of the whirling firebrand, so the sense organs apprehend objects as if they were present."⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾

And,

§110. According to the *Ratnakūṭa[sūtra]*, while the Sage was not yet in *pari-nirvāṇa*, two monks, who were without the quality of being true monks, dispelled the darkness of bewilderment of the five hundred monks by the sunlight of the excellent doctrine stated by the Great Sage.⁽⁴⁴¹⁾

Similarly [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*],

§111. "Just as in a dream a young girl sees her son born and die and when he was born she was extremely joyful but when he died she was in a state of sadness, so you should know all dharmas."⁽⁴⁴²⁾

"Just as an illusionist magically creates forms such as various chariots [drawn by] elephants and chariots [drawn by] horses, but no chariot whatsoever is [in fact] observed there, so you should know all dharmas."

"Just as with a clear sky the moon's reflection is seen in a limpid lake, but the moon does not move into the water, so you should know that all dharmas have that character."

"Just as echoes of inaccessible mountain streams in rocky hollows dependently arise, so you should understand all conditioned phenomena; all the world is like an illusion and a mirage."

"Just as at midday in the hot season a man might wander consumed by thirst [and] see a mirage as a pond, so you should know all dharmas."

"In a mirage there is not [actually] any water, [but] this confused person wants to drink it. One cannot drink unreal water. So you should know all dharmas."

"Just as when there is not a single cloud in the sky and yet in an instant a circle of clouds appears and one should understand where they came from originally, so you should know all dharmas."

"Just like a city of Gandharvas, a mirage, like an illusion or like a dream, characters created mentally but empty of nature, so you should know all dharmas."

§112. Thus ends the thirteenth chapter in the *Bodhisattvayogācāracaṭuṣṭaka*, entitled "The Refutation of the Sense Organs and [their] Objects".

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATIONS

(1) *zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* 諸法性相 — a term with many uses. See en. 47 for extensive explanations. Note that while the term can be used to refer simply to the ultimate character of dharmas, as we see in en. 47 b), in Vijñānavāda contexts it frequently means the ultimate nature *plus* the conventional "character". It is this use of *xìng xiāng* that we find for example in Chapter VIII of Dharmapāla's commentary, T. 1571 x 245b17: *zhū fǎ xìng xiāng sú yǒu zhēn wú* 諸法性相俗有真無 "The nature and character of all dharmas is to exist conventionally but to be ultimately inexistent." See en. 114 and §220a24.

(2) Cf. AK viii, LVP p. 193 and n. 2. According to the *Vyākhyā*, *jñāna* is a conceptual (*vikalpa*) type of discernment (*prajñā*) associated with mental consciousness (*manovijñānasamprayuktā*), whereas *darśana* is a non-conceptual discernment. In the extensive references given in the remainder of de la Vallée Poussin's n. 2, *jñānadarśana* is explained in terms of its worldly dimension (viz. understanding the past, the present and the future as well as previous lives) and in terms of enlightenment or deliverance (*vimukti*). In its latter use *jñānadarśana* is understood as part of the "super-knowledge which realizes an understanding [capable of] destroying defilements" (*āsravakṣayajñānasākṣātkārābhijñā*). Cf. AK vii, p. 100, n. 2 (*Vyākhyā*): *vimuktasya vimukto 'smṛti jñānadarśanam bhavati / kṣīṇā me jātir yāvan nāparam asmād bhavaṃ prajānāmṛti / iyaṃ ucyate āsravakṣayajñānasākṣātkārābhijñā*. Cf. also the *Yogācārabhūmi*, transl. Xuán zàng, xii, 15; found in *Fǎ xiāng dà cí diǎn*, p. 903, (*xiū dìng wéi dé zhì jiàn* 修定爲得智見). As for the interpretation of the compound, AK and the Tibetan equivalents in Mvyut (*ye śes mthoñ ba*; *ye śes gzigs pa*) give no real clues. We have, however, followed Nakamura, *Bukkyō-go dai jiten* p. 947, who takes it as an instrumental *atpuruṣa*. For the "unobstructedness of the Buddha's thought" (*apratihatacitta*), cf. *Traité*, I Chapt. XII.

(3) Following Dharmapāla's commentary, *shèng* 勝 = *shèng jiě* 勝解 (*adhi-mukti*).

(4) *shī zī* 師資. Lang (Thesis) p. 435, n. 2, following Tucci, translates this as "the teacher's assistance", which is probably the most plausible interpretation. (The Tibetan translation of the *kārikā* has no correlate to these characters.) However, cf. Nak. p. 544, where the compound is taken in the sense of "master and disciple": *shī zī* 師資 = *shī dì* 師弟. Other uses: *shī zī xiāng chéng* 師資相承 "master-disciple transmission".

(5) This may refer to AK vii (LVP pp. 108 and n. 2), where we find a discussion of three super-knowledges (*abhijñā*) which are characterized as *sākṣātkriyāvidyā*, and which come about "in [their proper] order" (*yathākramam*). In brief, according to AK, the point is that the *abhijñā* known as the "remembrance of past lives" (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñānasākṣātkārābhijñā*) dispels errors relative to the past, the *abhijñā* consisting in the understanding of birth and death (*cyutyupapādajñānasākṣātkārābhijñā*

or *divyacakṣus*, "divine eye") dispels errors relative to the future, and the *abhijñā* consisting in the understanding which eliminates defilements (*āsravakṣayaññānasākṣāt-kārābhijñā*) dispels the errors relative to the present. By the first one sees the suffering of self and others, by the second, one experiences disgust at such suffering, and thus on the basis of these two *abhijñā*, one produces the third and comes to understand the bliss of nirvāṇa. For references for the usual sixfold classification of *abhijñā*, in which these three are included, see Dantinne (1983) pp. 271-272, note z.

(6) Namely, Pūraṇa Kāśyapa, Maskarin Gośālīputra, Ajita Keśakambalin, Kakuda Kātyāyana, Nirgrantha Jñātiputra, Saṃjayin Vairāṭiputra. See *Inde classique* §§2241-2. See Vogel (1970) for a translation of the relevant portions in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* concerning the doctrines of the six heretics.

(7) zhòng 中 "hits", "attains".

(8) As Dharmapāla's commentary makes clear, Āryadeva is referring here to the four noble truths.

(9) See en. 32 on *pariyavasthāna*.

(10) *avidyā*, *pramāda* and *middha* are mental factors (*caitta*). *pramāda*: see AK ii, LVP p. 162, and p. 157 for *apramāda*; also AK iv pp. 45, 85. *middha*: AK ii p. 168; v pp. 99-100. *avidyā*: see e.g. May (1959) n. 586.

(11) The Tibetan of k. 278 differs here and does not speak about *sūnyatā* (*ston pa űid*). Tucci (1925), p. 546 as well as Lang (Thesis) p. 436, n. 10, translate zhēn 眞 separately as *vero* / "true"; this, however, seems unnecessary in light of the fact Hirakawa (p. 272) attests that Xuán zàng renders *sūnyatā* by zhēn kōng, and that Paramārtha apparently also followed suit, rendering *sūnyatā* by zhēn kōng lǐ 眞空理 .

(12) Following the Japanese translation, I have added bù 不 in front of wéi 唯 . See Kyik *Chūgan-bu* iii, 314.13 and n. 12.

(13) Cf. LVP (1932) on Āryadeva and Dharmapāla's conception of nirvāṇa.

(14) In Chapter II (= CS X) on the refutation of the *ātman*.

(15) yín 淫 — or with the radical for "woman", as in our text — has a sexual sense often translating Skt. *maithuna* or *kāma*, a sense which seems unlikely if we are speaking about children. It does, however, also mean "excessive", and can be taken as a verb meaning "to go to excess", "to indulge in" or "to be addicted to", as we see in its Modern Japanese use as *insuru*. This meaning is very similar to dān 耽 , and hence

would give us a parallelism between the two groups of four characters *yín luàn mí xīn* and *dān miǎn sè shēng*.

(16) As Tucci (p. 547, n. 1) points out, *yīn* 因 "cause" is explained by Dharmapāla as meaning *fāng biàn* 方便 = *upāya*, i.e. "method", "means".

(17) Cf. Skt. k. 279. *Qīng liáng* literally means "coolness", which does, however, concord with the well-attested Buddhist image of *nirvāṇa*, or peace, as being a cool respite from the fire of the passions (*kleśa*). Cf. *Vinaya* i, 34: *sabbam ādittam* ("all is aflame"); and Pr. 497.6-7, May (1959) p. 232, where *nirvāṇa* without remainder (*nir-upadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) is characterized as a rainfall which puts out the fire of suffering.

(18) *Fā xīn* 發心 is usually *cittotpāda* ("generating the mind of enlightenment"), which makes little sense given Dharmapāla's contempt for the Outsiders. More likely, it is translating something like *samārambha*. Cf. Nak. p. 1257a.

(19) Quotation unidentified. The four fruits of religious practice are "stream enterer" (*srotaāpanna*), "once returner" (*sakṛdāgāmin*), "non-returner" (*anāgāmin*) and *arhat*. See LVP's "Note sommaire sur le chemin" in AK v, pp. iv-xi, in particular pp. vi-vii, ix-x; also Lamotte, *Traité* I p. 130, n. 1 for the steps leading up to "stream entering" (*srotaāpatti*); AK vi pp. 194-277 for *srotaāpanna*, etc. and pp. 241-2 for *śrā-manyaphala*; Nak. 514b; Pr. 484.6-7, 485.8-487.4; May (1959) pp. 216-218 and n. 739.

(20) I.e. in chapters I (= CS IX) and III (= CS XI) respectively.

(21) Cf. §222a21, p. 123.

(22) More common is *bù xiāng lí* 不相離 = *aviyukta*, or *avinābhāva* ("necessarily connected"). It would seem that it is especially the Vaiśeṣika school which is being singled out here. The argument is similar to that in PV II k. 220 et seq. where Dharmakīrti argues against the Vaiśeṣika's idea of the *ātman* existing separately by saying that "necessarily when one is attached to the self, one will not be free of its possessions". *niyamenātmani snihyaṃs tadīye na virajyate* /. Cf. PVV ad k. 222 (= 220 in Miyasaka's edition): *yady apy ātmani snehavān tathāpy ātmīye sukhāsādhane vairāgyān na saṃsaratīti cet / naitad yuktaṃ yata ātmani snihyan prīyamāṇas tadīya ātmīye sukhāsādhane niyamena na virajyate 'bhiṣvajaty eva, tat katham ātmīyavirāgān muktiḥ / ātmasnehasyātmīyavairāgyavirodhivāt*.

(23) Cf. for example Praśastapāda (p. 70.10-12), who holds that intelligence, pleasure, suffering, desire, hate, effort, merit, demerit, conditioning, number, size, separateness, contact and disjunction are all qualities belonging to the self. *tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādvēṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṃkhyāparimāṇaprathaktva-saṃyogavibhāgāḥ* /.

(24) A valid homologous example should possess both the property to be proved (*sādhya**dharma*) and the property which constitutes the reason (*hetu*). Failure to possess these properties leads to a fallacy of the example (*ḍṣṣāntābhāsa*). Cf. NP 3.3.1 for the five possible fallacies of the homologous example. See also Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1921-1971) pp. 296-297 and NM, k. 11 pp. 36 et seq. in Tucci and pp. 62 et seq. in Katsura (1981).

In Dharmapāla's reasoning, the subject (*dharmīn*) would be "qualities such as suffering, pleasure, etc.", the *sādhya**dharma* would be "not being absent in the self in nirvāṇa" and the reason would be "being a possession of the self". The opponent could not try to assert that there is a *ḍṣṣāntābhāsa*, for the example, "the nature of the self", would indeed not be absent in the self in nirvāṇa and would also be a possession of the self. Cf. the subsequent argumentation, where it is said that if the self at any time lacked its nature, it would simply be nonexistent.

(25) If the adversary asserts that the self has no nature — which is tantamount to saying that it is nonexistent — this statement will obviously contradict his previous position. NM gives five ways in which the thesis (*zōng* 宗 = *pakṣa*) can be contradicted: by one's own words; by one's previous position; by generally recognized statements; by direct perception or by inference. See NM, T. 1628 p. 1a, 15-21; Tucci pp. 6-7; Katsura (1977) pp. 113-115. NP 3.1 has roughly the same five and then adds four other fallacies to come to a total of nine *pakṣābhāsa* in all. For a thorough study, see the article by Masahiro Inami, "On *pakṣābhāsa*", forthcoming in the proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna.

Note that there are various formulations of the requirement that the thesis must be free from contradiction. Cf. PSVa 43a6-b2. NM k. 1 defines the thesis as: *svayaṃ sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ*. ("The thesis is something which [the proponent] himself intends to be proven [and which is] not negated by a contradicting proposition.") Skt. found in PVV ad PV IV, k. 86. Dharmakīrti in PV IV k. 86 et seq. shows that this formulation is not essentially different from the definition of the thesis in PS III, k. 2; see our fn. 49. For the argumentation in PV IV on these definitions, see Tillemans, "Pramāṇavārttika IV and its commentaries", forthcoming in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, volume on Mahāyāna Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

(26) For the use of the term *ākṣepahetu*, cf. MAV ad 11cd, ed. Nagao 22.5. Other references found in Nak. p. 326d and *Fā xiāng dà cí diǎn*, vol. 1, p. 1037, which gives references from the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*. The term is usually understood in the context of the ten causes, and means the latent karmic seeds (*bīja*) which will "propel" or "project" forth their results when other conditions are also present. Cf. *Siddhi* II, pp. 453-463, and p. 456 in particular. See also LVP (1913), p. 66: "*ākṣepahetu*, a. semences actuelles d'*avidyā*, etc., qui 'projetent' la renaissance [...]." In the passage from Dharmapāla, however, it seems that it is not strictly speaking the

latent *bījas* which are being discussed, but rather various *actions*, and hence the term is probably being employed in a less rigorous and technical fashion.

(27) For *vikurvaṇa*, see AK vii, p. 112, n. 3 and references therein: *vikurvaṇa* is classified as one of the ten sorts of *ṛddhi*. Cf. Mvyut section XXVI (*bodhisattvabalāni*) where *vikurvaṇabala* is classified as one of the ten powers of a bodhisattva. See also BHSD p. 481 s.v. *vikurvaṇa* and *Siddhi* II p. 633. Note that *shén biàn* can also equal *shén tōng* 神通 (*ṛddhi*). Cf. Nak. p. 795b. For *ṛddhi*, see AK vii p. 98, n. 1; pp. 112, 122; *Siddhi* II, pp. 792-4; *Traité* I p. 382, n. 2a.

(28) In k. 280 *parokṣa* is rendered into Chinese by *shēn shì* 深事. Thus, *shēn* 甚深 could reasonably translate *atyantaparokṣa* here, although the usual equivalence is *gambhīra*. See Chapter II, B. p. 31 and Tillemans (1986a), pp. 37-38 and n. 21.

(29) Viz. those of body, speech and mind.

(30) To avoid an irritating over-repetition of the same hyperbolical superlatives, I have had to translate *wú liáng* 無量 in different ways: "immeasurable", "myriad".

(31) On these terms, see May (1959) n. 89, 581 for their general sense and numerous references to AK, *Siddhi* and *Traité*. Note that the Epistemological school, to which Dharmapāla very probably belonged, had a special position on *vikalpa*, understanding it as a process of associating a name with a thing, and thus creating distinctions such as substance, universals, etc. See en. 367.

(32) For *anuśaya* and *kleśa* ("passions"), see en. 87. The *Abhidharmakośa* speaks of eight and also ten ensnarements (*pariyavasthāna*); see AK v, LVP p. 90 et seq.; see PSP p. 137.18-26 and Lamotte, *Traité* I p. 424 for the ten: anger (*krodha*), hypocrisy (*mraṁśa*), torpor (*styāna*), sloth (*middha*), regret (*kauṛṭya*), frivolity (*auddhatya*), disrespect (*āhrīkyā*) impudence (*anapatrāpya*), avarice (*mātsarya*) and envy (*īṣyā*). While the Vaibhāṣika accept ten *pariyavasthāna*, there are also references to five hundred! See *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. *Bonnō*, p. 124 and *Traité* I p. 424, n. 3. Edgerton and others tend to translate the term as "possession", "obsession", which is a sense of the Skt., but is not clearly reflected in the Tibetan and Chinese. Lamotte translates *pariyavasthāna* as *enveloppements*, which captures the sense of the Chinese ("bind"; "fetter") and the Tibetan *kun nas dkris pa* ("wrap up completely"; "ensnare"), but is perhaps a bit anomalous in formulae such as "the strong envelopings of the passions". I opt for "ensnarements", which seems to me closer to the Tibetan and Chinese. Finally, note that, following PSP and *Traité*, any passion can be termed *pariyavasthāna* in that it ensnares or fetters the mind and thus makes an obstacle to virtue. PSP p. 137.18-19: *kun nas 'khri śin sems la thams cad du dkris nas gnas pas kun nas dkris pa ste / dge ba'i phyogs la 'jug pa'i bar chad byed pa 'ñid do ||*

(33) Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 317.1) has *rú* 如 instead of *yán* 言

(34) For *quān fāng biàn* and *shàn quān fāng biàn*, see Nak. pp. 434b and 849c respectively; see Lamotte (1962) n. 68 for two sorts of *upāyakaṣāya*. The idea that only voidness or *nirvāṇa* is really true and that all else is false is supported by numerous references. Cf. *Majjhima* III 245.19-21: *etaṃ hi bhikkhu paramaṃ ariya saccaṃ yadidaṃ amosadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ*. Sanskrit in Pr. 41.4-5: *etad hi bhikṣavaḥ paramaṃ satyaṃ yad uta amoṣadharma nirvāṇaṃ sarvasaṃskārās ca mṛṣā moṣadharmāṇaḥ*. Transl.: "Indeed, Monks, this is the ultimate truth: what is non-deceptive in character, *nirvāṇa*. Now, all conditionings are false and deceptive in character." Cf. M. av 119, 17-19 ed. LVP for the same passage with a few variants. MMK XIII, 1: *tan mṛṣā moṣadharma yad bhagavān ity abhāṣata / sarve ca moṣadharmāṇaḥ saṃskārās tena te mṛṣā* // Elaboration on the above sūtra passage in Pr. ad MMK XIII, 1. My thanks to C. Scherrer-Schaub for references.

(35) The Japanese translator (Kyik p. 317.8) preferred to read *shì suǒ shì* 識所識 and *yán suǒ yán* 言所言 as conjunctive compounds, i.e. "consciousness and what is known", "words and what they express". This version fits less well with the preceding statement and with the subsequent argumentation, where Dharmapāla only refutes what is understood by consciousness and what is expressed by words.

(36) The argument here is reminiscent of Dignāga's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika position that one and the same substance can be grasped by means of two different sense perceptions. See PSVa 19b3 (PSVb 100b2) et seq: *gal te yaṅ rdzas gcig pa dbaṅ po du ma'i gzuṅ bya yin no 'ze na...* transl. Hattori (1968a) p. 44 et seq. In brief, Dignāga argued that the different senses, like sight, touch, etc., apprehend different objects, viz. colour, warmth and so forth. If the object of these different perceptions was the same then various absurdities would follow: there would be no difference between visual qualities such as colour and tactile qualities such as warmth; visual perception should be able to grasp tactile qualities; the variety of the senses would be pointless, etc. etc. In Dharmapāla's argument, the "object" of perception (*jìng* 境) which he is investigating and refuting is an external object (such as a vase, etc.). He then argues that because such an "object" would absurdly be many different and contradictory things according to the sense perceptions, it is unreal.

(37) a) The terms *shí* 實 and *shí yǒu* 實有 admit of numerous Skt. equivalents in H., just as the Chinese itself has various nuances ("real"; "substantial"; "true"; "in fact existent", "actual") according to the different contexts. I also translate *shí* according to context. Be all this as it may, it should be borne in mind that for the Buddhist, "substantially existent", "real", "true", etc. are synonyms.

b) For Buddhist Epistemologists the meaning of a word (*śabdārtha*) is always a conceptually created fiction, because it is a type of universal applying to several distinct things, and is thus not a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) which has its own unique

essence (*svarūpa*). Cf. PV III 287: *śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā / svarūpaṃ ca na śabdārthas...* "Wherever it apprehends a word-meaning, that consciousness is a conceptualization. Nor does a word-meaning have its own essence..." Now, Dharmapāla is using a variety of the "neither one nor many" reasoning (*ekānekaviyogahetu*), where it is argued that a whole, such as a forest, cannot be identical to, or in some way exist in the parts (viz. the trees), because it is one thing and the parts are many different things. See Chapt. III, B. pp. 63-64 and fn. 133, 134. In the Epistemological school, this style of reasoning is adapted to refute the reality of universals by treating the universal as a kind of whole and its instances as being analogous to parts. Thus, the universal, which is one thing, cannot be present in many instances (*anekavṛtti*). See PVV ad PV IV, k. 12 translated in Tillemans (1986b) pp. 156-159 and n. 62 for the corresponding PVin passages (i.e. P. 286a4-8). Prajñākaragupta's PVBh ad PV IV k. 12 gives a long elaboration of this style of argumentation in the Epistemological school, using it to refute, *inter alia*, the Naiyāyika's notion of time (*kāla*) and universals. Finally, see Tillemans (1982), (1983), (1984c) for Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamika uses of the different varieties of the "neither one nor many" reasoning, and in particular, its use in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, where it serves to refute all types of entities, be they espoused by Buddhists or non-Buddhists.

(38) Usually *zōng* would mean "the whole" or "the collection" (*samudāya*), but here the use of this term is somewhat different as witnessed by the subsequent discussion. What is at stake are universals rather than wholes or collections. Cf. Nak. p. 876: *zōng* = *sāmānya* and Tib. (Mvyut. 4443) *spyi* ("universal"). See also en. 43, 72.

(39) Taking the Vaiśeṣika standpoint, number (*saṃkhyā*) is one of the qualities (*guṇa*); "two and all the rest" (*dvitvādi*) is cited as an example of qualities inhering in their bases, i.e. substances. See VS 1.1.23 and *Praśastapādabdhāya* p. 111 (ed. V.P. Dvivedin): *ekādivyavahārahetuḥ saṃkhyā / sā punar ekadravyā cānekadravyā ca / ... anekadravyā tu dvitvādikā parārdhāntā /*.

(40) *jiǎ shī shè* 假施設 = *jiǎ shè* 假設 = *jiǎ lì* 假立 = *prajñapti*. The term is used to indicate that some expression or notion has no objective counterpart in the world and is in that sense just an invention of language or thought. See en. 363. For the use of *prajñapti* in Madhyamaka contexts, see *Hōbōgirin*, *Chūdō*, p. 462. (There the Chinese term *jiǎ míng* 假名 [= *upādāya prajñapti*] is translated as "nom d'emprunt", "nom provisoire". While *jiǎ* does have a secondary sense of "borrow", its primary sense is "false", "untrue", and it seems to me that this sense might better capture the very frequent and important contrast which we find in Dharmapāla between *jiǎ* versus *shí* 實 ["real"; "true"; "substantial"].)

The Epistemologists, like the Mādhyamikas, also use the term *prajñapti* as meaning a notion or expression with no objective counterpart, although their general doctrinal position obviously differs. See PSVb, P. 97a7, trans. Hattori (1968a) p. 34 and n. 17 for *prajñaptisat* (*btags pa yod pa*) and *dravyasat*. The prime example of a

designation in this system is a universal, whereas the only things which are substantially existent are particulars.

Note that subsequently the Tibetan dGe lugs pa epistemologists went so far as to incorporate this idea of mere invention, or mere designation (*btags pa tsam*), by language or thought in their definition of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (i.e. *spyi msthan*): *sgra rtog gis btags tsam yin gyi rañ mtshan du ma grub pa* (see *bsDus grwa chuñ* p. 7b, ed. T. Kelsang and S. Onoda [1985]). Transl.: "Something which is not established as a particular, but is merely designated by words and thought". A *svalakṣaṇa* (*rañ mtshan*; "particular") is defined as a "dharma which is not merely designated, but exists due to its nature".

Finally, see also the **Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa* (*Qǔ yīn jiǎ shè lùn* 取因假設論 T. 1622) translated in Kitagawa (1973). This text, attributed to Dignāga, speaks of three sorts of designations: wholes (*yōu fēn* 有分 = *avayavin*) continua (*xiāng xù* 相續 = *saṃtāna*) and different states / qualities (*fēn wèi chā bié* 分位差別 = *avasthāviśeṣa*). These "entities" do not themselves have any objective existence or *svabhāva* ("nature"), but are designated in dependence upon other things — probably *svalakṣaṇa* — which do have *svabhāva*. See Hattori (1988) pp. 42-44.

(41) Japanese translation (Kyik p. 317.16) reads *gòng* 共 instead of *jù* 俱 .

(42) Viz. substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*), actions (*karman*), the genus or universals (*sāmānya*), species or particulars (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*). See Frauwallner (1953-56), Vol. II, Potter (1977), Ui (1917), Foucher (1949) and Matilal (1977) for general accounts of the Vaiśeṣika categories. For the nine substances, see en. 61. For *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, see en. 53.

(43) The term is used in two primary senses and has many Sanskrit equivalents: a) *sāmānya*, a "universal" as opposed to particulars (*viśeṣa*) — this is what is at stake in the present context; b) *samudāya*, *samuccaya*, "collection"; "synthesis". See en. 38, 72.

(44) The argument is directed specifically against the Vaiśeṣikas, who held that all reality was subsumable under six categories of entities. A word can designate a number of entities only in virtue of some feature existing distinctly from the entities themselves and serving as grounds (*nimitta*) for applying that word. A problem then arises when we try to find the grounds for applying the most general terms like "*padārtha*": If there is some general nature of *all padārtha*, and if it is indeed something separate from *padārtha*, then it cannot itself be in one of those six categories, and by implication, must be unreal. It is interesting to note that Dharmapāla's argument seems to recur in Dharmakīrti's *Pramānavārttika* III (*pratyakṣa*) k. 158: *padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetum anyañ ṣaṣu* samīkṣate* //. Tib.: *drug rnams la ni tshig don sgra // rgyu gzan gañ la ltos par mthoñ*. *Miyasaka ed.: *ṣaṣkaṃ*. D. Shāstrī reads *ṣaṣu*, which seems preferable in view of Tib. *drug rnams la*. Cf. Tosaki (1979) Vol. I, pp. 256-7, cf. n. 128. Manorathanandin comments: *kiñ cānuyāyī padārthaśabdaḥ ṣaṣu padārtheṣu kaṃ anyañ*

hetuṃ nimittaṃ pravṛttaṃ samīkṣate / na hi śaṭpadārthātiriktaṃ kiṃcid asti //. ICañ *skya grub mtha'* (p. 56 Sarnath ed.) gives a good characterization of this argument against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: *du ma la sgra gcig 'jug pa rgyu mtshan don gzan gyis khyab pa yañ mi 'thad de / tshig gi don drug la dños po zes pa'i sgra gcig 'jug pa yañ tshig gi don drug las gzan pa'i dños po la bltos par thal bar 'gyur pa'i phyir / ci ste de yañ yod do ze na / tshig gi don drug las gzan pa'i šes bya med par smras pa mi 'thad par 'gyur ro // 'di ni rnam 'grel le'u gsum pa'i rigs pa'o /*. "It is also incorrect [to say] that one word's being applied to many [things] must imply grounds [for the designation in question] which are separate objects. For, the same word "entity" applies to [all] six *padārtha*, but it would follow [absurdly] that [the word "entity"] would depend on an entity distinct from the six *padārtha*. [Objection:] Suppose one says that this exists too. [Reply:] Then it would be incorrect to assert that there are no knowables apart from the six *padārtha*. This is an argument in the third chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*."

(45) *xìn jiě* 信解. The term figures repeatedly in this chapter (cf. 216c4, 28; 218a29; 218b2, 9, 14), and judging by the contexts, we conclude that it is probably being used in a general, relatively non-technical sense of "belief" or "conviction", rather than in its normal use as a translation of *śraddhādhimukti* ("faithful application") or *adhimukti* ("zealous application"). What is at stake in 216c4, for example, is simply belief or conviction in the statements found in the scriptures of the Tathāgata, and not *śraddhādhimukti*. Cf. Nak. p. 776a, which does attest the occasional use of *xìn jiě* for *pratyaya* and *sampratyaya* in MAV. Note too that in §215c16, k. 276 and §215c23 that, at least in this chapter, Xuán zàng seems to prefer *shèng jiě* 勝解 for *adhimukti*. For the use of *xìn jiě* in a technical sense as *śraddhādhimukti*, see AK vi LVP p. 196 and 274. The *Abhidharmakośa* makes a difference between two sorts of disciples, an inferior one who applies himself primarily through faith, and a superior one who is possessed of philosophical vision (*dṛṣṭiprāpta*).

(46) Similar passages in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. T. VIII 223 vi 259c20-21; Skt. ed. N. Dutt p. 225, 23-24. Cf. *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, T. V 220 lxvi 309c5.

(47) a) *xìng xiāng* 性相 probably has to be taken here in the sense of *bhāvalakṣaṇa* ("the character of existence"; "the existential character"); see Nak. p. 714. In our en. 1 we saw instances of the term being used to refer to both conventional characters and ultimate natures. Here, however, *zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* 諸法性相 seems to be used much in the same way as the sūtra's use of *zhū fǎ shí xìng* 諸法實性 ("the true nature of all dharmas"), i.e. the ultimate nature of dharmas.

b) *zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* figures in Vijñānavāda literature with a number of different senses: Nak. p. 714bc gives four different uses, the principal three of which treat the compound as conjunctive, i.e. the nature (*xìng* 性) and the character (*xiāng* 相); see Takakusu (1947), chapter on the Hossō doctrine (i.e. Vijñānavāda), which is also known as *shōzōgaku* (= *xìng xiāng xué* 性相學), "the study of the nature and

the characters"; see also D. Shimaji, *Historique du système Vijñaptimātra*, p. 34 in S. Lévi (1932), who explains that the term *xiāng* 相 in such phrases as *xìng xiāng bié guān* 性相別觀 ("separate inspection of the nature and the characters") means the conventional phenomena, while *xìng* is their ultimate nature. As these writers make clear, the conjunctive interpretation of the term is the usual one in Vijñānavāda contexts. We do also find conjunctive uses in this chapter of Dharmapāla; see en. 69, 114 and §220a24.

c) The term does also figure often in the *Guāng bǎi lùn shì lùn* — eg. T. 1571 iii 198b25; iv 206a17; iv 215c14 (see en. 1), v 211b25, viii 230a3 —, but it is unlikely that it must always be taken in a conjunctive sense. Tucci (1925) pp. 529-530 n. 1, in translating Dharmapāla's commentary to CS k. 221, takes the Chinese compound as the equivalent of *bhāvalakṣaṇa*.

d) Finally note that *zhū fǎ shí xìng* and the present usage of *zhū fǎ xìng xiāng* seem to be close to that of the term *zhū fǎ shí xiāng* 諸法實相, which figures again and again in Kumārajīva's translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (*Dà zhì dù lùn* 大智度論), and is, as Lamotte remarks, the pivotal term in this text's explanation of voidness. See *Traité* III, xlii and *ibid.* p. 1501 (quoted below in our en. 138) for a description of this "true character of things". In our text, Dharmapāla, as rendered by Xuán zàng, also uses this term to refer to voidness; see §221c20. It should be noted that the Japanese translator (Kyik p. 318.2) had qualms about our text's use of *xìng xiāng* and chose to read *zhū fǎ fǎ xiāng* 諸法法相, a reading which seems less plausible. At any rate, *dharmāṇām dharmalakṣaṇa*, which literally ought to be rendered as *zhū fǎ fǎ xiāng*, is attested in Nak. 691a as a Sanskrit equivalent, amongst others, of *zhū fǎ shí xiāng*.

(48) For *apratigha* and *sapratigha*, see May (1959) n. 195, 670. *sapratigha*, "having resistance" is a characteristic of form (*rūpa*), i.e. matter. See AK i, LVP p. 51. The point, then, is that voidness, or the true nature of dharmas, is not in any way obstructed or blocked by material things, nor does it itself block them — it is neither *suǒ duì* 所對 nor *néng duì* 能對.

(49) Cf. §217a28, *wú xiāng wú èr gù shuō wéi yī* 無相無二故說爲一. Cf. *Traité* V p. 2345 which speaks of "le Nirvāṇa de caractère unique (*ekalakṣaṇa-nirvāṇa*)".

(50) Here Dharmapāla's thought corresponds quite well to the third of the three "absences of nature" (*wú xìng* 無性 = *niḥsvabhāvatā*) which figure as negative counterparts in connection with the Vijñānavāda doctrine of the three natures (*svabhāva*) or three characters (*trīṇi lakṣaṇāni*) of dharmas. The canonical source for the three absences of nature is *Samādhinirmocanasūtra*, Chapt. VII §2-13 (ed. and transl. Lamotte [1935]; see also *Siddhi* II p. 556ff for the three *niḥsvabhāvatās*, viz. the absence of nature concerning characters (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*), concerning production (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*) and the absence of nature concerning the ultimate (*paramārtha-*

niḥsvabhāvatā). The first *niḥsvabhāva* pertains to *parikalpitasvabhāva* and is the unreality of the thoroughly imagined (*parikalpita*) characters themselves; the second is the unreality of any self-production of dependent phenomena (*paratantra*); the third *niḥsvabhāva* is the ultimate status of dharmas and is the negative correlate of *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* ("the nature which is thoroughly established") — this *niḥsvabhāvatā*, then, equals the real nature of dharmas, a nature which is free of duality, characters and other thoroughly imagined natures (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). Cf. D. Shimaji p. 38 in Lévi (1932). On the three natures, viz. *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*, see our Chapter III B. "Dharmapāla on perception", and *Siddhi* II p. 514ff.

(51) Equivalence attested in H. 423. *bhāvāntara* has the sense of a "reality sui generis". See Stcherbatsky (1930) vol. II, p. 93, n. 4. Dharmapāla is presumably refuting that voidness could be something existing in its own right, over and above the things which are void.

(52) In what follows, Dharmapāla's argumentation against the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas shows many points of similarity with his discussion of these two schools in the *Chéng wéi shí lùn*. Cf. T. 1585 i 2b23-2c22 for the Sāṃkhyas (transl. in *Siddhi* I pp. 23-26) and 2c22-3b7 (transl. *Siddhi* pp. 26-29) for the Vaiśeṣikas.

(53) For the usual six Vaiśeṣika categories, see en. 42. To examine what perception is in general for the Vaiśeṣika, in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* we have a somewhat more complex explanation of perception than the classic definition which can be found in the *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama. In Book III, Kaṇāda speaks of cognitions proceeding from a contact between the mental organ, the self, the sense organ and the object. (Gautama in NS 1.1.4 had just spoken of perception [*pratyakṣa*] as a contact between the object and the sense organs.) VS 3.1.13: *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād* yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*. *Sinha's text leaves out *manas*; see Hattori (1968a) p. 135, n. 4.4. for some textcritical remarks. Note that Candrānanda's *vṛtti* (ed. Jambuvijayaaji p. 27.12) speaks of a "fourfold contact" (*catusṭayasannikarṣa*), as does Dharmapāla in his discussion below (his Chapter V §227b8 et seq.) of the Vaiśeṣika theory of perception. See also en. 60 for Śrīdhara and Praśastapāda on the fourfold contact.

Translation of VS 3.1.13: "That [cognition] which is produced from the contact between the self, the sense organ, the mental organ and the object is other [than fallacious]." Praśastapāda (p. 186) speaks of four sorts of knowledge (*vidyā*): perception, inference, memory and what stems from authority. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is defined as a knowledge arising in dependence on one or more of the organs, including the mental organ: *tatrākṣam akṣam pratyūtpadyata iti pratyakṣam / akṣāṇīndriyāṇi ghrāṇarasana-cakṣustvakchrotamanāṃsi śaṭ* /. See also Ui (1917) pp. 152-153; cf. Matilal (1977) pp. 65-66 for a comparison between Candramati and Praśastapāda's accounts of cognition. For further details concerning the Vaiśeṣika account of perception, see also en. 60.

The first five of the six Vaiśeṣika *padārtha* are said to be perceptible, but inherence (*samavāya*) is not. See Ui (1917), pp. 67-68. Cf. also Kuī jī, T. XLII 1830 i (*mò*) 261a15:

有彼本許六句義者前五句現量所得

"In this work, for those who maintain six categories, the first five categories are accessible to direct perception."

For the ways in which universals are perceived, see Potter (1977) p. 137. Note however that not *all* entities which fall under these five categories are perceptible, i.e. there are, for example, substances such as subtle atoms which are simply too small to be perceptible. Cf. VS 4.1.6. Praśastapāda (pp. 328-329) explains that inherence is one, i.e. an indivisible thing, and that because it has a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) or self-occurrence (*svātmavṛtti*) with its relata, it cannot be perceived but must be inferred: *ata evātīndriyaḥ sattādīnām iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛtyabhāvāt svātmagatasamvedanābhāvāc ca / tasmād iha buddhyanumeyaḥ samavāya iti*. Cf. Potter (1977) pp. 302-303; p. 683 in the translation of G. Jha (Chaukhambha, Varanasi, reprinted 1982).

Interestingly enough, Dignāga, in the *Nyāyamukha*, discusses the Vaiśeṣika position that vases, etc. (i.e. substances), number, etc. (i.e. qualities), going upwards, etc. (i.e. motions), existence (i.e. the genus) and vaseness, etc. (i.e. species) are directly perceived, arguing that these "perceptions" are fallacious in that they would involve conceptualization. Conspicuously, he leaves out inherence. T. XXXII, no. 1628, i, 3b28-3c1:

如是一切俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶性智皆似現量

於實有中作餘行相假合餘義分別轉故

"Thus as regards conventional existents, the cognitions of vases, etc., number, etc., upward motion, etc., existence [and] vaseness are all fallacious direct perceptions, for there is conceptualization which, with regard to what really exists, fabricates other [different] characters and imputes connections with other things."

(Note that Tucci's translation [pp. 51-52] is unsatisfactory in that, *inter alia*, he did not translate *yǒu xìng* 有性, which is important here because it shows that Dignāga probably understood *sāmānya* as being only "existence".)

In translating and explaining Dignāga, it is probably preferable to render *sāmānya* as "genus" and *viśeṣa* as "species". This is in keeping with Hattori's style of translation in his work on Dignāga, and makes good sense in that Dignāga, like the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, seems to have taken *sāmānya* in Vaiśeṣika contexts to be the all-embracing universal, viz. existence, and took *viśeṣa* as meaning a lesser universal, such as substantiveness or vaseness. When, for example, Dignāga cites VS 8.1.6, his commentator Jinendrabuddhi explains *sāmānya* as meaning *mahāsāmānya* (i.e. existence) and *viśeṣa* means the other *sāmānyas* such as substantiveness (*dravyatva*). See Hattori (1968a) p. 137, n. 4.15. Thus, in Dignāga *sāmānya* is understood as what Praśastapāda

would term a "higher" (*para*) universal, and *viśeṣa* is taken as a lower universal. Cf. *Praśastapāda* (p. 11): *sāmānyam dvidham paramaparam ca...*

H. Ui (1917), however, pointed out (pp. 69-71 et seq.) that the term *tóng yì* 同異 in Dharmapāla is being used to mean *sāmānyaviśeṣa* much in the same way as Candramati used it in the *Daśapadārthaśāstra*, i.e. as a limited universal, such as potness. (From this he deduced various conclusions about the history of Vaiśeṣika thought.) Candramati had, in addition to *sāmānya* (= existence) and *viśeṣa* (= ultimate particular, i.e. *antyaviśeṣa*), introduced a category termed "both" (*jū fēn* 俱分): on the basis of an occurrence of *tóng yì* near the end of Candramati's text, Ui argued that this must be *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, where this compound is to be taken as meaning just one type of thing, i.e. the "limited universal", and not two categories, viz. *sāmānya* + *viśeṣa*. This odd sense of the term seems to be attested in other texts of the same general period, such as Śaṅkarasvāmin's *Nyāyapraveśa*, (cf. Tachikawa [1971] transl. p. 126, Sanskrit: 3.2.3 example #3 in Tachikawa's text). Note that the term *sāmānyaviśeṣa* may very well also be used in a similar sense in the *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* ad Chapter I (*Brahmakāṇḍa*) k. 23: *sā ceyam ākṛtiḥ śabdatvasāmānyaviśeṣād anyā* /. See Biardeau (1964) pp. 52-53.

Now, Ui gave a number of references to the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* of Dharmapāla / Xuán zàng, citing in particular page 2b of an older edition of the canon. As far as I can tell, the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* section at stake must be T. 1585 i 2c22 - 3b7 (transl. *Siddhi* I pp. 26-29), but here Dharmapāla / Xuán zàng definitely does not explicitly state a neat list of the six categories, including the problematic *sāmānyaviśeṣa*. Rather, as de la Vallée Poussin had already pointed in *Siddhi* p. 28 n. 1, Ui frequently cited the commentary by Kuī jī, viz. the *Chéng wéi shí lùn shù jì* 成唯識論述記 T. 1830. And in fact, it is there in Kuī jī's commentary, which is giving a kind of introduction to the discussion in *Chéng wéi shí lùn* 2c22ff, that we find a nicely numbered list of the categories. T. 1830 i (mò) 255c15-17:

一實二德三業四有五同異六和合 此依百論及此本破 唯有六句義法

"The first is substance, the second is quality, the third is action, the fourth is existence, the fifth is limited universal (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*), the sixth is inherence. These are refuted by the *Śataśāstra* [i.e. here 百論 = 廣百論, the text on which Dharmapāla comments] as well as by the present work [viz. the *Chéng wéi shí lùn*]. There are just six categories."

To conclude from this mass of data, we shall prudently follow Kuī jī (and Ui's) lead in taking the fifth category in Dharmapāla as being *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, understood as a limited universal — the various "reasons for" seem more convincing than those "against". Nonetheless, the following reservations are in order: the issue is not clear-cut, and certainly cannot be decided just by a quotation from a later Chinese commentator such as Kuī jī; in contrast to Candramati, it is clear that the Vaiśeṣika system which Dharmapāla is discussing has only six categories, and in the context of the argumentation in his fourth chapter (= CS XII), he enumerates them (viz. *shí, dé, yè, tóng, yì, hé hé*) but never seems to speak of two separate categories, i.e. *yǒu* 有

(*sattā* = "existence") and *tóng yì* 同異 (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*). Finally, it may be worthwhile to note that Louis de la Vallée Poussin was faced with a similar problem as to how to translate *tóng yì* in the passage 故同異性唯假施設 T. 1585 i 3a25-25; *Siddhi* I p. 28. He opted for the conjunctive rendering of the compound: "Concluons que tous ces genres ou espèces n'ont qu'une valeur de désignation."

(54) For the Sāṃkhya's definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*) or "what is seen" (*dr̥ṣṭa*), see SK k. 5, *prativīṣayādhyavasāyo dr̥ṣṭam...* Gauḍapāda's *Bhāṣya*: *prativīṣa-yeṣu śrotrādīnāṃ śabdādīviśayeṣu adhyavasāyo dr̥ṣṭam pratyakṣam ity arthaḥ*. "*Dr̥ṣṭa* or perception is the apprehension of the respective objects of the [senses such as] the ear, etc., viz. the objects, sound and so forth". Cf. §217c14 and en. 65. Dignāga, however, in criticizing the Sāṃkhya theory of perception, used a definition mentioned in the *Yuktīdīpikā*, p. 3.20-21 (ed. Pandeya) : *śrotrādīvyrttiḥ pratyakṣam* ("The operation of the [senses such as] the ear, etc. is perception"). See PS I, Hattori (1968a) p. 52 and n. 5.1. This latter definition is that of Vārṣaganya = Vṛṣagaṇa. See Frauwallner (1958) on the Sāṃkhya epistemology of Vṛṣagaṇa as can be gleaned from PS and PST. The full definition of Vṛṣagaṇa as found in PST and in the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* *Nayacakravṛtti* of Siṃhasūri (see Frauwallner [1958] p. 124 and Hattori [1968a] pp. 148-149, n. 5.2) is as follows: *śrotravakcakṣurjihvāghrāṇānāṃ manasādhiṣṭhītā vṛttiḥ śabda-sparśarūparasagandheṣu yathākramam grahaṇe vartamānā pramāṇam pratyakṣam*. Transl. Frauwallner (1958) p. 127: "Die vom Denken geleitete Tätigkeit des Gehörs, der Haut, des Auges, der Zunge und des Geruchs, welche sich der Reihe nach beim Erfassen des Tones, der Berührung, der Form, des Geschmacks und des Geruchs betätigt, ist das Erkenntnismittel sinnliche Wahrnehmung." Dharmapāla seems to allude to this position in the next chapter, viz. his commentary on CS XIII. See §228b29 and en. 343.

For a general account of the Sāṃkhya system, its history and its twenty-five elements (*tattva*), see Frauwallner (1953-56), Vol. I, p. 275 et seq., Hulin (1978), Larson (1969), Garbe (1894). The three qualities (*guṇa*), viz. "ontological excellence" (*sattva*), "agitation" (*rajas*) and "dullness" (*tamas*), are inherent in and are the ontological constituents of the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*), which, according to the different combinations of these qualities, makes up the various coarse objects in the world. For the process of "evolution" of *prakṛti*, see en. 68. In effect, then, when one perceives an object, one must perceive (in some fashion or another) the qualities; note that this position is stated in its various forms and is subjected to intense scrutiny by Dignāga in PS I. To take an example of one Sāṃkhya position: "Since *sattva*, etc. are not [essentially] different from sound and other such [objects of the senses], they are apprehended [by the senses] like sound, etc." (transl. Hattori 1968a, p. 55).

Finally note that 樂 *lè* in this portion of Dharmapāla's text refers to *sattva* (one of the qualities) and 苦 *kǔ* refers to *rajas*, although literally they, of course, mean pleasure (*sukha*) and suffering (*duḥkha*) respectively. Cf. Nak. p. 1406 *raku* 樂. Dharmapāla, or perhaps Xuán zàng, seems to have chosen to call the qualities by the terms for their corresponding feelings: *sattva* is associated with pleasure, *rajas* with suffering and *tamas* with bewilderment (*moha*). Cf. SK k. 12: *prītyapṛtīvīṣādātmacaḥ ... guṇāḥ*.

Gauḍapāda: *tatra prītyātmakam sattvaṃ prītiḥ sukhaṃ tadātmakam iti / aprītyātmakam rajah aprītiḥ duḥkham / viśādātmakam tamaḥ viśādo mohaḥ /*. The same indirect way of referring to the qualities also occurs also in PS and PV's discussion of the Sāṃkhyas. Cf. the *Jīn qī shí lùn* 金七十論 (**Suvarṇasaptati*) k. 13, where Paramārtha uses *xī* 喜 ("joy"), *yōu* 憂 ("suffering") and *àn* 闇 ("stupor") for the terms *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* respectively. See also Takakusu (1904) p. 996, n. 1 for other Chinese renditions of the three *guṇas*. So, *lè děng* 樂等, which in fact more precisely corresponds to *sukhādi*, does refer to *sattvādi*, i.e. the three qualities; for the sake of convenience I will therefore generally translate by "*sattva*, etc.", instead of saying something like "[the three qualities which are of the nature of] pleasure, etc." Cf. §217c16.

(55) See en. 40 and 363.

(56) In Vaiśeṣika contexts it makes better sense to translate *sè* = *rūpa* as "colour", which is one of the *guṇas*. This is borne out in other chapters of CS where the Vaiśeṣika theory is discussed (e.g. CS XIV). In Buddhist and Sāṃkhya contexts, the usual translation, viz. "form", is to be maintained.

(57) Dharmapāla is arguing that inherence and universals are similar, according to Vaiśeṣika philosophy, in being unique entities, present indistinguishably in all their bases. Thus, if they are alike, then it should also follow that universals are not perceptible, just as inherence is not perceptible. But this runs counter to the Vaiśeṣika position on the perceptibility of universals. For the "oneness" and the imperceptibility of inherence, see the references to Praśastapāda in en. 53. For *sāmānya*, see e.g. Annambhaṭṭa's *Tarkasamgraha*: *nityam ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam* ("Genus /universal is permanent, one [and] inherent in many [instances]"); see Foucher (1949) pp. 164-165. Note that Annambhaṭṭa follows Praśastapāda's understanding of *sāmānya* as including higher and lower universals, viz. existence and substanceness, etc. respectively. See also en. 53 for indications on the Vaiśeṣika's position that universals *are* perceptible.

(58) Dharmapāla had previously argued that universals, which are designated upon various dharmas, cannot be directly perceived. So analogously for vases, cloths, etc.

(59) In the Vaiśeṣika system the action at stake is movement. Cf. *Tarkasamgraha*: *calanātmakam karma* ("Action is movement"); Foucher (1949) p. 163.

(60) Dharmapāla is referring to the Vaiśeṣika's position that perceptions of substances depend on the other categories. Cf. §224a7. For example, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* states that "[cognition] in respect of substances, qualities and actions, depends on the *sāmānya* ('genus' / 'universal') and *viśeṣa* ('species' / 'particular')" (VS 8.1.6: *sāmānyaviśeṣāpekṣam dravyaguṇakarmasu*) and that "[cognition] with regard to substance depends on substance, qualities and action" (VS 8.1.7: *dravye dravyaguṇakarmāpekṣam*).

In the latter case, for example, the point is that in cognitions of states of affairs such as when "a white cow, possessing a bell, goes", there is a quality (viz. white); a substance (viz. the bell) and an action (viz. going) which must be apprehended along with the substance, the cow. (Cf. Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary ad VS 8.1.7 in N. Sinha's ed. and transl.)

Dharmapāla's strategy in attacking the Vaiśeṣika's position is to consider the various possibilities where a cognition of a substance would depend on other categories. In each case his argument seems to be the same: if a cognition of something in category *A* is brought about by a non-*A*, then this cognition is not a *direct perception* of *A*. The underlying thought would be that if we directly perceive *A*, then it must be *A*, and not something else, which is responsible for our perceptions, an idea which would seem to be implied by the Vaiśeṣika's own explanation of perception as being dependent on the contact between the sense organ and its object. Cf. VS 3.1.13, en. 53.

Note that Praśastapāda speaks of two kinds of perception (*pratyakṣa*) of substances: (1) the mere perception of the substance in its own nature; (2) perception arising from contact between the mental organ and the self and depending on qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) such as *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, substances, qualities and actions. As Hattori (1968b) p. 162 et seq. points out, Praśastapāda's formulation of (1) is based on VS 4.1.6 and (2) is clearly based on VS 8.1.6-7. Cf. Schmithausen (1970) n. 7. It may well be this second type of perception which Dharmapāla has in mind too. See *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, pp. 186.14-19: *dravye tāvad trividhe* mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasaṅnikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātrakam / sāmānyaviśeṣadravya-guṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanahsaṅnikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate sad dravyam prthivī viśāntī śuklo gaur gacchatīti /*. *Read *trividhe* rather than *dvividhe*; see Hattori (1968b) n. 2. "Firstly, with regard to three sorts of substance: in the case of a large [substance], then due to the fourfold contact, a manifestation of a distinct colour and the fact that [the substance] possesses many [component] substances, and given that there exists the collection [of causes] such as merit and so forth, there is then [perception] which is just a representation of [the substance in] its own nature. [Also] perception arises from the contact between the self and the mental organ, and in dependence on qualifiers [such as] *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, substances, qualities and actions, as [when one thinks] 'The existent substance, which is earth and is a horned, white cow, is going'". Śrīdhara (*Nyāyakandalī*, pp. 188 et seq.) glosses the "fourfold contact" as between the self, *manas* ("mind"; "mental organ"), the sense organs and their objects. He terms the first sort of perception *nirvikalpaka* ("non-conceptual") and the second sort *savikalpaka* ("conceptual") and explains that in Praśastapāda's example of *savikalpakapratyakṣa*, the words "existent substance", "earth", "what has horns", "white cow", "goes" show that the perception is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by the *sāmānya*, by earthness (i.e. a *viśeṣa*), by a substance, by a quality and by an action respectively. *Nyāyakandalī* p. 190: ...*tasmāt sad dravyam iti sāmānyaviśiṣṭam prthivīti prthivītvaviśiṣṭam viśāntīti dravyaviśiṣṭam śuklo gaur iti guṇaviśiṣṭam gacchatīti karmaviśiṣṭam pratyakṣam syāt*. (Note that my translation of Praśastapāda's example is closer to that of Potter [1977] p. 294 and Jha p. 391 than to Hattori [1968a] p. 138, n. 16, who translates by a series of small sentences:

"[this] substance exists,' '[this substance is] earth,' '[this is] the horned,' '[this is] white,' or '[this] cow goes.'" Cf. Schmithausen op. cit. n. 7). Schmithausen (1970) brings some important modifications to Hattori's general stance in (1968b), notably the idea that *nirvikalpaṃ pratyakṣam* does not see the object as an undifferentiated composite of the categories, but rather sees the substance.

Finally, note that in the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dignāga also argues against VS 8.1.6-7, citing them explicitly, and also arguing that perceptions in which the object is cognized as dependent on other categories are impossible given the Vaiśeṣika's view that perception is produced from the contact between the object and the sense organ. See Hattori (1968a) pp. 43-44 and n. 15 and 16. Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* here gives a similar example to that found in *Praśastapāda*.

(61) I.e. cognitions of substances. Of the nine kinds of substance recognized by the Vaiśeṣika — viz. earth (*prthivī*), water (*ap*), heat (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), space (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), direction (*diś*), selves (*ātman*) and mental organs (*manas*) (cf. VS 1.1.4) —, the first three are grasped by the senses, whereas the latter six can only be inferred. Cf. Potter (1977) p. 87, Hattori (1968a) p. 144, n. 54. *Praśastapāda* p. 24: *trayāṇāṃ [= prthivyaptejasāṃ] pratyakṣatvarūpavattvadravatvāni*.

(62) The refutation seems to turn on the previously mentioned point that one does not perceive substance alone, but in dependence upon, or via, other *padārtha* such as actions and qualities. See en. 60. But then if a substance cognition which is brought about by substances also depends on non-substances such as qualities, etc., then the situation is indeed similar to what was discussed in connection with substance cognitions brought about through qualities or actions. Just as these latter substance cognitions could not be direct perceptions, so also cognitions of vases, etc. cannot be direct perceptions.

(63) Dharmapāla has refuted that substance cognitions are direct perceptions because they depend on other categories. He now wants to apply the same line of argument to cognitions of qualities, actions, universals and inherence.

(64) Although one classifies a cognition of a pot, for example, as a cognition of a substance, in fact it must also be connected with, or conditioned by, non-substances such as qualities, etc. Dharmapāla would seem to be referring to this point when he speaks of "[merely] designated connections": the cognition of *A* is only thought to be connected with *A*; in fact it is also connected with non-*A*'s.

Note that we find the same argument in the *Chéng wéi shí lùn*, i 3b3-7:

又緣實智非緣離識實句自體現量智攝假合生故 如德智等
廣說乃至緣和合智非緣離識和合自體現量智攝假合生故 如實智等
故勝論者實等句義亦是隨情妄所施設

LVP translates (*Siddhi*, p. 29):

"Inversement, la connaissance (*jñāna*, savoir) qui porte sur les *dravyas* n'est pas comprise dans une connaissance immédiate qui porterait sur une nature propre de *dravya* existant à part du *Vijñāna*, parce qu'elle naît d'un complexe de causes, comme la connaissance des *guṇas*, etc. Et de même jusque: la connaissance qui porte sur le *samavāya* n'est pas comprise dans une connaissance immédiate qui porterait sur une nature propre de *samavāya* existant à part du *Vijñāna*, parce qu'elle naît d'un complexe de causes comme la connaissance des *dravyas*, etc.

Conclusion: les *padārthas* des Vaiśeṣikas n'existent qu'en opinion (*ruci*); ce sont de simples dénominations."

As for the phrase *jiǎ hé shēng* 假合生, LVP translates this non-literally as "naître d'un complexe de causes". He is partially justified by Kuī jī's commentary, T. 1830 i (*mó*) 261c20: 先假合生者顯藉多法. "Above, '*jiǎ hé shēng*' shows reliance on many [different] dharmas." And indeed, Kuī jī's commentary develops the details of this explanation. However, it seems to me that the point is not that *jiǎ hé shēng* itself means "production from various causes", but rather that since there are various different causes involved, the link between the cognition of *A* and *A* itself is unreal, and mind-invented. Note that this conclusion that substance cognitions are not of an external object but of something essentially mind-invented is clearly the thrust of the *Chéng wéi shí lùn* passage cited above. Most likely, in our chapter of the *Guǎng bǎi lùn shì lùn*, Dharmapāla's argument is ultimately trying to arrive at the same conclusion; in the Epistemologist's system, if something is not an object of direct perception, it must be mind-invented, i.e. by *vikalpa*.

(65) See en. 54. Parallel passages in *Siddhi* pp. 23-26. See T. 1585 i 2b23ff. The discussion seems to turn on the Sāṃkhya principle *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* "substance is a composite of the *guṇas*." See en. 219 and Wezler (1986).

(66) There seems to be a deliberate parallel with the earlier discussion of *sā-mānyalakṣaṇa*. See §217a7.

(67) See en. 54.

(68) In the Sāṃkhya system, the Primordial Nature, which is composed of the three qualities, undergoes a series of transformations (*biàn* 變 = *pariṇāma*) to become the diverse objects in the world. From the Primordial Nature evolves the intellect (*buddhi*) or "great one" (*mahat*), which in turn evolves into the ego (*ahaṃkāra*), and then the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*), and these in turn into the five gross elements (*bhūta*), the five sense organs, the five organs of action and the mind. See Frauwallner (1953-56) Vol. I, p. 348 et seq. Note that because of the Sāṃkhya's doctrine of *satkāra-*

yavāda (i.e. the doctrine that an effect already exists in a hidden fashion in the cause prior to its appearance), there is no difference between the diverse objects which are the effects and the *guṇas* or Primordial Nature which is the cause. The effect is a manifesting of what was, in fact, already there. On *satkāryavāda*, see SK k. 9 and Gauḍapāda; for elements of Āryadeva's critique in CS XI and *Bāi lùn* see Honda (1974), p. 489. For the process of transformation from unmanifest (*avyakta*) to manifest, see SK k. 16 and 22.

(69) Note that here understanding the argumentation in Dharmapāla's commentary presupposes that *xìng xiāng* 性相 be interpreted as a conjunctive compound. Cf. en. 1, 47, 114.

(70) Cf. *Siddhi*, p. 24 for the same argument about the nature (i.e. the *guṇas*) and the characters. In PS I's refutation of the Sāṃkhya, we find a somewhat similar dialectic of one object versus many qualities.

(71) See Gauḍapāda's *bhāṣya* to SK k. 38.

(72) Cf. *Siddhi*, p. 25: "Les trois Guṇas sont 'particuliers' (*bhinna* ...) ayant chacun une nature à part; le Mahat (et les autres Tattvas) est 'synthétique' (*tsong* ... *sāmānya*)", car il constitue un seul et indivisible Dharma. Cependant le Mahat = les trois Guṇas (comme l'or et les bijoux): le 'synthétique' est 'les particuliers'. — Vous devez donc ou nier l'unité du Mahat ou nier la triplicité des Guṇas." Neither in the *Siddhi* and its commentary (see Kuī jī, T. 1830 i 254b12 et seq.), nor in our text is it clear, however, which historical Sāṃkhya, if any, Dharmapāla is arguing against.

*See LVP's note on p. 25 for the numerous Skt. equivalences of *zōng* 總, amongst which we find *samudāya* ("collection") and *samuccaya* ("synthesis"). Cf. en. 38, 43. The term seems to be used here in a fashion which is somewhat different from that of the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas, where it means a "universal" (*sāmānya*) or a "general nature". Furthermore, for the Sāṃkhya, it is usually the Primordial Nature and the *guṇas* which are *sāmānya* and the elements which are *viśeṣa*, the cardinal tenet being the non-difference of the two. (See Frauwallner [1953-56] Vol. I, pp. 398-400 for the Sāṃkhya's adaptation of Vaiśeṣika categories.) However, here the situation seems to be contrary: the *guṇas* are being termed "individual", "distinct", "particular", while form and so forth are "synthetic". What seems to be at stake is the part-whole relation, rather than that between particulars and universals. Once again, the view invoked seems to be that things are *guṇasamdrāva*, or what is equivalent, *guṇasamudāya*. See en. 219.

(73) Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 320.14) reads *yī zōng yī bié* 一總一別 instead of *yī zōng èr bié* 一總二別.

(74) Cf. *Siddhi* p. 25: "Le Sāṃkhya dira que la nature de chaque Guṇa comporte trois caractères (c'est-à-dire les caractères des trois Guṇas): nous voyons des

choses unes, parce que ces caractères, amalgamés (*houo ... tsa...*), sont difficiles à reconnaître." What follows in our text is also more or less mirrored in *Siddhi*. Cf. *Yuktiḍipikā ad SK k. 13* which also discusses the problem: *eko guṇas trirūpaḥ / sarve vā sarvarūpāḥ* (ed. Pandeya p. 60, line 24). "One *guṇa* has three characters. Or, all have all characters." The answer is that the *guṇas* mutually beget each other (*anyonya-jananavṛttayaḥ*), but do not have "mixed natures". *Yuktiḍipikā* p. 61, line 9: *tasmād yuktam etat anyonyajanavanavṛttayo guṇāḥ na ca saṃkīrṇasvabhāvāḥ*.

(75) A reference to the key theme in Sāṃkhya philosophy that the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*), which is "blind", exists for the benefit of the Spirit (*puruṣa*), who is the enjoyer (*bhokṛ*) of the diverse objects exhibited by the Primordial Nature (cf. SK k. 17), but who will finally come to realize his separateness from this nature and thus attain liberation. See SK k. 21, 56, 58, 60.

(76) See en. 68. Cf. Paramārtha's terminology in Takakusu (1904) pp. 1062-1064.

(77) I.e. as an objection leading to Āryadeva's answer in k. 280. See §216c3-216c20.

(78) T. reads *zhōng xìng* 種姓 = *vaṃśya, gotra* (which is correct), but gives *xìng* 性 as variant. The interchange of the two characters is frequent; see Demiéville (1987), p. 39, n. 6.

(79) For Sanskrit equivalents, see Nak. p. 302. The term is one which is used in the *Vinaya*. Cf. the entry in *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, ed. E. Waldschmidt, p. 173 ("Vinaya Chinesisch") which refers to T. XXIV 1451 xxxvi 386a4. Other variations on this term, such as *smṛtimān saṃprajānan* and *smṛtisamprajānya*, are also to be found. For the former term, see *Traité II*, pp. 1024-5 (note), where the term is used in connection with the third level of "trances" (*dhyāna*). For the latter, see BHSD, s.v. *saṃprajānya*. In *Traité I*, p. 7, n. 6 the quality *smṛtaḥ saṃprajānaḥ* characterizes the Buddha at the moment of his birth. Cf. also May (1959) n. 925.

(80) The understanding of this term is problematic: I have taken it as a *karmadhāraya*. Cf. Nak. p. 1234: *dhamma-anudhamma-patipanna*. Mvyut. II24: *chos dañ rjes su* (')*mithun pa'i chos la žugs pa* = *dharmānudharmapratipanna*. See May n. 749 and index: *dharmānudharmapratipatti*, *chos dañ rjes su mithun pa'i chos kyi nan tan*, "application aux dharma conformes à la loi". BHSD p. 27, s.v. *anudharma*.

Hayashima (1976) gives a detailed discussion on the different ways to render the compound, i.e. taking *dharmānudharma* as a *dvandva* compound and the whole as a *tatpuruṣa*, "the practice of the Dharma and the *anudharma*", or taking the whole compound as a *karmadhāraya*, "the practices which are in keeping with the Dharma". He gives the following example of the first version: In the *Vivṛtagūdhārthapiṇḍāvvyākhyā*

on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *dharma* is interpreted as being the path of no more learning (*aśaikṣamārga*) whereas the *anudharma* ("secondary *dharma*") is the path of learning. Let me translate the Tibetan text which Hayashima gives in n. 7, p. 13: *chos kyi rjes su mthun pa'i chos śes bya ba la chos ni bden pa mthoñ ba'o // rjes su mthun pa'i chos ni de'i sbyor ba'i lam mo // rnam pa gcig tu na chos ni mi slob pa'i lam mo // rjes su mthun pa'i chos ni slob pa'i lam mo // rnam pa gcig tu na chos ni don dam pa mya ñan las 'das pa'o // rjes su mthun pa'i chos ni zag pa med pa'i las thams cad do* (P. 390a4-6). "In the term *dharmānudharmapratipatti*, *dharma* is the seeing of the truth [and] *anudharma* is the path which brings one to that [vision]. Or, *dharma* is the path of no more learning [and] *anudharma* is the path of learning. Or again, *dharma* is the ultimate, viz. *nirvāṇa*, [while] *anudharma* consists in all the non-defiled actions." As for the second version, Hayashima cites *inter alia* a passage from the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*: *teṣāṃ ca tathāgatānāṃ dharmadeśanāṃ śṛṇomi dharmasya cānudharmaṃ pratipadye*. "I both listen to these tathāgatas' teaching of the Dharma and practise in accordance with [that] Dharma." (P.L. Vaidya, *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 5, p. 296). The second version seems to apply better when *dharmānudharmapratipatti* is taken as belonging to the practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*) in the three trainings of hearing, reflection and meditation.

Finally, note that Dharmapāla actually lists the six *dharmānudharmapratipatti*; they are simply the six perfections. These then may very well be the six *anudharmas* (or *dharmas*) which are referred to in Mvyut. 9320-1 and about which Edgerton puzzled on p. 27 of BHSD.

(81) For the ten *vaśitā*, see BHSD p. 474 and Mvyut. 770-780. "Miraculous powers" (*shén lì* 神力 ; *shén tōng* 神通 = *ṛddhi*) is one of the ten.

(82) *sān qiān* = *sān qiān shì jiè* 三千世界 or *sān qiān dà qiān shì jiè* 三千大千世界 . Cf. H. p. 161 and Nak. p. 479.

(83) See Nak. p. 618 for the various Sanskrit equivalents.

(84) See en. 215.

(85) One of the three sorts of suffering, viz. suffering qua suffering (*duḥkha-duḥkhatā*), the suffering of change (*pariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) and *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*. Cf. AK vi LVP 125 et seq.; M. av. I, LVP (1907b) p. 259 and 260 n. 2.; Mvyut. 2228, *traya-duḥkhatā*; May (1959) n. 694; and BHSD p. 265 s.v. *duḥkhatā*. Edgerton sums up *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*: "this means particularly experience in itself, not painful or pleasurable, but, because impermanent and so undependable, still a cause of misery." AK vi LVP p. 128: "Mais, fût-elle accompagnée d'agréable, l'existence (*bhava*) dans sa totalité a la même saveur de *saṃskāraduḥkhatā*: les Āryas la considèrent donc comme douleur."

(86) The belief in the reality of the self and what belongs to the self (*ātmīya*). It is one of the five wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*) and admits of innate (*sahajā*) and speculative (*vikalpita*) forms — the latter often being classified into twenty sorts. For canonical references, see *Traité* II, p. 737, n. 3. Other references, see May (1959), n. 720. See also BHSD p. 553, AK v LVP p. 15: "Croire au moi et au mien (*ātmātmīyagrāha*), c'est la *satkāyadṛṣṭi*." Cf. parallel formulations in M. av. VI and *bhāṣya*, 234.1 LVP (1911) p. 282 and Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *dBu ma'i spyi don* for debates on the fine points of this part of M. av. (ff.151a-157b). AK v p. 15 n. 3 explains that the Sautrāntikas take *satkāya* (*shēn* 身) as referring to "the accumulation (*kāya*) of perishing things" (*sat*), viz. the aggregates (*skandhas*). Cf. Tib. 'jig tshogs la lta ba. (literally "the view with regard to the collection of the perishable") as translation of *satkāyadṛṣṭi*. Vaibhāṣikas, however, take *sat* in the normal sense of "existent / real" and *kāya* as collection. Thus, "the view with regard to the existent collection". At any rate, the self is said to be designated here by the term *satkāya* (viz. the aggregates) for quasi-pedagogical reasons: if one simply spoke of the view of the self (*āmadṛṣṭi*), it might be thought that the self, as object of cognition, must exist.

(87) For the passions and their various different classifications, see *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. *Bonnō* and May (1959) n. 226. For the six *anuśayas* (attachment, hatred, pride, ignorance, doubt and wrong views), see AK v LVP p. 1ff, PSP pp. 130-135 §29. Often *kleśa* is used synonymously with *anuśaya* as when the six *anuśayas* are referred to as the six *kleśas*. Cf. AK v p. 1, n. 4. This usage was adopted by Tibetans, who rarely use the term *phra rgyas*, but instead speak of the "six principal *kleśas*" (*rtsa myon drug*). Cf. *Yōns 'dzin blo rigs*, ff. 21a and 22a, ed. T. Kelsang and S. Onoda. Note however that strictly speaking the *anuśayas* are the latent *kleśas*; see Stcherbatsky (1923), p. 35 and Lamotte, KSP, p. 167. For the classification of *anuśayas* into ninety-eight sorts, see Lamotte, *Traité* I p. 424, n. 4.

(88) I.e. enlightenment or liberation.

(89) Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 324.14) reads *yī li* 義理 instead of *wú yī* 無義. Taking his reading we would have to translate the passage as: "...and is the method for [attaining] *nirvāṇa*, which permanently extinguishes all objects (*yī li* 義理 = *artha*)."

(90) See *Siddhi* pp. 100-123 and Lamotte, KSP, for the Vijñānavāda theory of karmic seeds (*bīja*) and Nak. p. 745b for *paripāka*.

(91) One of the five powers of insight (literally "eyes"); see *Traité* I p. 439; for canonical references see *ibid* p. 439, n. 1. The five are: the eye [made] of flesh (*māṃsa-cakṣus*), the divine eye (*divyacakṣus*), the eye of wisdom (*prajñācakṣus*), the eye of the Dharma (*dharmacakṣus*) and the eye of a buddha (*buddhacakṣus*). The *prajñācakṣus* is said to see the true character of the *dharmas*. Note that these five are spoken about

in the first chapter of *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, verses 21-22; cf. Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, *Don bdun cu*, p. 21.

(92) For a detailed account of the complicated problem of the threefold, tenfold and fivefold classifications of *kṣānti* ("patience", "receptivity" or sometimes even "conviction"), see Lamotte (1965) pp. 160-162, n. 119. See also Nak. 373c on the fivefold classification and BHSD s.v. *kṣānti*. Lamotte (ibid. n. 119) translates the *Avataṃsaka*'s definition of *ānulomikī kṣānti* as follows: "Qu'est-ce que l'*ānulomikī kṣānti* des bodhisattvas? Le bodhisattva examine (*vitarkayati*) et apprécie (*vicārayati*) ces mêmes dharma [prêchés par le Buddha]; il les assimile et ne les contredit pas (*na virodhayati*); il les intelliige graduellement si bien que sa pensée se purifie; il s'installe correctement dans leur culture et les possède (*pratipadyate*)."

(93) Unidentified. For Skt. see CSV §39 ad k. 286ab.

(94) Viz. that of the hearers (*śrāvaka*), solitary buddhas (*pratyekabuddhas*) and bodhisattvas. For the three sorts of enlightenment (*bodhi*), see *Hōbōgirin*, s.v. *bodai*, p. 87. Dutt (1930) p. 26; see also Dayal (1931) p. 11 and Lamotte, *Mahāyanasamgraha*, p. 63* for the corresponding vehicles (*yāna*). Tibetan *grub mtha'* (*siddhānta*) texts and commentaries on *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* teach that for the Vijñānavāda, as well as for the Svātantrika branch of the Madhyamaka school, these three vehicles have different sorts of realizations, and that it is only the *bodhisattvayāna* which realizes the definitive type of voidness of all phenomena. However, for the Prāsaṅgikas there is said to be no difference in their realizations. Cf. Tsoñ kha pa, *rTsa ba'i śes rab kyi dka' gnas brgyad* p. 28 et seq. (the "sixth point" of the eight) for the similarity of realization according to the Prāsaṅgikas. Tsoñ kha pa seems to rely on the *Yuktiṣaṅkīkāvr̥tti* in this connection. *lCañ skya grub mtha'* pp. 403-404 gives an explanation of the Svātantrika position on the three vehicles' differing realizations. Page 404: *chuñ ñu gañ zag gi bdag med thun moñ ba rtogs pa dañ / 'briñ po gzuñ 'dzin rdzas tha dad kyis stoñ bar rtogs pa dañ / chen po chos thams cad bden med du rtogs pa'o /*. "The inferior [stage, viz. that of the *śrāvakas*] is the realization of the common lack of self of the person; the middle [stage, i.e. that of the *pratyekabuddhas*] is the realization that the [object] which is grasped and the [subject] which does the grasping are void of any difference of substance; the great [stage, i.e. that of the bodhisattvas] is the realization that all dharmas are not truly existent."

(95) Read *yé* 耶 rather than T. *xié* 邪. The former was used by the Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 325.17) and is a variant in T.

(96) Cf. k. 287, where the Sanskrit corresponding to *kōṅg wú wǒ* is simply *nairātmya* rather than *sūnyānātman* (see H. 102) or something of that sort.

(97) The *Abhidharmakośa* speaks of three roots of virtue: absence of desire (*alobha*), absence of aversion (*adveṣa*) and absence of bewilderment (*amoha*), the latter being equivalent to *prajñā* ("wisdom / intelligence"). Obviously, these three are the contraries of the basic *kleśas*. See AK ii LVP p. 160; iv, 34; PSP pp. 124-125 §24.

(98) In what follows, the characters *kōng* 空 and *yǒu* 有 can, according to the context, be translated by "voidness" or "void" and "existence" or "existent" respectively. *kōng*, for example, can be a translation for *sūnyatā* as well as *sūnya*; cf. H. p. 101.

(99) Cf. CS VIII k. 195: *sad asat sadasac ceti nobhayam ceti kathyate / nanu vyādhivaśāt pathyam auṣadham nāma jāyate* //. "Existence, non-existence, [both] existence and non-existence, and neither [existence nor non-existence] are taught. Surely, isn't it in accordance with the illness that the medicine becomes salutary?" Transl. by Lang (1986) p. 85. See her n. 20 for the question as to whether one should read *pathyam auṣadham nāma* (as she does) or *sarvam auṣadham nāma*.

(100) "Proliferation" or "elaboration" of phenomena and the creation of difference is a feature of all conceptualization. The result of this essentially erroneous process is the constitution of objects with distinct characters corresponding to the concepts which we have created. Entities constituted in this manner, i.e. by conceptual elaboration, only have a nominal existence qua designations (*prajñapti*). Cf. Lamotte's transl. of *prapañca*: "vains bavardages", in other words, not far from "blah, blah" and with all its pejorative connotations. See *Siddhi* II, p. 607 as well as May (1959) n. 562 for numerous references. Cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga* I, 3-4; see chapter III, B pp. 59-61 on this argumentation concerning existence and inexistence.

(101) In other words, for teaching purposes it is permissible to state something which is not literally true.

(102) It seems plausible to take *biāo* 表 here as the equivalent of *vidhi*, which makes for the contrast between *pratiśedha* and *vidhi*. LVP in *Siddhi* p. 529 took 遮表 as *pratiśedhavijñapti* which he translated as "par voie de negation." This is unlikely. Admittedly, the more usual equivalent (see H. pp. 401-402) is *vijñapti*, which has the banal sense of "information" or "report" in addition to its technical use in the Vijñānavāda system, and this is clearly what influenced LVP. But we see other example of *zhē biāo* 遮表 used in Dharmapāla's commentary where the sense clearly must be the contrast between negation and affirmation. E.g. in Dharmapāla's commentary to CS XVI k. 395 (有非真有故 無亦非真無 既無有真無 何有於真有) , he cites an objector (T. 1571 x 245b20): 此中一類釋此難言我說真無是遮非表 "Here some make the following objection: 'We assert that true inexistence is a negation and not an affirmation.'"

Dharmapāla's strategy in saying that statements about voidness are just negations resembles Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti's style of argumentation, where statements about voidness are taken as non-implicative negations (*prasajyapratishedha*) and do not assert any positive quality or phenomenon. For this development of two sorts of *pratishedha* in connection with Buddhist Madhyamaka philosophy, see Kajiyama (1973), Ruegg (1977) p. 4, n. 10 and (1981) pp. 37-38, 65 and n. 94, Matilal (1971) pp. 163-164.

(103) Cf. *Siddhi* pp. 528-529: "...en effet, la Tathatā est à part de l'existence et de l'inexistence". T. 1585 vii 46b 17-18: 眞如離有離無性故 . See Chapt. III, B. p. 59 et seq.

(104) See en. 86.

(105) Note that the general line of argumentation is a recurrent one in Buddhist texts; cf. e.g. *Ratnāvalī* II, 19-25.

(106) The passage is translated in Tucci (1925), pp. 547-548, n. 2. However, Tucci translates *hán shì* 含識 as *ālayavijñāna*, the "store-consciousness" of the karmic seeds; this makes no sense at all. *hán* ("hold"; "contain") *shì* ("consciousness") just means "sentient beings"; see Nak. p. 199b, who gives *yǒu qíng* 有情 = *prāṇin*; *sattva* as a gloss for *hán shì*.

(107) Cf. *Kāśyapaparivarta* 64, ed. A. von Staël-Holstein pp. 95-96. My translation follows the Chinese of Dharmapāla's commentary. Cf. the different versions presented in Staël-Holstein. Same sūtra passage quoted in CSV XII §42.

(108) Cf. *Traité* I p. 69. In IV pp. xiii-xiv, Lamotte revises his previous identification of this verse as well as its translation:

"La non-dualité, la porte de la félicité,
La destruction des vues fausses,
Le domaine parcouru par tous les Buddha:
Voilà ce qui est appelé Non-moi."

Cf. also *ibid.* p. xiv for Lamotte's translation of the Sanskrit; this translation is only very slightly different substituting "épouvantail des vues fausses" for "la destruction des vues fausses". However, Lamotte's "la non-dualité" should probably be rejected: both the Sanskrit (*advitīyaṃ śivadvāraṃ*) and Tibetan (*ḥi sgo gñis pa med pa*) can easily be read as taking *advitīyaṃ* / *gñis pa med pa* as being an adjective modifying *śivadvāraṃ* / *ḥi sgo*. And moreover, this understanding of the verse is the one which is borne out by both Candrakīrti's and Dharmapāla's commentaries. Cf. Skt. of CSV ad k. 288: *nairātmyaṃ advitīyaṃ śivadvāraṃ bhavati / nirvāṇapurapraveśāya ekam*

evāsahāyam etat dvāram /. It seems that apart from differences of word-order and the absence of *iti* ... *ucyate* the grammar in Dharmapāla's text is similar to that of the Sanskrit which we possess, although he reads "nirvāṇa" instead of *śiva*. Hence my rendition of *niè pán bù èr mén* 涅槃不二門 by "the unrivalled door to nirvāṇa."

(109) Cf. Nak. pp. 2d-3a and Japanese transl. Kyik p. 328, n. 88. Monier-Williams, *Skt.-English Dictionary*: "agada mfn. free from disease, m. freedom from disease; a medicine, drug, (especially) antidote."

(110) Literally "the name" (*míng* 名).

(111) See en. 91.

(112) *lùn* 論 = *vāda* and *tā lùn* 他論 is probably *paravāda* = *parappravāda*. See en. 200 and 201. I understand the syntax differently from Tucci and the Japanese translator. The former (cf. p. 548) understands the passage as: "Although the buddhas did not expressly speak to refute the dharma of the opposing doctrine..." This would seem to me syntactically improbable and would also deviate too radically from the Skt., in that "dharma" would not be the doctrine of selflessness, but rather the position of the opponent.

(113) Tucci translates *yě huǒ* 野火 as "a fire in a field", but I have taken *yě* 野 in the sense of "wild" or "raging", which accords better with Dharmapāla's commentary about the "raging fire in the mountain forest". The Sanskrit is lost, and the Tibetan just speaks of "fire".

(114) See en. 1, 47, 69.

(115) More literally: "not unengaged" (?). See Nak. p. 1387d.

(116) See Nak. p. 804c. *shuǐ jīng* 水精 = *shuǐ jīng* 水晶 .

(117) See en. 86.

(118) *yàn bù* 厭怖 is attested as an equivalent of *udvega*, "fear" (Cf. H. p. 60); *yàn* 厭 can equal *ud-VII*.

(119) Quoted in Lamotte, *Traité* III p. 1686 and IV p. xv. However, the text in Kumārajīva's translation is somewhat different. The Skt. is lost but the Tibetan also differs considerably from the two Chinese versions.

(120) I read *shéi* 誰 ("who") instead of *wéi* 唯 ("only"), as does the Japanese translator (see Kyik p. 330.4).

(121) Numerous parallel passages. Cf. *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* quoted in Pr. 361.12-13 and translated in De Jong (1949) p. 20: *tadyathāpi nāma śāntamate vṛkṣasya mūle chinne sarvaśākhāpattraphalāni śuśyanti / evam eva śāntamate satkāyadṛṣṭyupaśamāt sarvakleśā upaśāmyante /*. See May (1959) n. 720 for other citations from treatises showing that *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is at the root of all passions (*kleśa*), heresies (*dṛṣṭigata*) and faults (*doṣa*). E.g. *Siddhi* p. 348: "Cette vue a pour action d'être le support de toutes les opinions fausses (*dṛṣṭigata*).". Finally, cf. M. av. p. 234.1 and also PV I k. 222: *sarvāsām doṣajātīnām jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt*.

(122) See en. 120. Read *shéi* 誰 instead of *wéi* 唯 . Cf. Kyik p. 330.9.

(122a) Chinese reads: ..."[respectively] understood by the eyes, the ears and the mind". I have deliberately changed the word order here in keeping with Dharmapāla's (and Candrakīrti's) interpretation that the Brahmin's doctrine is understood by the ears, the Jain's by the eyes and the Buddhist's by the mind.

(122b) For a similar comparison between the passions and thieves (*caura*), see AK vi ad k. 28ab, LVP 190 n. 3, which speaks of *kleśacaura*.

(123) Following Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 331.1) read *duō* 多 ("most"; "many") instead of T. *wài* 外 ("outside").

(124) Dharmapāla is probably alluding to the Mīmāṃsaka's "proof" that the *Vedas* are eternal, and hence non-belying, because they are not man-made (*apauruṣeya*). See *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I, 1, 6-23, 27-32; see Frauwallner (1961) p. 120 on the relation of this argument in 27-32 to the general Mīmāṃsaka position that words are permanent. Cf. Dharmapāla's explanation and refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka's proofs of the *Vedas*' permanence in T. 1571 i 187c16-188a7, and in particular, pp. 187c16-19:

復次有偏執明書聲常切不待緣後無壞滅性自能顯越諸根義爲決定量
會不差違 現比等量依士夫見 士夫有失見是疑因 故能依量皆難
信受

"Now, other factions hold that the words of the *Vedas* are permanent, that their beginning was never perceived, that they will never subsequently come to an end, that their nature is self-manifested and is beyond all sense objects, [and] that they can never fail to be a sure *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇas* such as direct perception, inference and so forth depend upon the views of a person, and when the person has faults, his views are a cause for doubt. Therefore, reliance on [such] a *pramāṇa* is completely unconvincing."

Dharmapāla replies that if, as the adversary maintains, all man-made views and *pramāṇas* which depend upon human beings are faulty, then it follows that the adversary's own views and texts as well as those of his teacher should also be faulty (in that they are also man-dependent). And thus the adversary's statements become self-refuting (*zì hài* 自害). Another counter-argument: "The words of the *Vedas* and other sorts of words are similar in nature. So why say that only the *Vedas* are permanent? You should not be able to assert that other words are impermanent." Note that Dharmakīrti in PV I k. 224 et seq. argues at length against the same Mīmāṃsaka position on *apauruṣeyatva*, which he introduces as follows in k. 224: *girāṃ mithyātva-hetūnām doṣānām puruṣāśrayāt / apauruṣeyaṃ satyārtham iti kecit pracakṣate* //. "Some say, 'As faults [or] causes for the verses being erroneous depend upon man, it is [statements] which are not man-made which have true meaning.'" Manoranthanandin (PVV p. 367) specifies that the opinion is that of the Jaiminiyas, i.e. the followers of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*: *girāṃ vācāṃ mithyātvasya hetūnām doṣānām ajñānavisaṃ-vādābhiprāyādīnām vā puruṣasyāśrayād āśrayanatvāt apauruṣeyaṃ vākyaṃ mithyātva-hetoḥ puruṣadoṣasyābhāvāt satyārtham iti kecit jaiminiyāḥ pracakṣate* //.

(125) See *Śūraṅgamasaṃmādhisūtra* §133 et seq. in Lamotte (1965) p. 231ff and n. 266 for four sorts of *puṇyakṣetra*; Van den Broeck (1977) pp. 86, 91; Nak. p. 1187cd. The image behind the term is that of a source of merit or happiness, i.e. the "field" in which virtuous "seeds" (*bīja*) can be planted.

(126) Read *tān lài zhě* 貪癩者 ("greedy lepers") instead of T. *pín lài zhě* 貧癩者 ("poor lepers"). Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 331.10) also reads *tān*.

(127) Tucci (p. 549) translates: "Si onora il brāhmano perchè ha penetrato la scienza...". However, the context and Dharmapāla's commentary make it clear that *wèi sòng zhū míng gù* 爲誦諸明故 means "because they recite the *Vedas*": *zhū míng* does not refer to knowledge, but rather to the *míng lùn* 明論, the *Vedas*. As for *sòng* 誦, H. gives as equivalences *ā-MNĀ* and *PAṬH* "read, recite". Bhattacharya (p. 161), probably basing himself on Tucci, takes the Chinese as corroborating his reconstruction, *vidyāgrahaṇataḥ* ("for the acquisition of knowledge"), but in fact the Chinese and Tibetan seem different.

(128) The underlying argument is that suffering is the result of a previous unvirtuous action, and that, *qua* retribution, it is neither virtuous nor unvirtuous and is "not defiled and not defined" (*anivṛtāvyākṛta*). Cf. AKBh ad ii, k. 57ab: *anivṛtāvyākṛto hi dharmah vipākah* / (Pradhān ed. p. 95, 10; LVP p. 289). Liberation (*mokṣa*), however, is itself virtuous and must depend upon previous virtuous causes: thus suffering is not the cause for liberation because it is not virtuous.

Vipākaphala, or the effect of virtuous or unvirtuous actions, is one of five types of effects spoken about in the *Abhidharma*'s elaboration of the law of karma. See Mvyut 2272-4 and 2276-7 and AK ii p. 287ff for the five. *Siddhi* p. 97 (LVP transl.)

describes it as: "le 'fruit de rétribution' des actes bons ou mauvais qui projettent (*ā-KṣIP*) une existence dans une certaine sphère d'existence, dans une certaine destinée, par une certaine matrice." *Vipākaphala*, as its name implies, is the effect of *vipākahetu* (i.e. virtuous or non-virtuous actions which will "ripen" as fortunate or unfortunate types of existences), one of six sorts of causes; see AK ii p. 244ff for the six and ii, p. 271ff for *vipākahetu* in particular. See also de la Vallée Poussin (1913) pp. 54-55 for the six causes. Finally, note that when *vipākaphala* is the result of virtuous actions, the causal virtue is one which is "defiled" or "impure" (*sāsrava*) in that it is under the influence of ignorance (*avidyā*) and craving (*trṣṇā*). Cf. AK ii (LVP p. 271) k. 54cd: *vipākahetur aśubhāḥ kuśalāś caiva sāsravāḥ* (ed. Pradhān p. 89). Transl. LVP "Sont cause de rétribution les *dharma*s mauvais et les *dharma*s bons qui sont impurs." (AKBh ad k. 54cd adds the word *dharmāḥ*.) Cf. also the definition of *mam smin gyi rgyu* (= *vipākahetu*) in *bsDus grwa brñ* p. 20a4 : *mi dge ba dañ dge ba zag bcas gañ ruñ gis bsdus pa / mam smin gyi rgyu'i mtshan ñid / mtshan gzi ni / srog gcod kyi las lta bu /*. "The defining characteristic of *vipākahetu* is: 'What is classed as either unvirtuous or as defiled virtue.' The illustrative example (*mtshan gzi*) is the karma of killing and so forth."

(129) A formal reasoning (*prayoga*) which can be reworded as follows:

Thesis (*pakṣa*): The various self-inflicted physical sufferings of the Jains are not a cause for liberation.

Reason (*hetu*): Because, such karmic ripenings are the consequence of past evil actions and are not virtuous *dharma*s.

Example (*dṛṣṭānta*): Just like pleasurable ripenings.

Cf. the Japanese translator's note 105, Kyik p. 332. The example must refer to ripenings which are pleasurable in the *samsāric* sense of "defiled" or "impure" (*sāsrava*) pleasure. See the preceding note.

(130) See en. 129.

(131) The subsequent commentary makes it clear that the "present conditions" are *moha*.

Note that there are sufferings or pleasures which are *not vipāka* of past virtuous or non-virtuous actions. In particular, as AK ii k. 60-61 and *bhāṣya* make clear, no mind (*citta*) or mental factor (*caitta*) which is defiled (*kliṣṭa*), or unvirtuous, can be the effect of a *vipākahetu*. It can easily be seen that this principle is a direct consequence of AK ii, k. 57ab, which states that a ripening (*vipāka*) is always a non-defined *dharma*, i.e. it is neither virtuous nor unvirtuous. See en. 128. Cf. AK ii, LVP p. 298: "La pensée et les mentaux [...] lorsqu'ils sont souillés, naissent de cinq causes à l'exclusion de la cause de rétribution [i.e. *vipākahetu*]." The example which Dhar-

mapāla presents, viz. sexual pleasure, is a defiled state of mind, and as such cannot be a *vipākaphala*.

(132) *shēn*, of course, usually means "the body" (= *deha*; *kāya*; *śarīra*, etc.), but it can also translate *janman* ("birth"; "origin"; see Nak. p. 770c), and that is the sense at stake in this discussion.

(133) *lùe yán* 略言 = *lùe shuō* 略說 = *samāsatas*. Lang (Thesis) n. 27 p. 444 translates from the Chinese as follows: "In brief, what the Buddha said: 'These two things are distinct from other schools, viz., non-harming produces [rebirth as] men and gods, and the view of emptiness verifies Nirvāṇa'." But this does not account for *jù* 具, which has the sense of "to have" as the Japanese translator (Kyik p. 333.17) also brings out clearly. Nor is there reason to suppose that this is a quotation from the Buddha.

(134) See *Traité* II pp. 782-784 ("note préliminaire") for a summary of morality in the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika system; see also Lamotte (1962) pp. 413-415.

For the ten virtuous and ten non-virtuous actions, see BHSD p. 170 s.v. *karmapatha*, Lévi (1929) pp. 268-271 for a work on the *daśa akuśalakarmapatha*, a text attributed to Aśvaghōṣa; *dāna*, see *Traité* II chapter 19, pp. 662 et seq; *priyavacana*, BHSD p. 394; *arthacaryā*, BHSD p. 66; *samānārthatā*, Dayal (1931) pp. 255-257, BHSD p. 569. Dayal p. 256 cites the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*'s gloss of *samānārthatā*: "Here the bodhisattva himself pursues the same Ideal or Aim and the same Good (Root of Good) as he exhorts others to follow". The latter four are known as "the four ways of gathering [disciples]" (*catvāri saṃgrahavastūni*); see Lamotte (1962) p. 116, n. 67, Dayal op. cit. pp. 251-259, Mvyut section XXXV, 925-928, *Dīgha* iii 232, *Dharmasaṃgraha* 19. For the four *dhyāna*, see *Traité* III pp. 1233-1238; for the fourfold *ārūpyasamāpatti*, see *Traité* III pp. 1274-1279. These *samāpatti* are: (a) the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśanantyāyatana*), (b) the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (*viññānānāntyāyatana*), (c) the sphere of nothingness (*ākimścanyāyatana*), (d) the sphere of being neither conscious nor unconscious (*naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*). See Dayal (1931) p. 230 on five *samāpattis* — the four *dhyānas* and five *samāpattis* go to make up the nine *anupūrvavahāras* ("states following one another in regular succession"). The difference between *samādhi* and *samāpatti* is a subject of some controversy. Edgerton opined in BHSD (s.v. *samāpatti*) that the term in other contexts signifies "attainment", but in Buddhism it comes to mean the same as *samādhi*. (Cf. Lamotte's translation as "recueillement" and the frequent use, in Chinese, of *dìng* 定 for both *samādhi* and *samāpatti*.) But cf. Dayal op. cit. pp. 229-231 on the *ārūpyasamāpattayah*; he translates *samāpatti* as "attainments"; May (1959) translates as "obtentions"; see his n. 436 for further references. Tib. *sñom par 'jug pa* is just a completely literal translation of *samāpatti* and does not (as Edgerton would have it) specially emphasize "entering into equanimity".

(135) On the term *tathatā* ("thusness"), see *Siddhi* II pp. 743ff. For *bhūtakṣi*, see *ibid.* II pp. 750ff. for explanation and canonical references. On the etymology of the latter term, *Siddhi* p. 750: "La Tathatā est *bhūta-kṣi* parce qu'elle est l'objet du savoir exact, donc *bhūta*, vraie; parce qu'elle est l'extrémité: il n'y a rien à trouver plus loin que le *nairātmya*, donc *kṣi*, extrémité." MAV 1, k. 15 gives *tathatā*, *bhūtakṣi* and *animitta* in its list of synonyms for voidness: *tathatā bhūtakṣiś cānimittam paramārthatā / dharmadhātus ca paryāyāḥ śūnyatāyāḥ samāsataḥ //*. "Thusness, the true endpoint, what is without characters, the ultimate truth and the sphere of the Dharma are, in short, synonyms for voidness". Cf. T. 1600 (transl. Xuán zàng) i 465c 13-14:

略說空異門 謂真如實際 無相勝義性 法界等應知

The points behind saying *tathatā*, *bhūtakṣi* and *animitta* respectively are, according to MAV 1, k. 15, *bhāṣya* and *ṭīkā*, that voidness is never different (*ananya*), is non-erroneous (*aviparyāsa*) and is the cessation, or absence, of all characters, be they conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) or unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). Cf. MAV-*bhāṣya* ad k. 16: *ananyathārthena tathatā nityam tathāiveti kṛtvā / aviparyāsārthena bhūtakṣiḥ viparyāsā-vastutvāt / nimittanirodhārthenānimittam sarvanimittābhāvāt //*. Translations of the relevant passages from the *bhāṣya* and *ṭīkā* in Stcherbatsky (1936) reprinted (1970), pp. 81-83.

(136) See p. 55, fn. 117, §217a21, en. 138.

(137) Literally, "the disciplinary code of individual liberation", the name of the code of precepts for monks in the *Vinaya*. *Prātimokṣasaṃvara* can also refer to the text in which this code is contained. Cf. BHSD s.v. *saṃvara*, *prātimokṣa*.

(138) See §217a21 & en. 47. See *Traité* III p. xlii for a list of the occurrences of this term in the *Dà zhì dù lùn*. See *ibid.* p. 1501 for a good example of the way the term is used in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature: "Ce [vrai] caractère [des *dharma*] est non-né (*anutpanna*) et non-détruit (*aniruddha*), ni souillé (*asaṃkṣiṣa*) ni purifié (*avyavadāta*), ni existant ni non-existant (*naivasan nāsat*), ni pris (*anupātta*) ni rejeté (*aparityakta*), toujours apaisé (*śānta*), parfaitement pur, pareil à l'espace (*ākāśasama*), indéfinissable (*anirdeśya*), inexprimable (*anabhilāpya*); il est destruction de tous les chemins du discours (*sarvavādamārgoccheda*), il dépasse le domaine de toutes les pensées et de tous les mentaux (*sarvacittacaitasikadharmagocarasamatikrānta*); il est pareil au Nirvāṇa: c'est la Loi des Buddha."

(139) Read *zhì* 智 instead of T. *zhī* 知. Japanese translation (Kyik p. 335.4) and T. variant: 智 .

(140) Nak. p. 1292a explains that as the future has no end, this idiom, "bounds of the future" (*wèi lái jì* 未来際), is used to say that something is eternal.

(141) I follow Red mda' ba p. 143.11-12: *smra ba po'i yon tan tshig zur dad pa / don phyin ci ma log pa / ñag sna phyi ma 'khrugs pa brjod pa blo gsal ba*. "The teacher's good qualities are that [his] words are impartial, the meaning is non-erroneous, the speech does not state confusions between [what came] before and [what comes] after and [his] mind is clear." Note that both Lang and Bhattacharya understand *ma 'khrugs pa* in the sense of *akopa* "without anger". (See Lang, Thesis p. 418. Her understanding of the syntax differs too.) This is one possible sense, but I have taken *'khrugs pa* in the sense of *saṃkula / ākula*, "confusion", which accords with Red mda' ba's understanding. Cf. also Lokesh Chandra s.v. *'khrugs pa*.

(142) *smra ba po la yon tan* literally means "the good qualities, in the case of the teacher," Following Red mda' ba, rGyal and Kaḥ thog, however, I understood the *la don* as essentially possessive: *smra ba po'i yon tan*. Similarly for *ñan pa po la*. Cf. B's reconstruction: *vaktur guṇaḥ*.

(143) The point of the argument is not that good qualities *actually* change into bad ones, but rather that they *seem* to be bad to a disciple or master who is himself riddled with faults. Cf. Kaḥ thog's summary of the argument (pp. 190b5-191a2): *snod mtshan ñid tshañ na smra ba po'i yon tan zur dod pa dañ gsal ba dañ ma 'khrugs pa dañ / ñan po'i lhag pa'i bsaṃ pa khoñ du chud la / sams la zañ ziñ med pa sogs de las rnam pa gzan du skyon du snañ bar mi 'gyur ba yon tan kho nar snañ la / ñan pa po la'añ yon tan skyon gyi ño bor 'gyur ba min te / ñan pa pos smra ba po'i yon tan la de ñid du śes pas de las gzan skyon du go bar mi 'gyur la / ñan po'i yon tan la smra ba pos yon tan du śes pa las gzan skyon du mi 'gyur ro /*. "When the vessel satisfies the definition, then the teacher's good qualities, viz. impartiality, clarity, not being confused ... and so forth will not appear to be anything other than this, i.e. as faults, but will [instead] appear to be only good qualities. And the good qualities of the auditor, too, will not become faults. Since the auditor correctly understands the teacher's good qualities, he will not understand them as otherwise, i.e. as faults. And because the teacher will comprehend the auditor's good qualities as [in fact] being good qualities, they will not become otherwise, i.e. faults."

(144) Cf. Red mda' ba p. 143.15-16: *ñan pa po rañ gi ñes pa mi brtsi ba rnams kyis smra ba po skyon dañ ldan pa ñid du brtsi bar byed de /*. The exact sense of the word *'dzud par byed* (usually: "guide; impose; insert") is unclear in CSV, although Lokesh Chandra does give *pravartaka* ("set in motion"; "causing"; "effecting") as a possible equivalent.

(145) Following Bhattacharya's amendment to the text we would have "teaching" instead of "praising".

(146) Unidentified. B reconstructs: *abhiprāyopadeśasūtra*. But see Lokesh Chandra s.v. *lhag pa'i bsaṃ pa bskul ba'i mdo*. The *Adhyāśayasaṃcodanasūtra* is a

medium length sūtra of the *Ratnakūṭa* group — *Ratnakūṭasūtra* #25 in the *Ōtani Kanjur Catalogue*.

(147) Literally: "They regard this as if of the Sage".

(148) Following Tib. one would translate: "we have not said anything..."

(149) The length and complexity of the Skt. and Tib. forces me to significantly alter the word order in the English translation. I begin with the main verb, which is at the end of the Skt. sentence.

(150) Following Tib. and B. we would translate: "So why, after imagining an impious apprehension in your heart, ..."

(151) Note that the Sanskrit is hybrid here, with the result that we have *dharmāṇa* instead of *dharmāṇām*, *dharmā* instead of *dharmāḥ*, the use of the singular *asti* where one would expect the plural, as well as *astī* with a long *ī* instead of the final *i*. See Edgerton (1953) p. 59 §8.117, p. 55 §8.78, p. 129 §25.4 and p. 131 §26.2 respectively for explanations of these phenomena. As we shall see below in CSV, Candrakīrti also gives a grammatical commentary on some of these particularities of hybrid Skt. In particular, he shows that *nivṛtti* has to be interpreted as if it were the locative *nivṛttau*; this concords nicely with Tib. *mya ṅan 'das la*. Stcherbatsky (1965) did not take this into account, and as a result his translation of the passage is quite different. Cf his p. 188.

Finally it should be remarked that in what follows the discussion in CSV is largely parallel to that in Pr. 522.10 - 523.13; see en. 159.

(152) I.e. principally the body.

(153) See en. 151.

(154) The sūtra which is partially quoted is Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* VII 1.39: *supām sulukpūrvasavarṇāccheyāḍādyāyājālah*, a sūtra describing phenomena in Vedic Sanskrit. Transl. Renou (1966). Candrakīrti, interestingly enough, uses the part of this sūtra which speaks of substituting *luk* (i.e. "suppression"; "dropping out") in order to justify the elimination of the locative singular and thus explain why we find *nivṛtti* rather than *nivṛttau*. See en. 151. This elimination of the locative ending does frequently occur in Vedic locative singulars, notably in nouns in *-an* — e.g. *carman*. Nonetheless, it is curious that in connection with the *Samādhirājasūtra* Candrakīrti repeatedly (cf. en. 158) invokes considerations about Vedic in order to explain Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit: while Candrakīrti in other works often makes reference to grammatical sūtras to explain classical Sanskrit, I know of no other instance where he invokes Pāṇinian sūtras or Vedic Sanskrit forms to explain hybrid Sanskrit phenomena. Cf. the

discussion of *tiñ* below in §16. On *sup* and *su* see Abhyankar (1977)'s entries for these Pāṇinian terms.

(155) On *skra śad*, cf. *Zidian* p. 54: *mgo nas lhuñ ba'i skra'i miñ ste...* "A word for the hairs which have fallen from one's head." *skra śad 'dziñs* = *keṣoṇḍuka* "tangled hair", "a mesh of hair".

(156) On the use of this example, see en. 370. *Timira* is often thought to be some form of ophthalmia. However, J. Filliozat, who was both an ophthalmologist and an orientalist, has argued that this translation is mistaken. See Filliozat's explanations in *May* (1959), n. 779: "*Timira* ne peut se traduire valablement par 'ophtalmie'. Ce dernier terme désigne des conjonctivites qui ne donnent pas les symptômes de *timira*. *Timira* = 'obscurité' ou plus généralement 'trouble visuel' dû à des opacités et altérations de réfringence à l'intérieur des milieux transparents de l'oeil." Note that when the *timira*, or "opacities of one's vision" develop further, they often lead to advanced cataracts.

(157) Quotation unidentified; the snake-rope and *timira* themes, however, are very common in Madhyamaka discussions. Cf. e.g. the opening verses of the *Has-tavālaprakaraṇa* and its *ṛtti* (attributed by Tibetans to Āryadeva), pp. 276-277 in F.W. Thomas and H. Ui (1918).

(158) The rule is from the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali (ed. Kielhorn III p. 256, line 14): *tiñām ca tiño bhavantīti vaktavyam*. This is a qualification to Pāṇini VII 1.39 and again concerns Vedic Sanskrit. What is at stake is of course Candrakīrti's continuing attempt to explain why the *Samādhiraśasūtra* says *nivṛtti dharmāṇa na asti dharmā*. Previously he had explained the fact that *nivṛtti* should be taken as being in the locative, although the case-affix does not appear. Subsequently he will explain that *dharmāṇa* means *dharmāṇām*. Now he is again invoking considerations about Vedic to explain why we find *asti* instead of *santi*. Unfortunately such a distinction does not come out clearly in the Tibetan because there is no distinction between singular and plural verb forms.

As for the key term *tiñ*, it figures in Pāṇini as a *pratyāhāra* for the eighteen personal endings for verbs, i.e. *tip*, *tas*, etc. for the Active, and *ta*, *ātām*, etc. for the Middle. See Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* III 4.78; Renou (1966) vol. 1, pp. 273-274; Abhyankar s.v. *tiñ*. My thanks to J. Bronkhorst for identifying the two grammatical citations in CSV XII.

(159) It is very odd to classify Kaṇāda (= *gzegs zan*) on one side and the followers of Kaṇāda, viz. the Vaiśeṣikas (= *bye brag pa*), on the other! We can reasonably assume that the Tibetan text is corrupt here. Cf. Pr. 523.9-13 which gives a more elaborate account: *astīti bhāvasadbhāvakalpanāvatām jaiminiyakāṇāda-kāpilādīnām vaibhāṣikaparyantānām, nāstīti ca kalpanāvatām nāstikānām apāyagati-*

niṣṭhānām, tadanyeṣām cātītānāgatasamsthānām avijñaptiviprayuktasamskāra[nām] nāstivādinām tadanyad astivādinām, [pari]kalpitasvabhāvasya nāstivādinām paratantra-pariṇipannasvabhāvayor astivādinām evam astināstivādinām evaṃ caratām na duḥkhaṃ saṃsāraḥ śāmyatīti ||* *Read *avijñapti*° instead of Pr. *vijñapti*°; cf. Tib. *mam par rig byed ma yin pa*. Translation: "Those who think 'it exists' and thus imagine that entities really exist, [are] the followers of Jaimini [i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas], Kaṇāda [i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas], Kapila [i.e. the Sāṃkhya]s etc. up to and including the [Buddhist] Vaibhāṣikas. And those who imagine 'inexistence' [are] the nihilists, who end up in unfortunate states of existence. And the others — viz. those [Sautrāntikas] who say that the past, the future, unmanifest [karma] and conditionings which are neither [mental nor physical] are [all] inexistent, but say that apart from these [things] there is existence, as well as those [Vijñānavādins] who say that imagined natures (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) are inexistent but say that dependent (*paratantra*) and thoroughly established (*pariṇipanna*) natures exist — [these philosophers] in such a fashion assert both existence and inexistence. For [all] them who practice in this way, suffering, i.e. saṃsāra, will not cease." Note that I have replaced LVP's half-*daṇḍas* with commas. Also, because of the length of the Skt. sentence, I have had to alter the syntax a bit by rendering the series of genitive plurals into complete English sentences.

(160) Cf. the translation of these verses from the *Ratnāvalī* in Tucci (1934) pp. 321-322, Hopkins (1975) pp. 25-26.

(161) See *Mahāparinibbānasuttanta* 5.27, *Dīgha* II 151.20-22: *idh' eva subhadda samaṇo, idha dutiyo samaṇo, idha tatiyo samaṇo, iddha catuttho samaṇo. suññā parappavādā samaṇeḥi aññe*. Cf. Skt. in *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (ed. Waldschmidt) III, 378: *iha prathamah śramaṇa upalabhyata iha dvitīya iha tṛtīya iha caturtho ... śūnyāḥ parapravādāḥ śramaṇair vā brāhmaṇair vā*.

(162) Tib. understands the syntax slightly differently: "Now the Outsiders, because of their inability to teach the method for abandoning all, are established as having faulty understandings with regard to other sorts of entities too, and thus [this] need not be established."

(163) Monier-Williams *Dictionary* p. 88: *arundhatī*... "the little and scarcely visible star Alcor (belonging to the Great Bear, and personified as the wife of one of its seven chief stars, Vasiṣṭha, or of all the seven, the so-called seven *ṛṣis*;...)."

(164) Unidentified. On *mchiñ bu* ("rhinestones"), cf. *Zidian* p. 240. *mchiñ bu: rin po che bcos ma'am rdzun ma'i miñ*.

(165) Following Tib. (*brtags nas*) we would translate: "having imagined [the idea] that ...".

(166) Quoted in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, p. 212.20-21: *nāsty ahaṃ* na bhaviṣyāmi na me 'sti na bhaviṣyati / iti bālasya saṃtrāsah paṇḍitasya bhavakṣayaḥ //*. Cf. B. p. 146 n. 1. *Ed. Vaidya: *nasmy ahaṃ*.

(167) A somewhat non-literal rendering of *notsahate... asato manaḥ*. Literally, "The mind of the mediocre person does not have the courage ...".

(168) Cf. *Ratnāvalī* 1.39 (ed. Hahn): *sarvaduḥkṣayaṃ dharmaṃ śrutvaivam aparīkṣakaḥ / saṃtrasyaty aparījñānād abhayasthānakātarah //*. "Thus, after hearing the Dharma that removes all suffering, someone who does not examine it, [and] who is afraid of the fearless state, is terrified due to not thoroughly understanding." Cf. the translations of this verse from the *Ratnāvalī* in Lang (Thesis) p. 440 and Hopkins (1975) p. 22.

(169) Tib. has "when he is lifted up by the elephant" (*glan po ches spar ba na*).

(170) *parijaya* = Skt. *paricaya* ("acquaintance, knowledge of"). See BHSD p. 322.

(171) Skt. has literally: "the profane who reside on the level belonging to the profane." To avoid this pleonasm I have followed Tib. in reading "beings" (*sems can* = *sattva*).

(172) Tib. has: "The quietening dharma is what opposes that training, [in other words,] the voidness of nature of entities, for it is conducive to the cessation of saṃsāra."

(173) I use the formulation "having..." purely out of convenience to handle the long Skt. sentence. The Skt. does not have an absolutive, but rather has the *bahuvrīhi*, *pranaṣṭasanmārgasya*.

(174) Tib. seems to take *mahāprapāta* as the "cause for great precipices / abysses" (*g.yaṅ sa chen po'i rgyu*), perhaps in keeping with the preceding mention of precipices (cf. §35) (*prapāta*). "Cause for great precipices", however, is not clear, and I prefer to take *prapāta* here in the sense of "downfall".

(175) The passage is translated on the basis of the Skt. text. Tib. has some differences; see Bhattacharya's notes to his p. 148. For the four *saṃgrahavastu*, see en. 134.

(176) Unidentified.

(177) See en. 128.

(178) Tib. translates *pratyayāt* in this context by *rkyen las* ("by conditions"), but it is not clear what the point would be. Hence I have taken *pratyaya* in its sense of "belief", "firm conviction", etc.

(179) My translation follows the Tibetan; I have placed in parenthesis those words in Staël-Holstein's Skt. text which do not have any correspondent in the Tibetan. *Kāśyapaparivarta* §64 (ed. Staël-Holstein): *varam khalu (punaḥ) kāśyapa sumerumātrā pudgaladṛṣṭir (āśritā) na tv evādhimānikasya* śūnyatādṛṣṭi(mālinā) / tat kasmād dhetoḥ /*. Ibid. §65: *sarvadṛṣṭigatānām śūnyatā nihsaraṇam yasya khalu (punaḥ) kāśyapa śūnyatādṛṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi** /*. *Bhattacharya reads *evābhimānikasya*; cf. his reconstructed Skt. text on p. 150; cf. also the virtually identical passage from the *Ratnakūṭasūtra* cited in Pr. p. 248.9-11 where we find *evābhāvābhiniveśikasya*. ***iti vadāmi*, while it has no correspondent in CSV, is translated in the Tib. found in Staël-Holstein's edition: ... *gsor mi ruñ ño zes ñas bśad do*. Finally note that in the Tib. of Staël-Holstein's text the last lines of §65 are the same as those for the last lines of §64. The Skt. differs however.

Nāgārjuna develops the same thought in MMK XIII, 8: *śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnām proktā nihsaraṇam jinaiḥ / yeśāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire //*. "The Victors have explained that voidness is the deliverance from all views. But, they have said that those who have a view on voidness can never be healed."

(180) Tib. takes *darśana* here in the sense of "teaching", rather than "view". Cf. Tib. *ston pa*. However, the Chinese takes it as "view" (*jiàn* 見).

(181) Cf. the Tibetan translation of *netara* by *tha mal pa ma yin pa* ("uncommon").

(182) *nirvṛtti* is frequently indistinguishable from *nirvṛti*, *nirṛti* and *nivṛtti*. *nirvṛti* is synonymous with *nirvāṇa*. See May (1959) n. 682.

(183) See en. 108.

(184) "the absence ...selflessness" is not in HPS and has been translated on the basis of the Tibetan.

For the use of the term *svabhāva* ("nature"; "own-being"; *svabhāva* = *svarūpa* = *svalakṣaṇa*) in Madhyamaka philosophy, see e.g. De Jong (1972) pp. 2-3, Ames (1982), (1986) pp. 321-322. Note that the definition which Candrakīrti gives here in CS XII is frequently cited in Tibetan explanations as to what *svabhāva* is. In both Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka, however, the term often used in a more banal sense where it is simply a way of saying what something is conventionally, and where it does not have the technical sense of a "mode of being independent of causes and conditions." Note that the Epistemological school's idea(s) of *svabhāva* and *svalakṣaṇa* differ from those of the Madhyamaka in that they define *svalakṣaṇa* in terms of momentary exis-

tence and causal efficacy, uniqueness of location in space and time, etc., but certainly not as something independent. See en. 366; see also Steinkellner (1971), (1973a) on the Epistemologists' understanding of *svabhāva*, *svabhāvapratibandha* and *svabhāvaheṭu*. These subjects would need a separate study to be treated adequately, and in fact until we are clearer on the differences in the various schools' conceptions of these terms, it is difficult to evaluate and interpret the debates which they had amongst each other.

(185) Cf. Pr. 212.18: *tatropādāyata ity upādānaṃ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ / yas tān upādāya prajñapyate sa upādātā grahitā nispādaka ātmety ucyate* /. "Here, *upādāna* means what is appropriated, i.e. the five appropriated aggregates. The appropriator, the holder, the effectuator, which is designated in dependence upon those [aggregates], is said to be the self." Transl. Schayer (1931). See May (1959) index, s.v. *upādāna* and n. 467 for a distinction between a wider and narrower sense of *upādāna* in this sort of discussion, that is, the word can mean the process of appropriation or the object of appropriation. In our discussion, it is the narrower sense which is at stake, a sense where *upādāna* means virtually the same as *upādeya*. Thus, the aggregates are the object; they are what is "taken up" or appropriated by the self, which is the agent, i.e. that which effectuates the "taking" or "appropriation".

Note that the absolutive *upādāya* has the sense of "on the basis of", "in dependence upon", as Candrakīrti later brings out in CSV XII §48 by means of his gloss *pratītya*. See en. 40 and 363 for *upādāya prajñapti*. Other senses of *upādāna*: (1) material cause or basis, as in the discussions of fuel and fire, where fuel is termed the *upādāna*; (2) appropriation in the sense of a fourfold type of grasping or clinging, as in the context of the twelve links of *pratītyasamutpāda* (cf. Pr. 555-556, transl. May pp. 262-263 and LVP [1913] pp. 26-29).

(186) See en. 363.

(187) The six sense organs including the mind (*manas*) are known as the *ādhyātmikāyatana* ("internal domains"); their respective objects are the *bāhyāyatana* ("external domains"). We find in Mvyut the list of twelve; see also PSP pp. 144-145 on *dvadāśāyatana*; frequently one simply speaks of the group of six organs, terming them *ṣaḍāyatana*. Edgerton also mentions the use of *ṣaḍāyatana* in the context of *pratītyasamutpāda* as applying to the six pairs of organs and their respective objects. See BHSD s.v. *āyatana* and Mvyut 2027-2039, 2246, LVP (1913) pp. 18-20, AK iii, p. 63, May (1959) n. 505 and 938.

(188) Various uses: (1) three *dhātus* in the sense of worlds, viz. the realms of desire, form and no-form; (2) eighteen *dhātus* or phenomenal constituents, viz. the six organs, six objects and six consciousnesses; (3) six *dhātus* or psycho-physical elements, viz. earth, water, fire, air, space, consciousness. See BHSD s.v. *dhātu*; Stcherbatsky (1923) pp. 9-10; Mvyut. 2040-2058; PSP p. 145 for the eighteen; AK iii, pp. 1-12 for the three *dhātus*; AK i, pp. 34ff. for a general discussion of the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, *dhātus*

and the purpose in introducing these schemata. It might seem as if it must be the six *dhātus* which are at stake here in our text. Pr. chapter V is consecrated to the "examination of the dhātu" (*dhātuparīkṣā*), while chapters III and IV are devoted to the *āyatanas* and *skandhas* respectively, all with the general aim of refuting the scholastics' version of what the person is. In Pr. chapter V the sense of *dhātu* being examined is indeed that of the six *dhātus*. However, note that it is also equally possible that it is the eighteen *dhātus* which are at issue in our text: AK i, LVP p. 40 speaks of how the doctrine of the *skandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus* is supposed to counter grasping at the self; in this context, there are eighteen.

(189) "For fools" (*mūrkhajanasya*) is missing in the Tibetan.

(190) I take *darśana* here as "vision" in keeping with Tib. *mthoñ ba*.

(191) "There is no [other] ... in this manner" is missing in Skt. and has been translated on the basis of the Tibetan.

(192) "Therefore" and "which is characterized ... nature" are missing in Skt. and are translated following the Tibetan.

(193) For the three *vimokṣamukha*, which are types of meditative trances (*samādhi*), see especially AK viii, pp. 184-187 and p. 184 n. 1. To resume the discussion in AK: (1) *śūnyatāsamādhi*, which is directed towards the void and selfless aspects (*ākāra*) of the truth of suffering, is the opponent to the wrong view with regard to the personality (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*). (2) *ānimittasamādhi* is directed towards the lack of ten sorts of marks or characters. These *nimitta* are the five *āyatanas*, such as form, sound, etc. plus the genders, male and female, plus the three characters of what is conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*), viz. arising, duration and destruction. *ānimittasamādhi* is linked to the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*) and has its four aspects. (3) *apraṇihitasamādhi* has the aspects of the other noble truths, and is a meditation where one does not direct the mind towards any dharma in the three worlds, viz. anything impermanent, ridden with suffering, etc. Other references: Dayal (1931) p. 234 and n. 489 for scriptural references to *Samādhirājasūtra*, etc.; Pr. 246.6 and n. 1; De Jong (1949) p. 21 and n. 59; May (1959) n. 436; *Traité I*, p. 163, and especially pp. 321-325 for a Mahāyānist version of the three; Van den Broeck (1977) for the *Amṛtarasa*'s explanations; Dantinne (1983) pp. 267-269 for further references and translations of pertinent passages from the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*.

(194) The point is that perceiving selflessness will automatically imply the acquisition of *apraṇihitasamādhi* and *ānimittasamādhi*.

(195) From the **Bodhisambhāra* = *Byañ chub kyi tshogs*, attributed to Nāgārjuna; on this text see Lindtner (1982)'s *Introduction* as well as his Chapter XIII

for further remarks and a translation from the Chinese. The text is inexistent in Sanskrit, but was translated into Chinese by Dharmagupta as the *Pú tí zī liáng lùn*.

A few quotations survive here and there in Tibetan translation. My translation here is based on Tib. Cf. the Chinese (T. XXXII, 1660 iv 532a 19-20):

菩提資糧論 無自性故空 已空何作相 諸相既寂滅 智者何所願

Cf. also Lindtner's translation on p. 235. Note, however, that he splits *jí miè* 寂滅 into "extinct (*śānta*) and abolished (*niruddha*)". This hardly seems justified, especially as *jí miè* often just translates *nirvṛta* (H. *nirvṛta*) and the Tib. just has *log pa*.

(196) Tib. *mthoñ ba*.

(197) Very common terms. Indeed they are now part of the English language — see Jackson (1982). *śrāvaka* = the followers of Hīnayāna. *pratyekabuddha*: "one who has won enlightenment but lives in solitude and does not reveal his knowledge to the world" (BHSD p. 379). See en. 94.

(198) Instead of *dharmāśārīrāvyatikavartitām*, the Tibetan seems to read °*vartinām* (*chos kyi sku las tha mi dad par bžugs pa*), which would necessitate the following translation: "Or alternatively, to show that it belongs to all the perfectly enlightened ones, who abide inseparably from the Body of the Dharma (*dharmāśārīra*), he said 'the sphere of all the buddhas'."

What is invoked here is the schema of the three "bodies" (*kāya*) of the Buddha; see *Siddhi* II, pp. 762 et seq. In much of the Indo-Tibetan *Prajñāparamitā* literature and that centred around the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, selflessness or voidness (i.e. the *dharmadhātu*) is regarded as the "naturally abiding buddha-nature" (*prakṛtistha-gotra*); the *dharmakāya* (= *dharmāśārīra*) is in effect this "buddha-nature" once it has been cleared of adventitious (*āgantuka*) defilements (*mala*). Cf. Tsoñ kha pa's explanations in *Legs bśad gser phreñ* 208a5-210a6 translated in Ruegg (1969) pp. 118-122. Note that in *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* VIII, the *dharmakāya* is of two sorts: the wisdom-*dharmakāya* (*jñānadharmakāya*) and the essential-body (*svābhāvikakāya*; *svabhāvakāya*). See Obermiller (1932) pp. 46, 83 and 45, 83 respectively. Roughly speaking, the former is the omniscient mind of the buddhas; the latter has two aspects (1) voidness and (2) the mind free from adventitious defilements. See *rJe bstun pa'i don bdun cu* (ed. Onoda) pp. 56-57, where the two *kāya* are treated as topic 61 and 64 in the seventy topics on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*: *dag pa gñis ldan gyi dbyiñs mthar thug de ño bo ñid sku'i mtshan ñid / de la dbye na / rañ bžin rnam dag gi char gyur pa'i ño bo ñid sku dañ / blo bur rnam dag gi char gyur pa'i ño bo ñid sku gñis yod /... ji lta ba dañ ji sñed pa la ltos te zgigs pa mthar thug pa'i mkhyen pa de / ye šes chos sku'i mtshan ñid*. "The ultimate sphere endowed with the two purities' is the defining characteristic of the *svābhāvikakāya*. Here there are two divisions: the *svābhāvikakāya* consisting in the fact of essential purity and the *svābhāvikakāya* consisting in the fact of adventitious purity. ... 'The wisdom which is the final vision on how things really are (*ji lta ba*) and how they

appear (*ji sñed pa*)' is the defining characteristic of the *jñānadharmakāyā*." Note that *ji lta ba* in this context means basically *paramārthasatya* and *ji sñed pa* here means *saṃvṛtisatya*; see Lokesh Chandra s.v. *ji lta ba* and *ji sñed pa*. Finally, see also *Siddhi II*'s appendix, "Les corps du Bouddha", as well as Ruegg (1969) *passim* for numerous different precisions.

(199) Literally "the name" (*nāman*).

(200) See BHSD s.v. *parapravādin*: "false teacher, one who promulgates false doctrine". *parapravāda*: "rival (false, heretical) doctrine". See en. 112, 201.

(201) Quoted on p. 232 of M. av. *bhāṣya* ad M. av. verse 118cd. See LVP transl. p. 281. De la Vallée Poussin gives *paravādin* ("les contradicteurs") as the equivalent of *gžan smra nmams*. However, CSV previously used *phas kyi rgol ba*, rather than *gžan smra nmams*, in that sense of *parapravādin* ("rival assertors"); when it subsequently glosses *gžan smra nmams* it uses *pha rol po'i smra ba*, which equals the term *parapravāda* ("rival assertions") in Yamaguchi (1974) *Index to the Prasannapadā part II*. Cf. also Lokesh Chandra, *gžan smra ba* = *paravāda* while *phas kyi rgol ba* = *parapravādin*; *paravādin*; Mvyut 2730. Lang (1986) p. 115 translates: "Nevertheless, it destroys other theses, just as fire destroys fuel". See en. 112 and 200.

(202) Lang (1986) translates: "An opponent (*para*) dislikes anyone who has understood this teaching". It is syntactically impossible to take *gžan la* as the subject. The verb *dga' ba* in Tibetan has its object with the particle *la* (*la don*). The subject does not take the instrumental (*byed sgra*); thus *de* is the subject of *mi dga'* and *gžan la* is the object.

(203) *mnog* = *āsvāda* in Lokesh Chandra.

(204) The argument seems to turn on the division of the Dharma into two: statements or scriptures (*bstan pa*; *luñ*) and realizations (*rtogs pa*). The real refuge of the Dharma is the latter, but the former is a facsimile. See e.g. Pr. 487.6 et seq., May (1959) p. 219 and n. 744; Stcherbatsky (1923) p. 2, n. 2; AK iii p. 87, n. 3, AK viii pp. 218-220; *sKabs dan po'i spyi don*, the chapter on the three refuges, i.e. *kun mchog gsum gi rnam bzag*.

(205) B. reconstructs as *vastudṛṣṭi*. However the equivalence, *bhāvasadbhāva-darśana*, is also plausible as this is the entry in Yamaguchi (1974) for *dños por lta ba*.

(206) On *jīvitendriya* see AK ii k. 45 and AKBh, LVP p. 214 et seq. *jīvita* = *āyus* ("life") and is held, by the Vaibhāṣikas, to be a distinct dharma which is the basis for warmth and consciousness and is the cause for the duration (*sthiti*) of the continuum (*saṃtāna*). The Sautrāntikas do not recognize this *jīvitendriya*. As for

"tangle"/ "thicket" (*tshañ tshin*). Cf. *Zidian*: (*rgyan tshig*) *rtsi śin sogs stug cin 'dziñs pa ste...*

(207) The Tib. syntax in *bde bar gśegs pa pa'i dan ma yin* is somewhat weird, but probably has to be understood as an ellipsis for *bde bar gśegs pa pa'i lugs dan rjes su 'brel ba ma yin*. At any rate, that seems to be the way rGyal and Kaḥ thog took it. rGyal p. 12: *...sañs rgyas kyi bstan pa dan min ze na*. Red mda' ba (p. 154) chose the solution of simply eliminating the problematic genitive: *... bde bar gśegs pa dan ma yin ze na*.

(208) Lang (1986) understands *śākya* as Śākyamuni, *gos med* as *nagnaka* and *bram ze* as *vipra*. One could perhaps argue that *śākya* in the *kārikā* and CSV should be taken in the sense of "the Buddhists" in keeping with CSV's reference to *bde bžin gśegs pa pa*. Cf. the commentaries of rGyal tshab (p. 12) and Kaḥ thog (p. 405), which speak of *śākya pa*; Bhattacharya also seems to take *śākya* in CSV in the sense of "the Buddhists". Nonetheless, the Chinese version of k. 294 must be read as referring to the Buddha /Tathāgata, and thus supports Lang. Finally note that *gos med* could also be *acelaka* or *nirgranthika*, while *bram ze* is more usually simply *brāhmaṇa*. Cf. the Chinese of k. 294, which uses *pó luó mén* = *brāhmaṇa*.

(209) My understanding of the syntax differs from B. and follows Red mda' ba (p. 154): *de yañ 'di ltar gcer bu pa rnams ni gtsaṅ sbra spyod pa dan bral ba'i phyir lus dri ma'i 'dam gyis gos śin khrus ras med ...*

(210) *mig 'phrul*. Literally, "illusion", but the equivalence *mig 'phrul* or *mig 'khrul* = *indrajāla* is attested; cf. Yamaguchi (1974) p. 173 and Lokesh Chandra. *Indrajāla*, in Buddhism, becomes an image for the vast phantasmagoria of the world which holds people captive and is, in fact, more or less synonymous with *māyā* ("illusion"). The term has a long history, but is first found in *Atharvaveda* VIII.8.8, a hymn which is a charm for vanquishing enemies: *ayaṃ loko jālam āśīc Chakrasya mahato mahān / tenāham Indrajālenāmūṃs tamasābhidadhāmi sarvān* // "This vast world was the net of the great Indra. With this net of Indra, I encircle all those with darkness."

(211) Cf. rGyal p. 13: *...khyod kyis kyañ de ltar bsgrub rigs so ze na |*.

(212) Lang (1986) translates *phyi 'chos* as "outward show". Note that rGyal p. 13 glosses *phyi 'chos* as *phyi tshul 'chos pa* ("hypocrisy"). Cf. *Zidian* s.v. *tshul 'chos*: *yon tan med bžin du yod pa ltar byas nas gžan gyi mgo skor ba'i bya spyod kyi miñ* "A practice to cheat others where one pretends to have good qualities which one does not in fact have".

(213) See en. 128.

(214) Transl. De Jong (1949) p. 13, Ruegg (1969) p. 447 n. 3 and Lang (1986). However, De Jong, Ruegg and Lang take *kevalam* as simply meaning "only". De Jong: "Dans leur doctrine il n'y a que ces deux concepts". Ruegg: "ici [dans leur enseignement] il n'y a que ces deux [choses]". Lang: "Here [in our system] there are only these two". I prefer to follow CSV's gloss of *kevalam* as *parisuddham* (*yoñs su dag pa*).

(215) Cf. the discussion of these themes in *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, k. 9-11, transl. in Lindtner (1982). Red mda' ba (p. 156) has an interesting comment in this regard: '*di lhags bcas dan lhag med kyi myan 'das kyi ran sde pa gzan dag ñon moñs ma lus pa spañs śiñ phuñ po ma 'gags pa dan / phuñ po ma lus pa 'gags pa la 'dod pa ltar 'dir mi bzed de / ñon moñs ma lus pa ma spañ yañ mthoñ nas mya 'das mñon sum du byed de / rigs pa drug cu pa las / de ñid mthoñ chos mya ñan las // 'das śiñ bya ba byas pa'añ yin // źes bśad pas so //*'. "Here it [i.e. *nirvāṇa*] is not to be taken in the way in which our other coreligionists, who [accept] *nirvāṇa* with remainder (= *sopadhiśeṣaṃ nirvāṇam*) and without remainder (= *nirupadhiśeṣaṃ nirvāṇam*)*, accept that [in the former case] the passions are all abandoned but the aggregates have not [yet] ceased and [in the latter] the aggregates have all ceased. Although all the passions have not [yet] been abandoned, still, when one has seen [voidness] one directly realizes *nirvāṇa*, for as it is said in the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā***': 'This is extinction [*nirvāṇa*] in this very life (*dṛṣṭadharmanirvāṇa*) and one's task is accomplished (*kṛtakṛtya*).'" *For these two concepts in the Yogācāra school, see the passages from the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in Schmithausen (1969) pp. 46ff et passim. **k. 11ab. The translation of the *kārikā* is that of Lindtner (1982) p. 107.

(216) Cf. Lang's translation: "All people love their own thesis, just as they love their own birth-place. Yet why should a reason that defeats it distress you?" She has taken *sdug pa* in two opposite senses, viz. love and distress. Now admittedly *sdug pa* is an odd word and does have these opposite senses, but it would be strange to have both in one verse. Cf. Bhattacharya, who used *priyaḥ* in both occurrences. Finally, cf. Red mda' ba's commentary (p. 158): '*di phyir rol pa khyod la rgyu gañ gis na sdug par 'gyur te mi 'gyur ba kho na'o*' "For what reason would this be pleasing to you, the Outsider — it would not be [pleasing] at all". On this interpretation then *sdug pa mi 'gyur ba kho na'o* is being rhetorically expressed by the verse's words *gañ gis sdug par 'gyur*. This would fit nicely with the *bù shēng xīn* 不生欣 of the Chinese translation.

(217) Literally, "when there is a cause for perishing / declining".

(218) Cf. Red mda' ba p. 158: *ji ltar mkhas pas ran gi skyes sa yin yañ rgud pa'i rgyur mthoñ na / de la re ba spañs nas 'byor pa'i yul gzan la bten pa de bžin du ...*

(219) Kapila, who is traditionally recognized as the founder of the Sāṃkhya system, is nonetheless a historically obscure personage. See Mainkar (1972) p. 14 and Frauwallner (1953) p. 282, 286.

ī 體 is most commonly the equivalent of *svabhāva*, but also has the less usual equivalents *dravya* ("substance") or *artha* ("entity"). See H. p. 320 and en. 308. At any rate, whatever the Skt. might be, it is clear that what is being meant is the object itself; the thing or substance which we perceive. While Dharmapāla's Sāṃkhya terminology may be somewhat unorthodox, it seems that he is arguing against the basic Sāṃkhya conception of what a material object, or substance, is, viz. a collection of qualities.

A. Wezler (1986) has shown on the basis of the reference in *Mahābhāṣya* II 366.26 to the Sāṃkhya position, *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*, as well as on the basis of other sources, that the Sāṃkhyas held a fundamental position to the effect that substances (such as vases, etc.) are simply composites or collections of the *guṇas*. Wezler p. 23: "...according to Sāṃkhya a *dravya* consists of *guṇas*, or, to be more precise, is nothing but a *guṇasamudāya*, an "aggregate/integrated whole of *guṇas*." Ibid p. 11: "There can indeed be hardly any doubt that *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* is but another formulation of *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*, or *vice versa*, and that the expressions *samudāya* and *sandrāva* are hence considered here to be practically synonymous."

Following Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri's explanations, the *guṇas* mentioned in the phrase *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam*, can be understood as being the qualities or properties of the *tanmātras* ("subtle elements") of sound, tactile sensations, form, taste and smell, viz. *śabdatanmātra*, *sparśatanmātra*, *rūpatanmātra*, *rasatanmātra*, *gandhatanmātra*. Here, in Dharmapāla, we see what looks like the same Sāṃkhya position, although our author speaks of "objects" or "dharma" (rather than *guṇas*) making up "natures", i.e. ī 體, but judging from the enumeration which he gives in the course of the argumentation (cf. §§222a28, 222b4 and k. 302), he seems to be speaking about *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa* and *sparśa*, leaving out *śabda* (see §222b8). It is not at all impossible that he means these terms in the Sāṃkhya sense of the properties of *rūpatanmātra*, etc., although as the discussion proceeds it is clear that he is *also* arguing against Buddhist Abhidharma based positions.

It is, however, worth stressing Wezler's point that, according to Siṃhasūri, *guṇa* in the phrase *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* is equally explained as referring to the three constituents of the primary matter or Nature (*prakṛti*), viz. *sattva*, etc. And in fact, it seems that Dharmapāla in the previous chapter's discussion on Sāṃkhya did take up this understanding of *guṇasaṃdrāva*, *guṇasamudāya*. See §217c14 et seq. and en. 72. In short, he seems to have taken up — in different chapters — both interpretations of what it means to say that a thing is a composite of the *guṇas*. In both chapters we see that the Sāṃkhya's weak point, for Dharmapāla, is his problematic position that the entity itself is not different from the *guṇas*, and that hence there is the absurdity that predicates pertaining to some or all of these *guṇas* — e.g. invisibility, the manyness of the *guṇas* — should also apply to the entity itself.

(220) See en. 219 and k. 302, §222b8.

(221) While it seems that in this section Dharmapāla's adversary is still the Sāṃkhya, the argument about the inexpressibility of non-entities is primarily a Buddhist-Nyāya controversy. The general tactic of the Buddhist is to hold that words for non-entities refer to a mentally created fiction, i.e. a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. See Matilal (1970), Mimaki (1976) p. 60, Tillemans (1982) p. 112 et seq. and (1984c) for some aspects of the discussion in PS, PV IV, *Madhyamakāloka* and other texts. Cf. also PV IV k. 222-236 summarized in our article, "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV and its Commentaries", forthcoming in K. Potter (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Motilal Banarsidass.

(222) If "visibility" were a property belonging to the form itself, then the form should always be visible. But in fact, it is sometimes visible and sometimes not. If the act of seeing *X* gives *X* itself the property of visibility, then not seeing *X* should equally make it have the property of invisibility. Ultimately the argument seems to turn on the hypothesis that visibility or "being seen" is a property belonging to the nature of form, and that this nature cannot change. Finally note that in this and the following arguments, "visibility" is not taken in a dispositional sense (i.e. *Y* is visible because if a person looked at *Y*, he would see *Y*), but in a more ordinary sense: "*Y* is visible now" means we *do* see *Y* now.

(223) The Madhyamaka tactic of negation without affirming the contrary. See en. 102.

(224) See en. 48.

(225) The hidden premise is that if *X* is composed of atoms (which alone are fully real), and none of the atoms have a property *P*, *X* does not have *P* either. Cf. en. 246.

(226) *pāṅg bù* 傍布 = SPHAR; *spharivā* (H. p. 432), Tib. *khyab par byed pa*, "spread out", "distribute". Note that this is a possible sense of *bù* 布, besides its usual sense, "cloth". Cf. the occurrence of these characters in AKBh iii ad k. 65-68, T. 1558 xi 60a 7. LVP (p. 162) translates by "cover". Cf. AK ed. Pradhan p. 168.13: *pañcāśat yojanāni śākhāpatrapalaśaṃ spharivā* tiṣṭhati* /. *Pradhan reads *skarivā*, which is a misprint.

(227) For the interpretation of k. 305 as showing the fallacy of *sādhyasama*, see en. 379.

Dharmapāla's argument seems to be against a position described in the *Chéng wéi shí lún*, T. 1585 i 4b 16-18:

有執色等——極微不和集時非五識境 共和集位展轉相資有麁相生
爲此識境彼相實有爲此所緣

"Certain people hold that the individual atoms of form, etc., when they are not combined, are not objects of the five [sense] consciousnesses. But in their combined state, when they mutually interact, there arises something gross in character. It is this which is the object of the consciousnesses; its character is substantially existent and it is this which is perceived."

See *Siddhi* I p. 45. Kuī jī in T. 1830 ii 271 a 10 attributes this view to Zhòng xián 衆賢 (Saṃghabhadra). a "Neo-Sarvāstivādin" (xīn sà pó duō 新薩婆多); cf. Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam* p. 16.26-27 (in S. Lévi's edition): *anyas tu manyate / ekaikaparamāṇur anyanirapekṣyo 'īndriyo bahavas tu parasparāpekṣā indriyagrāhyāḥ* /. "But another thinks that the individual atoms which do not depend on anything else are beyond the range of the senses. However, many [such atoms] which depend upon each other are apprehendable by the senses."

Saṃghabhadra seems to have postulated a collective character of atoms which would be the objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) for consciousness. In this way he hoped to avoid Dignāga's critique that individual atoms could not serve as objects of consciousness because they do not resemble the representation which consciousness has of its objects. Note that Yamaguchi and Meyer (1929) n. 11, basing themselves on Kuī jī, are of the opinion that the third opponent being refuted in *Ālambanaparīkṣā* — i.e. k. 3ab et seq. — is Saṃghabhadra, in spite of the fact that Vinītadeva's commentary speaks only of "Vāgbhaṭa, etc.". This seems to be borne out in reading Kuī jī. Dignāga and Vinītadeva describe this view as holding that the collection of atoms, rather than the individual atoms themselves, is perceived, although the atoms themselves can still be said to cause the perception via the intermediary of the collection. (Cf. the similar views of Vasubandhu and Yaśomitra described in en. 370 as well as Candrakīrti's discussion [in CSV XIII §11-13] of the *timira/keśa* example used in this regard.) The opponent avoids Dignāga's critique by arguing that in general things have several characters — form, smell, etc. — but that for any given perception only one is perceived. Similarly, we perceive only the collective aspect and never that of the individual atoms.

Kuī jī in T. 1834 xiā 992c 25- 993a 4 gives the following explanation on Saṃghabhadra's view as found in the Abhidharma commentary, the *Nyāyānusāra*:

其正師恐違自宗眼等五識不緣假法異於經部 若順於古即有陳那五識
之上無微相故非所緣失 遂復說言色等諸法各有多相於中一分是現量
境故諸極微相資多有一和集相 此相實有各能發生似已相識故與五識
作所緣緣如多極微集成山等相資各有山等量相 眼等五識緣山等時實
有多極微相資山相五識並得故成所緣 不爾即有非所緣失。

"The teacher of the *Nyāyānusāra*, fearing [the Sautrāntika view that the whole is unreal] would contradict his own [Sarvāstivādin] theses, [said that] the five consciousnesses, such as those of the eyes, etc., do not apprehend dharmas which are designations, and [thus] he differed from the Sautrāntikas. If one follows the older [Sarvāstivādins], then Dignāga [argues in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*] that because the character of atoms is not found in the five sense consciousnesses, there is the fault [that the atoms] are not what is apprehended. So then [Saṃghabhadra] replied that dharmas such as form and the like each have several characters. Amongst them, one part is the object of perception. Thus, the atoms' interactions each have one collective character. This character substantially exists. Each [such character] gives rise to a consciousness which resembles [the collection's] own character, and therefore, they serve as the objective conditions (*suǒ yuán yuán* 所緣緣 = *ālambanapratyaya*) for the five consciousnesses. For example, when the interactions of many atoms become [gross objects] such as mountains, etc., the interactions each have the dimension of the mountain, etc. When the five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth apprehend the mountains, etc., there substantially exists a character of a mountain which consists in the interaction of many atoms; the five consciousness obtain [i.e. cognize] it. Therefore, it is established as what is apprehended. Were it otherwise, there would be the fault of not being what is apprehended."

(228) Below and in §224c29 Dharmapāla formulates this dilemma somewhat more clearly: *a*) either the division of matter goes on forever and one incurs the fault of an infinite regress, never arriving at anything indivisible and hence real; or *b*) the division is carried through to an end where there are no more material characteristics and the object is then unfindable like space.

For a Vijñānavādin's account of atoms, cf. *Chéng wéi shì lún*, T. 1585 i 4b 28-4c 4:

爲執麤色有實體者佛說極微令其除析 非謂諸色實有極微
諸瑜迦師以假想慧於麤色相漸次除析至不可析假說極微
雖此極微猶有方分而不可析 若更析之 便似空現不名爲色故
說極微是色邊際

"To those who hold that gross forms exist substantially, the Buddha taught about [subtle] atoms to dispel [this view]. But he did not say that forms are really atoms. The Yogācāryas, by means of the concepts of their intellect, step by step divide gross forms to arrive at what is indivisible. They metaphorically term this 'atoms'. Although these atoms still have directional parts, they are indivisible: if one continues to divide them it will be like looking at space: one cannot call them forms. Therefore, it is said that the atoms are the extreme limit of form."

Cf. *Siddhi* pp. 46-47. In n. 3 on p. 47 de la Vallée Poussin gives the citation from AK alluded to in the final line above. Note however that my translation differs in a number of places from that of LVP, who, in all due respect, translates oddly here. E.g. "Les Yogācāryas, non pas avec un réel couteau mais par la pensée [=... yǐ jiǎ xiǎng huì! 以假想慧]"; "à cette extrême fraction, d'existence toute fictive, ils donnent le nom d'atome [= jiǎ shuō jí wēi 假說極微]"; but jiǎ shuō is better taken as meaning *upacāra*, i.e. "metaphor(ically)".

(229) As is often the case, *rūpa* has two senses in these discussions. In the previous paragraphs *rūpa* referred to the visual characteristics of an object — similar to *rūpa* in the Buddhist notion of *rūpāyatana*. But now "form" is used in its equally frequent sense as a synonym of matter, and includes not just visual form, but also sounds, smells, tastes, the elements and other tactile sensations.

(230) The position being attacked is probably that of the Mīmāṃsā. See *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.6-23; Frauwallner (1961). Note that Dharmakīrti was familiar with this argument about *saras* vs. *rasa* and alludes to it in PV I k. 301: *ānupūrvyām asatyām syāt saro rasa iti śrutau/ na kāryabheda iti ced asti sā puruṣāśrayā* //. "Suppose it is said that when there is no [objectively existing] order, then the words *saras* and *rasa* would not have any different effects. [Reply:] This [order] depends upon the person." In PVSV to this section of PV I Dharmakīrti identifies his opponents as "Jaiminiyas", i.e. Mīmāṃsakas. See PVSV's introduction to PV I k. 283cd; p. 150, 6 in Gnoli's edition. The basic conceptions at stake are, however, also common to Bhartṛhari's notion of *sphoṭa*. Cf. *Vākyapadīya* I, 49 ed. Rau (48, ed. Biardeau): *nādasya kramajātatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ / akramāḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedaḥ iva jāyate* // "As it is the resonance which occurs successively, the [word itself, i.e. the *sphoṭa*] has neither before nor after. It [i.e. the *sphoṭa*] is without any successive order, but appears to be divided due to the successive nature [of the resonances]." See Biardeau (1964), p. 91.

(231) Taishō reads *sūi xiǎn sè* 雖顯色 and gives no variants, but we should read *lí xiǎn sè* 離顯色, as does the Japanese translator (Kyik p. 340, 18). This not only concords with Tib. but also is the reading commented upon by Dharmapāla.

(232) *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, in the Epistemologist's system, are only cognizable by inference (*anumāna*) and not by perception. Cf. Dignāga's PSV ad PS I k. 2, quoted in PVBh 169, 9-10: *svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ* /. Transl. Hattori (1968a) p. 24. See also en. 366, 367.

(233) I.e. when it does not also perceive colour, e.g. a cognition of a shape in the dark.

(234) If the opponent tries to maintain that shapes are understood independently of other understandings, Dharmapāla replies that understanding of shapes, such

as those of a whirling firebrand, must nonetheless rely on initial sense perceptions (e.g. the perceptions of the fire on the torch which twirls around). As such it is inferential or conceptual.

(235) LVP AK i p. 16: "Le visible est couleur et figure. La couleur (*varṇa*) est quadruple: bleu, rouge, jaune, blanc... La figure (*saṃsthāna*) est octuple: long, court, carré, rond, haut (*unnata*), bas (*avanata*), égal, inégal."

(236) The elements (*bhūta*) are fourfold: earth, air, fire and water and are considered as being only perceptible by the sense of touch. The derivatives from the elements (*bhautika*) include all the various visual, olfactory, gustatory, and auditory sense of colours, shapes, etc. Other tactile sensations such as roughness, heaviness and so forth are also classified as *bhautika*, so that in effect the sense of touch is the only sense that perceives both *bhūta* and *bhautika*: the others perceive only *bhautika*. It should be mentioned there are other *bhautika*, such as the invisible subtle matter (*rūpa-prasāda*) making up the sense organs (*indriya*) (see en. 264 below) and the unmanifest (*avijñapti*) forms. A commonly invoked classificational schema is to take the elements, plus the other sense as constituting the "outer domains" (*bāhyāyatana*) of consciousness, while the sense organs *qua* subtle matter are the "inner domains" (*ādhyātmikāyatana*). See AK i, k. 12, 23, 24; LVP AK i pp. 21-23, 43-46, 63-66; May (1959) n. 184, 198; de la Vallée Poussin (1913) pp. 18-20. For a summary presentation of the *bāhyāyatana* according to the Tibetan scholastic, see *Yōns 'dzin bsduṣ grwa chuñ* ff. 3a6-4a4 ed. T. Kelsang and S. Onoda. See also en. 237, 256, 264, 386, 387.

(237) Colour, smells, etc., which are derived from the four elements, are perceived by the eyes, nose and so forth. The four elements (earth, air, fire, water) themselves, however, are perceived by the sense of touch. While these entities are perceived by different faculties, the world does not make such a differentiation between object itself (viz. the elements) and its derivative properties. In that sense, the reason in the argument, viz. "having different cognitions", does not conclusively prove the thesis, viz. that the *bhautikas* and the *bhūtas* are taken as different by the world. Cf. in this vein AK i, k. 13: *prthivī varṇasaṃsthānam ucyate lokasañjñayā*. "What one terms 'earth' according to worldly convention is a colour and a shape."

(238) Dharmapāla here invokes the orthodox position of AK where shape is said to be seen by the eyes.

(239) Thesis: Shapes are not seen by the eyes.

Reason: They are cognizable by means of touch.

Example: Like roughness.

The equivalences in H. (p. 222) show that Xuán zàng often used the character 澁 (*astringency*/ "roughness") in the sense of *karkaśatva* ("hardness"; "roughness"). Cf. Nak. p. 668a. Dharmapāla's argument is that if shape really exists, it must comply

with the Abhidharmic division of phenomena: what is seen by the eyes is not felt by the body and vice versa. Thus if shape is real and is felt, it is not seen. The implicit conclusion seems to be that because shape is conventionally thought to be both felt and seen, it cannot be real.

(240) The argument is turning on the use of the restrictive particle *eva* ("only") which is supposedly present, implicitly or explicitly, in every assertion and which provides for different sorts of restriction or necessity (*jué dìng* 決定 = *avadhāraṇa*; *niyama*) between the terms in the sentence. See Kajiyama (1973) and Gillon and Hayes (1982). Thus, Dharmapāla's opponent is in effect construing the argument as saying that shapes are only cognized by means of touch: in that case they cannot be cognized by seeing colours. Or, it is only shapes which are cognizable by touch: in that case shapeless things couldn't be felt. But Dharmapāla replies that his point is that shapes, *inter alia*, are *indeed* cognized by touch. The difference is between *saṁsthānam spraṣṭavyam eva*, *saṁsthānam eva spraṣṭavyam* (the opponent's two versions) and *saṁsthānam spraṣṭavyam asty eva*, the latter being Dharmapāla's version. Similar types of arguments about *eva* and *avadhāraṇa* are found in *Pramāṇaviniścaya*'s *Svārthānumāna* chapter concerning the *pakṣadharmatva* in the triply characterized reason (*trirūpalīṅga*): see PV in ed. Steinkellner (1973) p. 30 et seq.; transl. Steinkellner (1979) pp. 32-35. See also the discussion in PV IV (k. 171-172) about whether one must understand the definition of the thesis as *sādhyanirdeśa eva pratijñā* or *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñāiva*. Dharmakīrti is known to have systematized the uses of *eva* as *ayogavyavaccheda* ("exclusion of non-connection"), *anyayogavyavaccheda* ("exclusion of connection with something else") and *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* ("exclusion of absolute non-connection"). See Kajiyama, Gillon and Hayes, op. cit. To put things in Dharmakīrtian terms, Dharmapāla's opponent is construing *eva* as *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda* respectively, while Dharmapāla would be taking it as *atyantāyogavyavaccheda*. I have summarized PV IV k. 190-194 dealing with these three uses of *eva* in my article "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV and its Commentaries". Note that *dīṅ* 定 does occasionally translate *eva*, especially in logical contexts, as we see in Xuán zàng's Chinese translation of the *Nyāyapraveśa*, T. 1630. See Katsura (1986c) and my remarks in Tillemans (1988b), pp. 156-158.

(241) The term here is *sè* 色 = *rūpa*, but the subsequent explanation which speaks of "blue, etc." makes it clear that *here rūpa* is to be taken as having its meaning, "colour". Cf. also Japanese transl. p. 341, n. 29: "The cognition of colour (色彩 *shikisai*) by means of touch must necessarily have shapes such as length, roundness, etc. as its intermediary (媒介 *baikai*), and is an inference."

(242) See en. 240 . *jué dìng* 決定 = *avadhāraṇa*; *niyama*, "necessity", "restriction".

(243) Previously, in §223b26, Dharmapāla had argued that one cannot prove that shape and colour are *different* by invoking the reason that their respective

cognitions are different. But now he says that they are not *identical*, and here he himself gives the reason that their cognitions are different. The conclusion which he draws in §223c17 is that shape and colours are neither identical nor different, and are hence unreal.

(244) See en. 243. A variation on the *ekānekaviyogahetu*. See Chapt. III, B. pp. 63-64, fn. 133, 134, en. 37.

(245) Shape, according to AK iv k. 3, does not exist in the individual atoms, and there are no "atoms of length" and so forth. See AK iv LVP p. 11: ... "mais l'existence de ces atomes [de figure] n'est pas établie comme est établie l'existence des atomes de couleur..."

(246) The recurrent principle that if none of the atoms (which are alone are substantial) have a property *X*, then the collection (which is insubstantial) cannot have *X* either. See en. 225.

(247) See en. 53.

(248) See en. 56 for the Vaiśeṣika use of the term *rūpa*, viz. colours, which are in the category of qualities (*guṇa*).

(249) Note that the character *cū* 麤 here is probably being used for the Vaiśeṣika technical term, *mahattva*, rather than its more usual Buddhist equivalent, *audārika* ("coarse"). Size (*parimāṇa*), one of the seventeen qualities in Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika system, is subdivided into five: largeness (*mahattva*), smallness (*aṇutva*), longness (*dīrghatva*), shortness (*hrasvatva*) and sphericity (*pārimaṇḍalya*). See VS 1.1.5 and 7.1.15-26 as well as p. 213, §9 and 218, §66 in Hattori's summary in Potter (1977). Cf. also Śaṅkara Miśra's commentary ad VS 7.1.15 (ed. Sinha, 7.1.8; transl. Sinha p. 221): "Moreover, in the perceptibility of Substance, Measure or Extension [i.e. *parimāṇa*] also is a cause, like colour; for, without magnitude, substance cannot be perceptible."

(250) The text reads 實之與色亦可別觀 which has little sense. I would emend to 實之與色不可別觀

(251) The argument is reminiscent of the discussion of the Vaiśeṣika's theory of perception in the previous chapter. If the cognition of the colour is different from that of the substance, then these cognitions are not direct perceptions caused by substance. In a direct perception really caused by the substance, one could make no distinctions like, "here is substance", and "here is the colour".

(252) This equivalence is not attested in H. and Nak., but these are the usual Sanskrit terms in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contexts. See Potter (1977) p. 49: "The best a Naiyāyika can do to explain what a locus is [is] to say that it is that which we say things reside 'in' or 'on' or 'at'. It is not spatiotemporally conceived, although spatiotemporal difference implies different loci."

(252a) The "same natural kind" is that of colourness, the *jāti* or lower universal (*aparasāmānya*) in virtue of which the different individual colour qualities are all said to be colours. Cf. *Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 103: *rūpādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ guṇānāṃ pratyekam aparasāmānyasambandhād rūpādisaṃjñā bhavanti*.

(253) The point seems to be that if the nature of the universal varied in keeping with the different particulars, then ascribing a universal would become haphazard. The reason there is colour is because of the presence of the property colourness, which is always the same. If such a universal did not exist, then particular colours could equally arbitrarily come into being or go out of being.

(254) The Vaiśeṣika position is that the colours, being qualities, do not have other qualities such as size. Rather it is the substance in which the colour inheres which would have these other qualities.

(255) See Chapter III, B. p. 61, fn. 131.

(256) See en. 236, 264, 386, 387 on the elements. Cf. *Yōṅs 'dzin bsdus grwa chuṅ*'s definitions of the elements (f. 4a): "hard and resistant" (*sra žiṅ 'thas pa*) = earth; "wet and liquid" (*brlan žiṅ gser ba*) = water; "hot and burning" (*tsha žiṅ sreg pa*) = fire; "light and moving" (*yaṅ žiṅ g.yo ba*) = air. While this approach might perhaps seem to lead to idealism, in fact the definition of the elements in terms of touch sensations is already fundamental in the (realist) philosophy of the Abhidharma. See AK i k. 12 and AKBh and other references in en. 387, 388. See also fn. 90 for the Sarvāstivādin's (unstable) position that sense-data *are* external objects.

(257) A reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that the qualities of a substance may alter while the substance itself continues to exist. This whole process of qualitative change is known as *pāka*, "cooking", the prototypical example being that of a pot, which changes colour and other such qualities when it is baked, but whose atomic constituents persist. See Potter (1977) pp. 84-86.

(258) The example here is a *vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭānta*, i.e. something which has neither the reason-property (*hetu*) nor the property to be proved (*sādhya*dharmā). Vases, etc., according to the Vaiśeṣikas, are perceptible and they do become qualitatively different when heated. Thus this example is used to establish the con-

traposition of the implication in question (*vyatirekavyāpti*): whatever is an object of the senses does become different when heated.

(259) My translation is based on Dharmapāla's interpretation. It can readily be seen that Candrakīrti's interpretation is completely different, taking k. 310 as being a refutation of the general term, perceptibility (*draṣṭavyatva*). It is interesting to note that following Candrakīrti's interpretation, the second half of k. 310 has a rather unobvious connection with the first half. Dharmapāla has no such problem. Finally note that my translation differs significantly from that of Tucci (1925) p. 553, n. 1, who seems to have taken k. 310 as expressing a similar point to a passage in *Bāi lùn* VI. I presume that this must be T. 1569 xià 176c 12-15; see Tucci (1929) p. 56 for a generally accurate translation. The point however is not very similar as far as I can tell. At any rate, neither Dharmapāla's nor Candrakīrti's interpretations of k. 310 seem to concord with this argument from the *Bāi lùn*. Dharmapāla's argument seems to be an appeal to empirical observation and to the Buddhist theme that only changing and impermanent things are real: if substances existed we would have to be able to see that they undergo change, but in fact we see nothing of the sort.

(260) Cf. §223a 24-25 and en. 228.

(261) T. has *yōu wú fǎ* 有無法, which is clearly an error for *yōu wéi fǎ* 有爲法. Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 346.11) reads *yōu wéi fǎ*.

(262) See AK i k. 5 for the three unconditioned dharmas, viz. space (*ākāśa*) and the two sorts of cessations (*nirodha*). Cf. *Siddhi* p. 72 et seq. for the Vijñānavādin's refutation.

(263) For the term *yì mén* 義門, see Nak. p. 219c. The argument may be a similar point as expressed in §217a2 of the previous chapter: "One object at the same time gives rise to many consciousnesses, and the object's character varies according to different perceptions. [Thus] these consciousnesses could not arise in conformity with an external object, for the nature of one object is not established as many [different] characters."

(264) Cf. AK i k. 9cd: *tadvijñānāśrayā rūpaprasādāś cakṣurādayaḥ*. Cf. T. 1558 i 2b 12:

彼識依淨色 名眼等五根

"The bases of the consciousnesses of these [objects], i.e. the subtle matter, are [the five sense organs such as] the eye and so forth."

Cf. LVP AK i p. 15, where *rūpaprasādāḥ* is translated as "des éléments matériels subtils". See also LVP AK i p. 65; *Traité* I p. 332; May (1959) n. 131, 199. As for the dif-

ference between the eye organ *qua* subtle matter and the eye *qua* "ball of flesh" (*māmsapiṇḍa*) the former is just derived from the elements (*bhautika*), is invisible and is an "inner domain" (*ādhyātmikāyatana*), while the latter is an "outer domain" (*bāhyāyatana*) and is composed both of the elements, earth, etc., themselves (*bhūta*) as well as the colours, shapes, etc. derived from them (*bhautika*). See en. 236, 268 and cf. AK i LVP p. 65.

(265) See AKBh ad AK i k. 9cd: *yathoktaṃ bhagavatā cakṣur bhikṣo ādhyātmikam āyatanam catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya rūpapasāda iti vistaraḥ*. Identified in Y. Honjō (1984) pp. 4-5 as *Samyuktāgama* (zá ā hán jīng 雜阿含經) 322, i.e. T. I 99 xiii 91c 5. Same quotation in longer form in AKBh ad AK i k. 35, transl. LVP p. 65.

(266) The opponent accepts the cardinal tenet of Abhidharmic philosophy that entities are nothing other than the collection of their constituent dharmas.

(267) T. has: 二相差別俱非假有 "Two different characters are both not designations". It would seem to make better sense to read 二相差別俱非實有 .

(268) Dharmapāla's argument turns on the highly simplistic physics of his time where matter was thought to be composed of four elements: the organs would therefore be all the same in that each is composed of the four. If, however, one argues that there is some difference in the collections of elements constituting the causes for consciousness, then it should be possible for the consciousness to be produced directly from the elements — e.g. from an object which has the necessary collection of elements — and thus bypass the sense organs. It is probably fair to say that these anomalies and the remedies proposed in the subsequent argumentation by both Dharmapāla and his opponents just occur within the context of a now outmoded conceptual framework. It is interesting, however, to see that the scientific framework of the period leads to all sorts of *ad hoc* postulates, and finally to the fundamentally anti-theoretical standpoint that perception is simply inexplicable, as we find in k. 311cd. Curiously enough, the physical theory itself was never put in question, no doubt partially because, as we see in k. 311cd, the Buddhist sūtras endorsed the inconceivability of karmic processes. Thus the paradoxes were not at all taken as constituting a *reductio ad absurdum* of any initial physical assumptions; rather they were further proof of the veracity of the sūtras' assertions of inconceivability.

(269) The scholastic speaks of two sorts of karma: a) "propelling karma" (*yīn yè* 引業 = *ākṣepakakarmān*), which is responsible for one's taking birth in a particular realm, viz. as a god, man, hell-being, etc; b) accomplishing karma, which takes care of the details of one's existence in that realm, viz. whether one is rich, poor, has defective senses, etc. See AK ii LVP p. 273, n. 1; AK iii LVP p. 43; AK iv, k. 95b LVP p. 199-200; Nak. 1288a.

(270) In other words, if each sense organ were produced from a different karma.

(271) Cf. Japanese translator's n. 58 on p. 348: "Because the retributive cause for the realm of form is just virtuous karma."

(272) See H. p. 349 for the equivalence. For the terms *sabhāga* ("having [its own] share") and *tatsabhāga* ("that which is analogous to a *sabhāga*"), see AK i, LVP pp. 75-78. AKBh ad AK i k.39d (ed. Pradhan p. 28.2): *yah svakarmakṛt sa sabhāga iti* /. "What performs its own action is *sabhāga*". Objects, sense organs and consciousnesses can all be *sabhāga*. In the case of the sense organs, they are *sabhāga* when intact and functioning, but *tatsabhāga* when they are not functioning. As LVP (p. 78 n. 2) notes, the Mādhyamikas make use of this terminology arguing that the eye organ which is *sabhāga* does not in reality see the visible objects because it is an organ just like the eye organ which is *tatsabhāga*. Cf. Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* D. 76b7-77a1: *don dam par brten pa mtshuṅs pa'i mig ni gzugs la lta bar mi byed de / mig gi dbaṅ po yin pa'i phyir dper na de daṅ mtshuṅs pa bzin no*. Cf. Tib. and Skt. in Pr. 32.9 and n. 8.

(273) The domains are of two sorts, outer and inner, the outer being the objects and the inner being the sense organs. See en. 236. Here what is meant are the domains which are the sense organs.

(274) *sūn yì* 損益 = *kārāpakāra*; Tib. *phan pa daṅ gnod pa* has been translated here as "impaired /impairment" and "aided/ aid" rather than the more usual "harmed/harm and benefited/benefit". What is at stake is the defective and the improved functioning of the senses, as when the eye is damaged or when collyrium or medication is applied.

(275) Translation unsure.

(276) In other words, there must be an *avinābhāvaniyama* ("necessary connection") between the terms of the inference: when there are different consciousnesses there must be different sense organs and when there are no different sense organs there are no different consciousnesses. The opponent accepts this, but he also argues that one and the same entity can have several different powers. In that case the *avinābhāvaniyama* in the inference would not hold: it would not necessarily be so that there must be different sense organs to produce different consciousness, for one and the same sense organ could have several different powers. For the development of the notions of *avinābhāvaniyama*, *vyāpti* ("pervasion") and other such related concepts, see the historical study on this subject by Katsura (1986a) and its English summary in (1986b); see also Stcherbatsky (1926), Chapt. XV; Mookerjee (1935) Chapt. XXIV.

(277) Cf. TS k. 488: *saṃkṣepo 'yaṃ vīnaṣṭāc cet kāraṇāt kāryasambhavaḥ / pradhvastasyānupākhyān niṣkāraṇam idaṃ bhavet //*. "To summarize: if the effect were produced from a cause which had perished, it would be causeless, for what is destroyed is indiscernible."

(278) On *vāsanā* ("tendencies"; more literally, "residues"), see Lamotte (1974). They are likened to the smell of a flower which remains after the flower itself is gone. Note that *vāsanā* $\equiv$ *bīja*. The theory of karmic production from *vāsanā* is in opposition to the theory of the Sarvāstivādin, who maintains that the past karma itself produces the result. For Vijñānavāda and most other schools the karma perishes immediately after its production but leaves *vāsanā* or *bīja* which will produce the effect. See *Siddhi* p. 475 and en. 283.

(279) The opponent is seeking to maintain that karma is responsible for the production of the sense consciousnesses, but at the same he wishes to avoid the absurd consequence that the very same karma should also produce sense consciousnesses in the formless realm. He therefore argues that the karma produced in realm *X* only produces the sense organs in the same realm *X*. These organs in turn produce the consciousnesses which cognize objects in *X*. Thus it is impossible that a karma produced in realm *X* would eventually lead to a sense consciousness in another realm *Y*.

(280) An appeal to the principle that any consciousness, being a subject (*viśayin*), must have an object (*viśaya*). If mind in the formless realm could not perceive objects in the other realms, it could not perceive any objects at all, and thus it could not exist.

(281) If there were real, externally existent, sense organs, and consciousness were produced by karma, then the absurdities mentioned in the previous paragraphs would ensue. But Dharmapāla and the Vijñānavādin's theory is that karmic tendencies *develop* into the various conditions of the sense organs which then affect consciousness: everything (be it object, sense organ or consciousness) is thus a development of a karmic tendency; the problem of the relationship between the karma and the sense organ is to be resolved by saying that the organ is not a distinct external object, but is itself a manifestation of the karma. See en. 283 for the Vijñānavāda account of the sense organs. As for *pariṇāma*, it is the key term in Vijñānavāda, signifying in general the various transformations which consciousness undergoes to manifest objects. See our en. 283; *Siddhi* pp. 6, 92-93 and *passim*; p. 140 for *pariṇāma* by the influence of conceptualizations (*vikalpabala*).

(282) Cf. H. wàng wèi 妄謂 = *ḍṛṣi*. Cf. also *Zuī xīn shí yòng hàn yīng cí diǎn* (ed. Liang Shih-chiu et al, Taipei, The Far East Book Co., 1972), p. 1028 s.v. wèi: "1. to tell; to say 2. to name...3. to think; to be of the opinion; to assume."

(283) After having shown the incoherence and unreality of the different ways in which consciousness could be caused (viz. by the sense organs, by the sense organs + karma, by karma alone) Dharmapāla here seems to be stating his own position, viz. that everything, be it consciousness, the sense organs or the objects, is caused by karmic tendencies in an illusory fashion, like dream phenomena. At any rate, such is his and the other commentators' account as described in the *Chéng wéi shí lùn*.

To elaborate: The usual Vijñānavādin account (Cf. *Siddhi* I pp. 41-42 and p. 229 et seq.) is that karmic seeds produce both the sense organs and their objects, although nothing exists externally and all is a development (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness. The sense organs themselves are simply "powers" (*gōng néng* 功能 = *śakti*), but not external things constituted of derived matter. *Siddhi* p. 42: "Comme l'indique leur nom d'*indriya* (*Kośa*, ii, p. 103), ils sont seulement des "puissances" (*śakti*), non pas des choses extérieures constituées par de la matière dérivée des quatre grands éléments (*upādāyarūpa*, *bhautikarūpa*, *Kośa*, i, p. 21)." Dignāga himself also held that the sense organ was a power and, in keeping with his idealist position, explicitly denied that it was constituted of matter. Cf. *Ālambanaparīkṣā* k. 7cd: *lhan cig byed dbaṅ nus pa yi / no bo gaṅ yin dbaṅ po'aṅ yin //*. "That which is in essence a power capable of acting simultaneously [with the object for producing consciousness] is the sense organ". The *Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti* comments: *dbaṅ po ni raṅ gi 'bras bu las nus pa'i no bo ñid du rjes su dpag gi 'byuṅ ba las gyur pa ñid du ni ma yin no /*. "The sense organs are inferred from their effects as being in essence powers, but they are not derivatives from the elements". Cf. the translations of Yamaguchi and Meyer (1929); Tola and Dragonetti (1982) p. 128 seem to have forgotten to translate k. 7cd. Dharmapāla himself certainly must have endorsed this position as he wrote a commentary on the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, but unfortunately the text of his commentary (only available in Chinese translation) abruptly ends before this point. In the present context, however, Dharmapāla does not devote more than a few lines to such a theory. Instead he seems to wish to insist on the inconceivability of karma and causation, and thus tries to demonstrate that the various theories of *real* sense organs and karma do not withstand logical analyses. See §225c29 below. Note that Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi also accepted that the karmic production of the sense organs was ultimately inexplicable. See en. 284.

(284) The Epistemological school equally subscribed to the inconceivability of the karmic production of the sense organs. See Hattori (1968a) n. 5.6 for quotations from the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* to this effect. On Buddhist assertions of the inconceivability (*acintya*) of karmic retribution, see LVP (1913) p. 64 and references in his n. 1: *Aṅguttara* ii, 80; *M. av. vi*, k. 42 (LVP [1910] p. 321); *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 4, 100 for the inconceivability of dependent origination.

(285) On this term, see Nak. p. 1215c. "showing a change of appearance." Skt. *prātihārya* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.

(286) The allusion is to the Sāṃkhya theory that when a sense object is perceived, four elements are involved: *a)* the sense organ; *b)* the intellect (*buddhi*); *c)* the ego (*ahaṃkāra*); *d)* the mental organ (*manas*). See SK 30: *yugapac catuṣṭayasya tu vṛttiḥ kramaśaś ca tasya nirdiṣṭā / dṛṣṭe tathāpy adṛṣṭe trayasya tatpūrvikā vṛttiḥ ||*. The latter three are collectively known as the internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and have differing functions (see Gauḍapāda ad SK 29); the mental organ (*manas*), which is considered to be an *indriya*, is responsible for reflection (*saṃkalpa*; cf. SK 27) and distinguishing one thing from another. Dharmapāla / Xuán zàng's use of *nèi zhī* 內智 in this context can not mean simply *buddhi*, but rather should be referring primarily to *manas*, as amongst the *antaḥkaraṇa* it is only *manas* which is termed an *indriya* — Dharmapāla makes it clear that he is speaking about two sorts of *indriya* here. Cf. Dignāga's refutation in PS I k. 8-9 of the Sāṃkhya view that the object apprehended by means of *indriyavṛtti* ("the operation of the senses") is then apprehended by means of *manovṛtti*. See Hattori (1968a) p. 157, n. 5.58 for PST's description of this position.

(287) Here we have to take "sight" in the sense of the perception which arises from the function of the eye. In Candrakīrti's interpretation, however, *darśana* means "the organ of sight", i.e. the eyes. This we can see by Candrakīrti's references to *adhipatipratyaya*. See en. 397. Dharmapāla, by contrast, makes no references to *adhipatipratyaya* ("the dominant condition"), i.e. the eyes, but rather takes the verse as refuting the Sāṃkhya's theory of "double perception", where one is supposed to see something first and then apprehend it by means of the mind.

(288) Cf. SK 30 and *Bhāṣya* where it is said that in certain cases the sense organ and the *antaḥkaraṇa* act simultaneously (e.g. when things are seen in a flash) and in others they act sequentially (e.g. when one slowly discerns more and more about a distant object.)

(289) An allusion to the cardinal tenet of Sāṃkhya philosophy that the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*) undergoes its various manifestations for the benefit of Spirit (*puruṣa*). See SK 21: *puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya / paṅgvandhavad ubhayor api saṃyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ ||*.

(290) In what follows Āryadeva and Dharmapāla take up the question of *prāpyakāritavāda* ("the position that [sense organs] operate by contact") versus *aprāpyakāritavāda*, i.e. the problem as to whether sense organs function by "going out" to their object or not. The Sāṃkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins held that this "operation by contact" was necessary; Dignāga denied it and was hence an *aprāpyakāritavādin*. See Mookerjee (1935) chapter XVIII for a résumé of the Indian philosophical debate on *prāpyakāritavāda*. See also TS and TSP chapter XXIV k. 2518 et seq. (transl. Jha Vol. II, pp. 1164-1170).

As for the Buddhists' position, they generally held that the eye, ear and *manas* ("mind"; "mental organ") function without contacting their objects; if they did have to

contact the object, then, as Dignāga argues in PS I, they could not apprehend things at a distance (*sāntaragrahaṇa*), nor could they apprehend objects bigger than the sense organ itself (*adhikagrahaṇa*). See PS I k. 1cd, Hattori (1968a) p. 37 and especially pp. 124-126, n. 3.33 for further details and Uddyotakara's counterarguments in the *Nyāya-vārttika*. The Buddhists held that the nose, tongue and corporal sense organs function by contact and can only perceive objects which are of their same size. Cf. AK i k. 43cd-44ab (ed. Pradhan pp. 32-33; transl. LVP pp. 87, 93): *caḥṣuḥśrotramano 'prāptaviṣayaṃ trayam anyathā / tribhir ghrāṇādibhis tulyaviṣayagrahaṇaṃ matam //*. Finally, however, in what follows it becomes clear that, in contrast to Dignāga and AK, Dharmapāla takes a more Madhyamaka stance arguing that both the theory of *prāpyakāritva* and that of *aprāpyakāritva* lead to absurdities. Cf. the parallel discussion in *Bāi lùn* T. 1569 xiā 175c 28- 176a15; Tucci (1929) pp. 51-52.

(291) Note that Dharmapāla seems to provisionally adopt the Naiyāyika view that the eye is not the fleshy organ or the pupil, but rather the light-ray (*raśmi*) which goes out to the object. Cf. NS 3.1.34: *raśmyarthasaṃnikarṣaviśeṣāt tadgrahaṇam //*. "Their apprehension is due to a particular contact between the light-ray and the object". Vātsyāyana's NS *bhāṣya*: *tayor mahadaṇvor grahaṇaṃ caḥṣūraśmer arthasya ca san-nikarṣaviśeṣād bhavati yathā praṭīparaśmer arthasya ceti /* "The apprehension of these two, viz. the gross and the minute, is due to a particular contact between the eye's light-ray and the object, just like that between the light-ray of a lamp and an object." It would be all too easily refutable to hold that the actual fleshy organ comes into contact with the object. As Dignāga argued in PSV I (p. 194, 6-7): *dbaṇ po ni rten gyi yul ñid na gnas pa ste der gso ba la sogs pa rab tu sbyor ba'i phyir* (transl. Hattori p. 38: "The sense remains at the very place of its [physical] basis, since it is to this [basis] that medical treatment and so on is directed.")

(292) Cf. TS XXIV, k. 2522 (Jha 2523) and TSP. Kamalaśīla's commentary gives a good idea of the debate and the subsequent replies to Uddyotakara (Vol. II p. 830): *kiṃ punar atra pramāṇam / sannikṣṇaviprakṣṇayor tulyakālagrahaṇāt / yo hi gatimān sa sannikṣṇam āśu prāpnoti viprakṣṇam cireṇa yathā devadatto grāmād grāmāntaram gacchan / śākhācandramasos tu tulyakālam unmeṣasamanantaram eva grahaṇaṃ dṛṣṭam / tasmād aprāpyakāri caḥṣur iti gamyate /*

atrodḍyotakaraḥ prāha jñānānām āśūtpatteḥ kālabhedasyāgrahaṇān mithyā pratyaya eṣa utpalapatrasāavedhavad iti / tad etad asamyak / evaṃ hi saro rasa ityādāv api kramavyavasāyo na syāt / āśūtpattes tulyatvāt / tataś ca praṭītibhedo na syāt / sarvāsām ca buddhīnām āśūtpattir asīti na kadācit kramagrahaṇaṃ syād iti prāḡ nirloḥitām etad vistareṇa /

"But what *pramāṇa* is there for this [position that sense organs operate without contact]? [Kamalaśīla's reply:] It is because there is simultaneous apprehension of what is near and what is far away. Indeed, something mobile reaches a nearby thing quickly and a far away thing with a longer delay, just as when Devadatta goes from one village to another. However, we observe that the apprehension of branches [in a nearby tree]

and that of the moon is simultaneous, immediately after opening one's eyes. Therefore it is understood that the eye operates without any contact [with its object].

To this Uddyotakara replies: 'Because the consciousnesses are produced quickly, no difference in time-lapse is apprehended. Consequently, the idea that [the cognitions occur] like the [simultaneous] piercing of a hundred-petal lotus is mistaken.' [Kamalaśīla:] This is not correct. For in that case then there would be no ascertainment of any order in [words] such as *saras* and *rasa* as they are the same in being produced quickly. Therefore there would be no difference in our understanding [of such words]. Now, all cognitions are produced quickly, so there could never be any apprehension of order: this has already been thrashed out extensively earlier on."

(293) Literally: "the sight of very far away and nearby forms would have to be clear."

(294) The argument is as follows: *prāpyakāritva* implies no differences in clarity when the object is far or near. Sight and hearing do exhibit such differences, therefore we infer *aprāpyakāritva* in their cases. Cf. TS(P) XXIV, k. 2522: *dūrāsannādibhedena spaṣṭāspaṣṭam yatheksyate / rūpaṃ tathaiva śabda 'pi tīvramandādivid bhavet* //. "[In spite of their being no contact between the objects and the sense organs], just as form is seen clearly or unclearly due to such differences as being far away or near, so too would there be cognitions of intensity and weakness, etc. of sound as well."

(295) See en. 290.

(296) Mookerjee (1935) p. 307 summarizes the prevailing physical view of that time: "A magnet attracts a piece of iron from a considerable distance and no physical relationship between the two is observable." Thus, the magnet is thought to possess the property to be proved, viz. *aprāpyakāritva*, as well as the reason, that is, like the eyes, its force varies with distance. Cf. TS XXIV, k. 2518 (Jha k. 2519): *aprāptimātrasāmye 'pi na sarvasya graho yathā / ayaskāntena lohasya sāmārthyanīyamasthiteḥ* //. "Although the simple absence of contact is [always] the same, one does not apprehend anything and everything [irrespective of distance], for the power [of things] remains restricted, just as between a magnet and iron." Interestingly enough, Śaṅkarasvāmin (see TSP ad TS k. 2519) argued that the magnet *did* send out "light-rays which penetrated the iron" and were responsible for attracting it. But Kamalaśīla and Śāntaraksita appealed to "empirical" evidence and said that this "light" was unobservable and hence couldn't exist.

(297) *Taishō: nū* 塗 = "smear"; "erase". The Japanese translator (Kyik p. 352. 7) reads *nū* 途 = "road". Note that on p. 182 of *Zuì xīn shí yòng hán yīng cí diǎn*, it is specified that 塗 is sometimes used with the sense of 途.

(298) *yīn* 因 . Lit. "cause"; "reason".

(299) Ironically, here Dharmapāla / Āryadeva are using a variation on the basic argument of the Prāpyakāritvavādins, one which is developed by Kumārila in SV *śabdanityatādhikaraṇam*, 119 and 120: *yeṣāṃ tv aprāpta evāyaṃ śabdaḥ śrotreṇa gṛhyate / teṣāṃ aprāptitulyatvaṃ dūravyavahitādiṣu // tatra dūrasamīpasthagrahaṇāṅgrahaṇe same / syātāṃ na ca kramo nāpi tīvramandādisambhavaḥ //*. This is the argument which Śāntarakṣita, a confirmed *aprāpyakāritvavādin*, was seeking to answer in TS XXIV, k. 2522 (Jha, k. 2523). Basically, Dharmapāla / Āryadeva's strategy is to first use the Aprāpyakāritvavādins' arguments against the Prāpyakāritvavādin and then to proceed vice versa. Not surprisingly, the Madhyamaka conclusion of using both adversaries' arguments is that real perception is impossible.

A final point worth mentioning is that Dignāga used the impossibility of phenomena being hidden as an absurd consequence of *prāpyakāritvavāda*, and hence as an argument *in favour* of *aprāpyakāritvavāda*. Cf. PS I section 3, k. 2b.

(300) Japanese translator reads *jìn yuǎn* 近遠 ("near and far") instead of T. *jí yuǎn* 極遠 ("very far").

(301) The theme that distance and obstruction would be impossible is frequent in this sort of discussion, both in the present chapter and in other texts such as PS. A frequent way of expressing distance in these sorts of debates on (a) *prāpyakāritvavāda* is *sāntara*, lit. "having an interval". See en. 290 for Dignāga's use of the term; *sāntaragrahaṇa*, e.g. means "perception at a distance". Be this as it may, *sāntara* is usually *yǒu jiàn* 有間, leading us to suppose that either *zhōng jiàn* 中間 is being used oddly or that it is an error for *yǒu jiàn*.

(302) Cf. *Bǎi lùn xià* 176a 23-24:

外曰：光意去故見色眼光及意去故到彼能取色

"Outsider: Because the light-rays and the mental organ (*manas*) go out, one sees form. As the eye's light-rays and the mental organ go out, then when they reach that [object] one apprehends form."

Cf. Tucci (1929) p. 52, who mistakenly takes *yǎn guāng* 眼光 as "the eye and the light".

(303) T. has *zhū dēng* 珠燈 (*zhū* = *ratna*; "jewel"), but gives *shū dēng* 殊燈 ("various lights") as a variant.

(304) The typical Aprāpyakāritvavādin argument. See en. 296.

(305) As we see in the verses cited from TS and SV the two are generally treated as analogous. See en. 294, 299.

(306) T. reads *ruò ěr yǔ shēng wú wén ér qǔ* 若耳與聲無聞而取 (Lit. "If the ear and sound were without hearing, but still there was apprehension"). Perhaps *ruò ěr yú shēng* 若耳於聲... would make better sense. At any rate, the point is that if the ear is not what hears sounds, then turning one's head and ears in the direction of a particular sound would be inexplicable.

(307) *fāng wéi* 方維 . Paramārtha translates AK's *koṇa* ("angle"; "intermediate point of the compass") and *vidiś* by *wéi* 維 .

(308) Dharmapāla commentary (in e.g. §227a14) makes it clear that he interprets "nature" (*xìng* 性) in this verse as the Primordial Nature or Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*) in Sāṃkhya philosophy. See en. 68. Obviously Dharmapāla interprets k. 316 very differently from Candrakīrti: in effect, the last half of the verse, on Dharmapāla's interpretation, asks "Why would not the eye organ see the Primordial Nature making up the eye?" Note that while the Skt. just speaks of *svabhāvaḥ sarvabhāvānām* ("the nature of all entities"), the Chinese speaks of the *ǐ* 體, *xiāng* 相, *yòng* 用 of all dharmas. Dharmapāla's commentary in §227a14 shows that these are three separate terms: "...while the characters (*xiāng*) and functions (*yòng*) may differ, their *svabhāva* (*ǐ*) remains undifferentiated. The character *ǐ* in this context poses a problem as to its potential Skt. equivalent: viz. *dravya* / *svabhāva*. Given that *svabhāva* does occur in the Skt. and *dravya* does not, it might seem more reasonable to opt for *svabhāva*. At any rate, be it *svabhāva* or *dravya* here, the basic idea is much the same: the entity itself composed of the *guṇas*. See en. 219. I leave the term *svabhāva* ("nature"; "own-being") in Sanskrit here to avoid confusion with *prakṛti* (*xìng* 性), i.e. the Primordial Nature.

(309) See en. 75. *puruṣa* = the consciousness; the self. "Conscious principle" = *caitanya*, a frequently used synonym of *puruṣa*. See e.g. CSV X, HPS 488, 2 et seq.

(310) A generally held thesis in Indian philosophy: *svātmani kṛiyāvirodha* ("the contradiction of there being an action [directed] to itself"). See May (1959) n. 135; M. av. 166, 7 (LVP [1910], p. 349 and n. 2); K. Bhattacharya (1973), p. 53 n.

(311) See en. 54, 68, 72, 219.

(312) Viz. the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*). Cf. en. 308.

(313) However, cf. Gauḍapāda ad SK 16, who argues that although the Primordial Nature is one, it does not follow that everything ends up the same, because this Nature is transformed according to the predominance of the different *guṇas*. *yasmād ekasmāt pradhānād vyaktaṁ tasmād ekarūpeṇa bhavitavyam / naiṣa doṣaḥ pariṇāmataḥ salilavat pratipratiguṇāśrayaviśeṣāt / ekasmāt pradhānāt trayo lokāḥ samutpannāḥ tuḥyabhāvā na bhavanti* /.

(314) The Sāṃkhya recognizes three *pramāṇas*: perception (*dṛṣṭa* = *pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and authoritative speech (*āptavacana*). See SK 4.

(315) We should probably read *tī wú bié gù* 體無別故 instead of *tī yòng bié gù* 體用別故 ("because the substance and functions are different"), which makes no sense in this context. The former reading would correspond to the Sāṃkhya's own principle, which Dharmapāla is using against him to draw absurd consequences.

(316) The equivalence *xiū liú* 鳩鵲 = *ulūka* is attested in H. "Ulūka" ("owl") is a very common appellation of Kaṇāda, the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*. The Aulūkyas (*xiū liú zǐ* 鳩鵲子), thus, are the Vaiśeṣikas.

(317) In other words, the eye organ has fire as its material cause, the ear organ space, the nose earth, the tongue water and the body organ the air element. Ui (1917) pp. 78-79, in discussing this passage from Dharmapāla, pointed out that the Vaiśeṣika position described is that of Praśastapāda. Ui argued that the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* itself does not assert that space is the material cause of the ear organ; see op. cit. pp 194-195. Now, it is true that in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* passages describing earth and the other elements we do find the view which Dharmapāla discusses. See pp. 26 et seq. in V.P. Dvivedin's edition. However, the same theory is also presented in Candramati's *Daśapadārthaśāstra* (see Ui p. 103) and indeed also in the *Nyāyasūtra*.

(318) Dharmapāla does not argue for this, but presumably he is asserting that from a common sense point of view the eye does not resemble fire, the ear does not resemble space and so forth.

(319) The Buddhist holds that the elements are just touch sensations. See k. 309 and commentaries.

(320) Cf. Praśastapāda pp. 189-90; see en. 60 for translations of the relevant sections. Cf. VS 3.1.13, which speaks of the fourfold contact: *ātmendriyamano'rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat*. See en. 53 for translation and remarks.

(321) Dharmapāla comments on the verse as being a refutation of the Vaiśeṣikas and of the Hīnayāna. So because the term *rūpa* means different things for the Vaiśeṣika (i.e. "colour") and for the Hīnayāna (viz. "form"), I leave it here in the Sanskrit. See en. 56. Note that Tucci (1925) translated *sè shì* 色識 as *rūpavijñāna*, i.e. probably "consciousness of *rūpa*" and *sè yǎn* 色眼 as "visione del *rūpa*". This seems unjustified as a translation: a) *sè yǎn* 色眼 = *rūpa* + *caṅkṣus* and not *rūpadarśana*. b) Dharmapāla's interpretation of the verse makes it clear that he takes the verse as talking about three things, the eye, the *rūpa* and the consciousness, and that because each of them lacks the other two, they cannot individually produce sight. c) Finally his introduction to the verse and subsequent commentary (§227b29) make it clear that he

takes the verse as actually refuting the Vaiśeṣika's *four* factors, but that Āryadeva did not talk about the self because it had already been refuted. See en. 53 and 60 for the four in VS and Praśastapāda. In short, the "consciousness" spoken about in the verse is, according to Dharmapāla, the *manas* of the Vaiśeṣika.

(322) T. reads 二 ("two") rather than 三 ("three") but gives *sān* as a variant in two editions. The Japanese translator (Kyik p. 355.9) read *sān*, which is no doubt correct, as we see by the subsequent discussion about the "three dharmas".

(323) A widely used argument against the idea of the effect existing at the time of the cause (*saikāryavāda*). See MMK I,1; M. av. VI 8cd; TS I, k. 17-18. MMV p. 11: 'di ltar dños po bdag gi bdag ñid du yod pa rnams la yañ skye ba dgos pa med do. "So there is no need for entities which exist in themselves to arise again."

(324) Cf. MMK I, 6, MMV (p. 20) and Pr., as well as TS IX k. 488-489 for similar reasonings involving the impossibility of a temporal sequence in causation.

(325) If causes and effects are inexistent, it makes no sense to speak of identity or difference.

(326) The Vaiśeṣika had argued that four factors were necessary to see colour: the eyes, the colour, the mental organ and the self. See §227b8. The self was refuted already in Chapter II = CS X. Note that this allusion to the four factors shows clearly that Dharmapāla interpreted Āryadeva's use of "consciousness" as meaning the mental organ or *manas* of the Vaiśeṣika. See en. 321.

(327) Cf. AK ii k. 47ab and AKBh (LVP pp. 238-240) classification of expressions in terms of three "collections" (*kāya*): names, phrases and letters (*vyañjana*). In what follows, "sound" (*śabda*), as is often the case in Indian philosophy, has often to be understood as meaning "linguistic expressions" or "words".

(328) Alternatively, "describe", "express". H. quán biāo 詮表 = *pratyāyaka* ("making known"; "causing to understand").

(329) The point of the preceding argument seems to be that the particular character could not be responsible for reference, in that reference depends on conceptually created entities, viz. *apoha*, and not on something perceived in direct perception. Cf. Chapter III, Appendix I, §g.

(329a) The argument here is very brief and may have eluded us. Nonetheless, the point probably turns on a theme frequently found in the Epistemologists: in reasonings the terms must be universals, failing which we cannot give homologous examples (*tóng yù* 同喻 = *sādharmyadṛṣānta*) which are different from the *dharmīn*

and possess the *hetu* and *sādhya*dharma. Cf. en. 24. Suppose we are proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced. In that case, if the *sādhya*dharma and *hetu* are particulars (e.g. sound's impermanence or sound's producthood), we cannot give any *sādharmya*dṛṣṭānta, like a vase, which has these properties: a vase does not have sound's impermanence; it simply has the universal property, impermanence. This much is standard fare. In Dharmapāla's argument there is presumably a hidden premise that particular sounds uttered at specific times and places could not refer to universal properties, but why this is so is left unexplained.

If no homologous examples can be given, the reason is classified as an *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*hetu — "a reason which is inconclusive because it is [too] exclusive". To take the usual case, "sound is impermanent because it is audible", no example different from the *dharmin*, "sound", can be given. Thus the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between *hetu* and *sādhya*dharma cannot be ascertained and the reason is inconclusive. See Tillemans (1990) on the Indo-Tibetan debates concerning the *asādhāraṇānaikāntika*-hetu.

(330) I.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are not heard because they are mental creations without reality. On *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, see en. 366, 367.

(331) See en. 327 above.

(332) An allusion to one of the five similarities (*samatā*) which must hold between minds and their mental factors. *Inter alia*, they must have the same object (*ālambana*). See en. 427 for explanation of the fivefold similarity.

(333) This would be absurd because, according to the ontology of the Epistemologists, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* are not effects, but are mental constructions or designations. If they were subject to causation by the sense organs and so forth, they would be no different from real entities (*vastu*) or *svalakṣaṇa*. See en. 330, 366, 367.

(334) Cf. H. p. 432 *bàng lún qiě zhǐ* 傍論且止 = *alam atiprasaṅgena*.

(335) Note that CSV and Dharmapāla take k. 319 differently, the former understanding the verse as speaking of "the beginning of the sound", the latter "the origin". Tucci translated *shēng běn* 聲本 as "il principio del suono", but this is not borne out by Dharmapāla who glosses *běn* 本 as *yuán* 源, "source".

(336) The idea seems to be that if sounds came to the ear and were then heard, one would never actually hear the speaker emitting the sound, but only the sound which had entered the ear. It might be thought that the ear would indeed have to go out to where the speaker was to make the correlation between sound and its source, but this is not in any way observed. Note that some later authors such as Dharmarājadhvarīndra, the writer of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, did actually hold that the

ear organ had to make the journey to the actual place of the object, failing which it would be impossible to know the connection between sound and its source. See Mookerjee (1935), p. 303.

(337) H. *dùn* 頓 = *yugapad*.

(338) T. *jù* 具 . Japanese transl. (Kyik p. 358.5) *jù* 俱 is preferable.

(339) One of the four conditions for consciousness. See Mvyut. §CXV, *catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ* for equivalents. The *samanantarapratyaya* of a consciousness *A* is that consciousness which immediately precedes *A* and ensures that *A* is a consciousness, and not matter. See AK ii k. 61c, LVP pp. 299-306 and *Siddhi* II pp. 437-444. Cf. *Yōns 'dzin bsdus grwa brin* pp. 20b 6-21a 1 for a concise, textbook-style definition: *bzi pa ni / shon 'dzin mñon sum myoñ ba gsal rig tsam du gtso bor dños su skyed byed kyi rig pa / shon 'dzin mñon sum gyi de ma thag rkyen gyi mtshan ñid / mtshan gzi ni / shon 'dzin mñon sum gyi sha logs de ma thag tu byuñ ba'i shon po yid la byed pa'i ses pa lta bu /*. "As for the fourth [condition], the defining characteristic of the immediately preceding condition of a perception which apprehends blue is: the consciousness which principally and directly produces the perception of blue *qua* clear and knowing experience. The illustrative example is: a consciousness directed at blue which arises immediately before the perception of blue."

(340) For *divyaśrotrābhijñā*, which is one of the six super-knowledges and depends on meditative trances, see AK vii, k. 42ad, LVP pp. 98-100. It is said to perceive sounds irrespective of whether they are near, far, subtle, etc., just as the "divine eye" (*divyacakṣus*) perceives all forms. See AK vii, k. 54cd, LVP pp. 123-124. Dharmapāla seems to be giving a counterexample to the opponent's view that one cognizes the whole sound only after hearing the parts. In the case of the *divyaśrotra*, one hears sounds in their totality; it would follow absurdly from the opponent's view, however, that only the subsequent mind which arises right after the *dhyāna* could cognize whole sounds.

(341) The moments t_1 , t_2 , t_3 of hearing, which correspond to the moments of the sound, would be followed by three successive mental consciousnesses. Thus, the apprehension of the whole could not follow immediately after one hears the parts.

(341a) T. and Kyik 359.5 read *wèi fēi shēng* 未非聲 ("something which is not a non-sound"), but the context clearly demands that we read *wèi lái shēng* 未來聲 ("a future sound").

(342) The argument turns on the notion that "coming into being" is the defining characteristic of the present, while "having ceased" is the characteristic of the past. This is more or less generally accepted, the differences amongst the schools being

whether the future and past do or do not in some sense exist. Cf. for example AKBh ad AK v k. 26 for the Vaibhāṣika view: *yadā sa dharmāḥ kāritram na karoti tadānāgataḥ / yadā karoti tadā pratyutpannaḥ / yadā kṛtvā niruddhas tadātīta iti* / "When this dharma is not executing its activity it is future; when it is executing, then it is present; when it has executed [its activity] and has ceased, it is past". This position accepts that there is something existing in the three times which is past, present or future in terms of its activities. The other schools, especially the Sautrāntikas, deny this. For definitions of the three times from the Tibetan scholastic standpoint see *Yonis 'dzin bsdus grwa brin* ff. 21b6- 22a2.

(343) This was the position of the Sāṃkhya philosopher criticized in PS and PST (cf. en. 54) — Frauwallner (1958) identifies him as Vṛṣagaṇa. Cf. PST cited in Frauwallner p. 110: *bstan bcos su rna ba la sogs pa rnam kyī* rañ gi yul la rnam par 'jug pa dañ / da ltar ba'i dus la 'jug pa ñid du bsgrubs nas 'di skad bśad do // de bzin du yid ni don thams cad la dus gsum pa ñid du rab tu 'jug ste /...* Transl. Frauwallner: "Das Śāstram (*bstan-bcos*), d.h. das Śāstītantram, hatte also gelehrt, dass die äusseren Sinne, das Gehör usw., sich auf das ihnen entsprechende besondere Objekt richten und dass sich ihre Tätigkeit nur auf die Gegenwart erstreckt. Anschliessend daran hiess es: 'In entsprechender Weise richtet sich das Denken auf alle Gegenstände und auf alle drei Zeiten...'" *We should read *kyis* instead of *kyi*.

(344) Cf. Vidyābhūṣaṇa (1913) p. 84 on NS 3.2.4: "The Sāṃkhyas affirm that knowledge is a mode of the permanent intellect [i.e. *buddhi*] from which it is not different. Knowledge, according to them, is nothing but the permanent intellect modified in the shape of an object which is reflected on it through the senses." Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* to NS 3.2.2-3 and 3.2.9 describes their position that the *buddhi* or "inner organ" (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is one, but has *vṛtti* ("operations"; "functioning") which differ just in the way in which a glass put over differently coloured substances will *seem* to have different colours. Cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad NS 3.3.9: *ekam antaḥkaraṇam nānā vṛttaya iti saty abhedavṛtter idam ucyate/*

sphaṭikānyatvābhimānavat tadanyatvābhimānaḥ (9)
tasyām vṛttau nānāvābhimāno yathā dravyāntaropahite sphaṭike anyatvābhimāno nīlo lohita iti evaṃ viśayāntaropadhānād iti.

See also the description of this process in *Bāi lùn* T. 1569 *shàng* 171c 22-25:

"The one can have various forms, like crystal. As one crystal becomes blue, yellow, red and white according to the colors (of things near by), just so one *buddhi* becomes various according to its objects. At one time it perceives misery, at another time pleasure and so on. Although *buddhi* has various forms (actually) there exists only one *buddhi*." (Translation in Honda 1974, p. 487).

Note that *ṛtti* in the context of the Sāṃkhya theory of perception means that the sense or mind "transforms" so that it has the aspects (*ākāra*) of the object. Cf. *Yuktiṭīpikā*'s explanation, *viśayākārapariṇāmātmikā ṛttir...* ("the operation is in essence a transformation into the aspects of the object"), quoted in Hattori (1968a) p. 148, n. 5.1.

Following Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of Vṛṣagaṇa's Sāṃkhya definition of perception discussed in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (see en. 54 and Hattori [1968a] n. 5.1, 5.2), the term *manasādhiḡhitā* ("controlled by the mind") was interpreted by some Sāṃkhyas to mean that the mind went together with the senses, while others took it as meaning that the mind apprehends the initial sense perception. Dharmapāla seems to be refuting the former position now, but also discussed something very similar to the latter view in connection with k. 312.

(345) The equivalence is amply attested in H. and Nak. Note that Vṛṣagaṇa also seems to have made a difference between *'jug pa* = *ṛtti* and *rab tu 'jug pa* = *pravṛtti*, the former term applying to the senses and the latter term applying to the mind. See en. 343. Dharmapāla seems to reject the distinction.

(346) See en. 344.

(347) Tucci (1925) mistakenly translates *chén 塵* as *āyatana* which renders the passage perfectly incomprehensible. *chén 塵* = *artha* is attested in H. p. 275, and *artha* is what occurs in the Skt. of k. 322. Although the Skt. does not have a separate word for "erroneous" in the verse, the nuance seems to be important to Dharmapāla's interpretation. As a result, although the Skt. is simply *vyavasthā*, I translate the Chinese *wàng lì 妄立* as "erroneous determinations".

(348) One of the usual senses of *saṃjñā* is indeed "sign", "signal".

(349) Nak. p. 121a: "The fact of mental reflection. In the Vijñānavāda, it is the sixth consciousness reflecting upon the phenomenon."

(350) Unidentified.

(351) Unidentified.

(352) Read *ài 愛* rather than *yōu 憂* (= *daurmanasya*; "despondency"). Cf. the immediately following line (229b23) in the Chinese text: *ài xīn 愛心* .

(353) See AK viii k. 17ab, LVP pp. 168-173.

(354) An inhabitual, and so far untraceable, tenfold schema.

(355) See en. 437 for references to other works. Instead of "comet" one more usually finds "mist".

(356) A key Indian Buddhist notion — lit. "what is not made (*kṛta*) by bringing together parts or conditions", or "what does not depend on causal conditioning". See Bareau (1951). The Chinese term, lit. "without activity", has a long history, serving *inter alia* as the early Buddhist translation of *nirvāṇa*. AK i k. 5 gives the traditional three *asaṃskṛtas*: space (*ākāśa*) and the two cessations (*nirodha*); for the Vijñānavāda interpretation of these three as being ways of designating the ultimate "thusness" of dharmas, the *bhūtataṭhatā*, see *Siddhi* pp. 72-78. Note that some philosophers, e.g. the Vātsīputrīyas, held that only *nirvāṇa* was *asaṃskṛta*; others, as discussed in Pr. 176.9-10, held that voidness, which is defined as "thusness" (*tathatālakṣaṇa*), is *asaṃskṛta*. See AK i, LVP's p. 7 n. 2. Nāgārjuna maintained that when one has shown that there can be no conditioned things, there cannot be any unconditioned things either. MMK VII, k. 33: *utpādashitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam / saṃskṛtasyāprasiddhau ca katham setsyaty asaṃskṛtam //*.

(357) Cf. Kamalaśīla's reasoning in TSP's introduction to TS Chapter XXIII (*bahirarthaparīkṣā*) (p. 670). See fn. 135.

(358) The discussion below alternates between two meanings of *pratyakṣa*: a) perceptible or evident objects; b) direct perception, viz. the consciousness which perceives such objects.

(359) Cf. the discussion below in §4. See also en. 362.

(360) For the Sāṃkhya, see en. 54, 68, 219. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika held that the whole was different from the parts but linked to them by "inherence" (*samavāya*). Cf. Śāntarakṣita's TS k. 560 (Jha, k. 561): *vibhinnakarṣaktyāder bhinnau tantupātau tathā / viruddhadharmayogena stambhakumbhādibhedavat //*. "Similarly, the threads [i.e. the parts of the cloth] and the cloth [i.e. the whole] are different in that they have different makers and different powers, just as pillars, vases and so forth [differ] due to their contradicting dharmas". For the Buddhist critique of the inherence relation between parts and wholes, see TS and TSP chapter XV, k. 822 et seq., *samavāya-padārthaparīkṣā*. See also Udayana's *Āmatattvaviveka* pp. 617 et seq. (résumé in Potter [1977] pp. 541-544) and Potter (1977) pp. 74-86 for the Buddhist-Nyāya debate on wholes and parts.

(361) CS IX k. 211, translated in May (1981) p. 88. The point according to the CSV ad k. 211 is that the cause cannot be permanent while the effect is impermanent: such differences of character between cause and effect are not to be found. In the Sāṃkhya system the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*), i.e. the three *guṇas*, which are the essence of all phenomena, is permanent, while the phenomena themselves are

impermanent. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the ultimate constituents of objects, viz. the atoms, are permanent.

(362) For the Vaibhāṣika the eight substances are: the four elements, viz. earth, air, fire and water, plus their four derivatives (*bhautika*), i.e. the four domains (*āyatana*), those of (visual) form (*rūpa*), smell, taste and tactile sensations. See AK i LVP pp. 144-149. PSP p. 114, 26-28: *de la rdzas brgyad ni 'di lta ste / 'byuñ ba chen po bzī dañ / gzugs dañ / dri dañ / ro dañ / reg bya'o //*. On the elements and their derivatives, see en. 236, 256, 264.

(363) For the "fivefold" (*pañcadhā*) reasoning, see e.g. MMK XXII,1: *skandhā na nānyaḥ skandebhyo nāsmiṃ skandhā na teṣu saḥ / tathāgataḥ skandhavān na katamo 'tra tathāgataḥ //*. "He is not identical with the aggregates; he is not different from the aggregates; the aggregates are not in him; nor is he in them; the Tathāgata does not possess the aggregates. Who then is the Tathāgata?" See Pr. 432.12-13; De Jong (1949) pp. 73-75; Pr. 454.14-15; May (1959) pp. 183-184. The five lemmas, if generalized are as follows: *X* is identical with *Y*; *X* is different from *Y*; *Y* is in *X*; *X* is in *Y*; *X* possesses *Y*. They apply to various relationships, such as that between parts and wholes as well as cause and effect. In other words, not finding one of the five possibilities shows that the entities in question are without nature (*svabhāva*), are impossible and cannot exist as anything more than mere designations (*prajñapti*). In M. av. VI, 151 Candrakīrti adds two lemmas to come up with the sevenfold reasoning: *X* is not the collection of *Y*'s; *X* is not the shape of the *Y*'s. To take the part-whole relationship, the result is that *X* is designated in dependence upon *Y* (*upādāya prajñapti*) as what appropriates (*upādātṛ*) its substrata (*upādāna*), but neither conventionally nor ultimately does it have any of the possible relations with *Y*: it is a mere "designation" in that its name is without any real denotation. Cf. M. av. VI, 158, transl. LVP "Sans doute, le char n'est établi, ni au point de vue de la réalité, ni au point de vue du monde, d'aucune de ces sept manières [identité avec les membres, etc.]: mais le monde, abstraction faite de la critique (*avicārataḥ*), le désigne en raison de ses membres." Note that *upādāya prajñapti* is glossed by commentators like Avalokitavṛata as *upādānam upādāya prajñapti*. *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* P. vol. 97, f. 277; see Nagao (1979) p. 33. However, *upādāna* need not mean just the material cause (like a seed) of an effect (like a sprout), it can also be the substrata, i.e. the parts. See also en. 40, 185.

(364) Here and in what follows the argumentation is largely directed against the Epistemological school or "logicians" (*rtog ge ba = tārīkika*), who held that it is only the particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) such as a form, a colour, etc. which exist and which are cognized through direct perception without the intermediary of any conceptualization (*vikalpa*; *kalpanā*). See en. 366, 367. The present argument is that if gross objects like fire or vases were independently real, they would be independent of their *upādāna*, viz. their causes or parts, and would thus exist unaffected by changes in the latter.

Candrakīrti subsequently retorts that the same logic can be universally applied; no entity has any preferential status in this regard.

(365) CSV XIII §7-9 and §15 and *Prasannapadā* pp. 71-72 (see en. 374), show us that there two ways to understand the word *pratyakṣa*: a) "what is present before (*prati*) the sense organs (*akṣa*)", i.e. something perceptible or visible; b) "what is in connection with the sense organs", i.e. direct perception. See en. 367. Candrakīrti clearly takes the first etymology, while the Epistemologists opt for the second. The result is that for Candrakīrti the word *pratyakṣa* is to be taken in the sense of an evident, or perceptible, object and that the corresponding cognition is metaphorically termed *pratyakṣa* because it has an object which is *pratyakṣa* (i.e. perceptible) as its cause. This etymology would seem like a matter of word-play were it not for the fact that it permits Candrakīrti to include under "perception" any and all consciousnesses, conceptual or not, for which the object is one which is perceptible; it is, for example, possible to have a perceptual judgment about a vase; in other words, one can have a perception which is *also* conceptual, because the vase which causes such a judgment is itself a perceptible object. See en. 428.

(366) Dignāga characterizes *svalakṣaṇa* as inexpressible (*avyapadeśya*). See PSV ad PS I, k. 2c-d, Skt. quoted in PVBh p. 236.13-14. Dharmakīrti gives what became the standard characterization of *svalakṣaṇa* in four points: a) they have practical and causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*); b) they are unique (*asaḍṣa*); c) they are not objects of words (*śabdasyāviśaya*); d) their cognitions do not rely on any other causes (*anyanimitta*) but them. Universal characters (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) are the exact opposite. See PV III, k.1-2:

mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viśayadvaividhyāc chaktyaśaktitaḥ /
arthakriyāyāṃ keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ //
saḍṣāsadaṣṭatvāc ca viśayāviśayatvataḥ /
śabdasyānyanimittanāṃ bhāve dhīśadasattvataḥ //

Text in Tosaki (1979) pp. 58-59. Note that the insistence on *arthakriyā* seems to be Dharmakīrti's development; see Hattori (1968a) n. 1.14 and Tosaki (1979) p. 60; on diverse aspects of *arthakriyā* see Mikogami (1979), Nagatomi (1967-68), May (1982) n. 35. Note also Dharmakīrti's pronouncement in PV III k.53cd: *meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam*. "It is the *svalakṣaṇa* alone which is [really] cognized." See Stcherbatsky (1926), Chapt. VII on *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. See also en. 40, 184.

For Tibetan explanations see en. 40 and the definitions in Tsoñ kha pa's *sDe bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel* p. 8: *rañ mtshan gyi mtshan ñid / don dam par don byed nus pa / dper na sñon po lta bu'o // yañ na yul dus ma 'dres par gnas pa'i dños po / spyi mtshan gyi mtshan ñid don dam par don byed mi nus pa'i chos / yañ na rtog* pa la yul dus 'dres par snañ ba'i snañ yul / dper na rtog pa la lto ldir žabs žum snañ ba lta bu'o /*. * Text has *rtogs*. Transl.: "The defining characteristic of a *svalakṣaṇa* is being ultimately efficacious; or alternatively, [it is] being an entity which exists without

combining [different] places and times. For example, like [a patch of] blue. The defining characteristic of a *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is being a dharma which is not ultimately efficacious; or alternatively, [it is] being an appearing object which seems to combine [different] places and times. For example, like the appearance to conceptualization of [a vase] which bulbous and splay-bottomed." Cf. also *ICaṇ skya grub mtha'* pp. 98-99, where *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is said to be equivalent to conventional truth (*kun rdzob bden pa* = *saṃvṛtisatya*) for the Epistemological school, and *svalakṣaṇa* equivalent to ultimate truth (*don dam bden pa* = *paramārthasatya*).

(367) For *gyer po*, see *Mvyut gyer po* = *paṇu*, *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* vol. III, which gives the primary meaning as "intelligent", but also gives uses of the word where it means "clear" (e.g. *gnam gyer po*) or "luminous".

On *pratyakṣa* and *kalpanāpoḍha*, see NM k. 15ab et seq. (T. 1628 3b 14-17):

現量除分別 餘所說因生 此中現量除分別者謂若有智於色等境
遠離一切種類名言假立無異諸門分別 由不共緣現現別轉故名現量。

"Direct perception is free of conceptualization; the other [cognition, i.e. inference] arises from the reason as just explained. Here *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham* means: that cognition which does not conceptualize through imposing an identity between qualifiers and linguistic expressions upon objects such as form, etc.; it occurs in connection with the individual sense organs because they are its specific cause (*bù gòng yuán* 不共緣 = *asādhāraṇahetu*; *asādhāraṇakāraṇa*), and thus it is [named] *pratyakṣa*."

Skt. fragments given by Katsura (1982) p. 84: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham* (=PS I, 3c, Vibhūticandra, p. 174); *tatrāyaṃ Nyāyamukhagranthaḥ yaj jñānam artharūpāḍau viśeṣaṇābhīdhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣaṃ akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣaṃ* (TSP ad TS k. 1236; p. 456). See also PS I, k. 4ab: *asādhāraṇahetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate*. Transl. Hattori (1968a): "it is named after the sense-organs because they are its specific cause". NP 4: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham yaj jñānam arthe rūpāḍau nāmajātyādikalpanārahitaṃ tat / akṣaṃ akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣaṃ* /. "Perception is free of conceptualization; it is that cognition which does not conceptually construct proper names, classes and so forth upon objects such as form, etc. As it occurs in connection with the various individual sense organs it is [named] *pratyakṣa*."

See Hattori op. cit. n. 1.27 for the Buddhist Epistemologist's use of the term *kalpanā*; see also Stcherbatsky (1926), Chapter VI. The basic point for Dignāga is that conceptualization is the association of a proper name, a class, a quality, action or substance with the inexpressible *svalakṣaṇa* which one perceives, so that the resultant combination becomes describable. See PSV and PS I, k. 3d: *atha keyaṃ kalpanā nāma / nāmajātyādiyojanā* //. Dharmakīrti adds *abhrānta* ("unmistaken") to *kalpanāpoḍha* in NB I,4 and redefines *kalpanā* as "a cognition of a representation which is fitting to be associated with words" (PVin P. 252b4: *rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba snaṅ ba'i śeś*

pa. NB I,5: *abhiḷāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā*). Dharmakīrti introduced the specification "fitting" (*yogya*) to allow for the fact that infants and illiterates still have *kalpanā*, i.e. consciousnesses of representations which *would* be fitting to be associated with words, if the person could use language. For Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of *kalpanā*, see TS(P) k. 1212 et seq., Franco (1984) and Hattori (1968a) n. 1.27. The Tibetan scholastic generally adopts an abbreviated and somewhat different version of Dharmakīrti's definition: *sgra don 'dres ruṅ tu 'dzin pa'i ḥen rig* "A consciousness which apprehends words and objects as fitting to be associated". One interpretation is that *sgra* here means *sgra spyi* (lit. "word-universals"; i.e. images dependent upon language) and *don* means *don spyi* (lit. "object-universals"; i.e. images dependent upon perceptions of the objects). See *lCañ skya grub mtha'* pp. 100 et seq., where the author has an interesting discussion explaining why he disagrees with this widespread Tibetan definition.

(368) Cf. PS I, k. 4ab quoted in en. 367.

(369) Cf. *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and *vṛtti*, k. 1-5, where after refuting that the individual atoms are the objects of perception, Dignāga then shows that the collection (*'dus pa*) is not the object and nor is the combined aspect of the atoms (*'dus pa'i rnam pa*). The argument there, and perhaps in CSV, seems directed against the Neo-Sarvāstivādins, such as Saṃghabhadra. See en. 227. Vasubandhu is also clearly the target of CSV's arguments. See en. 370.

(370) On *timira*, *taimirika* and the illusion of a "mesh of hair" (*keṣoṇḍuka*) — a recurrent example of an illusion used as a simile to describe conventional truth — see en. 155, 156; Pr. 373, transl. De Jong (1949) pp. 29-30; M. av. 102,109, transl. LVP (1910) pp. 300, 306; *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* VI,7, transl. Lamotte (1935), p. 189 and n.7.

The opponent's use of the example in the present context is, however, not the usual case of a purely *illusory* perception of a "mesh of hair" (*keṣoṇḍuka*). Rather, the example is designed to show that one can see a collection (i.e. a pile of hair) without in fact seeing the individuals (i.e. the strands): a person suffering from *timira* does not have the visual acuity to see anything but a collection of hair. Note that the debate has some clear echoes in Abhidharmic literature. Cf. Saṃghabhadra's position as outlined in en. 227. As Kajiyama (1971) p. 1003 (21) points out, Vasubandhu himself, in debating on the meaning of *skandha* in AK i, k. 20 et seq., asserted that a collection of atoms is a cause for perception, for each individual atom contributes causally to the collections (*ekaśaḥ samagrāṇāṃ kāraṇabhavāt*), all be the contribution minute. (It is this latter point which Candrakīrti will attack in §13.) As for the use of the *timira/keśa* example in this context, interestingly enough, Yaśomitra in his *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharma-kośavyākhyā* (ed. D. Shāstrī I, p. 61, 18-21) to AK i, k. 20, gives the same example of a pile of hair: single strands are not visible to the *taimirika*, but are nonetheless causes for perceiving the whole pile: *yathā vā keśāḥ prthag prthag avasthītā na samarthāḥ taimirikacakṣurvijñānakaraṇe, samudītās tv asaṃyuktāpi samarthāḥ / tadvac cakṣurādīn-*

driyaparamāṇavo rūpādiviṣayaparamāṇavaś ca cakṣurādivijñānotpādane pratyekam asamarthāḥ, samuditās tu samarthāḥ /. "Just as the separately existing hairs are incapable of causing a *taimirika*'s eye consciousness, but when assembled together, even the disjoint [hairs], become capable, so too the atoms of the eye organ and the atoms of the objects such as form, etc. are each individually incapable of producing the eye consciousness, but when assembled together are capable."

(370a) An entomological aside: *śa sbran* are various sorts of *méng* 虻 ("gadfly") according to *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*. E.g. *śa sbran* can be a *niú méng* 牛虻 — a cattle-fly. In other words, it is some type of gadfly rather than a "blue-bottle fly", as Jäschke had erroneously speculated in his *Tibetan-English Dictionary* s.v. *śa*. The latter is just the common house and garden variety of fly ("a large buzzing fly with a blue body", *Concise Oxford Dictionary*), but the former is something distinctly more sinister, as its name "flesh-fly" (*śa sbran*) would seem to suggest. As for the *sbran bu mchu riñs* ("long-lipped fly"), the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* s.v. *mchu riñ* once again comes to our aid specifying that *mchu riñ* = *dug sbran mchu riñ* ("the long-lipped poisonous fly"): the Chinese translation tells us that this is "a synonym for a long-mouthed mosquito" 長嘴蚊的異名.

(371) The text reads *gnod pa mi srid do* — "even when it depends on the atoms, there cannot be any harm / refutation / impairment". This makes no sense in terms of the line of argument. It seems more likely that *gnod pa* is a mistake for *nus pa*. A similar problem occurs in the next line where we encounter *gnod pa ga la srid*. Cf. Kaḥ thog's (f. 210a) explanation of the point at issue: *so sor phye ba la rañ gnas pa'i rdul phran re re žiñ śes pa de sñed bskyed na ma dmigs pa de'i phyir nus pa cuñ zad kyañ yod pa ma yin na tshogs pa la yañ ji ltar yod de med do* //. "One does not observe that when separated, the atoms existing by themselves individually produce a corresponding number of consciousnesses. Thus, given that they have absolutely no efficacy, then how could the collection [of the atoms] have any [efficacy] — it would not have any at all."

(372) See preceding note.

(373) Translating *rgyud du ma las skyes pa'i dbaṅ po'i yul ñid* as a relative clause yields little meaning: "The crescent moon, etc. are all seen to be objects of senses which arise from many extractions." One could however take *skyes pa'i* as equalling *skyes bu'i* and thus the problematic phrase would mean "sense objects of (for) persons from many [different] extractions". This would accord with rGyal tshab's interpretation of *rgyud du ma las skyes pa* as being a backhanded way to say *skyes bu du ma* ("numerous people"). rGyal p. 2: *'jig rten na yañ zla ba tshes pa sogs skyes bu du mas mñon sum du grub pa'i yul mñon sum du grags kyi yul can la ma grags pa'i phyir* /. "For, in the world, things such as the crescent moon and so forth, which are objects established by numerous people as being perceptible (*mñon sum* = *pratyakṣa*), are acknowledged as perceptible."

But the subject (*yul can* = *viṣayin*) is not so acknowledged." Cf. also Lokesh Chandra, who gives *nara* and *pums* ("man") as possible equivalents of *skyes pa*.

(374) Cf. Pr. 71.10- 72.1: *api cāparokṣārthavācivāt pratyakṣaśabdasya sāṅśād abhimukho 'rthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ / pratigatam akṣam asminn iti kṛtvā ghaṭanīlādīnām a-parokṣānām pratyakṣatvaṁ siddham bhavati / tatparicchedakasya jñānasya tṛṇatuṣāgnivat pratyakṣakāraṇatvāt pratyakṣatvaṁ vyapadiśyate //*. Note that my translation of *pratyakṣakāraṇatvāt* differs from that of Stcherbatsky (1927) p. 159: I follow the Tibetan in reading it as a *bahuvrīhi*. Cf. Tib.: *de yōṅs su gcod par byed pa'i ṣes pa ni rtsa dan sog's ma'i me bzin du mñon sum gyi rgyu can yin pa'i phyir mñon sum ñid du rjod par byed do*. "Now, moreover, because the word *pratyakṣa* means objects which are not imperceptible, an object which is clearly in front [of us] is *pratyakṣa* [i.e. perceptible]. Vases, blue [patches] and other such non-imperceptible things are established as being *pratyakṣa* in that the senses accede to them. The consciousness which discriminates such things is taught to be a *pratyakṣa* because it has a *pratyakṣa* [i.e. a perceptible object] as cause, just like grass and chaff fires [which are so-called because grass and chaff are their causes]."

(375) Cf. *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (ed. Rahder) 43.6: [*sarvasaṃskṛtaṃ*] *riktaṁ tuccaṁ mṛṣā moṣadharmā viśaṃvādakam*. Note that *bslu ba'i chos can* = *moṣadharman* or, as we find in CSV XIII §108, *moṣadharmaka*; cf. Mvyut. 7314: *bslu ba'i chos can* = *moṣadharmināḥ*. See also en. 34 for canonical references. Note that *bslu ba / mi bslu ba simpliciter* are not *moṣa / amoṣa*, but are almost always some variant on *viśaṃvādin / aṣaṃvādin*. This is especially so in the definition of *pramāṇa*. Hence, I have translated the two uses of *bslu ba* differently.

(376) The argument seems to turn on the combination of scriptural citations plus the logician's definition of *pramāṇa* as being *aṣaṃvādin* (i.e. *mi bslu ba*). Cf. PV II, k. 1: *pramāṇam aṣaṃvādi jñānam*.

(377) Monier-Williams p. 551: "nimba, m. the Nimb or Neemb tree, *Azadirachta Indica* (its fruit is bitter and its leaves are chewed at funeral ceremonies)."

(378) The point of the aside seems to be that if one analyzes, one cannot say that one really sees the vase. The world, of course, says that it sees the vase, but this is just an approximate, conventional description — like the world's habit of inaccurately labelling beans and so forth. Some botanical remarks: In fact, the *mudga* and *māṣa* are two closely resembling species. Monier-Williams: *mudga* = *Phaseolus mungo*; *māṣa* = *Phaseolus radiatus*. Cf. *Hobson-Jobson* ss. vv. Mash and Moong and the quotation there (s.v. Moong) from the observer Ibn Batuta: "The munj is a kind of māsh, but its grains are oblong and the colour is light green ..."

(379) Note that my translation of k. 305 differs significantly from that of Lang (1986). She translates (p. 119): "The investigation of whether or not an atom has parts also occurs in the system [of our opponents]. Therefore, it is not logically possible to establish that [atom] to be established (*sādhya*) by means of [an atom] that remains to be established."

First of all, the words "system [of our opponents]" seem unjustified. Secondly, it seems to me unlikely that one is seeking to establish atoms by appealing to considerations about atoms. Cf. rGyal p. 4: *de'i phyir dños po rañ mtshan pa ma grub bsgrub par bya ba yis bsgrub bya bum pa rañ gi ño bo ñid kyis grub pa mñon sum gyi gźal byar 'gyur bar mi 'thad do /*. "So, by means of something which is to be proved, i.e. unestablished particular entities (*dños po rañ mtshan pa*), it is improper to [prove that] something [else] to be proven, viz. a vase which exists in virtue of its nature, would be the object of a direct perception." In short, one is appealing to considerations about atoms to establish the perceptibility of gross objects such as vases, but both are equally in doubt. Kaḥ thog (f.212a) makes it clear that what is at stake here is the fallacy of *sādhyaśama*, where the reason is itself as much in doubt as the proposition to be proved: *de'i phyir sgrub byed (b)sgrub bya dañ mtshuñs par ma grub bo*. See also rGyal tshab's topical outline §1.1.1.1.5 to k. 305, translated in our Appendix. Cf. NS 1.2.8 for the logical fallacy of *sādhyaśama*. See MMK IV, k. 8 and Pr. translated in May (1959) for *sādhyaśama* in Madhyamaka method; cf. also K. Bhattacharya (1978) p. 22, n. 3.

(380) For whole objects to exist really and hence be perceptible in truth, they would have to be wholes in virtue of their own nature (*svabhāva*). But this is not the case: they are only wholes relative to something else, but cannot be wholes simply in themselves.

(381) Cf. en. 235 and AK i k. 10 and AKBh: *rūpaṃ dvidhā varṇaḥ saṃsthānaṃ ca*. "Form is twofold, viz. colour and shape."

(382) One can see different colours individually and separately, but one cannot see shape and colour in this manner. So in what sense would they be different?

(383) Visual form (i.e. colour and shape) is a derivative (*bhautika*) of the elements (*mahābhūta*) and is in that sense caused by them. See en. 236.

(384) Lit. "distinct from a seeing form"

(385) See AK ii LVP p. 145 which mentions that in the *Kāmadhātu* every molecule must have at least the eight substances, viz. the four *mahābhūta* and four *bhautika*. One cannot perceive the causes of form (viz. the elements) and the form itself separately, for the latter is simply a type of manifestation or derivative (i.e. *bhautika*) of the former.

(386) Cf. AK i LVP pp. 64-65: "Or le solide, l'humide, etc. sont tangibles et seulement tangibles: la solidité n'est pas perçue par l'organe de la vue." See en. 236, 256, 387, 388.

(387) Cf. *Traité* I p. 367: "Ainsi la terre (*prthivī*) a pour caractère la solidité (*khakkhaṭatva*)..." See May (1959) n. 197 for references in Pr. and secondary literature. For canonical references concerning the nature of the four elements see *Traité* I, p. 367, n. 2. and en. 386, 388.

(388) Cf. AK i k. 12cd: *dhṛtyādikarmasamsiddhāḥ kharasnehoṣṇateraṇāḥ*. "The solid, the viscous, the hot and the moving consist in actions of supporting and the like." Cf. Tib. of AK i k.12 (*'dzin pa la sogs las su grub*) and AKBh ad i k. 12: *dhṛtisamgrahapaktivyūhanakarmasv ete yathākramam prthivyaptejovāyudhātavaḥ* /. "The earth, water, fire and air elements consist respectively in the actions of supporting, cohesion, 'cooking' and expansion."

(389) Translated according to the Sanskrit. Transl. by De Jong (1949) p. 84.

(390) rGyal tshab rje (p. 7) takes the opponents here as being Vaiśeṣikas (*bye brag pa*) and understands "perceptibility" as being a universal (*spyi* = *sāmānya*). However, as J. Bronkhorst points out to me, this is problematic in that perceptibility would then have to inhere in a substance, quality or motion. But in fact, "perceptible" is not a member of any of these three categories, so (at least strictly speaking) perceptibility does not satisfy the requirements for being a universal. Cf. *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* p. 17: *dravyādīnām trayānām api sattāsambandhaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ* ... "The three, viz. substance and [qualities and motions] are also connected with existence, have *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* ..." Ibid. p. 19: *sāmānyādīnām trayānām ... asāmānyaviśeṣavattvaṃ* ... "The three, viz. *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and inherence (*samavāya*) do not have *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* ..." In short, if Candrakīrti is speaking about a Vaiśeṣika universal, it is in a loose and unorthodox way: in fact, it is not clear whose ideas are being refuted.

(391) Lang (1986) p. 120 seems to have understood *skyes pa* as "genus (*jāti*)". She translates as follows: "There is no quality in this pot here having the genus (*jāti*) perceptibility. Therefore, there is no such truly existent thing as [the genus] perceptibility." Not only does this seem to me unjustifiable on syntactical grounds, but *jāti* in the technical sense of "genus" (or natural kind) is not rendered by *skyes pa* or *skye ba*, but rather by *rigs*. Admittedly the commentary of Candrakīrti is tortuous here, but at any rate it does not support Lang's rendering, nor do the indigenous Tibetan commentaries take *skyes pa* in the technical sense of "genus"/natural kind.

In the second half of the verse, she does not adequately render the word *ltar*, which is clearly showing a parallel: in §44 Candrakīrti glosses *ltar* by ... *ji ltar* ... *de bžin du* I would tentatively propose that we understand Candrakīrti's explanation of k. 310cd in CSV §44 as follows: 1) the hypothesis of §43 is that the vases are

essentially imperceptible but become perceptible due to their connections with another entity, perceptibility; 2) perceptibility cannot be produced in vases which, on the hypothesis of §43, are essentially imperceptible; 3) existence would be parallel to perceptibility in that the object would be existent only on account of some other entity, existence. 4) Like perceptibility's absurd production in essentially imperceptible things, so too things such as vases, which would not have existence as their own essence, could not acquire existence either.

(392) *bsam gyis mi khyab pa* = *acintya* ("inconceivable"). The term should be taken in the sense of something being too subtle for us to understand, and not in the sense of something being impossible or inconsistent.

(393) The equivalence could also be *tathatā*, "thusness".

(394) This and the next citation remain unidentified. For a similar account of the creation of the world from the primordial wind (*prāgvāyu*), see AK iii k. 90cd et seq. LVP pp. 185-186.

(395) *byed pa* = *kartṛ*, *kāraka*, *karāṇa*, etc. in Lokesh Chandra. But it seems likely that it is *karāṇa* ("instrument") at stake here. Further on, in CSV §58, the opponent tries to argue that the perception is not the *byed pa*, but rather the *byed pa po* (= *kartṛ*), "the agent" — this pair of terms *karāṇa* / *kartṛ* (= *byed pa* / *byed pa po*) is frequent in Indian and Tibetan grammatico-philosophical discussions. See Tillemans (1988a), p. 493, n. 8, 9 and Tillemans and Herforth (1989) p. 6, n. 10 and p. 40.

(396) Cf. *Bāi lùn* T. 1569 xiā 175c 11-28; Tucci (1929) pp. 50-51. Cf. also MIMK IX, 12 and Pr., where Candrakīrti gives a similar argument against the relationship between the person and the senses.

(397) The introduction to the verse and Candrakīrti's conclusion suggest that we probably have to understand "sight" as meaning the "organ of sight", "the faculty of sight", i.e. the eye. Cf. en. 287. Lang seems to be in disagreement, taking *darśana* here as meaning "perception" (Lang 1986) or "the act of perception" (Thesis). In connection with the conditions for consciousness, the term *adhipatipratyaya* usually refers specifically to the sense organs, the objects or to *manas*, as we shall see below. But on p. 467, n. 21 of Lang's thesis, she invokes a definition of *adhipatipratyaya* in Pr. 77.4 which perhaps justifies a looser use, so that, according to her, it is the "act of perception" (*darśana*) (see her p. 454) which would be the *adhipatipratyaya*: *yasmin sati yad bhavati tat tasyādhipateyam iti*. "That, which being existent, something else comes into existence is the dominant [condition] of that [latter thing]." (Transl. Lang.)

However, if we say that Candrakīrti is speaking about the conscious phenomenon, sight or perception, rather than the eye, then it is not clear that the verse has much connection with what Candrakīrti is trying to prove. The opponent's point was

essentially a *kāryahetu*: the eyes exist because the consciousness which is their effect exists. Candrakīrti's conclusion is that "since the consciousness is thus [in reality] impossible, then the idea that the eyes and other [sense organs] exist because [consciousness] exists is incorrect (§57)." What he in fact wants to show is that consciousness cannot exist because it cannot stand in any possible temporal relationship with the sense organs. Cf. also §58, where the opponent refers to k. 312 and concedes that the *eye* is not the instrument for consciousness, thus clearly showing that the instrument referred to in the so-called "third case" mentioned in the *kārikā* is *not* sight *qua* conscious phenomenon, but rather the eye.

Lang is, however, not alone in taking the *kārikā*'s use of *darśana* as meaning perception: rGyal tshab's topical outline §1.1.2.1.1.2.2. reads *rnam šes byed pa po yin pa dgag pa* ("Refuting that consciousness is an agent"), indicating that he took k. 312 as speaking about the conscious phenomenon, and not the eyes. He then gives *mig byed pa po yin pa dgag pa* ("Refuting that the eye is an agent") as a heading starting with §58 and introducing a new hypothesis which will be treated in the subsequent verses (k. 313 et seq.) on the organs' movement or non-movement. This seems an improbable interpretation. There can be little doubt that it clashes with §58's obvious reference to k. 312, for §58 is the opponent's attempt to say he avoids the problems in k. 312 because the *eye* is an agent, not an instrument. If the opponent were really changing subjects from consciousness to the eye (as rGyal tshab would have it), this parry of the "third case" would be incoherent.

The *adhipatipratyaya* is routinely taken as being one of four conditions (*catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ*), i.e. the [general] causal condition (*hetupratyaya*), the objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), the immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*) and the dominant condition; (*adhipatipratyaya*); see BHSD p. 13, Pr. 76.5 et seq., AK ii LVP pp. 299-313. The *adhipatipratyaya* ≡ the "effective cause" (*kāraṇahetu*); see AK ii k. 62d, LVP p. 307. Thus, for example, in the case of the production of a sprout, it is the seed (AK ii LVP pp. 247-248). In the case of a sense consciousness, however, the dominant condition is usually taken to be the sense organ, but even the objects are included so that we end up with the ten *āyatana* being dominant. See AKBh ad AK ii k. 56c (LVP p. 288): *tadyathā pañcasu vijñānakāyeṣu daśānām āyatānām ... ādhipatyam*. The Tibetan scholastic manuals such as the *Blo rigs kyi sdom tshig* of A kya Yoñs 'dzin dByaṅs can dga' ba'i blo gros (18th C) stress that the sense organs and *manas* are the dominant conditions for sense consciousnesses, but do not seem to mention the objects under this particular rubric. See A kya Yoñs 'dzin op. cit. p. 524: *thun moñ thun moñ ma yin pa'i // bdag rkyen gñis yod dañ po ni // de yi bdag rkyen yid dañ ni // gñis pa mig dbañ lta bu'o //*. "There are two dominant conditions: the common and the exclusive. The first is the *manas* which is that [consciousness'] dominant condition. The second is [the sense organ] such as the eye organ."

The inescapable impression is that Candrakīrti's interpretation of k.312 in terms of *adhipatipratyaya* is less elegant than that of Dharmapāla. In order to make sense of Āryadeva's thought he seems to be forced to appeal to an ambiguity in the term *lta ba* = *darśana*, viz. "vision" or "sight" vs. "the eye organ"; "the organ of sight".

Cf. May (1959) n. 131, 524 on this ambiguous use of *darśana*. Note that a similar problem for Candrakīrti arises in connection with k. 317, and here *darśana* in CSV clearly has to mean "the faculty of sight", i.e. the eyes. Finally note that Dharmapāla has a rather different interpretation from Candrakīrti, one which does not speak of *adhipatipratyaya* and which takes k. 312 in the context of a refutation of the Sāṃkhya's philosophy of perception. See en. 287.

(398) See en. 292, 294.

(399) Lang (1986) translates: "Alternatively, [if the eye moves without having perceived anything,] it is false to maintain that [the visible form] is necessarily perceptible (*draṣṭavya*).\" But this does not concord with CSV, which glosses k. 314cd as *athādr̥ṣtvā gacchati tadā didṛkṣitaviśayadarśanaṃ niyamena na prāpnoti*.

(400) Tib. "...the eye would have absolutely no need to go, i.e. to move."

(401) AK i k. 43cd: *cakṣuḥśrotramano 'prāptaviśayaṃ trayam anyathā* //. The verse in AK specifies that the eye, ear and mind operate without any contact with their objects, while the other three senses do contact their objects. Candrakīrti's comment in §64, which explains the AK passage as being only a negation (*pratiśedha*) of "operation by contact", seems to neglect, somewhat disingenuously, the last part (*trayam anyathā*) of the verse, which clearly is an affirmation. See AKBh ad k. 43 (LVP pp. 87-93) for the Abhidharmic arguments on these points.

(402) This sentence does not figure in Skt., but is translated on the basis of Tib. It is nonetheless necessary for the reasoning in the passage, especially if the following sentence *gatau hi satyām*, etc. is to have any connection.

(403) Lang (1986): "[You claim that] the own-nature of all things must first be seen in the things themselves. [We reply:] ..." There is, as far as I can see, no textual justification in CSV for taking the first half of the verse as being specifically a *pūrvapakṣa*. It seems to represent a generally accepted view of how things behave in the world. Āryadeva and Candrakīrti, in typical Mādhyamika fashion, provisionally accept this worldly truth, and then show that it leads to absurdities.

(404) See *Bāi lùn* T. 1569 xiā 176a15-21; Tucci (1929) p. 52. Cf. MMK III, 2: *svam ātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati / na paśyati yad ātmānaṃ kathaṃ draṣyati tat parān* //. Transl. May (1959) p. 79. CS k. 316 is quoted in PP; see D. 78b3.

(405) *campaka*. See *Hobson-Jobson* s.v. *Chumpuk*: "a highly ornamental and sacred tree, a kind of magnolia, whose odorous yellow blossoms are much prized by the Hindus, offered at shrines, and rubbed on the body at marriages."

(406) Lang (Thesis) p. 469, n. 28 cites *Majjhima* I, p. 111: *cakkhuñ ca pañic-ca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvijñānam*. "The eye-consciousness arises in dependence upon the eye and form." Cf. Pr. 6.3; Stcherbatsky (1923) p. 55; the canonical references cited in LVP's n. 5 to Pr. 6.3; MMK III, 7. See also *Traité* II, p. 747, n. 1 for Skt. sūtra reference (= *Samyutta* II, p. 72): *cakṣuḥ prañīya rūpāṇi cotpadyate cakṣurvijñānam, trayāṇaṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ, saḥajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā*. "The eye consciousness arises in dependence upon the eye and the forms. The coming together of the three is contact; feelings, notions and attention are produced together with [the consciousness]." Cf. k. 323 below.

(407) Here too "sight" has to be taken as meaning "the organ of sight", i.e. the eyes. See en. 397. Cf. the Chinese which clearly speaks of "the eyes". See also §68, 70 and en. 409.

(408) See en. 236, 264.

(409) Cf. Tib: "Nor does consciousness have eyes (*mig*) either". This would tend to corroborate my point that *darśana* in this context in CSV has to be taken as "the organ of sight", "the eyes". See en. 397, 407.

(410) Translated on the basis of the Tibetan. The argument is not very clear in the Skt.: "For consciousness cognizes but does not see. If, however, consciousness saw, then it would also have the sight of form*, as the consciousness would really exist." *Or perhaps, "sight and form".

(411) Cf. Tib: "Nor does it have [the organ of] sight, for it has as its nature something which is not [the faculty of] sight."

(412) Some remarks on Candrakīrti's possible adversary. In the Vaiśeṣika conception of *prāpyakāritvavāda*, sounds can be produced from sounds — they travel by means of a series, like waves in water, one engendering the other until the ear organ is reached. Cf. VS 2.2.36: *saṃyogād vibhāgāc ca śabdāc ca śabdaniṣpatteḥ*. "For sound is produced from conjunction, disjunction and from [another] sound." *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* p. 288.4-6: *...śabdāc ca saṃyogavibhāgaṇiṣpannād vīcīśantānavac chabdasantāna ity evaṃ santānena śrotrapradeśam āgatasya grahaṇam*.

(413) Lang (1986) translates: "how can any confidence be placed in it?" But the Tibetan takes *pratyaṃ* as *śes pa*, so this translation seems unlikely.

(414) Candrakīrti's commentary to k. 319 and his introduction to k. 320 make it clear that he understands the verse as discussing the beginning moments of the sound and not the "origin" or "speaker". He argues, in effect, that this "beginning" is a sound, an insistence which would obviously be absurd if he were, like Dharmapāla, construing

k. 319 as talking about the "origin" of sound, i.e. the speaker. Cf. also Tib. *ādi* = *dan po* ("first"; "beginning").

(415) Lang (1986) translates *kevala* as "whole": "If the sound does not come as a whole, why is it apprehended as a whole?" This is fairly improbable as a translation of *kevala*, which Tib. *rkyan par / reñ bu* clearly takes in the sense of "alone". What is more it runs counter to CSV's interpretation which speaks of the impossibility of sound being alone in that it must be accompanied by other *dravya*. Interesting enough, though, the Chinese of CS does have *quán* 全 ("whole"; "totality"), but Dharmapāla's understanding of the verse is completely different from that of Candrakīrti and it is perilous to mix the two perspectives here.

(416) Tib: "Thus it would not be apprehended by any sense organ at all." The idea of the argument seems to be that sound *A* which begins at time t_0 is heard when the sound reaches the ear at t_1, t_2, t_3 , which are times later than t_0 . What one hears is thus sound at t_1 , etc., but never the sound which existed at t_0 . The assumption is that if one hears *x* at some time *t*, *x* must exist at *t* and not at some time before. Cf. rGyal p. 12, 1-2: *gal te rna ba'i dbaṅ po dan phrad de sgra 'dzin na phrad pa'i sha rol gyi sgra yi dan po gaṅ gis 'dzin...* "If one apprehended sound when it came into contact with the ear organ, then what would apprehend the sound's beginning, which is before the contact?"

(417) An allusion to the "atoms which are aggregates", or the molecules (*saṃghātaparamāṇu*), spoken about in texts such as AK ii k. 22, LVP pp. 144-149. A molecule, as opposed to the atom properly speaking (i.e. the *dravyaparamāṇu*), is supposed to be composed of at least eight substances (*dravya*): the four elements and the four *bhautikas*, viz. (visual) form, smell, taste and tactile sensations. However, in case it also has sound, then there is a ninth substance.

(418) Cf. transl. in Python (1973) p. 125; May (1959) p. 87.

(419) Translated according to the Sanskrit in Vaidya's ed. of the *Lalitavistara* and the Tibetan version found in M. av. *bhāṣya*. Cf. LVP's transl. p. 314. It is unclear to me as to what sort of instrument a *tuna* is. BHSD and Kern (see LVP p. 314 n. 5) hypothesize that it is some sort of drum, but the Tibetan has *gliñ bu* = "flute".

(420) *dvāra*: lit. "doors".

(421) Cf. Red mda' ba p. 169: *de'i tshe yul mtha' yas pas don rtogs pa yañ mthar thug pa med pa'i* phyir 'ldog par mi 'gyur la* /. "Then, because there is an infinite number of objects, the cognition of entities would also be without end, and hence [the movement of the mind] would not stop." *Text reads *med pas*; cf. Tib. of CSV, *med pa'i phyir*.

(422) Literally, "there is no establishment of their own essences". Following Tib. *rañ gi ño bos grub pa*, however, we would have to take the compound *svarūpasiddhi* as meaning "establishment by their own essences" rather than "establishment / proof of their essence." While this Tibetan reading is a possible interpretation, it seems to fit less well with the rest of the passage.

(423) Adding "of this notion" can be justified on the basis of the Tib.: *bstan pa de'i tshe de nams kyi sgo nas 'du ses de rañ gi ño bos grub par ga la 'gyur*.

(424) While it might at first sight seem that *yo ...sa* in k. 322 were correlated, this is not borne out by Candrakīrti's commentary, nor would it make much philosophical sense, because the *artha* would then have to be the aggregate of notions. Cf. the Chinese version of k. 322.

(425) See en. 428 for the Epistemologist's and Mādhyamika's use of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*). It should be remarked, however, that there is one significant difference here from the Dharmakīrtian view. Whereas Dharmakīrti had maintained that the object of mental perception and that of sensory perception are qualitatively identical but must exist at different moments, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti say that it is the very same object which is subsequently apprehended by *manas* (*sa eva paścān manasā ghyate*).

(426) One might very well translate *avidyamānasvarūpe 'pi pūrvagrhīte 'rthe* as "with regard to the object which had been apprehended earlier, but whose own nature does not exist either", instead of as a locative absolute. Although the locative absolute seems the more plausible interpretation of the Skt., it does not concord with the Tib. *de bžin du smig rgyu la bya ba ltar yod pa ma yin pa'i rañ bžin can gyi dños po buzuñ zin pa la yañ gañ nam par rtog pa can gyi nam par ses pa skye ba de ni chos thams cad nam par 'jog pa'i rgyu yin no*. If we translated in keeping with the Tibetan translator's interpretation of the Skt. text, we would have something like, "In this same fashion, the cause for the [different] determinations of all dharmas is the conceptual consciousness which arises with regard to an object which had been apprehended earlier, but whose own nature does not exist, like a mirage."

(427) Tib. translates *°saṃprayoga* as *dañ mtshuñs par ldan pa* ("having similarity"). What is at stake is the *saṃprayuktakahetu*, ("associated cause"; Tib. *mtshuñs ldan gyi rgyu*) which is included in the *Vaiśiṣṭikas'* sixfold classification of causes (*ṣaṣṭvidho hetuḥ*). See LVP (1913) pp. 54-55. Minds (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) must have a fivefold set of similarities (*samatā*): *a*) basis (*āśraya*), i.e. they depend upon the same sense organs; *b*) object (*ālambana*), i.e. they apprehend the same object; *3*) aspect (*ākāra*), i.e. they both adopt the likeness of their object [AKBh ad ii k. 34, Pradhan ed. p. 62.6: *sākārās tasyaivāmbanasya prakāraśa ākaraṇāt*]; *d*) time (*kāla*), i.e. they are simultaneous; *e*) substances (*dravya*), i.e. they have the same substantial

cause or substratum (*upādāna*). Cf. AK ii, k. 34bcd, LVP pp. 177-179: ...*cittacaitasāh / sāsrayālabanākārāḥ saṃprayuktāś ca pañcadhā* // AKBh ad k.34: *pañcabhiḥ samatāprakāir āśrayālabanākārakāladravayasamatābhiḥ*. Any mind (*citta*), conceptual or not, must have at least ten mental factors (*caitta*) associated with it (cf. AK. ii, k. 24, LVP pp. 153-155), one of which is the notion (*saṃjñā*). Candrakīrti's point about the *vikalpakaṃ vijñānam* being termed "*saṃjñā*", then, is that while the conceptual consciousness is not strictly speaking the notion and is not actually the "aggregate of notions" in the traditional classification of five *skandhas*, it is so intimately associated with the notion that it is termed "*saṃjñā*". For the five aggregates (*skandha*), see e.g. Stcherbatsky (1923) pp. 6-7; Takakusu (1947) p. 72.

(428) K. 322 and CSV are interpreted by Tibetans as showing that Āryadeva and Candrakīrti postulated a conceptual mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), a claim which is plausible. Let us look briefly at the details as presented in the *Tshig gsal ston thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bśad* of 'Jam dbyaṅs bśad pa Ṅag dbaṅ brtson 'grus (1648-1722), his work on the Prāsaṅgika use of *pramāṇas*. The point is also briefly explained in a section of Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's (1469-1546) textbook (*yig cha*) on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, the *dBu ma'i spyi don*, f. 147b, which I have translated as an appendix to an article, "Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamikas on *mānasapratyakṣa*", i.e. Tillemans (1989b).

First of all, for the notion of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) in the Epistemological school, see Stcherbatsky (1930) vol. II, appendix III; Mookerjee (1935) chapter XIX, pp. 311-314. Mookerjee summarizes Dharmakīrti's basic view; Stcherbatsky translated a number of passages, among them one from 'Jam dbyaṅs bśad pa's *Blo rigs* which describes and criticizes the Sa skya pa's description of the three Indian traditions on the matter, viz. those attributed to Prajñākaragupta, Saṃkarānanda and Dharmottara. See also: Nagatomi (1980); Kajiyama (1966) pp. 45-47 for Mokṣākara-gupta's account in his *Tarkabhāṣā*.

The basic idea for the Epistemologists is that there is a type of perception which has the mind as its dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*), which is free of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) and which perceives an object which had initially been perceived by a sense perception. In fact, the explanation is somewhat more complicated if we take the Dharmakīrtian position. Dharmakīrti maintained that the object of mental perception was qualitatively identical to that of sense perception, but that the two sorts of perceptions apprehended objects which existed at different moments. The point in saying the object of mental perception was a facsimile, but not identical with that of sensory perception, was to avoid Kumāra's charge that if the mental perception apprehended the exact same object as the sensory perception, the former would be redundant and would not give any new experience. See NB I, 9: *svaviśayānantaraviśayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janītam tan manovijñānam*. "*Manovijñāna* is that which is produced by the immediately preceding condition, i.e. the sense cognition, which is coactive with the object which immediately follows [the sense cognition's] own object."

Why there must be such a mental perception is a thorny point. Jñānagarbha seems to have considered it to be a necessary intermediate stage between sense perception and conceptualization, but Dharmottara and his followers felt that there really was no argument which could be given except an appeal to the scripture which stated: "O monks, form is apprehended by two [sorts of cognition], i.e. by the visual consciousness and by the mind (*manas*) which is induced by this [visual consciousness]." *dvābhyāṃ bhikṣavo rūpaṃ ghyate cakṣurvijñānena tadākṣṛṇa ca manasā*. Quoted in Durveka Miśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa* ad *Nyāyabindu* I, 9 (ed. Malvania 62, 21). Dharmottara went so far as to say in his *ṭīkā* to NB I, 9 that there is absolutely no means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) which proves its existence. *etac ca siddhāntaprasiddhaṃ mānasaṃ pratyakṣam / na tv asya prasādhakam asti pramāṇam /*. "This mental perception is recognized by [our] philosophical system, but there is no *pramāṇa* which proves it." In short, for many non-Prāsaṅgika schools, *mānasapratyakṣa* was postulated because it was mentioned in the scriptures, but it had little or no philosophical import. dGe lugs pa Epistemologists, such as dGe 'dun grub pa (1391-1474) in his *Tshad ma rigs pa'i rgyan*, accept Dharmottara's characterization but assimilate the problem to an "inference based on [scriptural] authority" (*vid ches pa'i rjes dpag*). See his p. 63 of *Rigs rgyan*. This is also implicitly the line of defense found in Mokṣākaragupta.

Candrakīrti's revised definition of *pratyakṣa* (see en. 374) is used as a key step in reinterpreting this theory of mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) to Madhyamaka purposes, for it allows one to postulate perceptions which are also conceptual. For the other schools, mental perception, like all direct perceptions, was free of conceptualization, but Candrakīrti relied on CS k. 322 to postulate a type of *conceptual* mental perception. It would always be associated with sense perceptions and would be responsible for the genesis of the notions (*saṃjñā*) by means of which we impose natures on objects; because it is conceptual, one can claim that these notions are mind-invented and do not correspond to anything in the object.

Here then is 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa's Prāsaṅgika definition of perception. Folio 581: *mñon sum tshad ma'i mtshan ñid yod de / rañ gi rten rtags yañ dag la dños su ma brten par rañ gi 'dzin stañs kyi yul gyi gžal bya mñon sum pa la mi slu ba'i šes pa de de yin pa'i phyir /*.

"A consciousness which, without directly relying on a valid reason as its basis, doe not belie with regard to the perceptible (*mñon sum pa*) discriminable object apprehended by it."

After having given a definition of mental perception which omitted mention of *kalpanāpodha* (= *rtog bral*) and which simply specified that such a perception must have *manas* as its dominant condition, he says that this is the defining characteristic because:

"While this much [i.e. the dependence on *manas*] is common to all philosophical systems (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*), here the fact that most mental perceptions in sentient beings' [mind]-streams are pervaded by being conceptual

cognitions is a Prāsaṅgika position which is not common to the Svātantrikas and on down. According to these [Prāsaṅgikas], amongst mental perceptions there are many conceptualizations, such as where one thinks [something is] "such and such" [a thing], and thus one definitely has to give up the [specification] "free from conceptualization" in the defining characteristic of perceptions which are *pramāṇas*. Thus, the reason for negating [*kalpanāpoḍha*] is of such a sort."

Text on f. 586: ...*yid kyi mñon sum tshad ma'i mtshan ñid yin te / de tsam grub mtha' kun mtshuñs kyañ 'dir ni sems can rgyud kyi yid mñon phal cher la žen rig gis khyab pa ni rañ rgyud pa man chad dañ thun moñ ma yin pa'i thal 'gyur ba'i lugs yin no // 'di pas yid mñon la 'di'o sñam pa lta bu'i rtog pa mañ bas mñon sum tshad ma'i mtshan ñid du rtog bral ñes par 'dor dgos pas bkag pa'i rgyu mtshan de ltar yin pa'i phyir.*

For 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa this type of *mānasapratyakṣa*, which would be responsible for our thinking that something is "such and such" (*'di'o sñam pa*), is already to be found in Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī* 4,53. (In fact it is especially Ajitamitra's commentary which is important here for 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa.) But what is significant for us is that 'Jam dbyaṅs bžad pa leans heavily on CS and CSV and cites CSV ad k. 322 in this connection. The interpretation is plausible, for what is especially noteworthy is that Candrakīrti's commentary, in speaking of *vikalpakaṃ vijñānam*, lends credence to the Tibetan's idea that the Prāsaṅgikas were speaking about a *conceptual* mental perception in these contexts. In short, the rather complicated mechanism of mental perception apprehending a previous, and now inexistent, point-instant of the object is being used to reinforce the Mādhyamika's position that the object itself has no nature; indeed by the time it is apprehended as being something or another, the object itself has ceased to exist. See Tillemans (1989b) on these subjects.

(429) See en. 406.

(430) An action must have a basis (*āśraya*), or subject to which that action occurs. However, in the case of the action of production, that which is undergoing the action does not yet exist, and so cannot serve as the basis. In general terms, production of *X* is impossible because *X* does not yet exist at the time of its production. See en. 324 for references in MMK, MMV, etc. Cf. Dharmapāla's commentary, 227b26-27: "[For,] at the time of the effect, there is no cause: so the effect is the effect of what? At the time of the cause, there is no effect: so the cause is the cause of what?"

(431) Tib. adds "a cavalry corps". In fact, Indian armies would classically have four corps: the "cavalry corps (*rta'i tshogs* = *aśvakāya*)" should thus be included. See Mvyut 3638-3641; *Inde Classique* §1596.

(432) Cf. *Samyutta* iii, 142. For the cliché *asato, rktato* (= *riktato*), *tucchato* ... *anātmato*, cf. *Śālistambasūtra*, ed. LVP pp. 89-90, quoted in Pr. 593; May (1959), p. 296.

See also *Traité* II, p. 641 and n. 1 for canonical references from *Majjhima* and *Aṅguttara*. AKBh viii ad k. 4cd applies the same images to the *saṃjñā*; see LVP p. 144 and n. 2. Contemplating that everything is impermanent, painful, void, selfless, like a sickness, an abscess, a splinter and an impurity constitutes the eight sorts of contemplation (*anupaśyanā*) (see *Traité* p. 641); the first four are the aspects (*ākāra*) of the truth of suffering.

(433) *vicāryamānasya*, although a passive, is to be taken in an active sense. See Renou (1975) §342, p. 464 n.: "A basse époque, on rencontre des passifs avec valeur active-transitive,...notamment en bouddh[ique]."

(434) *na bheṣyati* = Tib 'byuñ mi 'gyur. *bheṣyati* is a Hybrid Sanskrit future for *bhaviṣyati*, the stem *bhe* being used for *bhavi*. See Edgerton (1953) p. 224 column 1.

(435) Lang translates *indriyānāṃ gatau* as "in the movement of the sense faculties". This, however, does not fit the context (which is no longer discussing movement), nor does it concord with Tib., viz. *dbañ rtoḡs*.

(436) See en. 386.

(436a) See en. 210.

(437) Cf. *Ratnāvalī* 1,36; *Śūnyatāsaptati*, verse 66; *Yuktiṣaṅkā*, verse 28. See *Traité* I chapter XI on the ten examples used to illustrate the illusory nature of dharmas.

(438) Translated on the basis of the Sanskrit. The Tibetan would give: "Just as magically created women which come forth by means of trances are causes for passions in the desirous, as are really existent women, [and just as] there does not exist any nature to the 'sages' magically created due to the power of sages'* [own] magic trances, but the [magical creations] which lack the nature of real sages can vanquish the mental darkness of all beings, as can real sages, and can be causes for sentient beings' paths to higher states and salvation;" *I read *thub pa rnams kyi* instead of *thub pa rnams kyi*s, which is incomprehensible for me. Cf. Kaḥ thog p. 449: *de bžin du thub pa'i tiñ nie 'dzin las sprul pa'i thub pa rnams rañ gi ño bos med kyañ ...* Note that here I translated on the basis of the actual Tibetan text, rather than B's restitution of the Tibetan into Sanskrit.

(439) *ātmabhāva* means simply "the body". Cf. BHSD. Note that Tibetan translators sometimes translates the term as *bdag gi dños po* and sometimes as merely *lus*. See May (1959) n. 1017. Candrakīrti adopts the formula "associated with sleep" (*middhasaṃprayukta*) no doubt in keeping with the Abhidharma's theory of *citta* and *caitta* being associated. See en. 427. *middha* is a mental factor (*caitta*).

(440) *Ratnāvalī* 4, 57. Cf. transl. in Tucci (1936) p. 429 and Hopkins (1975) p. 70.

(441) Translation unsure. This passage is clearly destined to support the second simile, viz. magical beings (*nirmāṇa*) which, although unreal, aid people in their practice of the Dharma. The passage, which refers to the *Ratnakūṣasūtra*, seems to allude to the story of the two magically created monks in the *Kāśyapaparivarta* §§138-149 (ed. Staël-Holstein) of the *Ratnakūṭa*. Cf. in particular *Kāśyapaparivarta* §141.

(442) Cf. transl. May (1959) p. 142 and 258.

IMPRESSUM

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